Perceptions of the Israel – Palestine conflict:: frames among the public, political stakeholders and media in Palestine and Israel by Kukali, Elias
PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISRAEL – PALESTINE CONFLICT:
FRAMES AMONG THE PUBLIC, POLITICAL STAKEHOLDERS AND
MEDIA IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL
D I S S E R T A T I O N
Zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie an der
Philosophischen Fakultät
der
Technischen Universität Dresden
Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft
Vorgelegt von
Elias KUKALI
geb. am 21.08.1987 in Bethlehem, Palästina
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ABSTRACT
This study is an attempt to comprehend how Palestinians and Israelis perceive the
conflict and the peace process. It identifies the channels and dynamics related to the
shaping of their perceptions on the individual, community, and political levels. The
main objectives of this study are to probe the degree of homogeneity between these
levels for both Palestinians and Israelis as well as the degree of discord between
them on the same levels and to pinpoint intervening factors that contribute to carv-
ing out the ultimate perceptions that individuals hold. Unlike previous work, this
study employs a multi-method approach to measure and benchmark of the topic at
hand. To bridge further gaps, a developed matrix extends the analyses on temporal-
spatial dimensions of individuals’ cognitions, affections, and behaviors pertaining
to the conflict. This study falls within the descriptive research that seeks probing
the effect of macro-level factors (the media, and political parties/leaders) on micro-
level ones (the audience cognitive processing), and is involved in describing and
identifying its elements and components through the collection and analysis of data.
Interpretation of data is based on a combination of content analysis for eight major
newspapers, two public opinion surveys and a document analysis affiliated to the
main four political parties.
The analysis of the Palestinians and Israelis’ perspective of the conflict and the
peace process revealed that the actual conflict has three main dimensions: First,
the struggle between individuals, which is full of self-contradictions, as each party
describes a conflict in a way different than the other. It is a conflict, in which the past
and present of the two sides of the conflict are different - the bitter past itself with
different narratives, yet the motives are the same but conducive to different results.
Whereas each party is blaming the other on these three levels, the conflict is rooted
in different forms, but intertwined with one another. Both nations differ entirely in
prioritizing the core issues of the conflict. For example, the study reveals that for
Palestinians the issue of Jerusalem ranks first, followed by the issue of releasing
of prisoners. The issue of the refugees ranks third, and paradoxically recognizing
Israel as a Jewish state ranks last according to Palestinians. As for the Israelis, the
issue of security and safety ranks first, the recognition of the Jewishness of their
state ranks second, followed by the issue of Jerusalem that comes in the third place,
whereas and at loggerheads with the Palestinians’ aspirations, the establishing of
a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders ranks last on their part. The same applies
to the proposed solutions of the conflict. The future is fuzzy, and everyone sees the
most appropriate solutions that fit their own interest, as a part of the zero-sum game.
Both peoples yearn for peace, and both peoples are tired and bored of the conflict,
but the majority in both sides, however, are not willing to make concessions towards
this end and consequently are not optimistic in reaching peace in the near future.
Furthermore, each party does not view the political leadership of the other party
as a partner for peace. Secondly, a media conflict, where the analysis illustrates a
similarity in the issues raised in the Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, but there
were distinct statistical differences in the extent of coverage and in the display of
those issues and their interpretation between the Israeli and Palestinian media, the
matter which is clearly reflects on the individuals’ view on the causes of the conflict,
its consequences and solutions. Regarding the third level of the conflict i.e. the
conflict between political leaders and parties, a strong statistical relationship has
been established between political affiliation to a particular party and the perspective
of both, the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, on the most significant issues of the
conflict. This is reflected in the homogeneity degree of the priorities of the parties
and political leaders in the analysis of documents and media, in the analysis of
the content with the order of priorities in the Palestinian and Israeli mindset. The
statistical results have particularly shown a strong reciprocal correlation between the
angles of this triangle. The relationship boosts wrong inherited notions and beliefs,
which necessitates their eradication and adoption of new strategies on the part of
political stakeholders. In that case, the media will publish them in a positive way
that serves the peace process and bring the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to an end.
Finally, on the basis of the results and conclusions of this dissertation a model was
developed that illustrated how these interactions frame realities into new realities
that let the peace process sink even more day by day.
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‘Peace does not lie in charters and covenants alone. It lies in the hearts
and minds of the people’.
– John F. Kennedy (1917 - 1963)
1.1 Preface
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most bitter, deeply rooted and protracted
conflicts of our century (Kelman, 2005, p. 640; Maoz et al., 2007, p. 81; Shlaim,
2005a, p. 241; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24). It has been so deep-seated that even wars
and peace treaties have been unable to bring about an end to it. It is considered
one of the major intractable conflicts of our time that according to Coleman (2003)
has resisted even the most serious attempts towards a resolution. The fact that both
nations have historically claimed the possession of the entire land of Greater Israel
or Historic Palestine, and the consecutive failure to find a satisfactory solution for
both parties has congealed the peace process (Hassassian & Kaufman, 1999a, p. 3;
Maoz & Eidelson, 2007a, p. 1476; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24).
What makes the resolution of the conflict even more difficult is the lack of agree-
ment between official representatives of each side in the negotiations for making
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concessions to the other side. A possible lack of public support on each side for so-
lutions that involve such compromises undermines the abilities of policymakers to
negotiate and consequently, implement mutually acceptable and compromised so-
lutions to the conflict (Maoz & McCauley, 2005, p. 792; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007a,
p. 1478). Not only the political, historic, or economic issues of the conflict impede
the achievement of a peaceful solution, but the psychological factors as well, which
enfolded “years of hostility, clashes, and wars that have significantly affected the
states of mind of both the Palestinians and Israelis” (Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24).
The influence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has extended to the outer world,
shaping its economy, relationships between various states and powers, and became
a reason behind the emergence of several terrorist organizations (Fan & Weimann,
2003, p. 3). As an active conflict, it is considered a central issue and threat first to
the Middle East, because it is the prism through which most Arabs view the world,
and secondly to the international community, because of superpowers’ involvement
(Telhami, 2008, p. 6; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 24). Therefore, in contrast to other conflicts,
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterized by high intensity attempts to diplo-
matic negotiations (Zussman et al., 2006, p. 85; Hassassian & Kaufman, 1999a,
p. 3).
Not surprisingly, the long duration of the conflict made it most intensely re-
searched topic of our time, and much has been written about it (Irwin, 2009, p. 1;
Chang, 2008, p. 1; Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 7). It is a conflict where religion expresses
prominent primordial values. However, the points of contention and dominant dis-
course continue to be territorially centered. In other words, a more nationalist or
statist than religious and theocratic one (Frisch & Sandler, 2004, p. 78). Dowty
(2001, p. 2) once noted that it is a clash between two people over the same land,
echoed by David Ben-Gurion(1) statement: ‘We and they want the same thing.
We both want Palestine’. According to Maoz and Eidelson (2007a, p. 1476), the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict evolves over three broad dimensions; (1) territorial dis-
agreements, (2) values-and identity-based disputes; “that are based in people’s psy-
chology, culture, fundamental values, shared history, and beliefs”, and (3) the on-
going threats to security on both sides.
The nature of the conflict suggests many aspects that according to Donway
(1997, p. 589) have national, ethnic, and religious dimensions. Avnery (2010, p. 22)
stated that the conflict “is becoming less and less an Israeli-Palestinian confronta-
tion, and more of a Jewish-Arab one”(2). Aziz (2007, p. 2) however, believes that
the struggle is between Jewish nationalism and Palestinian nationalism.
‘We will argue that the dispute over land and borders lies at the heart of the
(1)Founder of the State of Israel and its first Prime Minister.
(2)See also: Avnery, 2004.
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, with these words Newman and Yacobi (2004, p. 2) de-
scribed the conflict. Both parties are motivated by an aspiration to maximize their
interests, and unfortunately pro-peace factions and political movements in both ter-
ritories are rather weak (Donway, 1997, p. 589). The equation is as simple as com-
plicated as it can get, if memories of shady past continue to flourish in Palestinian
and Israeli minds, so will the cycle of revenge (Chao, 2011, p. 23). Most Palestinians
and Israelis are being fed with hatred from the very beginning of their lives, through
family and friends, education, political leaders and parties, propaganda, and media.
All these and more serve to strengthen misunderstandings and create intolerance
between Israelis and Palestinians.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
One of the main reasons for being unable to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
is the misdiagnosing of the conflict as only a dispute over materialistic resources,
and not addressing the real underlying causes loaded in the minds of both the Pales-
tinians and Israelis. In this context, the first step towards getting closer to achieving
an effective solution is through correctly identifying the conflict as an identity one
that lies in the cognitive process of people’s minds. It is a grave mistake for an indi-
vidual to think his/her opinion does not matter because every person’s opinion plays
a significant role and can contribute to the process of change. Individuals are only
as powerful as their knowledge, because, without sound knowledge, they might not
think correctly. A group of individuals is very influential because together they will
have an enormous impact on any future solution and reconciliation.
Overcoming psychological barriers and progressing towards a solution must be
sought by a scientific probing of the trends of the public on both sides. This will
help stakeholders on both sides to pinpoint major obstacles to reaching a just and
last solution to the conflict. Otherwise, a failure to secure a lasting solution to the
Palestine-Israel conflict will inflame and escalate violence and aggravate the situa-
tion. Had concrete steps not been taken to resolve the conflict, its religious compo-
nent will exacerbate at the expense of the political one, which will be detrimental to
the entire region that is already afflicted with a politicized religion.
Although the desire of the two conflicting parties is to conclude peace, each
according to their vision, there is still a set of issues that remain to be addressed. The
recognition of those disputed issues will certainly enhance the chances of achieving
peace. Those issues should be discussed in any future negotiations between the
leaders of both nations. Such negotiations may lead to the narrowing of the gap
between the two sides, and broadening the spectrum of issues to be agreed upon.
Despite the extensive research on this topic, the number of researchers that con-
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sidered, controlled for, or even estimated the role of media and political leaders and
parties in shaping the public perceptions of the conflict is very limited. Many of
which overlooked the historical aspect of the conflict, and the accumulation of ex-
perience and individuals’ quality of life in carving out their ultimate perceptions.
Moreover, the growing recognition of the crucial role of the media can make many
examine to what extent the media can play a constructive role in resolving the con-
flict. Therefore, this study includes content analysis of both the Palestinian and Is-
raeli media in an attempt to measure to what degree the media reflect the opinion
at the grassroots levels on either side. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in attitudes
and perceptions between the political leaders on both sides of the conflict merits
a thorough study. An additional competitive advantage of this study goes beyond
measuring current factors that influence the process of shaping perceptions to intro-
duce a deeper analysis of the past and the future as well. This study is an attempt
to explore and integrate those factors across an individual’s cognition, affection and
behavior.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this study are to investigate the dimensions of the public percep-
tions of the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis and the role of com-
munication processes in the emergence of these perceptions. In particular, the dis-
sertation looked into differences and commonalities in the causes of the conflict, its
layers, and possible solutions. It combined historic review with quantitative meth-
ods. Comparative surveys, document and content analyses were at the center of data
collection. The theoretical foundation of the empirical parts was derived from theo-
ries on the framing of public issues, information processing and persuasion, as well
as public opinion theories.
Mainly, this study described and analyzed the Palestinians and Israelis’ various
points of view, beliefs, opinions, notions and attitudes towards the other, the peace
process and the conflict. The idea is that people’s attitudes towards an object or phe-
nomena influence their actions, interpretations, and notions about it. The research
aim is focused on describing and analyzing the variety and diversity of beliefs, opin-
ions and attitudes on the conflict, and on exploring the motives, causes and effects
of the variety of attitudes and opinions.
The achievement of a genuine peace should start by recognizing the trends and
inclinations of the society in both countries towards a long list of issues, trying
thereby to narrow the points of dispute and to enhance the aspects of proper un-
derstanding. This dissertation achieved its objective among other scientific studies
that might contribute to the laying of the foundations of a genuine and comprehen-
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sive settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict so that all parties can live in peace,
security and economic prosperity.
To summarize, the broad objectives of this dissertation are:
• To investigate perceptions’ gap of the conflict between Palestinians and Is-
raelis.
• To reveal what factors sustain this gap, and the role frames infused by respec-
tive media and political stakeholders play in shaping these perceptions.
1.4 Approach
Quantitative research was used to describe and interpret the objectives of the disser-
tation statistically with numbers. This type of analysis uses several kinds of com-
putational and statistical methods that enabled the exploration of causality, com-
parison, and explanations of phenomena through numeric variables. As mentioned
above, this dissertation used as its core multi-methodology design survey, content
and document analyses data. This combination was used for the purpose of breadth
and depth of understanding and corroboration. Thus, a quantitative research analysis
was applied to determine the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables in Palestine and Israel.
Accordingly, I started with the content analysis for four newspapers in each coun-
try as explained below, and then conducted a representative survey in each country
using a face-to-face survey on a sample of 1015 Palestinians and a representative
web-based survey of 512 Israelis. Finally, I performed a document analysis of press
releases of political parties on both sides.
1.5 Significance of the Study
Undoubtedly, the Palestinian-Israeli public opinion plays a decisive and crucial role
towards a just and lasting solution, which would most probably include long-term
concessions on both sides. When considering a general compromise to settle the
Palestinian–Israeli conflict, considerable weight will be given to the estimates relat-
ing to what may be accepted or refused by both the Palestinian and Israeli publics,
since only the opinions of political leaders, factions and organizations on both sides
are insufficient and indeterminate. Therefore, conducting a mixed-method research
will pave the way for a better understanding of the Palestinian and Israeli pub-
lic opinions as it represents their sound knowledge and opinion that are based on
reality. Moreover, this study is expected to provide figures on public opinion, its
components and directions that in turn may help to make appropriate decisions that
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direct their views and enhance the development of an informed democratic society.
In this case, the evolution of views about negotiations with the other side will have a
predictable component that can be described by the results of a comparative survey
of public opinions.
From a political science perspective, this study specifies the proximity of the re-
sponsiveness between the public and the government, to what extent the public’s
perception goes along with the position of their respective government, and how
responsive the government is to these perceptions. From a historic perspective, it
monitors how public perceptions mobilized, developed, and evolved in light of cer-
tain events - like the 1948 Arab-Israeli war or the first and second uprising of the
conflict. From a social science perspective, it studies public opinion “as a force that
affects the individual’s behavior in the public sphere, as a reflection of our social
nature and the motivation to be socially accepted”. Finally, from a communication
science perspective, this study examines the influence of mass media on public opin-
ion, and how they shape public perceptions of the conflict and the peace process.
(Donsbach & Traugott, 2008, p. 2).
The mass media play a considerable role in shaping up beliefs and attitudes con-
cerning the status of a national or ethnic group towards the other, and that by weav-
ing a set of narratives about the origin of the conflict and the heroic roles of the
national or ethnic group, and the formulation of narratives about the stages of the
conflict that gain a legendary character. On this basis, the national group creates,
particularly in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a set of contradicting nar-
ratives, which include a bunch of key beliefs and constants in dealing with the na-
tional, ethnic, and religious groups that are viewed as perennial foes. Dealing with
the media in an objective, balanced manner is elusive because the range of conflict
encompasses media terminologies.
Understanding each other’s visions through dialogue, research, as well as listen-
ing to experts can have beneficial outcomes towards ending the conflict. It is indeed
the vehicle needed so that they will have a mutual understanding of each other. Al-
lowing both parties to participate in such a dialogue will allow them to further and
better understand each other and will remove the many obstacles that would have
been presented had they not taken the time to learn about one another.
To sum up, this study aims to sound the core final status issues that may be con-
sistent or inconsistent with both, the Palestinian and Israeli public opinions. Despite
the desire of the two disputing peoples regarding concluding a peace agreement be-
tween them, there is still a package of outstanding issues. Also, the realization of
such disputed issues and those that will be, or might be, accepted by both parties
will certainly enhance the chances of reaching peace by casting light on these is-
sues. If we take into due consideration that the task of the leaderships and media
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on both sides must be primary to narrow the differences between the two sides and
expand the range of issues that might be accepted by both parties, peace would have
then a great opportunity. Any attempt to make a long-term prediction and an eval-
uation of the public opinion at that time would only serve as a rough estimate, that
must be dealt with very carefully, as both public opinions could be influenced by a
number of factors and variables, the results of which are precariously predictable.
However, dealing now with the basic issues of the peace process is essential to chart
the way, or at least get signals about the general situation of those issues or solutions
presented at the negotiating table.
1.6 Chapter Organization
Chapter two discussed the process of my empirical framework that started with a
historic review of the conflicts’ origins or causes, consequences, and projected so-
lutions, followed by a summary of extracted conflict-related dimensions that could
end up in the minds of the Palestinian and Israeli public, political leaders, and me-
dia. Therefore, as a first step, I generated a pool of arguments on the conflict based
on a thorough review of historic and political science literature on the issue. Then
I extracted diverse perceptions (or dimensions) about the conflict and the peace
process and employed them as inputs for successive sections and chapters. This
section attempted to simplify historic events and highlight discrepancies. It started
with a brief overview of the historic land of Palestine, followed by descriptions of
early, modern, and current history. Emphatically, it is not only bound to repeat what
history had marked, given that the historic review will be the central mode of inves-
tigation. It traced the history of the conflict between Israel and Palestine from 4000
B.C. to 2014 A.D.
Chapter three started with the variable model of the dissertation, which used
a multi-method approach of content, survey and document analyses, based on a
historic review of the conflict, to answer the research questions. Now, in order to
achieve the goals set by this dissertation a review of media literature and studies
about the considerable impact of media on the individual, community, social groups
and public opinions is presented. It investigated many approaches and theories that
attempted to address the impact, persuasion, mobilization and their scope as well as
how public opinion is formed by daily media. Media theories were established and
hypotheses were determined for testing. Theories of Media effects and connection
with public opinion and political discourse were part and parcel of this process, cou-
pled with previous research with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Mainly,
it focused on framing as a theory of media effect, and the role it plays in charging
emotions, attitudes, and stirring feelings while reaching the level of psychological
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war, brainwash and incitement. It also revealed to what extent media contributed to
the escalation of the conflict and its nurture, and the mobilization against the other.
Other issues discussed in this chapter included information flow by the public, the
relationship between public opinion and the media, the use of conflict-related nar-
ratives and the dehumanization of the other, and concluded with the perceptive of
the Palestinians vis-à-vis the Israeli media and vice versa. Followed by some high-
lights of the most prominent research and projects that have been done about the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and peace process. This chapter includes a matrix that
has been developed based on a thorough review of this literature and previous re-
search, in an attempt to investigate the conflict on an extended temporal-spatial basis
namely, cognitions, affections, and behavior.
Chapter four investigated the explicit rules and methods or instruments on
which this study was based and against which claims of knowledge were evalu-
ated. Survey, content, and document research designs were adopted in this multi-
methodological study. They were chosen because the sampled elements and the
variables that were studied were simply observed as they were without attempting
to control or manipulate them. Data was collected from a sample in each stratum
of analyses to determine the relationship between causes, problem dimensions, and
possible solutions.
Chapter five was divided into five main sections: the first started with a brief
overview of terminologies used in Palestinian and Israeli media, followed by tests
of reliability and validity. These tests, in addition to hypotheses testing accompa-
nied all methods of analysis. This section included the analysis of media data on
both sides; what were the most common topics, the degree of discordance between
Palestinian and Israeli media, the style and direction of coverage, and more. The
second section comprised of hypotheses testing and survey results, on which com-
parisons between Palestinians and Israelis’ perception frames was based. Further
investigations in the third section consisted of a deeper analysis of independent
variables contributing to the formation of audience frames through the summary of
comprehensive multiple regression models on both sides. On the fourth section, I
used validated dimensions of the content analysis and applied them to a document
analysis of political parties’ secretary announcements, public speeches and press
releases, and I compared perception frames in these documents between Palestini-
ans and Israelis. Finally, I integrated all the findings of the analyses and compared
the level of accord between public, media, and political stakeholders’ frames, as
shown in Figure 1.1 below. Chapter six started with the dissertation’s model of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict that introduced a new reading of the status quo on the
basis of the analyses, literature and theories, followed by a summary of findings,
conclusions and recommendations.
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Chapter 2
ELICITATION OF DIMENSIONS
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2.1 Historic Review
‘If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its develop-
ment’.
– Aristotle (384 B.C. - 322 B.C.)
‘Recovering the past is a necessary part of the route to the future’.
– Scham et al. (2013)
In order to understand the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is necessary to go back
to the very bud of the Jewish question that started in the second half of the nine-
teenth century when Moses Mendelssohn along with others initiated the Jew-
ish ‘Haskala’ i.e., enlightenment in Europe which helped them get out of ghet-
tos and think of getting back to the ‘Promised Land’ and form a nation. The
‘Haskala’ formed laid the fertile ground for the official birth of the Zionist move-
ment in the first Zionist Congress that was held August 29-31, 1997 in Basle. Since
then, the Zionist movement worked diligently to realize Jewish statehood in Pales-
tine. Fifty years after the first Zionist conference, specifically November 29, 1947,
the United Nations recognized the influential Jewish presence in Palestine and is-
sued resolution number 181 for the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews.
The establishment of the state of Israel on 78.0% of the Historic Palestine in May
1948 was a turning point and a landmark in this conflict. Since then, the Palestinian
cause has been outstanding and a just and lasting solution is being sought until this
10
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very moment. The literature review in this research study reveals details that pro-
vide a lay person a thorough idea about the roots of the conflict and subsequent
repercussions.
In the last seven decades, dozens of books and articles were published discussing
the evolvement and development of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, political actors,
events, and accords. In addition to a full package of scientific research studies, doc-
uments, and papers devoted to (1) analyzing the core issues of the conflict and at-
tempting to resolve them (Landman, 2002, p. 136), (2) focusing on the psychologi-
cal, social, economic, and political aspects of the conflict, and (3) emphasizing the
influence it exerts on both nations and on the world. Akasaka (2008) pointed out that
the ‘Question of Palestine’ has been the subject of “countless hours of debate, dis-
cussion, and negotiations”. Surprisingly, the enormous amounts of writings failed to
expedite future research, since most of what has been written did not illustrate a bal-
anced and objective representation of reality. Instead, they intended to justify claims
and to neglect others, and “to vilify the enemy and to glorify the own side” (Isseroff,
2009). Nonetheless, the different perceptions that those writings hold are significant
and still account for a large proportion of interpretations to subsequent and future
occurrences on both sides.
2.1.1 A Brief Overview
The historic land of Palestine is located in the Middle East, along the Eastern
Coastline of the Mediterranean Sea. Bordered by Lebanon to the north, Syria to
the northeast, Jordan to the east, Egypt to the southwest and the Mediterranean
Sea to the west (Stobaugh, 2014, p. 31). It lies in the heart of the so-called ‘an-
cient world’ (Pastor, 2012), namely, at the junction of the three continents i.e. Asia,
Africa, and Europe. Its location makes it a land bridge that links Asia with Africa
and the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. This geographic location has histor-
ically given it religious, cultural and economic importance (Badaruddin & Jafar,
2011, p. 26).
The total area of the land is 27,027 km2. It is split into two parts: Palestine and
Israel. For now, Palestine claims approximately less(1) than 21.4% (6,020 km2) of
total area of which 93.9% is in the West Bank and 6.1% in the Gaza Strip, and
Israel claims 78.6% (22,145 km2) of it including the Golan Heights area(2) (1,176
km2) (Chase & Kuhn, 2011, p. 4; Al-Rimmawi, 2003, p. 77; Palestine Trade Center,
2011; Encyclopedia of the Nations, 2009; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010)
The majority of the Palestinians live in the Diaspora. According to the
(1)Because of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
(2)Captured from Syria during the Six-Day War of 1967.
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Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2014), the estimated population of the
Palestinian territories for the year 2014 is 4.55 million people, of which 61.3%
are in the West Bank, and 38.7% are in the Gaza Strip. Israel’s population has been
estimated to a total of 8.30 million people in January 2015 (Jewish states Central
Bureau of Statistics, 2014). This number includes about 341,400 Israeli settlers in
the West Bank, 18,900 in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights (estimations of 2012),
and 196,400 people in East Jerusalem (estimations of 2011) (Israel Demographic
Profile, 2014).
In Palestine, the official language is Arabic, with English being widely spoken.
Hebrew is used particularly among freelancers who have business relations with
Israelis. Hebrew is the official language in Israel, with Arabic being used officially
for Arab minorities, in addition to Russian, and English as the most commonly
used foreign languages (Palestine Trade Center, 2011; Israel Demographic Profile,
2014).
The land of Historic Palestine is considered ‘the cradle of civilizations’ and the
place for the world’s three monotheistic religions; Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
(Al-Rimmawi, 2003, p. 77). For Christians, it is the source of Christianity, where
Jesus Christ was born, lived, spread his teachings, crucified and resurrected. It is
also the place where Muslims believe that Prophet Mohammed ascended to heaven
from the Dome of the Rock. Jews believe that the land of Israel rightfully belongs
to Jewish people, because of God’s promise made to Abraham (Genesis 12: 1-7).
Also, that Jerusalem has been the center of their national life for about 3,000 years
since its conquest by King David. Therefore, the Holy Land has long been a highly
religious destination for Muslim, Christian and Jewish pilgrims from all over the
world. The very concept of the ‘Holy Land’ suggests that religion is implicated in
some way (Kibble, 2003, p. 331).
The percentages of Muslims and Christians in Palestine are 98.8% and 1.2% re-
spectively (estimations of 2010) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014).
In Israel proper, the percentage of Jewish people is 75.1%, Muslims 17.4%, Chris-
tians 2.0%, Druze 1.6% and others 3.9% (estimations of 2012) (Israel Demographic
Profile, 2014).
The illustrious tactical and geographic position of the land at the center of the
globe, and as a bridgehead between three continents i.e. Europe, Asia, and Africa
together made it a strategic place that a lot of tribes, nations and empires battled to
occupy, particularly merchants that came from eastern side heading to the West or
vice versa had to pass through it (Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 4; Map of the World, 2009).
Starting from the Assyrian Empire (721 - 587 B.C.), to the Babylonian Empire (587
- 538 B.C.), the Persian Empire (538 - 333 B.C.), the Hellenistic Empire (333 -
63 B.C.), the Roman Empire (63 B.C. - 328 A.D.), the Byzantine Empire (328 -
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636 A.D.), the Crusaders (1099 - 1291 A.D.), the Mamluks (1291 - 1516 A.D.), the
Ottoman Empire (1516 - 1917 A.D.), and finally, the British Mandate (1917 - 1948
A.D.) after the end of World War I (Wright, 2001, p: 419 - 435; Israel Science and
Technology Homepage, 2010).
2.1.2 Early History
Harry S. Truman (1884 - 1972) once said ‘No two historians ever agree on what
happened, and the damn thing is they both think that they are telling the truth’.
Noticeable differences in citing one own and the other’s connection and belonging
to the Holy Land were revealed in literature. Both parties exclusively deny the other
originality to the land (Neuberger, 1998; Israel Science and Technology Homepage,
2010). For instance, Israeli literature emphasizes the Jews affinity to this land by
explicitly referring to it as ‘The Land of Israel’ or ‘The Promised Land of Israel’ (in
Hebrew, Eretz Yisrael). Moreover, they dub Palestinians as intruders (Reich, 2008).
Palestinian literature on the other side does not mention Israel and keeps insisting
that it is their land that was stripped from them by Israeli intruders and their brutal
occupation.
Reich (2008) wrote about the dispersion of Jews outside Israel after the defeat
of the Kingdom of Israel and Judea. Moreover, how the destruction of the Temple
“provides the base for the tenacity of the Jews to the Land of Israel”. He added,
Judea was once called Palestina (from which the word Palestine, and the Arabic
word Philistines originated). Jews believe that the Roman Empire has decimated the
Jewish community and renamed it to stamp out Jewish identification and connection
to the Land of Israel.
Origins of the Palestinians
‘Palestinians’ is a term given to the tribes that settled on the Palestinian shore -
Cana’an - from the southwest of Gaza to Jaffa in the north. Historians believe that
they originated from different regions in Asia Minor and Greece. The most an-
cient mention of Palestine was described in the texts of Egyptians and Assyrians
as ‘Palastu’ or ‘Pilistu’, which is the same as the Greek terminology ‘Philistia’ that
later became ‘Palastina’ (or Palestine). ‘Palestine’ was mentioned in the Torah as
‘Kvetorin’ and stated that their homeland is on the island of Caphtor correspond-
ing to Kveto in Egyptian sources, which refers to the island of Crete, in nowadays
Greece. One of the first waves of immigration to the land was after the Philistines
were expelled from Egypt by Ramses III in 1194 B.C. Then, they settled and estab-
lished an independent state on the southern coast of Palestine where they eventually
established a coalition of five-city states namely Ashdod, Ashkelon, Gaza, Gat, and
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Akron. The first three cities were right by the sea while the last two cities were a
bit inland. Sarcastically, the only town that is now under Palestinian sovereignty is
Gaza while the other four cities are inside Israel. Then the Philistines controlled
the Cana’anite town of Jerusalem (Zarley, 1990, p. 11; Dabash, 2011, p. 1; Arnaiz-
Villena et al., 2001, p. 900). Lerner (2012) believed that the Philistines immigrated
to the area in the same period of the Jewish migration to the economic opportunities
that such developments brought to the region.
Origins of the Israelis
According to the Bible, Moses led the Israelites (a confederation of Hebrew tribes,
or a portion of them) during the 40-year wander in the Sinai desert out of Egypt,
who under Joshua conquered and defeated most of the Cana’anites in 1125 B.C.,
yet, found the struggle with the Philistines more difficult. King’s David conquered
Jerusalem about 1000 B.C. and controlled most of the cities of Cana’an (Arnaiz-
Villena et al., 2001, p. 900; Isseroff, 2009).
The people of Israel (also called the ‘Jewish People’) trace their origin to Abra-
ham, whose son is Yitshak (Isaac), and grandson is Jacob (Israel). The name ‘Is-
rael’ is derived from the name given to Jacob. Jacob’s 12 sons (Reuben, Shimon,
Levi, Yehuda, Dan, Naphtali, Gad, Asher, Issachar, Zevulun, Yosef, Binyamin) were
the kernels of 12 tribes that later developed into the Jewish nation. One of the
Jews was Yehuda (Judah) from which the word ‘Jewish’ was derived. Therefore,
the names Israel, Israeli or Jewish refer to people of the same family (Quesinberry,
2003, p. 149; Israel Science and Technology Homepage, 2010).
Ironically, and according to the Torah and the Qur’an, both; Arabs and Jews come
from the same father; Abraham. He was a Semitic nomad who followed the caravan
trail westwards from the banks of the Twin Rivers (the Tigris and the Euphrates)
toward the land of Cana’an (Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 42). Abraham believed
that he was being directed by God toward a land of promise. According to Genesis
(17:8): ‘and I will give unto thee’ the Scriptures describe God as saying to Abraham,
and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of
Cana’an, for an everlasting possession’. He sired two sons; Isaac, son of Sarah, and
Ismael, son of an Egyptian slave woman named Hager. Isaac had two sons; Jacob,
who became the root of the Israelis, and Esau. The descendants of Ismael became
known as the Arabs (Ibid., p. 42). Some studies have found that Palestinians and
Jews came from the same origin. Indeed, archeological and genetic data generated
in a research done by Arnaiz-Villena et al. (2001, p. 889) revealed that the origins
of Jews and Palestinians stemmed from ancient Cana’anites, who in ancient ages
mixed extensively with Egyptians, Mesopotamians, and Anatolians. Thus, in their
opinion, the “Palestinian-Jewish rivalry is based on cultural and religious, but not
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on genetic, differences”.
Rise of Zionism
The rise of nationalism and the influence of romanticism, along with the spread of
the ideas of enlightenment and the principle of equality before the law, all helped
force the process of Jewish emancipation in Russia and Europe. The origins of the
new movement began in Russia, and its influence soon extended to Jews in Western
Europe and beyond (Laqueur, 2003, p. 3; Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 2).
Jews were unable to assimilate into European societies and lived in separate com-
munities in Europe given their different religious affiliation, laws and methods of
worship, dresses and customs, and the fact that they were always a minority (Aziz,
2007, p. 3). These and more had magnified their natural differences and gener-
ated widespread antipathy towards Jews and consequently the rise of anti-semitism
throughout non-Jewish populations: in Russia and Europe. For this reason, Jews
viewed a land of their own as a way to resolve the problem of the Jewish Dias-
pora and started to call for a pro-active politicized approach to achieving this goal
(Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 3; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 43 – 44).
Nevertheless, Hamas in their charter described the Jews and the factors that led
to the rise of anti-Jewish feelings as follows:
‘Jews have been scheming for a long time. . . and have accumulated huge and
influential material wealth. With their money, they took control of the world
media. . . With their money, they stirred revolutions in various parts of the
globe. . . They stood behind the French Revolution, the Communist Revolution
and most of the revolutions we hear about. . . With their money, they formed
secret organizations such as the Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, and the Lions
which are spreading around the world, destroying societies and carry out
Zionist interests. . . They stood behind World War I. . . and formed the League
of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World
War II, through which they made huge financial gains. . . There is no war going
on anywhere without them having their fingerprints’ (Hamas, 1988, Art. 22).
The official birth of the Zionist movement as a formal organization or political
movement is dated back to 1897 in the first Zionist Congress in Basle. The congress
was organized by Theodor Herzl; the father of modern Zionism, and the writer
of Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). It was a pamphlet where he proposed mass
emigration of Jews to a land of their own (Aziz, 2007, p. 3). Herzl convened this
congress that “brought the Zionist movement together and created a united Zionist
political platform” (Farrell, 2010, p. 20), and formed the World Zionist Organi-
zation (WZO), where more than 200 representatives from 24 states and territories
15
2.1. HISTORIC REVIEW
attended (Rist, 1994, p. 90). Cohn-Sherbok & El-Alami (2003) noted that Herzl in
a proposal of 65 pages to the Rothschild family has laid the foundations for the
creation of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East.
Zionism; was first coined in early 1890 by Viennese Jewish writer Nathan Birn-
baum as ‘Zionismus’ (derived from Mount Zion; a hill in Jerusalem) for the most
part was a secular movement that composed of classical liberals such as Theodor
Herzl, Chaim Weizmann and socialists like David Ben-Gurion. It was a movement
that always represented religious elements as a secondary matter of a vigorous and
vocal minority (Bein, 1990, p. 284; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 45).
As mentioned above, the establishment of this Zionist organization came as a
response to the long history of persecution, pogroms, Jewish-ghettos and exile. Jews
suffered from anti-semitic acts throughout Europe in a continuum of centuries time
and again, which later was labeled as ‘the Jewish problem’. They were believed to
be a pestilent race and as such must be destroyed. A problem of perennial minority
and pogroms, an issue of a homeless community that for them, the only solution
was by reviving the idea of returning to what they have all along considered their
historic homeland. They believed that it was the historical birthplace of the Jewish
people, and the Jewish life elsewhere was a life of exile (Neuberger, 1998). A belief
that gradually was cherished by various Jews groups who were forced to banish to
foreign lands (Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 2).
The motto of the Zionists is ‘a state for every nation, and the entire nation in one
state’, from which their spirit towards the establishment of a national homeland as
the only solution for Jews’ problems worldwide has started. It is an ideology “that
expresses the yearning of Jews over the world for the historical homeland Zion, the
Land of Israel” (Neuberger, 1998). The central argument of the Zionists is to free
Jews around the world from hostile and oppressive alien rule, and that liberation and
unity should be attained, which cannot be achieved without establishing a Jewish
state in the Land of Israel, with a Jewish majority. This is when the history of the
waves of immigration ‘Aliyah’ (Return to the Promised Land) had proven to them
to be true (Karesh & Hurvitz, 2006, p. 11; Lesch, 2001).
Waves of Immigration - Waves of immigration started at the beginning of the
twentieth century (1882 - 1902) with the immigration of a small band of Zionist
idealists from Russia called ‘Bilu’ who settled in Palestine. Followed by the second
Aliyah financed by the WZO in the period between 1904 and 1914, leading to a rise
in the Jewish population in Palestine to approximately 100,000. However, soon,
the Turk policies of deporting Jewish population having a dual citizenship have
brought the number to 50,000 Jews (Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 50). Later, a third
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Aliyah took place in the 1920s followed by a series of immigrations(3) to Palestine.
These immigrations changed the socio-economic, political and demographic status
of Palestine (Karesh & Hurvitz, 2006, p. 11).
The need for attaining a Jewish majority in Palestine and acquiring statehood
through a) continued legal and illegal Jewish immigration, and b) purchasing(4)
Palestinian lands in the period between 1900 - 1903 had resulted over a thirty-year
period in the dispossession and the expulsion of the majority of the Palestinians. In
1903, in an attempt to impress the British, Herzl has suggested creating a Jewish
colony or settlement in Africa and the Americas, that was before settling in Pales-
tine (IfAmericansKnew.org, 2000). The most prominent suggestion was the Uganda
Proposal, which entailed the creation of a Jewish homeland in the region of Kenya,
East Africa. However, Russian Jews bitterly refused that offer, and responded: ‘there
can be no Zionism without Zion, and there should be no state anywhere outside of
Palestine’ (Eisenstadt, 1992, p. 154; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 46)
The British Mandate for Palestine
The transformation of the political situation continued with the arrival of British
troops in Palestine in 1916, more so after the proclamation of the Balfour Declara-
tion on the 2nd of November 1917. This declaration gave the Zionist movement “its
long-sought legal statute” to pursue and carry out their plans to establish a Jewish
state in Palestine under the protection of the British Mandate (Bloomberg, 2004,
p. 166; Lesch, 2001).
Sykes-Picot Agreement - The Ottoman Empire that ruled Palestine for 400
hundred years was finally defeated in World War I. Its holdings in the Middle
East were then divided between Britain and France in accordance with the Sykes-
Picot agreement of 1916, with the assent of Imperial Russia. Briefly, the Sykes-
Picot agreement was a secret agreement between France and Britain, represented by
two diplomat negotiators; Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Franois Georges-Picot of
France, from whom the agreement name was taken. The core agreement discourse
involved the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire once World War I had ended.
The provisions of Sykes-Picot Agreement were as follows: (1) Syria, Lebanon and
Turkish Cilicia to be under the control of the French, (2) Palestine, Jordan and ar-
eas around the Persian Gulf and Baghdad to be handed over to the British. Both
countries were to control them effectively at a governmental and administrative lev-
els. They did not actually ‘own’ any of these territories, and (3) Jerusalem was to
be placed under international administration (Land, 2008, p. 10; Rowley & Taylor,
(3)Fourth Aliyah between 1924 - 1928, and Fifth Aliyah between 1932 - 1939.
(4)Supported and financed by the Jewish National Fund (JNF).
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2006, p. 48; Trueman, 2011).
In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was held between Allied victors (Britain,
France, the United States and the Russian Empire) and defeated powers (the Ger-
man Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria). The
conference involved diplomats from more than twenty-nine countries. The meeting
primary product was a series of treaties; the Paris Peace Treaties, which according to
MacMillan (2003) has “reshaped the map of Europe and the world”. In this confer-
ence, much of the Ottoman Empire was divided into mandated territories assigned
to victors of the war. Both, the Arabs represented by Emir Feisal, commander of the
Arab forces during World War I, and the Zionists represented by Chaim Weitzmann;
leader of the Zionist movement, and Felix Frankfurter; a member of the American
Zionist delegation to the Paris peace conference, have met and pleaded their case
(Isseroff, 2009). However, due to the double-standard strategy of Britain with the
parties, a misunderstanding took place; “Faisal assumed that the Jews would live
peacefully under Arab rule whereas Frankfurter understood that the Arabs would
live peacefully under Jewish rule” (Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 48).
The conference of San Remo that was held in 1920(5) and Article 22 in 1922
by the League of Nations awarded the British government “a sacred trust for civi-
lization”, a mandate to officially control Palestine. It was a year when discontent in
Palestine became peaked (Ibid., p: 48 - 49), particularly that Palestinians were aware
that Britain denied them their national self-determination and prevented them from
obtaining their recognition as an independent nation. However, neighboring Arab
countries achieved independence after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Even though
that “some of them were smaller, poorer, and less ready for self-government than
was Palestine” (Khalidi, 1992, p. 30; Khalidi, 1997, p. 190).
Balfour Declaration - The Husayn-Mcmahon correspondence of 1915-1916 was
the basis on which the Arab revolt(6) was launched to help the Allies fight the Turks
during World War I. The correspondence implied that Palestine would be included
in the zone of Arab independence and, therefore, be allowed to govern their indepen-
dent regions after the disintegration of the Ottoman rule. The British, and through
the proclamation of Balfour Declaration encouraged the colonization of Palestine
by Jews and ultimately the establishment of a legitimate Jewish country in Pales-
tine. This declaration denied the inclusion of Palestine in the Arab independent zone
mentioned in the 1916 correspondence (Rogan, 1999, p. 224; Lesch, 2001).
(5)In that time, Trans-Jordan (later Jordan) was part of Mandated Palestine until the British decision
to split off more than two-thirds (77.0%) of the Mandate and calling that area east of the Jordan
River ‘Trans-Jordan’. The remainder (33.0%) of Mandate Palestine was divided into Jewish and
Arab states by the United Nations Partition Plan of November 29, 1947.
(6)Led by Hashemite family of western Arabia.
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Arthur James Balfour(7) addressed the letter of declaration to Lord Rothschild
promising the Jews with the creation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine and
imposing the legal cornerstone of the future State of Israel. This letter represented
the first political recognition of Zionist aims by a Great Power, and it was called the
‘Balfour declaration’ after him:
BALFOUR DECLARATION
Motives Behind Balfour Declaration - Arthur Balfour had opposed Jewish
immigration to Eastern Europe and Britain. Therefore, he believed that the best for
Britain to take advantage of those Jews is by achieving the support of Britain for
them outside Europe. According to Bloomberg (2004, p. 166), there were some
motives that laid behind this declaration. First, the strong religious affiliation of
Lord Balfour and LIoyd George, who were both Christians and considered it an
opportunity to help those who had given the Bible to the world, given that they
realized the extent of the Bible’s contribution to Christianity and the British national
charter. Secondly, for political considerations; they wanted to attract the support of
Jews in America and Russia, to secure or at least positively influence the public
opinion of these superpowers on Britain’s side. Finally, the strategic considerations;
(7)He was the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1902 - 1905), and at that time was
serving as the Foreign Secretary in David Lloyd George’s coalition government (1916 - 1919).
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controlling Palestine meant controlling a major strategic area that is “close to the
Suez Canal and the land and water routes to India”.
Balfour met Weitzmann in 1916, and they became close friends. The former
was impressed by the character of the Zionist leader, statesman, and chemist. Es-
pecially after he successfully offered his scientific service by developing a process
that yielded acetone; a solvent needed for “making cordite; the powder used to make
explosives for naval guns” (Weeks, 2012, p. 89), at a time when the British supply
of acetone was rapidly dwindling (Isseroff, 2009). Soon after, and in response to
Weitzmann’s requests, and the lobbying of the British Zionist movement, he issued
the declaration.
Responses to Balfour Declaration - The declaration was highly contested by
the Arab world and the Palestinians in particular, who felt that “Palestine could
not and should not be used to solve the plight of the Jews in Europe and that Jewish
national aspiration should not override their rights” (Lesch & Tschirgi, 1998, p. 50).
These positions underlined the desire of the Arabs for national independence and
their fear of the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish People in their
country (Kallaway & Bottaro, 1987, p. 270).
The inclusion of Balfour Declaration in the Mandate placed the British govern-
ment in an extraordinary and difficult position. On one side, “they were pledged
to the establishment of a National homeland for the Jews under the auspices of
British protection”. On the other side, they had to placate to “the rising frustra-
tions of the Arab populations” after liberation from Turkish rule, as agreed in the
Husayn-Mcmahon correspondence (Earl-Taylor, 1989, p. 2).
Britain implemented the first article of the Balfour declaration that gave the Jews
a national state in Palestine but failed to apply the second part of it, which stated:
“nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (Tucker, 2010, p. 1238; Akasaka,
2008, p. 1). It is true that the British policy towards Palestine provided a critically
important umbrella for the growth and consolidation of the Jewish community in
Palestine despite Palestinian opposition. However, this umbrella was not endorsed
by Britain alone, but the United States, though not a member of the League, had
a pervasive influence in setting up a Jewish National homeland in Palestine. Other
powers endorsed the same, like France and Russia (Rist, 1994, p. 90; Earl-Taylor,
1989, p. 2).
In the late 1930s, the support of Britain for the Jewish immigration started to di-
minish, but in that time, Jews were strong enough and capable of withstanding the
Palestinians on their own. Furthermore, the “Zionist movement was able to turn to
the emerging superpower, the United States, for diplomatic support and legitimiza-
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tion” at the end of World War II in 1945 (Aruri, 2008, p. 53; Lesch, 2001).
The dissemination of the Nazi-inspired racism through Czechoslovakia, Italy,
Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland has led to a continued and rapid growth
of illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine. It reached to 182,839 new entrants
between 1930 and 1936. The Palestinians resentment to the Jewish immigration,
land purchasing, clashed political demands and British support for Zionist progress
in Palestine peaked in the years between 1936 and 1939. With the most remark-
able six months strike of 1936 followed by a widespread rural revolt, disturbance,
and civil strife for three years period. The civil strife that was launched by Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem Amin Husseini became known as the ‘Arab Rebellion’ or ‘Great
Uprising’. The rebellion faced fierce resistance from the Jews, and soon after was
brutally crushed by more than 20,000 British security troops (in an unofficial coop-
eration with the Haganah; the military arm of the Zionist movement) (Kimmerling
& Migdal, 2003, p. 110; Tucker, 2010, p. 1238; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 51-54;
Lesch, 2001).
Palestine Royal Commission - In response to the Arab rebellion, a group of
full Royal Commission of Inquiry (or the Peel Commission) was sent by Britain. It
was headed by Lord Robert Peel, who came to investigate the roots and causes of
the unrest among Palestinian Arabs and Jews, and to propose solutions and recom-
mendations accordingly.
In July 1937, the Peel Commission published its report. The report admitted that
the Mandate was infeasible because of the incompatibility between Jewish and Arab
objectives in Palestine, and therefore, they recommended abolishing the Mandate,
except in a ‘corridor’ surrounding Jerusalem. Moreover, they proposed partitioning
the country into two independent states. Palestine was to be divided into three main
zones; an Arab state, a Jewish state, and a zone between Jaffa and Jerusalem that
would remain under the British Mandate and international supervision because it
contains most of the holy places in Palestine. In addition, they recommended that
until the establishment of the two states, Jews should be prohibited from purchasing
lands in the area allocated to the Arab state (Lewis, 2008, p. 319; Rabinovich &
Reinharz, 2008, p. 44).
In the beginning, these proposals were accepted by the British government and
endorsed by the Parliament in London. However, the Jews bitter disagreement
erupted between supporters and opponents while the Arabs rejected the proposal
and refused to regard it as a solution” (Bard & Schwartz, 2005, p. 21). By 1938, the
British government recognized that the partitioning plan would be infeasible, and
the report was ultimately shelved (Ibid., p. 21).
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White Paper - In response to the increased rioting of Arabs in 1939 against the
continued Jewish immigration to Palestine(8). The British colonial secretary Mal-
colm MacDonald issued the White Paper that set limitations and constraints on the
Jewish immigration to Palestine in order to conform to the “economic absorptive
capacity” of the country (Smith, 1993, p. 64; Akasaka, 2008, p. 3; Rowley & Tay-
lor, 2006, p: 50-51; Isseroff, 2002a). However, the White Paper failed to prohibit
the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine completely. Especially in light of the
rise of Jews persecution across Europe during the period 1939-1945 (Khalidi, 1997,
p. 190).
In May 1942, the Zionist leadership headed by David Ben Gurion gathered in
Biltmore Hotel in New York and formulated their position in what became known as
Biltmore Program(9), where they declared Palestine as ‘a Jewish common wealth’,
yet mentioned neither partition nor borders. It was a compromise that explicitly de-
clared the Zionist goal of an independent state in Palestine to ensure the right of free
immigration, and intensely opposed the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 (Shindler,
2009, p. 92; Isseroff, 2002b). According to Rabinovich and Reinharz (2008, p. 544):
‘the program has undoubtedly won the support of the Zionist movement as a whole,
mainly because it expressed the policy of Palestinian Jewry which now plays a lead-
ing role in the Jewish-Agency’.
Failure of the White Paper - Lord Moyne; the British Minister in Cairo who
was in charge of carrying out the terms of the 1939 White Paper was murdered
by the Sternists; extremist members of a Zionist organization(10) as a means of ex-
pressing their opposition to this Paper or any act they considered as an anti-Zionist
activity (Aronson, 2004, p. 229; Beckett, 2001, p. 87). Later, in 1944, this assassina-
tion led to the ‘Season’ campaign where members of the Stern Gang were rounded
up by the Haganah, the Irgun(11), and British troops. The Gang was terminated and
turned over to the British in order not to jeopardize cooperation between the Jews
and the British after the war (Ibid., p. 87).
Nevertheless, the aftermath of World War II, the Holocaust in Europe in 1945,
and the non-compliance of the British Labor party (who came to power then) to
their promise of reversing the British White Paper did not leave any venue for the
Zionists. Consequently, they started blaming the British ban on Jews immigration to
Palestine for the death of thousands of Jews in Europe. This led to the establishment
(8)Illegal immigration boosted the Jewish population to 450,000 that year, and comprised about
two-thirds of the territory’s population of 2 million in mid-1940s.
(9)Later renamed to ‘the Jerusalem Program’.
(10)Who broke away from the Zionist organization and began forming their own underground
groups.
(11)A break away from the Haganah and the main Jewish underground in the pre-state days.
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of a United Jewish resistance movement that comprised of various Jewish military
forces i.e. Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi. It was headed by Ben-Gurion, who in turn
launched an active struggle against the British in Palestine to drive them out and
speed up the establishment of an independent Israel (Sherbok, 1994, p. 188; Tucker,
2010, p. 649).
The Jewish revolt against the British included blowing up railways, kidnapping,
assassinating British employees and soldiers, and more. The political situation raged
in Britain and was massively demanding the British government to settle the conflict
and stop endangering the lives of British troops in Palestine (Heller, 1999, p. 4).
The British government was incapable of settling down this rebellious situation.
From one side, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended allowing
the immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. From the other side, the
Arabs’ pressures on the British Mandate to block these immigrations (Zarley, 1990,
p. 69).
Partition Plan - On the 1st of August 1946, the League of Nations was termi-
nated by the League Assembly, and its properties and assets were transferred to
the United Nations at a simple ceremony in Geneva (Goodrich, 1998, p. 3). At key
points in its history, the United Nations has been a major player in the Middle East.
However, instead of being committed to granting the right of self-determination(12)
for the inhabitants of an area to call a country of their own, they decided to revert
to the “medieval strategy of allowing an outside power to divide up other people’s
land” (AMP, 2009, p. 1).
After a two-month debate, and following the notification of the British Man-
date of the withdrawal from Palestine, the U.N. General Assembly decided on
adopting Resolution 181 (II). It enacted the termination of the British Mandate
through “a progressive withdrawal of British armed forces”, the partition of Pales-
tine into Jewish and Arab states with Jerusalem to be an internationalized city. All
to take place no later than the 1st of October 1948. Resolution 181 bestowed “in-
ternational legitimacy on the nascent, borderless and still-expanding state of Israel,
while postulating an abstract Palestinian state and protected international status for
Jerusalem” (Bennis, 1997, p. 1; Akasaka, 2008, p. 7; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 73;
BBC news, 2001).
The partition plan was approved by the majority of the United Nations General
Assembly members, with 33 votes in favor (57.9%), 13 against (22.8%), 10 ab-
stentions (17.5%) and one absent (1.8%) (Bennis, 1997, p. 1). The partition plan
“ran counter to the wishes of a vast majority of the population in Palestine” (Lesch,
(12)“The right of peoples to self-determination is a particularly well-known collective right, ex-
plicitly mentioned in common Article 1 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the
Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, 1966” (Butenschøn, 2006, p. 285).
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2001). It laid down: the Jewish state covers 56.0% of the land, and the Arab state
covers 43.0% of it (with 1.0% for a neutral Jerusalem). At that time, Jewish inhab-
itants constituted 33.0% of the overall population(13), and Palestinian inhabitants
constituted the rest 67.0%(14), as shown in Table 2.1 hereunder. Also, it established
“the guarantee of the rights of minorities and religious rights, including free ac-
cess to and the preservation of Holy Places”. In addition to the constitution of an
Economic Union between the two states (Akasaka, 2008, p. 5; BBC news, 2001).
TABLE 2.1 DISTRIBUTION OF ARABS AND JEWS AT THE TIME OF THE
PARTITION PLAN
State Jews Arabs and others Total
Jewish state 498000 407000 905000
Arab state 10000 725000 735000
City of Jerusalem 100000 105000 205000
Total 608000 1237000 1845000
% 33.0 67.0 100.0
Source: United Nations, 1990, p. 115.
Responses to the Plan - On the one hand, the plan enjoyed the warm support of
the Jewish community in Palestine, through the Jewish Agency “tactically because it
implied international recognition for their aims” (Ben-Baruch, 2004, p. 2). Despite
the opposition of some Jewish leaders, such as David Ben-Gurion; Israel first prime
minister, who believed that the Jewish problem “could never be solved within a
capitalist environment and that the Jews must return to their socialist, collectivist
root”. Moreover, for him, the plan did not conform to the ambitions of a Jewish state
on the entire territory of the Mandated Palestine and instead it imposed territorial
limits on the proposed Jewish State (Boyle, 1990, p. 333; Akasaka, 2008, p. 9;
Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 64 - 68; BBC news, 2001). All this despite the fact that
his attitude towards religion was only based on political interests (Gorny, 2013,
p. 41).
On the other hand, the “Arab nations unanimously expressed bitter opposi-
tion” (Boyle, 1990, p. 333). The plan was deemed to be a criminal act perpetrated
upon them by the United Nations because it “violated the provision of the United
Nations charter, which granted the right to decide their destiny”. Furthermore, it
unjustifiably gave special and preferential rights and status to the minority and ig-
nored the rights of the majority of the population of Palestine (Akasaka, 2008, p. 9;
Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p: 64-68; Isseroff, 2002a). Clashes between Jews and Arabs
(13)498,000 in the Jewish state, 10,000 minority in the Arab state and 100,000 in Jerusalem.
(14)807,000 in the Arab state, 325,000 in the Jewish state and 105,000 in Jerusalem.
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intensified and local fighting turned into a general conflict during the subsequent
months of the UN vote on the partition of Palestine into Arab and a Jewish territory
(Kamen, 1988, p. 68).
2.1.3 Modern History
The Independence of Israel and the Catastrophe of Palestine
Eventually, in May 1948, the British government departed from Palestine and re-
turned the Mandate to the United Nations (Isseroff, 2002b; Isseroff, 2009). Accord-
ing to official Israeli statistics, by the end of the British Mandate, 89.6% of all Jew-
ish immigrants came from Europe, America, and Oceania, and 10.4% immigrated
from Africa and Asia.
From April onwards, the Zionists started the implementation of Plan Dalet(15)
against Palestinians. Khalidi (1988, p. 8) described the goals of this operation:
‘These offensives entailed the destruction of the Palestinian Arab community
and the expulsion and pauperization of the bulk of the Palestine Arabs, were
calculated to achieve the military fait accompli upon which the state of Israel
was to be based’.
Khalidi (1988, p. 8) and Pappe (2006) agreed that the fundamental objectives of this
Plan were to conquer as much as possible of Palestine and to expel Palestinians from
their land. However, Hakabi (1972, p. 366) believed that the goals of this plan were
to “control over the territory of the Jewish State and to defend its border against any
invasion by the Arab armies”.
The Jewish Agency proclaimed the Declaration of Independence that announced
the creation of the State of Israel on the territory allotted to it by the partition plan. It
took place following the complete relinquishment of the British Mandate over Pales-
tine, and the disengagement of its forces on the 14th of May 1948. Unsurprisingly,
the Declaration of Independence led to more serious clashes between Arab nations
and Jews, and the crossing of borders of the newly proclaimed state by armies of
neighboring Arab countries. Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, plus a
token force from Saudi Arabia entered Palestine “in an attempt to prevent the cre-
ation of a Jewish state”. An event that marked the beginning of the 1948 Arab-Israeli
War known as ‘al-Nakba’ or the catastrophe (Kamen, 1988, p. 68; Akasaka, 2008,
p. 2008; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 73).
In the initial stages of the war, notable successes were scored by Arab armies.
(15)An offensive military operation.
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However, due to the crucial Arab decision of accepting the truce(16) the Arabs failed
to keep their successes in later stages of the war. Arabs did not make use of the
essence of the cease-fire that aimed to regroup and recruit the troops during the
truce. Nevertheless, the Israelis did; they took advantage of the truce in this critical
stage of the war, they regrouped, recruited and trained their troops for the fighting
(Kamen, 1987, p. 453).
The Israelis established the Israel “Defense Force” (IDF) that comprised of an
amalgamation of the underground armies of the Haganah, Palmach, Irgun, and Lehi,
and brought large shiploads of arms. According to Isseroff (2009): ‘better organi-
zation and intelligence successes, as well as timely clandestine arms shipments,
enabled the Jews to gain a decisive victory’. Add to that, although the Arabs of-
ficially were fighting according to one plan, coordination between them was very
limited. Gradually, the expulsion of Arabs became “a definite policy of the fighting
units. Residents of many Arab villages, who had not fled when their villages were
captured, were expelled by the government. Few were permitted to go back to their
homes, or to resettle in other localities” (Kamen, 1987, p. 453). The war ended with
the devastating defeat of the Arab countries and the Palestinians.
Outcome of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War - According to Awad (2011) - the Pres-
ident of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBU): in a matter of seven
months, the war yielded significant changes in the composition of the population
that lived in that part of the Mandatory Palestine, mainly the transformation of over
half of the Palestinians into refugees. Out of 1.4 million people, 750,000 Pales-
tinians were uprooted from 1300 Palestinian towns and villages, from which 531
were devastated. They were displaced to neighboring Arab countries like Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, and other countries of the world, as stateless persons
(Bell, 2011, p. 6). Also, thousands of Palestinians, almost 20% (186,000 out of
900,000) were internally relocated from their homes but remained within the newly
Israeli-controlled territories.
Official data indicate that the underground armies controlled 774 Palestinian
towns and villages, destroyed 531 villages and emptied 11 urban neighborhoods.
The atrocities of Israeli forces also included more than 70 massacres, rape of women
and incarceration of men during the al-Nakba. A total of approximately 15,000
Palestinians were killed and 78% of the land of Mandatory Palestine (including
West Jerusalem) was controlled (Awad, 2011; Khalidi, 1992, p. 30; Pappe, 2006,
p. 22; Kamen, 1987, p. 453; Smooha, 2002, p. 484; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012).
The remaining territories of Gaza district and the West Bank of the Jordan River
(which included East Jerusalem) were controlled by Egypt and Jordan respectively
(Akasaka, 2008, p. 10).
(16)Called for by the Security Council from June 11 to July 8 and from July 19 to October 15.
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The purpose of all these expulsions and massacres was “to create a purely Jew-
ish state ethnically cleansed of the indigenous inhabitants who had lived there for
centuries” (Nabulsi, 2006, p. 13). David Ben Gurion once said: ‘we must do every-
thing to ensure they (the Palestinians) would never return i.e. the old would die, and
the young would forget’. Since then, the war of 1948 was called ‘al-Nakba’ or the
catastrophe, which Awad (2011) was described as “a systematic replacement of the
population”. ‘al-Nakba’ is “an expression usually used for natural catastrophes such
as earthquakes, volcanoes, and hurricanes”, yet the Nakba of Palestine is an ethnic
cleansing process as well as a “destruction and displacement of an unarmed nation
to be replaced systematically by another nation” (Ibid.).
‘Ethnic cleansing’ a term firstly coined by Ilan Pappe in his book ‘The 1948
Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine’. It implies an accusation and reference to the culprits
of/for the events that took place not only in the past but also is happening in the
present (Tarachansky, 2009). According to Pappe (2006, p. 21) ‘al-Nakba’ does not
directly imply any reference to who is behind the catastrophe and, therefore, the
term of ‘Ethnic cleansing’ should be used as a better representation of what had
happened in 1948. He defined Ethnic Cleansing as ‘any action by one ethnic group
meant to drive out another ethnic group with the purpose of transforming a mixed
ethnic region into a pure one. An action can become Ethnic Cleansing regardless of
the means employed. Every means, from persuasion and threats to expulsions and
mass killings, justifies the attribution of the term to such policies’ (p. 22). Rowley
and Taylor (2006, p. 74) summed up the outcome of the 1948 war: ‘what is done
is done, and Israel has earned, through bloody battles, the right through might to
remain in Palestine’.
Armistice Agreements
The period between 1948 and 1949 witnessed a series of armistice agreements and
resolutions between Israel and neighboring Arab countries. These agreements were
arranged by the United Nations to cease all hostile military activities between the
signing parties (Shapira, 1971, p. 65). Israel originally was willing to convert these
lines into recognized international boundaries. However, the Arabs opposed the
idea, and instead, they considered the main aim from signing these armistice agree-
ments to have solely military significance and did not underline any peace treaties
(Blum, 2009, p. 29).
UN General Assembly Resolution 194
On the 11th of December 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 194
(III) that outlined ways to resolve the Palestinian problem. The resolution called
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for “placing all of Jerusalem under permanent international regime” and free ac-
cess to the holy places in Palestine. Also, it mandated a solution to the problem of
Palestinians-made refugees during the 1948 war as referred to in paragraph eleven
of the resolution (Khalidi, 1992, p. 33; Akasaka, 2008, p. 11), which stated:
‘Refugees wishing to return to their homes and to live in peace with their
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to re-
turn and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of interna-
tional law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities
responsible’.
A conference was convened(17) by the United Nations Conciliation Commission for
Palestine (UNCCP) in Lausanne, Switzerland. The conference was an attempt to
resolve the three major issues of refugees, the size of territories allotted to Palestine
and Israel, and the status of Jerusalem (Chiller-Glaus, 2007, p. 139) and separate
talks were held with both parties. Each agreed on the protocol to use the boundaries
established in the partition plan of UN Resolution 194 as the basis for negotia-
tions i.e. the same boundaries that were rejected by the Arabs previously. Unfor-
tunately, these delineated attempts have ended inconclusively because of priority
differences between the Arabs and the Israelis. The former pressing for the repa-
triation of refugees as a first step, and the latter, insisting on addressing territorial
questions first (Akasaka, 2008, p. 11).
Another attempt among many to lead to a permanent peace was Security Council
Resolution 62, which empowered the conclusion of armistice agreements between
Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria (Isseroff, 2002a). However, those and
later attempts by the Commission to secure the return of the Palestinians and the
internationalization of Jerusalem were deemed to fail, mainly, due to Arabs contin-
uing refusal to recognize Israel and its borders, and Israel’s “insufficient cooperation
to solve the refugees problem”, and the question of water (Isseroff, 2009).
Egypt-Israeli War 1954 and 1956
Peace talks slightly started to revive between Egypt and Israel in 1954 after the
overthrowing(18) of King Farouk corrupt government in Egypt. Until Egyptians un-
covered an Israeli spy ring “that was plotting to blow up US installations in Egypt”,
in order to tension the relation between the US and Egypt and prevent rapproche-
ment. This incident came to be known as ‘the Lavon affair’ or ‘the shameful busi-
ness’ (Tal, 1996, p. 59).
(17)From the 27th of April till the 12th of September 1949.
(18)By a semi-underground organization called ‘the Free Officers’, known in Arabic as ‘El-Dobatt
El-Ahrar’, headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser.
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Soon, in response to this shameful act by Israelis, Egyptians blocked the straits
of Tiran and Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, and later in this year, Egypt had na-
tionalized the Suez Canal. On the 29th of October 1956 in a plan to reverse the
nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israeli paratroopers landed deep inside the Sinai
Desert - joined later by France and the United Kingdom. This plan triggered the
second Arab-Israeli war and added another level to the bloody edifice of Israel’s
relations with its neighbors (Ibid., p. 59). The crisis ended with the eventual with-
drawal of the invading forces to the armistice lines in accordance to UN Security
Council Resolution 997 (Akasaka, 2008, p. 15).
Formation of the PLO
The first Arab Summit conference of 1964 took place to stop Israel’s plans to di-
vert part of the Jordan River had comprised the first steps towards the creation of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In May 1964, the Palestine National
Council was summoned in Jerusalem and proclaimed the establishment of the PLO
headed by Ahmad Shuqairi. The aim of the PLO was “to ward off the existing Zion-
ist danger in the technical and defense fields. Moreover, to organize the Palestinian
people to enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and de-
termining their destiny” (British and foreign state papers, 1971, p. 656). The PLO
was defined in the book of the United Nations Special Unit on Palestinian Rights
(1980) as ‘the general organizational framework within which all Palestinian or-
ganizations - commando groups, trade unions, professional associations, as well
as prominent national figures meet to work for the achievement of Palestinian na-
tional goals’ (p. 374). It regularly came to be internationally recognized as “the sole
legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people (Avnery, 2010, p. 13).
1967 Arab-Israeli War
Tensions between Arabs and Israelis escalated in the late 1960s with the continuous
struggle for “the waters of Jordan, Litani, Orontes, Yarmouk and other life-giving
Middle East rivers”, especially after the establishment of the Israeli National Water
Carrier plan that pumped the water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate south and
central Israel (Isseroff, 2009). Indeed, this was a principal cause of the 1967 third
Arab-Israeli war (Cooley, 1984, p. 3). Coupled with the closing of the Straits of
Tiran by Egypt, and the withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai, which according to
Lerner (2012) ‘if had not taken place the Six-day war would have never occurred’.
Although the question of water sharing between Israel and its neighboring Arab
countries became more apparent, however, it seemed less attainable because Israel
at that time consumed “roughly five times as much water per capita as each of it
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less industrialized and less intensively farmed neighbours” (Cooley, 1984, p. 3). In
1964, clashes started between allied Syrian-Lebanon forces and Israel concerning
the diversion of Jordan River water, later in 1967, Egypt and Jordan were dragged
into the war against Israel (Ibid.).
In the 5th of June 1967, Israel launched its first attack against Egypt, followed by
a series of clashes with Jordan and Syria. Within six days(19) the perceived balance
of power in the Middle East was changed, and a new reality was created. The Israelis
“had delivered a crushing defeat to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria” (Parker, 1992, p. 180),
and became the undisputed master of all Palestine, plus substantial portions of the
Sinai desert in Egypt and the Golan Heights of Syria (Ibid.). Israel had acquired
extensive territories that were several times larger than the 1948 borders, and a new
batch of 500,000 Palestinian refugees was created (Bell, 2011, p. 6).
Not to mention, the destruction of the primary military forces in Egypt, Jordan
and Syria, and the psychological effects resulting from these military defeats. In
comparison to minor losses on the Israeli side coupled with an exaggerated feeling
of confidence within and outside Israel in the strength and ability of Israeli military
(Alshaer, 2008). The 1967 war was another phase of the struggle between con-
flicted sides, a phase that “did not change the essence; it only changed the circum-
stances” (Avnery, 2010, p. 10). The Zionist objectives were furthered to cover more
territory, after which the armistice lines were replaced by cease-fire lines (Blum,
2009, p. 30).
Fateh Taking Over the PLO
Two years later, Fateh took over the PLO, which was not an easygoing task but a
complicated one that required political and diplomatic skills. First, the PLO in its
constitution “harbored ideologically diverse factions”, making it harder to control.
Secondly, tensions appeared among the PLO, the conservative Arab regimes and
the popular revolutionary forces in the Arab world. Debates included the degree to
which violence should be used and the right to repatriation of displaced Palestinians.
Furthermore, whether the State of Palestine should be established on the whole area
of Historic Palestine or the West Bank and Gaza alone (Araj & Brym, 2010, p. 843).
UN Security Council Resolution 242
The UN Security Council Resolution 242 was one of the most famous and fre-
quently cited resolutions. It became the cornerstone of the Middle East successive
diplomatic efforts for peace and the ending of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the
(19)The war lasted from the 5th till the 11th of June.
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coming decades. Examples of other attempts of peace resolutions included “the two
Camp David Framework Accords of 1978, the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979,
the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994 and the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles
of 1993, commonly known as the ‘Oslo Accord’” (Blum, 2009, p. 28).
The resolution was issued on the 22nd of November 1967 in the wake of the third
Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. A war that led to the defeat of Arab armies and the
expansion of Israel’s occupation to larger parts of the Arab world. According to
Lynk (2007, p. 7), the primary purpose of Resolution 242 in the eyes of its drafters
was “to bring an end to the Israeli occupation of the land taken in 1967 and to
create the political and legal foundations for an enduring peace in the region”. Blum
(2009, p. 28) saw Israel’s obligation to withdraw from territories that were occupied
in 1967 as the most important and contentious provision in Resolution 242, yet
“security considerations were uppermost in the minds of its drafters”.
The resolution stated that “all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of
the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article
2 of the Charter” (Gold et al., 2009), which “requires UN members to act in ‘good
faith’ and seek peaceful means for resolving international disputes”. Moreover, it
affirmed that the fulfillment of the Charter principles requires the establishment of
a just and lasting peace in the Middle East endorsed by the following principles:
(a) “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”, (b) the “withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from territories occupied” in the Six-day War, (c) “the termina-
tion of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and the acknowledgment
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries
free from threats or acts of force”. Furthermore, the resolution affirmed the neces-
sity “for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the
area, for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem, for guaranteeing the ter-
ritorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones” (Lynk, 2007; Isseroff,
2002a; PLO documents, p. 321).
Failure of UN Security Council Resolution 242 - Despite the legal and prac-
tical importance of the resolution that carries between its lines particular territorial
and other provisional significance. The resolution lack of specific, constructed lan-
guage, and legislative history, and failure of emphasizing many core issues of the
Arab-Israeli problem had in return raised many distortions and central interpreta-
tive differences between disputed parties. Blum (2009, p. 28) summarized the main
elements that are not mentioned in Resolution 242. According to his observation,
“the resolution does not speak of a Palestinian people or a Palestinian state, nor
does it mention Jerusalem”. Additionally, it de-emphasized the centrality of the
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Palestinians refugee’s problem by referring to it as a “just settlement of the refugee
problem”.
Likewise, the central argument of the Israelis and their supporters and adversaries
that call for ‘Land-for-Peace’ is not mentioned anywhere in the Resolution. Not to
mention, the unsuccessful timing of the resolution, which took place a few months
after the well-known ‘Khartoum meeting’, where Arabs intensively declared: ‘no
recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel and no peace with Israel’. These
resulted in the absence of any straightforward mention of peace treaties in the reso-
lution (Ibid., p. 28).
The first territorial component of the resolution included “the right of every state
in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries”. However,
the armistice demarcation lines in 1949 “were neither ‘secure’ and ‘recognized’,
nor were they ‘boundaries’” (Ibid.). In line with that, the broad and purposive le-
gal reading of Resolution 242’s second territorial component that requires “the total
withdrawal of Israel from all (the) territories captured in June 1967 has been fre-
quently challenged” (p. 29).
Legal scholars from Israel “have given the resolution a claustrophobic interpre-
tation over the years” (Blum, 2009, p. 30). They have argued that British sponsors,
in consultation with US delegation had deliberately omitted the definite article (the
term used is ‘withdrawal from territories’ rather than ‘withdrawal from all the terri-
tories’) and therefore insisted upon indefinite language (that most probably appear
due to the translation of the French written resolution to English) - no use of ‘the’ or
‘all’ - in the withdrawal provision. For that reason, they declared that Resolution 242
“does not compel Israel to make more than a partial withdrawal from the captured
territories” (Aziz, 2007, p. 6; Lynk, 2007, p. 8; Blum, 2009, p. 30).
Since then, a debate between Israel’s and Arab’s supporters and adversaries “has
raged over whether these provisions call for a complete Israeli withdrawal, a mi-
nor revision of borders, or license for Israel to retain sovereignty over some of the
conquered lands” (Lynk, 2007, p. 8). Consequently, the resolution faced bitter op-
position by the two parties each for their concern, particularly the PLO headed by
Yasser Arafat, who strongly criticized Resolution 242 because it reduced the Ques-
tion of Palestine to a refugee problem (Akasaka, 2008, p. 18).
The Fourth Arab-Israeli War
The October War, Ramadan War (or Yom Kippur War in Hebrew) was the fourth
Arab-Israeli war that was launched by Egypt and Syria against Israel on the 6th of
October 1973 (Long, 2011). It started with a sudden attack by Egyptian and Syrian
armies on Israeli forces stationed in the Sinai and the Golan Heights.
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The roots of the ‘War of Attrition’ between Egypt and Israel can be tracked as of
July 1967 with the first Egyptian victory against the Israelis at ‘Ras Al-’Ish’ attack,
followed by a series of attacks that took place in the first two years (till 1969).
The war took the form of limited artillery duels and small-scale incursions into the
Sinai and later was developed through subsequent military stages to a fully prepared
Egyptian Army for larger scaled operations in March 1969. Those operations were
called by Gamal Abdel Nasser; Egypt second president, ‘the War of Attrition’ (or
Harb al-Istinzf in Arabic). Until the restoration of the cease-fire on the 7th of August
1970 (Khalidi, 1997, p. 60; Pittsburgh Post-Gazzette, 1967). In an interview with
Mohamed Tantawi(20) stated: ‘The War of Attrition was something imperative for the
execution of the 1973 October War, even we - including military analysts, consider
the October War an extension of the Attrition War’.
The war officially ended with the signing of the disengagement agreement on
the 31st of May 1974. Israel agreed to return the city of Kenitra to Syria and the
eastern bank of the Suez Canal to Egypt, in exchange for the removal of Egyptian
and Syrian forces from the armistice lines, and the establishment of a special force
of the United Nations to monitor the accomplishment of the convention. According
to Bard and Schwartz (2005), ‘the outcome of the conflict was a territorial gain for
Egypt. In Syria, on the other hand, the Arabs could hardly claim victory since Israel
had substantially increased its territorial control’.
The Aftermath of the October War - The October war has altered the Is-
raeli thinking about the capabilities of the Arabs and made them reconsider their
strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the effect on the Arab world was even greater.
By demonstrating “their ability to mount an attack on Israel, Egyptians, and Syr-
ians emerged from the October War with a new sense of pride” (Bonham et al.,
1979, p. 5). The most important results of the war were: (1) the recovery of Egyp-
tian sovereignty over all the Suez Canal, and the cities along the canal and most of
the Sinai desert, (2) the recovery of Syrian sovereignty over the city of Kenitra of
the Golan Heights, and (3) the destruction of what Israeli military leaders used to
call ‘the invincible army’ myth by Egyptians strategic military actions and forces
(Ibid.).
Bonham et al. (1979) added: ‘the October war, to a much greater degree than
previously, resulted in the active involvement of the two superpowers’; the United
States and the Soviet Union, who in the 22nd of October 1973 in a joint proposal
(United Nations Security Council Resolution 338) called for ceasefire and adoption
of Resolution 242 in all of its parts. Later, they headed to the Geneva Conference
of 1973 sponsored by the United Nations “in an attempt to negotiate a solution to
the Arab-Israeli conflict as envisioned in United Nations Security Council Resolu-
(20)An Egyptian field marshal and statesman.
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tion 338”. Due to some reservations, the Geneva Conference was not resumed after
December 1973 (Quandt, 2008).
UN Security Council Resolution 338 - The three-line UN Security Council
Resolution 338, adopted on the 22nd of October 1973 entailed the following:
1. Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the
adoption of this decision.
2. Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations
start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at es-
tablishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
The war led to the return of shipping in the Suez Canal in June 1975, and finally,
it paved the way for the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel. The
agreement was held in September 1978 following the historic initiative of Anwar
Sadat, the third President of Egypt, to visit Jerusalem in November 1977. Followed
on the 1st of September 1982 with the so-called ‘Reagan plan’ that was primarily
based on the formula ‘Land-for-Peace’. The plan called for a freeze on the establish-
ment of Israeli settlements, urged Israel to return most of the West Bank and Gaza
to Jordanian control, and favored some form of governing association between the
Palestinian Territories and Jordan. However, Begin; the Israeli Prime Minister at
that time, did not agree on the plan, and therefore, no progress took place (Quandt,
2008, p. 31; Akasaka, 2008, p. 19).
First Palestinian Uprising ‘Intifada’
The Intifada, translated into English as the ‘uprising’ or ‘rebellion’ is often used as a
term for popular resistance to oppression. The first Palestinian Intifada in 1987 was
a popular uprising against Israeli military occupation. The uprising is also referred
to as ‘the war of the stones’ due to the iconic images of Palestinian youth throwing
stones at Israeli soldiers and their tanks. The Palestinians used civil disobedience,
boycotts, protests and to a lesser extent, violence to protest against the Israeli mil-
itary occupation. The Intifada quickly developed into a well-organized rebellion
orchestrated by the PLO from its headquarters in Tunis (Batchoun, 2003b).
The spark started in Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza Strip, and soon a collec-
tive Palestinian uprising erupted against Israel in both areas i.e. the West Bank and
Gaza. It started when a settler killed a schoolgirl, and an Israeli truck ran over seven
Palestinian workers in Beit Hanoun checkpoint in the north of Gaza (Hammami &
Tamari, 2001, p. 5; Palestine Facts, 2011a; Batchoun, 2003b). These incidents were
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the straw that broke the camel’s back, but the real reason behind the Intifada was
“the culmination of Palestinian discontent and frustration after twenty years of oc-
cupation since 1967 Israeli offensive” (Batchoun, 2003b). Israeli repression in the
form of “mass detentions, house demolitions, and other violent acts, as well as the
economic integration of the Palestinian territories by means of transferring Israeli
Jews into the Palestinian territories in clear violation of international law, amounted
to what the Palestinians saw as de facto annexation” (Ibid.). The Intifada calmed
down in 1991, and finally stopped with the signing of the Oslo agreement between
Israel and the PLO in 1993.
Over 1200, Palestinians were consequently killed by the Israeli Army during the
Intifada (1987-1993), of who 241 were kids, approximately 90,000 were wounded,
15,000 were arrested, and 1228 houses were demolished. On the Israeli side, about
160 Israelis were killed (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 6). Hammami and Tamari
(2001, p. 6) described the most significant achievements of 1987 Intifada:
‘Since the PLO had been dispersed in the aftermath of the Israeli’s military
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the daily lives of the Palestinians throughout
the Palestinian territories were under Israeli colonialism. This status quo that
was highly challenged by the Palestinian uprising, who through unarmed civil
insurrection have succeeded in convincing Israel that Palestinians could not
be governed by colonial rule’.
In addition, the Intifada led the Palestine National Council to consider the two-state
solution based on the 1947 United Nations partition plan. Later, it paved the way to
the Oslo accord, to the interim agreements of Wye agreement and Hebron protocol
as well (Ibid., p. 6). For Palestinians, the uprising managed to draw international
attention to their problem, and Israeli oppression imposed on them (Chao, 2011,
p. 9; Avnery, 2010, p. 13).
Madrid Peace Conference
On the 3rd of October 1991 (eight months following the 1991 Gulf War) the United
States, and the Soviet Union jointly sponsored the Madrid Peace Conference. It was
the first time after 43 years that the Israelis and the Arabs accepted to enter into
direct, face-to-face negotiations with each other. Israel from one side and Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, and a Palestinian delegation(21) on the other side. The aim of con-
vening this international conference was to address the Arab-Israeli dispute follow-
ing the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. The United States taking the lead in the con-
ference has adopted “an even-handed approach and pledged to promote a settlement
(21)That was not independent then but part of the Jordanian delegation.
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that would provide security for Israel and justice for the Palestinians” (Pressman,
2003, p. 28; Shlaim, 2005b, p. 242).
The conference through bilateral and multilateral meetings intended to start a
peace process by resolving past conflicts, signing peace treaties and for all sides
to settle their rival territorial claims. Areas including the Gaza Strip, West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) were the main points of contention, in addition to nego-
tiating issues of concern to the entire Middle East, such as water, environment, arms
control, refugees and economic development (BBC news, 2001).
The Madrid conference was considered a success and was open for more talks
(BBC news, 1991). Later in January 1992, bilateral talks between Israel and Arab
countries took place in the American capital - Washington, D.C., under the Ameri-
can auspices. Unfortunately, little progress was made on either track because of the
Likud’s “tough and uncompressing posture” – delegated by Shamir; seventh Prime
Minister of Israel, who stated that the basic problem of the conflict was not terri-
torial, but the Arab denial of Israel’s very right to exist. However, and later due to
the victory of the Labour party headed by Itzhak Rabin over the Likud party in June
1992, Israel adopted a more flexible position toward the Arab track but stayed still
regarding the Palestinian issue (Shlaim, 2005b, p. 242).
Oslo Accord I of 1993
Deadlock in official talks led Israel and the PLO to seek a back channel for com-
municating, away from the glare of publicity and political pressures. In late January
1993, unofficial and secret talks got underway in Oslo. They were led by two Is-
raeli academics; Dr. Hirschfeld and Dr. Pundik, and PLO treasurer Ahmad Qurei.
Initially, it dealt with economic cooperation but soon was broadened to negotiate a
joint declaration of principles (Shlaim, 1994, p. 33).
Over a period of eight months, talks developed and both parties became more
interested and involved in the updated details of those talks. Especially after (1) the
failure of the tenth round of the official Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Washing-
ton(22), and (2) the need for finding a political solution to the crisis in the relations
between Israel and the inhabitants of the occupied territories. In addition to several
reports and political changes that urged Rabin “to give the green light to the Israeli
team and the secret diplomacy to move into a higher gear” (Ibid.).
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, US President Bill Clinton, and PLO chair-
man Yasser Arafat, later came together to sign a breakthrough agreement. An agree-
ment that would lay a vital groundwork for each side to achieve what they wanted
most, namely, a land for the Palestinians they could finally call their own, and secu-
(22)That were running parallel to the secret talks of Oslo.
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rity and safety to both nations (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 245; Hammami & Tamari, 2001,
p. 7).
The Oslo deal was unique in that rather than negotiating major issues; partic-
ipants chose instead to sidestep them in order to build an atmosphere of mutual
trust and understanding as a first step. It was completely silent on the thorny is-
sues of the conflict, such as the right of return of the 1948 refugees, the borders of
the Palestinians entity, the future of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and
Gaza, and the status of Jerusalem (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 7; Shlaim, 2005a,
p. 245). Participants did not address these issues because if they did “there would
have been no accord” (Ibid.), and therefore, such issues were deferred to the final
status agreement (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 7).
Oslo was not a final peace deal but the beginning of a peace process and a call for
a five-year period in which both sides can take concrete steps that would improve
relations and increase goodwill between the two peoples. At the end of this five-
year period they would return to the negotiating table to deal with Palestinian and
Israeli demands, only this time not as enemies but as partners with a common goal.
A sense of trust between the two peoples needed to be built first before proceeding
to more critical issues, and the Oslo accord was designed to achieve that (Kopping
& Shore, 2003).
Commitments to the Oslo Accord - The PLO committed at the Oslo Accord
(1) to recognize Israel’s right to exist and live in peace and security, (2) to accept
the parts of UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338, which call for the amendment
of the PLO national charter that calls for the destruction of Israel through violence.
Besides, (3) to amend its charters that are inconsistent with these commitments, (4)
to confiscate all illegal weapons, (5) to preserve and protect all Jewish holy sites
that fall under the PA control in the transfer of lands, and (6) to educate their people
for peace (Feith, 1996, p. 6; Kopping & Shore, 2003).
In the light of these commitments Israel agreed (1) to give Palestinians the right
to self-govern Gaza and Jericho, (2) to recognize the PLO as a legal governing
body that represents the Palestinians everywhere (3) to transfer land over to PA
control(23), (4) to educate its public towards peace, and (5) to prepare the Israeli
population for the difficult compromises that would need to be made in order to
allow for the establishment of the Palestinian entity right next door (Shlaim, 2005a,
p. 245; Kopping & Shore, 2003; Dunn, 2004). The exchange of letters between
Arafat and Rabin was even more profound than this as Yasser Arafat’s letters con-
stituted forfeiting the Palestinians’ “right to violent resistance” (Lerner, 2012).
Moreover, it committed (6) to allow for the creation of a PA police force that
(23)The exact amount to be determined in a series of intimate deals.
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consisted of ten thousand pro-Arafat Palestinian fighters to maintain internal se-
curity, particularly in Gaza and Jericho, with Israel retaining overall responsibility
for external security and foreign affairs, and (7) to transfer power to ‘authorized
Palestinians’ in five spheres; education, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and
tourism (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 245; Kopping & Shore, 2003). Shlaim (2005a, p. 245)
stated: ‘the Declaration of Principles promised to set in motion a process that would
end Israeli rule over the two million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza’.
On the 13th of September 1993, “the Declaration was signed on the Southern
Lawn of the White House and sealed with the historic handshake between Prime
Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat” (Falk & Morgenstern, 2009, p. 242). By ac-
cepting the principle of partitioning Palestine and the territorial comprises as an end-
ing solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the two parties have “suspended the
ideological dispute as to who is the rightful owner of Palestine and turned to finding
a practical solution to the problem of sharing the cramped living space between the
Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea” (Shlaim, 2005a, p. 246). Moreover, Israel
by signing this declaration “not only recognized the PLO; it also recognized the
existence of the Palestinians as a people” (Scham et al., 2013, p. 7).
Despite the strong and vociferous opposition of hard-liners(24) to the Rabin-
Arafat deal, both leaders had received the support and approval of the majority
for this peace agreement. Another follow-up treaty was held in the 4th of May in
the same year and yielded the Gaza-Jericho Agreement or the so-called ‘the Cairo
agreement’; an agreement concluded for establishing a Palestinian autonomy in
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for a maximum transition period of five years
(Shlaim, 2005a, p. 246).
Oslo Accord II
On the 28th of September 1995, the second Oslo accord was signed between Rabin
and Arafat; a 300-page accord that “marked the point of no return in the process
of ending Israel’s coercive control over the Palestinian people” (Shlaim, 2005a,
p. 246). However, the implementation of the agreement was cut short by the as-
sassination of Rabin by a religious-nationalist Jewish fanatic a month after signing
the agreement, which led to “a serious blow to the entire peace process” (Ibid.,),
especially, after the electoral defeat of the Labor party headed by Shimon Peres
in May 1996, and the return of power to the Likud under Netanyahu’s leadership.
Upon taking office, the latter refused to withdraw troops from areas that were still
under Israeli occupation, and vehemently opposed the Labour government’s ‘Land-
(24)Nationalists and militant resistance movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the Pales-
tinian side and the right-wing nationalist parties and the far right-wing Likud party on the Israeli
side.
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for-Peace’ deal with the PLO (Palmowski, 2004; Palestine Facts, 2011b).
During his term as a prime minister, Netanyahu relentlessly started demolishing
houses, confiscating lands, vigorously expanding Jewish settlements, building an
elaborate network of settler’s ‘bypass’ roads, uprooting plantations, imposing cur-
fews and encroaching on Muslim holy places in Jerusalem (Avnery, 2010, p. 15).
Soon after an extensive period of economic and political war of attrition against the
Palestinians, American pressures compelled Netanyahu to sign two agreements(25),
in which the Likud party agreed to concede territories to the Palestinians. These
agreements were the reason behind the revolt of ultra-nationalists and religious
groups against Netanyahu’s actions and a year later to the fall of his government
(Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 7).
Optimists could still believe that “a return of the Labor party would mark a re-
turn to the ‘original spirit’ of the agreement” (Ibid., p. 7). In May 1999, the landslide
victory of the Labor party headed by Ehud Barak brought him into office. Unfor-
tunately, Barak dashed the hopes of reviving the moribund peace process with his
arrogant and authoritarian policies. Indeed, optimists did not take into considera-
tion that Barak as an interior minister in the Rabin government had actually voted
against Oslo at a time when faith in the Oslo agreement was at its peak (Shlaim,
2005a, p: 253-254). As soon as Barak came into power, he proceeded with the rapid
expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the confiscation of lands, and
he argued that the ‘Land-for-Peace’ deal does not serve Israel’s interests because,
in his opinion, Palestinians will always come back for more (Ibid.).
2.1.4 Current History
Camp David
In an attempt to conclude the issues(26) that were investigated by the Oslo accord,
the final stage of negotiations in the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Prin-
ciples was set out by the meeting of the Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser
Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and United States President Bill Clin-
ton in Maryland in the period from 11th till the 25th of July (Tucker, 2010, p. 143).
Unfortunately, those several meetings have culminated with failure due to many fac-
tors, most importantly, “the misjudgments and procedural errors made by all three
parties” (Balaban, 2005, p. 11). In addition to other factors, major differences of
opinion have reduced the likelihood of a successful deal later in 2000 / 2001.
(25)Namely, the Hebron Protocol on the 15th of January 1997, and the Wye River Memorandum on
the 23rd of October 1998.
(26)Such as the issues of Jerusalem, refugees right of return, borders, Jewish settlements and more.
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Failure of Camp David - The dominant version of what happened at the Camp
David summit was the Israeli one (echoed by the Clinton administration). It claimed
and emphasized on the generous offer by the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to
the Palestinians and the rejection of Palestinian negotiators to those offers with-
out giving any counterproposal to them (Dajani, 2005, p. 86). According to this
version, Barak offered the Palestinians “a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and
91% of the West Bank, a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, shared control of
the Temple Mount / Noble Sanctuary in Jerusalem’s Old City, and a commitment
to dismantle many Israeli settlements in the West Bank” (Pressman, 2003, p. 5).
Also, he proposed “the annexation of Jewish neighborhoods (settlements) in East
Jerusalem” (Ibid., p. 8), the establishment of three Israeli warning stations in the
West Bank, an Israeli presence at Palestinian borders crossings, and a demilitarized
Palestinian State for security concerns, in addition to a conditional return for the
Palestinian refugees under family reunification programs (Rydelnik, 2007, p. 215).
The Israeli version claimed that Palestinian negotiators, particularly Arafat have
turned down the diplomatic route to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. The Israelis also claimed that the Palestinian pressing need for recognizing
the refugees right of return has boosted their unwillingness to accept Israel’s right
to exist, their desire to destroy Israel, and were not seeking reconciliation with the
Israelis (Pressman, 2003, p. 5).
According to Pressman’s careful assessments of the event, the Palestinian ver-
sion is “much closer to the evidentiary record of articles, interviews, and documents
produced by participants in the negotiations, as well as testimonies of journalists
and other analysts” (p. 6). It stated that the Israeli’s offer at Camp David did not
entail the removal of many vestiges of the Israeli occupation in terms of land, se-
curity, settlements, and Jerusalem (Sheppard, 2009, p. 157). Moreover, the Israeli
definition(27) of the West Bank differed approximately 5% (5,538 km2 instead of
5,854 km2) from the Palestinian definition, leading to a net of 86.0% of the West
Bank, and that Palestinians were offered a noncontiguous state; breaking the West
Bank into three separate areas. Besides, Israel offered the Palestinians only a func-
tional autonomy; not a Palestinian sovereignty in core Arab neighborhoods(28) of
East Jerusalem, and even they demanded some form of sovereignty over the Haram
al-Sharif (Pressman, 2003, p: 17–18; Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 8).
The Palestinians denied the Israeli-American claim that the PA has preferred vi-
olence over peaceful negotiations and emphasized on the real reasons for launching
the second Intifada. According to the PA, the aim of the second uprising was not
(27)They omitted the area known as ‘No Man’s Land’ (50 km2 near Latrun), post 1967 East
Jerusalem (71 km2) and the territorial waters of the Dead Sea (195 km2) (Pressman, 2003, p. 16).
(28)Al-Shaykh Jarrah, al-Suwwanah, al-Tur, Salah-al-Din Street, Bab al-Amud, Ra’s al-Amud, and
Silwan (Pressman, 2003, p. 18).
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destroying Israel but rather was caused by factors under Israel’s control (Ibid., p.
6). Pressman (2003, p. 16) added in his observation that the Israeli offer at Camp
David was unprecedented. Barak by proposing to divide sovereignty in Jerusalem
went further than any previous Israeli leader. However, “it was neither generous nor
complete as Israel has since suggested” (p. 15). Moreover, the Israeli proposal at
Camp David, as noticed above “was not forthcoming enough, while they neglected
key components” (p. 16).
The Breakdown of the Camp David - On one level, the breakdown of the
Camp David was the product of the clash between Israeli demands for further con-
cessions on the part of Palestinians on final status issues in return of a greater land
area and the Palestinians inability to concede more on these issues after having al-
ready conceded a lot during the transitional period. Not to mention the Israeli idea
of shared sovereignty(29), that according to Klein (2004) ‘was on this point that the
summit ended’, plus the annexation of three settlement blocs that would extend Is-
raeli territory along the strip that extends from Jericho westward to Beit-Sahour,
“effectively splitting the West Bank into two parts” (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p:
8–9). Agha and Malley (2001, p. 13) stated:
‘The negotiations that took place between July 2000 and February 2001 have
created an indelible chapter in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
This may be hard to discern today, amid the continuing violence and accumu-
lated mistrust. However, taboos were shattered, the unspoken got spoken, and
during that period, Israelis and Palestinians reached an unprecedented level
of understanding of what it would take to end the conflict’.
Second Palestinian Uprising ‘Intifada’
The immediate trigger for the second Intifada (or uprising) in September 2000 had
been the shooting of demonstrators at the site against the background of the collapse
of the Camp David (II) summit in July. It was mainly connected to Ariel Sharon’s
visit accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers to the Haram al-Sharif on
the 28th of September 2000. Balaban (2005, p. 149) described Sharon’s visit at that
particular time as ‘throwing a lit match into a gasoline can with all the children in
the neighborhood standing by’.
Nevertheless, in both cases, one should look beyond the sparks “to the deeper
factors that determined the sudden transition from a seemingly routinized system
of control to a widespread violence involving young men and women ready to give
their lives for the sake of ending the status quo” (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 5).
(29)Vertically divided sovereignty in which the Palestinians would control the ground level, and the
Israelis would control the area below the surface of the Haram (Hammami & Tamari, 2001, p. 9)
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The continuation of mass detention, house demolition, expansion of settlements,
economic frustration, violation of international law and human rights, the policy of
repression against Palestinians, continued the perpetuation of the occupation and
Israel’s violations at the Haram al-Sharif along with other Muslim and Christian
shrines in the occupied Palestinian territories. All those factors were behind trigger-
ing the second Intifada (Ibid.; Batchoun, 2003a).
The Israeli government on the other hand claimed that the Palestinian leadership
planned and initiated the second Intifada because they wanted to provoke and in-
cur Palestinian casualties as a mean to regain diplomatic initiative (Pressman, 2003,
p. 12; Mitchell Report, 2001, p. 6), particularly, after the collapse of the Camp David
negotiations on the 25th of July 2000, and the “widespread appreciation in the in-
ternational community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse” (Asthana &
Nirmal, 2009, p. 247). However, according to Agha and Malley (2001) and Balaban
(2005, p. 148) the uprising was not a Palestinian initiative but a reaction to the Israeli
army excessive use of force.
Counter Israeli stances suggested that there were numerous Palestinian testi-
monies and documentation of prepared plans and forces ready for the breakout of
the second intifada, yet Jamal (2005, p. 155) believed that it is not evident that
any Palestinian political force planned it in advance. Rather, the second intifada
was “rooted in Israeli policies of settlement, land confiscation, and assassinations
since the signing of the Oslo Accord”. Hammami and Tamari (2001, p. 5) briefly
described the second Intifada:
‘The young men armed with stones facing the mightiest army in the Middle
East, the grieving mothers, the nationalist symbols unfurled at martyrs’ funer-
als all seemed to like are staging off the same events twelve years earlier. Even
the parades of masked youth carrying guns recall the final days of the first in-
tifada. This time, however, the episodes were more condensed, the killings
were more brutal, the reactions swifter, and the media coverage more intense.
Within a matter of weeks, the language of the uprising had become the idiom
of everyday life’.
Middle East Peace Summit
On the 17th of October 2000, in an attempt “to end the violence, to prevent its recur-
rence, and to find a path back to the peace process”, the government of Israel, the
Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, the United Nations and the
European Union have gathered together in the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm
el-Sheikh, Egypt. The summit was proved by the formation and the development
of an international investigation commission led by former US Senator George J.
Mitchell.
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The main goal of the so-called ‘the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Commis-
sion’ or the ‘Mitchell Commission’ was to answer the questions of ‘what happened’,
‘why it happened’, and ‘how the recurrence of violence [could] be prevented’. In
other words, to “forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the
future” (Mitchell Report, 2001, p. 4). The Israeli side had many reservations(30) and
expressed their dissatisfaction with the Mitchell Commission Report responding:
“it drove a nail into the coffin of any credibility that George Mitchell can ever have
as a Middle East envoy” (Bedein, 2009).
The Extraordinary Arab League Summit
Five days later, Arab leaders met in an extraordinary Arab League Summit in Cairo
and issued a communiquè. In summary, the communiquè comprised of the follow-
ing (The League of Arab States, 2000):
First, it praised the Palestinian Intifada that was the result of the bitterness of disap-
pointment after the longing years of anticipation and waiting to see a political
settlement, which has not been achieved because of the Israeli’ intransigence
and procrastination in implementing their commitments.
Second, it expressed Arab sympathy and prayers for mercy on the souls of the
martyrs who paid their lives to establish the State of Palestine and to achieve
peace.
Third, it condemned Israel’s acts against Palestinians and affirmed the right of the
Palestinians for a just compensation from Israel for human losses and material
damage.
Fourth, it decided in response to the proposal of Saudi Arabia to finance projects
designed to preserve the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem, to disengage
Palestine from its subordination to the Israeli economy, to allocate payments
to families of Palestinian martyrs in the uprising, and to take care of the edu-
cation of their children.
Finally, it called for the formation of an impartial international investigation com-
mittee under the auspice of the United Nations that reports to the Security
Council and to the Commission on Human Rights on the causes and the re-
sponsibility for the serious deterioration in the occupied Palestinian territories
and the massacres committed by Israeli occupation forces against Palestini-
ans, the Lebanese and other Arab citizens in the occupied territories. Also, it
demanded the Security Council to form an international criminal court to put
Israeli war criminals on trial.
(30)See: Bedein (2009).
43
2.1. HISTORIC REVIEW
Clinton Bridging Proposal
On the 2nd of December 2000, Saeb Erekat, PA chief negotiator, and Shlomo Ben-
Ami; Israeli Foreign Minister, met in Washington as guests of US President Clin-
ton to conclude an agreement. However, in the four-day meetings, no progress was
made despite Clinton’s attempts to suggest proposals designed to bridge the gaps
between both sides (Katz, 2005, p. 79). Instead, he provoked anti-American senti-
ments in the Arab world because of his stand in favor of Israel regarding the status
of Jerusalem (Donway, 1997, p. 590).
President Clinton in his proposal summarized the differences between the two
sides and proposed the resolution of each (Katz, 2005, p. 79). Both sides said yes
to the plan but with reservations that vitiated it (Pressman, 2003, p. 20). President
Clinton (2001, p. 174) stated: ‘both; Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat
have now accepted these parameters as the basis for further efforts. Both have ex-
pressed some reservations’. It was true, and both sides were committed to the Clin-
ton plan later at the Taba talks and used the ideas of his plan as the framework for
the Taba talks with their respective qualifications and reservations (Pressman, 2003,
p. 21).
The Taba Talks
Despite Israel’s earlier claims not to negotiate as long as violence continued, un-
der European and Egyptian patronage, members of the Israeli delegation had met
with their Palestinian counterparts on the 21st of January 2001 to negotiate a so-
lution, on the condition that those talks will be informal until all relevant issues
had been resolved (Peri, 2006, p. 102). Nevertheless, the escalation of violence in
the area and the fact that neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian public opinion were
inclined to compromise have made reaching a solution even much more difficult.
Ultimately, following the electoral defeat of Barak’s government at the hands of the
hardline Likud leader Ariel Sharon in February 2000, the prospects for meaningful
permanent status negotiations has quickly faded and “time ran out for the Taba ne-
gotiations to produce a comprehensive agreement on refugees and other permanent
issues, and it ended without a formal agreement” (Chiller-Glaus, 2007, p. 215).
From a Jewish and Arab State to Israel and Palestine
On the 12th of March 2002, in response to the request of President Bush, the Secu-
rity Council passed Resolution 1397, through which, the international community,
represented by the United Nations, have reiterated the importance of Resolutions
242 and 338. It demanded the solution that President Clinton could never explicitly
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call for during his term of the peace process, which was: ‘affirming a vision for the
region where two states, Israel, and Palestine, live side by side within secured and
recognized borders’ (Security Council Resolution 1397; Golan, 2004, p. 39). Be-
sides, it called for an end to violence, implementation of Tenet and Mitchell plans,
and referred to the Saudi initiative (Ibid., p. 39). Months later, the Bush administra-
tion unveiled its ‘Roadmap’ outlining the steps for a Palestinian statehood (Khalil,
2007, p. 98).
Operation “Defensive Shield”
At the end of March 2002, the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the Is-
raeli army to launch what so called the ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ (in Hebrew:,
Mivtza Homat Magen, lit. ‘Operation Defensive Wall’). It was a “large-scale mili-
tary operation conducted by the Israeli ‘Defense Forces’ in 2002, during the course
of the second Intifada” (Surhone et al., 2010, p. 204). It was the largest military
operation in the West Bank since the 1967 Six-Day War (Senker, 2005, p. 9).
For Israel, the main aim of this extensive operation was to stop the increasing
deaths from “terrorist” attacks, especially in light of the growing number of suicide
bombings carried out by Palestinian militants. Therefore, the “IDF” used this oper-
ation as a means to fight “terrorism” and destroy its infrastructure (Surhone et al.,
2010, p. 204; Senker, 2005, p. 9; Lauterpach & Greenwood, 2008, p. 335). Surhone
et al. (2010, p. 204) stated:
‘The spark that gave rise to the action was the March 27th suicide bombing at
a hotel in the Israeli resort city of Netanya. A Palestinian suicide bomber blew
himself up amongst a group of civilians celebrating Passover Seder at the
Park Hotel, killing 30 mostly elderly vacationers. The attack became known
as the ‘Passover Massacre’’.
Chao (2011, p. 13) added:
‘Palestinian violence has incited Israeli military retaliation, such as the Gaza
War and Operation Defensive Shield, causing international criticism over Is-
raeli brutality’.
Palestinians on the other hand, condemned the aggressive nature of this “offen-
sive” military strategy. Describing it as the “prelude to Israel’s ethnic cleansing of
the Palestinians” (Hamzeh & May, 2003, p. 199), a witness to Israeli war crimes,
and the largest military operation against Palestinian civilians since the 1948 Arab-
Israeli War (Ibid.,). During this operation, the Israeli army used the most advanced
weaponry at its disposal(31) to attack Palestinian cities in the West Bank. Schools,
(31)Merkava tanks, Apache attack helicopters and F-15 fighter jets.
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offices, and clinics were shelled (Senker, 2005, p. 9), Leading by the end of April
21st to the destruction of the Palestinian economic and social infrastructure, leveling
large swathes of residential area, killing 220 Palestinians, committing a massacre in
Jenin, injuring hundreds more, and arresting 6000 thousands of Palestinians while
nearly 17000 had their homes demolished (Hamzeh & May, 2003, p. 199; Ovendal,
2004, p. 315; Senker, 2005, p. 9). Ovendal (2004, p. 315) stated:
‘On the 2nd of March an Israeli newspaper quoted Israeli “Defense Force” In-
telligence reports to the effect that the American-backed IDF actions in the
occupied territories had prevented the Palestinian Authority from taking ac-
tions against “terrorists”, and that the “IDF” assassinations and bombings
were the reason for the suicide bombings against Israelis and had led se-
nior Palestinian Authority leaders to co-operate with the “terrorist” groups.
The Israeli attacks prevented Arafat from cracking down on the Palestinian
militants, and Palestinian reprisals provided Sharon with the excuse to delay
peace negotiations and mount assaults on centers of Palestinian population’.
The Roadmap
Following the negotiations of Mideast Quartet(32) on the 3rd of April 2003, and in
response to the feedback(33) of the Palestinians and the Israelis during the process,
the Quartet adopted and unveiled the ‘Road Map’ for peace. This major international
effort focused on establishing and advancing a new peace process that outlined the
steps believed necessary for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Cordesman &
Moravitz, 2005, p. 301; Price, 2003, p. 142).
The Road Map consisted of three scheduled phases and several concrete de-
mands; Phase 1 to be immediately accomplished. Phase 2 to be accomplished as
early as the end of 2003, and finally, Phase 3 to be accomplished in 2004 and 2005
(Ibid., p. 142). In summary, the Road Map “sought to establish a Palestinian state
by 2005 - considering that after the establishment of a Palestinian state a final set-
tlement would soon follow. Also, Israel was required to refrain from constructing
settlements, and to disengage from its borders with Gaza and the West Bank. At
the same time, the Palestinian Authority was required to take dramatic steps to stop
attacks against Israel” (Cordesman & Moravitz, 2005, p. 301).
Reservations of the Road Map - Although the Road Map of the US has re-
ceived an enormous international interest and attention since its inception, and de-
spite the Quartet attempt to push it forward, the level of success of this map to
(32)The Mideast Quartet comprises of the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Nations
and the European Union.
(33)On the 4th of June, a summit was held in Aqaba, Jordan, to hear pledges from the represented
Israeli and Palestinian leadership to the Road Map (Price, 2003, p. 142).
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reinstate the peace process was declining day by day due to several factors; the
Palestinians see the main reasons for this decline to be (Palestine Media Center,
2004):
First, the articles and the three phases of the Road Map have attracted most of
the attention to the security of Israel at the expense of other political aspects.
Moreover, the benefits were not mutually balanced and equal between the two
parties and were skewed in favor of the Israeli side. This has raised suspicion
in the plan and mistrust towards the United States’ objectives and intentions.
Secondly, the Road Map repeated the same mistakes and flaws of the Oslo agree-
ment: (1) it limited most of the actions in the first and second phases to secu-
rity issues and procedures, and (2) deferred the most important issues of inter-
est to the parties to negotiate a mutual agreement to the final stage. For exam-
ple, the refugees’ right of return - Sharon called for no return for the refugees
as a precondition for acceptance of a Palestinian state. In other words, the
Road Map would strip the Palestinians off the causes of force (resistance)
and then impose the bitter reality of Israeli conditions on Palestinians, which
means getting into a vicious circle of negotiations, as what happened in the
Oslo agreement and related covenants.
Thirdly, the security nature of the Road Map, particularly after the amendments
made by the US administration in response to Israel’s 14 reservations to it
(Butenschøn, 2006, p. 286). These reservations transformed the Road Map
into a security agenda and the Palestinian Authority to a security forum to
apply this program, which would have to worsen the situation and embarrass
Mahmoud Abbas(34) in front of the Palestinians.
Permanent Status Agreement
A major step forward was taken when the Geneva Accord was first concluded in
December 2003 in Switzerland. This accord was the outcome of official and non-
official tracks of talks between key figures in Israel and Palestine. The Geneva Ac-
cord was not an alternative for previous official negotiations(35) but a complemen-
tary one. It was a detailed model of a permanent status agreement that specified
possible terms of resolution, to put an end to the conflict and all mutual claims.
Moreover, that would be acceptable to mainstream elements in both societies based
on previous talks and agreements (Lerner, 2004, p. VII; Klein, 2004, p. 233).
What distinguished the Geneva Accord from previous documents dealing with
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is that it was a detailed model. A model that included
(34)The Palestinian Prime Minister at that time.
(35)UN Resolutions, the Quartet Roadmap, the Clinton Parameters and the Arab Peace Initiative.
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a precise map of the proposed permanent arrangement; something that was missing
before the Geneva Accord, and, “as opposed to earlier documents, the Geneva Ac-
cord was a signed agreement” (Ibid., p. 203). In this context Klein (2004, p. 233)
wrote: ‘the very fact of the signatures creates a personal commitment that differs
from a document published by a host institution’. Furthermore, the accord was
signed by more than twenty people on each side and not only by few individu-
als, who represented the genuine commitment and agreement to the articles of this
accord (Ibid., p. 233). The Geneva Accord offered several steps that its parties be-
lieved could resolve some of the most intractable issues, most importantly were the
acceptance of the ‘other’ as legitimate, security arrangements, territory, refugees
and Jerusalem (Klein, 2004, p: 233–250; Hauser, 2003).
On the one hand, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his government have bitterly
criticized and vehemently opposed the accord, and described the Israeli role in it as
subversive. Moreover, not only did they not embrace the accord, but as a reaction
to the support the accord has gained in Israel and abroad, the Israeli government
had taken unilateral steps in an attempt to ease its plight. On the other hand, the
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has called the accord ‘a brave initiative that opens
the door for hope’, the Palestinian Authority “has refrained from formally endorsing
the Geneva Accord because of the Israeli government’s failure to do so and because
such a step meant grappling with internal political struggles and making decisions
that the Palestinian government feels are premature” (Klein, 2004, p. 251). Besides,
Palestinian militant groups have rejected the plan, dubbing its drafters as traitors.
As mentioned above, since 1948, the Geneva Accord was the first detailed fore-
runner of an agreement that could actually work if there was the political will to
implement it, even though it was not the case. It became the term of reference in
every political and expert debate on the parameters of a permanent status agreement
(Lerner, 2004, p. VII).
Israel’s Security Barrier and Palestine’s Apartheid Wall
In June 2002, following several suicide bombings and attacks by Palestinian mili-
tants on Israeli targets that “haphazardly killed men, women, and children mostly
because they were simply Jewish or Israelis” (Stein, 2002, p. 4), the Israeli Cabinet
headed by Ariel Sharon approved the construction of ‘the Separation Barrier’ or
‘Security Fence’ as the Israelis termed it, and the ‘Apartheid Wall’ or ‘the Racial
Segregation Wall’ as the Palestinian referred to it (United Nations, 2005, p. 3). Is-
rael claimed that the central idea behind the construction of the wall was to create
an obstacle impermeable to suicide bombers attempting to infiltrate into Israel. An
automatic consequence was to separate the West Bank from Israel physically to
prevent such attacks on Israeli citizens (Shindler, 2008, p. 325).
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Nowadays, the total length of the wall is more than 700 km. According to the
Committee for the Review of the State Budget in 2007, the estimated cost of
the completed barrier till 2007 was between 13 to 15 billion New Israeli Shekel
(NIS). The wall consists of a combination of ditches, trenches, razor wire, electronic
fences, groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, buffer
zones and around 45 km length, 8 – 9 meter height concrete wall (United Nations,
2005, p. 3; United Nations, 2009, p. 8).
The route inside the West Bank severs people’s reach to their farms (inside closed
areas) to harvest crops and earn living and restricts access to their jobs and services,
livelihoods; including access to education and health services. Family and social
relations became impaired, particularly for those living in closed areas such as in
Jenin, Qalqiliya and Tulkarem districts; it obstructed them from maintaining family
connections in the remaining areas of the West Bank, and to access religious shrines
and cultural facilities (United Nations, 2005, p: 3–5).
74.6% of the Barrier is inside the West Bank territory (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 1),
and further encumbered the movement between the northern and southern areas
of the West Bank because it blocked current roads used by Palestinians to travel
between these areas. Also, Palestinians residing in ‘closed areas’ between the barrier
and the Green Line were required to apply for ‘green’ permits to remain living in
their homes and to continue residing in these ‘closed areas’. Neither the future of
their personal nor their land statutes have become certain of them (Ibid., p. 5).
Humanitarian consequences of the wall included leaving the Palestinians facing
economic hardship, the destruction of their lands and properties that would take
many years to recover, and the isolation of fragmented communities and residence
from social support networks. About 10.1% of West Bank and East Jerusalem most
fertile land; that is the homeland for 49,400 West Bank Palestinians living in 38
villages and towns, lie between the barrier and the Green Line (Ibid., p: 3-6).
On the 9th of July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the princi-
pal judicial organ of the United Nations issued an Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
declaring the Barrier illegal and calling on Israel to dismantle the Barrier (Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2009). In that opinion, the ICJ
stated:
‘Israel has the right, and indeed the duty to respond in order to protect the
life of its citizens. The measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in
conformity with international law. . . The Court accordingly finds that the con-
struction of the wall, and its associated regime, are contrary to international
law. . . Israel accordingly has the obligation to cease forthwith the works of
construction of the wall being built by it in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
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tory, including in and around East Jerusalem. . . Cessation of those violations
of its international obligations entails in practice the dismantling forthwith of
those parts of the structure. . . The Court nds further that Israel has the obliga-
tion to make reparation for the damage caused to all natural or legal persons
concerned’(36).
Moreover, in the 20th of July 2004, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the ICJ
opinion. Israel, however, proclaimed that it would not abide by the ICJ decision, but
it did plan amendments in the route of the barrier to satisfy the requirements of the
Israeli High Court of Justice (IHCJ).
Events of 2004
Sharon was suddenly confronted with a financial scandal that seemed to implicate
his sons, as well as himself, in a cloud of corruption. The elections were still weeks
away, and his victory was far from assured (Eytan, 2006, p. 121). The assassinations
of Sheikh Yassin; the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas in March 2004, and
the next leader of Hamas; Abdel Aziz Al-Rantissi; a month afterwards, symbolizes
Israel’s belief that “they could weaken their enemy by targeting its leadership”, the
leadership from which the will of Hamas stems (Milton-Edwards & Farrell, 2010,
p. 108).
The Palestinian-Israeli scenario continued; each with claimed justifications for
their acts; whether the Palestinian suicide bombings and resistant or offensive at-
tacks, such as the double suicide attacks on the 31th of August 2004, in Beersheba,
or the assassinations and massacres committed against the Palestinians, such as in
the ‘Rainbow Operation’ on May 2004, and the ‘Operation Days of Repentance’ in
October 2004 (Isseroff, 2009).
On the 11th of November 2004, Yasser Arafat; the figurehead of the modern
Palestinian national movement for forty years “passed away”, and on the 9th of Jan-
uary 2005 Mahmoud Abbas had been elected as his successor to the presidency of
the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) (Honig-Parnass & Haddad, 2007, p. 254).
Immediately after being elected, Abbas called for the implementation of the Road
Map and starting a discussion of final status issues (Report of the Council of Eu-
rope, 2005, p. 135). On the 8th of February 2005, the Sharm el-Sheikh summit was
held between President Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon. The main outcome of the
summit was the parties commitment to cease all acts of violence and to declare their
willingness to work towards the end of the four-year Al-Aqsa Intifada. Neverthe-
less, following the same pattern of previously held conferences, peace efforts were
doomed to failure because of Israel’s violations of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements,
(36)Arts. 141, 142, 151, 153.
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and the continued firing of Al-Qassam rockets, and mortar shelling of Israeli targets
by Palestinian militants (United Nations, 2000, p. 6).
The Disengagement Plan
Following three years of Israeli-Palestinian violence with no prospects for negoti-
ations, with the Israeli conviction that there is no reliable Palestinian partner with
whom they can make progress in a two-sided peace process. Ariel Sharon declared
in the Herzliya Speech on the 18th of December 2003, what he called the ‘unilater-
ally disengagement plan’. According to Sharon, if Palestinians would not do their
part on their program in a couple of months then Israel would initiate a unilateral
security step of disengagement from the Palestinians. This policy would require the
relocation of some Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the compen-
sation of those settlers who would be required to move. Upon the completion of this
process, there was no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces in
Gaza (Rabinovich & Reinharz, 2008, p. 544).
Sharon faced frenzied resistance among his coalition partners and, indeed, within
his own party, however, “he was able to pass the resolution in the Israeli cabinet
on June 6, 2004, and supporting legislation on October 25, 2004” (Ibid., p. 544).
Consequently, Sharon formed a new government with the Labor Party in January
2005. In the 15th of August 2005, Ariel Sharon initiated the disengagement plan,
in which all Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and another three settlements in
the West Bank were evacuated. The evacuation of 25 settlements with their 9400
settlers from Gaza Strip and northern West Bank to Israeli territories took place
over a period of three weeks. The settlements were officially handed over to the
Palestinians on the 12th of September (Reinhart, 2006, p. 30; Alpher, 2003). At that
time, Sharon declared:
‘The disengagement plan is the most important plan for Israel in the current
time, a plan that aimed at moving settlements from places where they cause us
problems to places where we want to remain in a permanent arrangement’.
Furthermore, it was considered an initial step towards surmounting the demographic
problem and the dangers of direct ongoing occupation (Ibid.). In addition to the fact
that Sharon recognized the need for close American support, who in turn backed
and assured the plan. The plan was approved by a majority of 65 Knesset members,
compared to 45 opposed and 7 abstentions. Moreover, it was opposed in a referen-
dum held by Sharon’s own Likud Party, and then, he refused to take it to the public
in a referendum (Lerner, 2012; Reinhart, 2006, p. 30).
Israelis varied in their responses to the plan; opponents of the plan claimed that
Sharon was diverting attention from the investigations held against him and his sons.
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Others described the disengagement’s plan as a disgrace and the evacuation of Gaza
as a defeat. On the other hand, a prevailing alternative view contended that Sharon
had decided to relinquish Gaza to focus his efforts to expand and strengthen Israel’s
grip on the West Bank and to expand its settlements. From this perspective, “the
continued occupation of the densely populated Gaza Strip became too costly, ab-
sorbing military and other resources” (Reinhart, 2006, p. 30). Israeli expansionists
stated:
‘It is clear that Israel does not benefit from this piece of land, one of the most
densely populated areas in the world, and (unlike the West Bank) lacking any
natural resources’ (Ibid., p: 30-32).
Khatib (2003) concluded:
‘It is one of the most dangerous Israeli plans to imperil the peace process and
the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. This plan proposes to use the wall that Is-
rael has built along the outlines of a 35-year-old settlement expansion project
in order to determine by force the final arrangements for the Palestinian ter-
ritories. In his speech, Sharon talked explicitly about consolidating illegal
settlements, rather than removing them, with no regard for Israel’s obligation
to stop building settlements according to the roadmap’.
Jarbawi (2003) added, ‘basically, Sharon had in mind that part of the West Bank
would be incorporated into the state of Israel. The wall was the marker and not
a security barrier, but the border’. However, for Palestinian fighters and militant
groups the disengagement plan was considered an Israeli retreat, and instead of
diminishing attacks against it, could have led “to more threats in more vital areas
and eventually undermine Israel’s very existence” (Telhami, 2004, p. 8).
London Conference
On the 1st of March 2005 a conference hosted by Great Britain in London to pro-
mote the Middle East peace process. The conference was attended by representa-
tives of the US, other foreign ministers from more than twenty countries and the
newly elected president of the PA; President Mahmoud Abbas. Israel decided to
boycott this step. The conference urged the Palestinian leadership to pursue ‘re-
forms’ and stressed upon the necessity of ending Palestinian attacks, and the dis-
armament of Palestinian militant groups. In line with this, the final communiquè
condemned the 25th of February suicide attack in Tel Aviv and called on the PA to
pursue sustained actions against them. It agreed to offer the Palestinian Authority
more economic support to help it achieve these goals (Mohsen & Nafi, 2005, p. 159;
Kumaraswamy, 2009, p. 159). Following the suicide bombing in a Tel Aviv night-
club in February 2005, Sharon repeatedly demanded: ‘there will be no progress until
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the Palestinians carry out a determined campaign to destroy the “terrorist” groups
and their infrastructure’. In response to that, Abbas vowed to punish those respon-
sible for the attacks and therefore, the Palestinian security forces have arrested six
Islamic Jihad militants who were suspected to be involved in the bombing (Report
of the Council of Europe, 2005, p. 135).
Additionally, Abbas managed after several days of internal talk with Palestinian
militant groups in Cairo to reach an agreement to continue what so called the
‘lull’ (calm or Tahdiya in Arabic) of fighting with Israel until the end of the year.
This agreement symbolized the willingness of participants “to complete the pro-
cess of democratization in the Palestinian society” and the recognition of their need
for the reform of the PA in every area, which would start by new elections for the
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) (Reinhart, 2006, p: 86–87).
Palestinian Legislative Elections of 2006
On January 2006, Sharon suffered a serious stroke and was brought to Jerusalem’s
Hadassah Hospital from his ranch in the Negev desert leaving the new Kadima party
in the hands of Ehud Olmert, who won the elections two months later, on a dovish
platform (Rabinovich, 2011, p. 163).
On the 25th of the same month, the Palestinian legislative elections took place.
Most of polling and research centers revealed very close results prior to the leg-
islative elections; Fateh’s rate fluctuated between 39.6% and 42.0%, and Hamas
between 29.0% and 35.0%. Surprisingly, the results of these legislative elections
revealed that Hamas - with its manifesto; the ‘Change and Reform List’ that “fo-
cused on the Palestinians’ concerns and daily life issues, as well as on corruption,
unemployment and security” had won 76 seats out of 132 and became in control
of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Cabinet. But Fateh; the ruling party that
dominated Palestinian politics since 1964, did not gain more than 43 seats, with
Mahmoud Abbas as the President with a broad power under Palestinian constitu-
tion (Thorpe, 2006, p. 387; Zweiri, 2006, p: 675-677; Kukali, 2006).
‘How did Hamas win the elections?’ Kukali (2006); The founder and the director
of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) responded to these unexpected
results: ‘polling and research centers deal with concrete data and figures and are
not in a position to predict the internal feelings of the people. Their outcome is
based on the response of the public to definite questions’. Furthermore, he added
that religion was a powerful element in determining the voting trends; a power was
successfully used by Hamas for the purpose of social control and was transformed in
a way to suit their purpose, and influence the Palestinian voting inclination (Kukali,
2006; Serafimova, 2007, p. 29).
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Other reasons that led to the popular disillusionment of Fateh, and thus the vic-
tory of Hamas in the election included the death of Yasser Arafat; Fateh’s unify-
ing leader and symbol, along with Fateh’s divisiveness, widespread disenchantment
with corruption, poor governance, and failure to establish a Palestinian state. In ad-
dition, the withdrawal of Israelis from Gaza Strip, the well-planned election strategy
and well-organized candidates of Hamas, and their use of an open, specific and con-
centrated language on daily life issues, all helped Hamas win the elections (Addis
et al., 2009, p. 22; Zweiri, 2006, p: 675-679).
Hamas’s victory resulted in an increased puzzlement within the Palestinian
street, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the Palestinian relations with the
international community. Thorpe (2006, p. 387) added, ‘President Bush was not
prepared for this development, he wanted free elections, but not such results’. Israel
“opposed the Palestinian legislative elections from the beginning”, and it desper-
ately urged the White House to compel the Palestinians to keep Hamas off the ballot
(Ibid.).
Capture of Gilad Shalit
On the 25th of June 2006, Hamas in a cross-border raid on an Israeli army outpost(37)
had killed two soldiers and abducted the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was held
as captive in Gaza by Hamas since then (Annual Report on Human Rights, 2009,
p. 130). Hamas started to negotiate with Israel to exchange the kidnapped Shalit
with Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. However, Israel refused to negotiate with
Hamas and instead they launched the ‘Summer Rains’ operation, which according
to Mikaberidze (2011, p. 330) was an attempt to secure the release of the captive
soldier alive and to stop the rain of Al-Qassam rockets on Israeli territories. All told,
“between 2001 and 2008, the rockets caused seven Israeli deaths” (Graham, 2010,
p. 288). Conversely, Effarah (2007, p. 520) once stated:
‘It was a deadly operation, where Israel perpetuated the violence to produce
a long, hot, filthy summer of human right violations in the occupied Pales-
tinian territories. . . it was a summer rain showers to kill innocent Palestinian
children, old men, and women of Gaza. . . to cut off electricity, fuel and water
sources. . . it was set for the Israeli planes to fire bombs and missiles at random
just to kill Palestinians. . . it was an operation that included the bombarding of
roads, bridges, universities and private houses, putting in jail ministers and
deputies, while killing full families and starving a whole population’.
According to the United Nations (2000, p. 7) report, since the disengagement from
the Gaza Strip in September 2005 and until August 2006, 450 Palestinians had been
(37)At Karam Abu Slim in Arabic, and Kerem Shalom in Hebrew.
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killed. ‘Operation Summer Rains’ was slowed through a truce agreement between
Israel and Palestinian militant organizations on the 26th of November 2006. The
“IDF” failed to return Shalit, and Al-Qassam rockets continued to fly from Gaza to
Israel through December (Mikaberidze, 2011, p. 330).
Operation ‘Summer Rains’ began in June 2006 after the abduction of the Israeli
soldier ‘Gilad Shalit’ by Hamas during an incursion on the border of Gaza Strip.
The military operation escalated by the firing of many rockets of Izz al-Din al-
Qassam brigades; the armed wing of Hamas, at Israel. The operation continued
later under the name of ‘Operation Autumn Clouds’. Initially, Israeli forces entered
Khan Younis searching for Shalit in the hope of liberating him. Having failed to do
so, they launched a full-scale invasion on the Gaza Strip, raising the number of the
dead resulting from this operation at more than 400 Palestinians and seven Israelis.
Israel agreed to withdraw its forces and a cease-fire was concluded on November 26,
despite the Israeli failure to release Gilad Shalit, who remained under the custody
of the Palestinians until the conclusion of Shalit prisoner exchange deal, brokered
by Egypt in October 2011, where the release of 1027 male and female Palestinian
prisoners (including 500 who were constituted a life sentence), has been effected,
and that after more than five years Shalit spent in captivity in a secret location in
the Gaza Strip, and after Israel with all its capabilities, intelligence apparatus and
agents in the Strip failed to have access to the place of his abduction (Tenenboim-
Weinblatt, 2011, p. 213; Pappe, 2010, p. 1).
Fateh-Hamas Conflict
Hamas’s victory in January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections set in motion a
chain of events that contributed to tense Palestinian factional standoff, primarily, the
declaration of Hamas as a “terrorist” organization, and the refusal to recognize it as
a legitimate winner in the elections, the act by the international community, led by
the United States and the European Union to cut off virtually all financial aid to the
Palestinians, and therefore plunging them deeper into poverty, above and beyond,
their refusal to have direct dealings with Hamas-dominated PA government.
Factional clashes were temporarily eased by the February 2007 Hamas-Fateh
‘Unity Agreement’ brokered by Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, later in June, a clash
broke out in the Gaza Strip between the forces of Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Ab-
bas, and Ismael Haniyeh; one of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin(38) early protgs, and led to
Hamas’s forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. In response to Hamas’s
takeover, the PA President, Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Hamas-led cabinet and
declared a state of emergency. He appointed a ‘caretaker’ technocratic PA gov-
(38)Founder of Hamas.
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ernment in the West Bank (led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a former World
Bank and International Monetary Fund official) (Schanzer, 2008, p. I; Thorpe, 2006,
p. 388; Addis et al., 2009, p. 22; Aljazeera, 2011), “leading to renewed US and in-
ternational assistance for the PA in the West Bank that prompted Hamas to further
tighten its grip on Gaza” (Zanotti, 2010, p. 20).
In November 2007, the Annapolis Conference was held in Annapolis, MD, with
the mediation of the US and the attendance of the Israeli Prime Minister then Ehud
Olmert and PA President Mahmud Abbas. The goal of the conference was to re-
vive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, mainly, “to launch continuous bilateral
negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to simul-
taneously implement the moribund 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Per-
manent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (Migdalovitz, 2007,
p. 1). However, the conference was doomed to fail because of domestic constraints
on both sides as was the case in previous attempts for peace.
Tax Money
Based on previous peace agreements and under an arrangement that dates back to
the 1990s, Israel collects taxes and custom duties from Palestinian goods on behalf
of the Palestinian Authority, mainly, for goods destined for the Palestinian mar-
ket but arriving at Israeli ports, as well as those from “indirect taxation on fuel,
social benefits, health services and income tax from Palestinians employed in Is-
rael” (Eglash, 2015). The PA uses this money to pay salaries, to provide public
services, to meet Palestinian humanitarian needs, and to cover other basic expenses
(Myre, 2007). Every month, Israel transfer an average of $50 million and more of
taxes and customs revenues to the Palestinian Finance Ministry. However, Israel be-
gan withholding the money it collects from custom and excise duties after Hamas
won elections in 2006. Because Israel was frightened that Hamas government will
use this money to perpetrate “terror” against it. Hamas bitterly refused this claim
and stated that it was a Palestinian money and that they as Palestinians had the right
to decide how they would spend it. It is believed that the amount Israel withheld in
January 2007 to be more than $500 million (Myre, 2007). Saeb Erekat(39) criticized
the Israeli move and stated:
‘Israel is once again responding to our legal steps with further illegal collec-
tive punishments. . . the Palestinians were told unofficially that the tax revenue
would not be transferred. This is not an Israeli charity to the Palestinian peo-
ple they are withholding, but our money, which is rightfully ours’.
(39)A member of the PLO executive committee.
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Erekat added: Israel is using tax money to impose political pressures on the Pales-
tinians and the Palestinian government. Moreover, it utilizes it to restrict and dele-
gitimize any Palestinian attempts or ‘unilateral moves’ as described by Netanyahu
to attract international sympathy and support to hold the Israelis accountable for war
crimes they committed against Palestinians. For instance, Israel decided to freeze
at least $127 million from the PA tax revenues as a response to the Palestinian at-
tempts to join the International Criminal Court in The Hague. These attempts if
worked “would give them the ability to request investigations of alleged atrocities
by Israel” (Eglash, 2015). Moshe Maoz(40) stated:
‘Holding back the tax funds could have harsh consequences, including spark-
ing bloodshed or maybe even an intifada, or violent Palestinian uprisings, like
those of the late 1980s and early 2000s’.
The key problem in the view of the Israelis has all along been the non-recognition
of the State of Israel by Hamas. For example, as mentioned earlier, Israel has im-
posed a blockade on Gaza after Hamas’s victory in the legislative elections in 2006
and also tightened the blockade in 2007 after the Hamas takeover of Gaza follow-
ing a coup against Fateh. The blockade contained a list of materials barred from
entering Gaza Strip, including many of the basic food ingredients and construction
materials, in addition to weapons of all kinds. Furthermore, Israel has granted per-
mits to exit Gaza for a very limited number of humanitarian and special cases. As
such, Gaza Strip became besieged from all its borders by both Israel and Egypt.
Egypt is the only Arab country that has with Rafah border crossing a shared bor-
der with Gaza. Due to the pressures and the policies pursued by the Republic of
Egypt towards Hamas Movement in Gaza and the closure of the border, Hamas was
forced to resort to the excavation of tunnels to secure wares barred by Israel and the
smuggling of arms (Aljazeera, 2015; Amnesty International, 2010).
After seizing power in 2012, Mohammed Morsi increased the support for Hamas
through the tunnels. This support enhanced Hamas ability to challenge the Israeli
enemy. Despite Morsi’s failure to control the Egyptian army, which opposed Hamas
support and demolished some tunnels, al-Sisi started - after the coup in Egypt and
his seizure of power - to destroy all the tunnels and build a buffer zone between Gaza
and Egypt while fighting the Muslim Brotherhood. The siege pressure on Gaza has
increased, particularly in the light of Egyptian threats against Hamas, and conse-
quently, Gaza Strip became between the hammer of the Israelis and the anvil of the
Arabs (Milton-Edwards, 2013, p. 60).
The year 2013 witnessed the declaration of the Palestinian and Israeli sides of
the resumption of negotiations between them after three years of stagnation. The
(40)A professor in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem.
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resumption of negotiations came after several shuttle rounds launched by US Sec-
retary of State, John Kerry, to the region. After having held several meetings with
the Palestinian and Israeli officials, the Palestinian Authority agreed to return to the
negotiation table without preconditions, except a partial freeze on the settlement
construction and/or expansion by Israel that did not include all the settlements of
Jerusalem (Ravid et al., 2013). In addition, the resumption of negotiations has been
conditioned by the release of 104 senior Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, a step
characterized by Israeli political sources as a gesture of goodwill towards the Pales-
tinian Authority in exchange of the Palestinian leadership’s refraining from joining
international institutions and corporations during the period of negotiations. The
release of the 104 prisoners, assigned to be in four batches, was made dependent
on the progress of negotiations. The release of the three batches of prisoners took
place in 2013 while Israel felt uncommitted to the release of the fourth batch if the
Palestinian Authority did not agree on the extension of the period of negotiations,
which is the same period I chose to analyze the content for reasons mentioned in
following chapters (Sherwood, 2013).
Hamas made in February 2014 a step towards the reconciliation with the rest
of the Palestinian factions with the aim to form a government of technocrats, in
which Hamas would have only five ministries to hold, for a period not exceed-
ing six months, legislative and presidential elections and the election of a new Na-
tional Council. Indeed, the new government swore the constitutional oath before
Abu Mazen, and thus the unity of the Palestinian parties was believed to have been
achieved as to ease the siege imposed on the people of Gaza. The immediate reac-
tion thereto came from Israel with the imposition of sanctions on Fateh, with the
pretext that it had concluded an agreement with a “terrorist organization”. One of
the most significant sanctions was the prevention of the arrival of three Hamas min-
isters to give an oath in Ramallah and the halt of negotiations with the Palestinian
Authority, and, finally, the reduction of fund transfer. For lifting sanctions, Israel
stipulated the non-cooperation with Hamas (Ben-Meir, 2014).
In June of the same year three settlers were abducted from settlements adjacent
to Gaza Strip. Without any clear evidence, the Israeli army launched a campaign of
arrests of Hamas members in the West Bank, which also included detainees released
under Gilad Shalit Prisoners Exchange Deal of 2012. After a couple of days, the
dead bodies of the three Israeli youths were found in the West Bank. In response
to and in retaliation for the killing of the three young people, a group of settlers
abducted in July of the same year the child Mohammed Abu Khudair and burned
him alive.
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Summary of Operations
The Palestinian-Israeli death loop continued. Each side blamed the other for start-
ing an attack or action, which for the other side is a justification for any ‘backlash
actions’ even if it meant the continuation of death tolls. The loop carries on un-
til massacres and destruction are committed. The international world is aware of
what is happening, protests are taking place all over the place asking for a peaceful
resolution and for the necessity to stop those war crimes. However, international
mediation has always failed to accomplish anything. The acceleration of death tolls
slows down, and both sides started recovering to charge for the second loop that
awaits a trigger to start rotating.
In the last 7 years, many operations claimed the lives of thousands of people.
For instance, Operation Protective Edge (July - August 2014) were 2,100 Palestini-
ans were killed, along with 66 Israeli soldiers and 7 civilians. Operation Pillar of
Defense (November 2012) were 167 Palestinians were killed, along with 6 Israelis.
Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 - January 2009) were 1,417 Palestinians were
killed, including 926 of whom were civilians, along with 10 Israelis (Middle East
Eye, 2014; BBC News, 2014).
2.1.5 Conclusion
If the famous statement confirms that history repeats itself, it is crucial to drop this
deep meaning on reading the events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or simply ac-
cept the opposite of this theory, which is that history does not repeat itself because
it is not possible to repeat the same figures at the same place and time once again.
However, history offers us a sermon, whilst human beings are themselves who re-
peat the same error by following the same steps that ancestors approached. From
this aspect, we realize that history did not repeat itself, but Palestinians and Israelis
failed to take the lesson from it. This theory or the previous one are heading in the
same direction, which is the death circle referred to above.
As mentioned earlier, research in and on the past helps understand and reveal the
present and also build a bright future. We find our identity in the past. The research
on issues of the conflict and its history helps to get rid of the causes of the conflict
and to put the standards of peace we want. It also helps us understand things that
have not been achieved and to know things, that are desired to be achieved. In my
view, understanding the history of the conflict and linking it to what is happening
at the present time through our study of the content analysis of the most prominent
Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, analysis of documents and the survey of the
Palestinian and Israeli public opinion on fundamental issues is a crucial beginning
for launching the final status negotiations and reaching a permanent settlement.
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2.2 An Analytical Framework of Central Dimen-
sions
Avnery (2010, p. 4) once stated: ‘The complete blindness of each of the two nations
to the national existence of the other inevitably led to false and distorted percep-
tions, that took root deep in their collective consciousness. These perceptions con-
tinue to affect their attitudes towards each other to the present day’. In this context,
Perceptions are the existing valid outcome of views that Palestinians and Israelis
hold about the peace process and the conflict. They are the cumulative product of
themes that happened in the past, going on in the present, and/or anticipated to hap-
pen in the future. Whether in the past, present, or future, different components were
developed and had their share of shaping the ultimate perceptions people hold about
the conflict and peace process.
As a complement to the historic review, the objective of this section is to inves-
tigate and summarize major issues or themes that constitute the perceptions people
hold about the peace process and the conflict. The same issues were allocated in
subsequent sections of this dissertation to different parts in accordance with their
validity, source, and spatial-temporal aces. After all, the main aim of this disser-
tation is not limited to comparing perceptions. Nevertheless, it is crucial to define
and understand the degree to which these perceptions are determined by all kinds
of possible aspects or components that fall within the borders of Historic Palestine.
2.2.1 Palestinian Refugees
‘Recognition of the refugees’ rights is critical for the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East. It is a core issue that should not be left until final
stage negotiations’ (Bell, 2011, p. 10).
Palestinian refugees count more than 5 million, a number which is considered
as one of the world’s largest refugee populations of the contemporary history (Bell,
2011, p. 6). According to Dajani (2001, p. 1), the main reasons for the Palestinians
displacement throughout the Middle East, and the “creation of the modern world’s
most enduring refugee problem” are: (1) the humanitarian crisis resulting from the
shattering of Palestinian communities all over Palestine, (2) the denial of their right
for a shared national consciousness through the ‘al-Nakba’ of 1948, and (3) the cre-
ation of the state of Israel on 78.0% of the territory of the Palestine Mandate of 1922
(Christian Aid, 2007, p. 5). Still, the Israelis refuse to acknowledge responsibility
for the creation of the refugees problem, and maintain instead that the displacement
of Palestinians was solely a by-product of conflict launched by the Arab world in
1948 rather than a deliberate policy of expulsion (Bell, 2011, p .8; Chow et al.,
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2008, p .14).
Clearly, both parties’ narratives regarding this issue are entirely different and
incoherent. The Palestinians claim the right of all refugees and their descendants
to return to their homes in Israel proper and are entitled to compensation. This
same right sorely contradicts and threatens the very definition of the Israeli state;
a state with a Jewish majority. Israel’s concern is that the sudden influx of several
million refugees would tip the scales in favor of Arab inhabitants in Israel, and
eventually threaten the state’s Jewish character, and cause Israel’s Jewish population
to become a minority (Chao, 2011, p. 12; Chow et al., 2008, p. 14). Therefore, for
the Israelis, the refugees issue is viewed as a “transparent attempt to quash Jewish
self-determination” (Dyszy, 2011, p. 10).
As a first step to resolving this core issue, the notion that it is a robust obstacle
to the peace process must be altered. It is not possible to reach a solution, when
what is considered a non-negotiable right on the one side, is regarded as a fatal de-
mographic threat on the other side. The right of return does not indicate the right
of every refugee (and their descendants) to go back to their exact place of origin.
After all, Israel cannot absorb more than 5 million Palestinians and still be a ma-
jority Jewish state (Stein, 2002, p. 10; Christian Aid, 2007, p. 5). Add thereto, for
Israelis, refugees do not have the right to transmit this status to their offsprings, and
hence, they do not have any right to come back to their ancestral lands. The Pales-
tinians require the Israelis “to acknowledge and accept responsibility for the plight
of the refugees as a critical step, before any forms of restitution, resettlement or
compensation can be addressed, and the conflict moves towards resolution” (Bell,
2011, p. 14). On the other hand, the Israeli “security concerns and questions about
the right of return are understandable and must be squarely addressed” (Ibid, p. 10).
This dissertation investigated further suggested solutions to the conflict and how
Palestinians and Israelis perceived them. Chow et al. (2008, p. 14) outlined some
suggestions for a peace settlement that will be gauged in later stages of this disser-
tation. In Chow et al. (2008) opinion, it is critical to offer the refugees a set of op-
tions that might normalize their status, in which compensation is an alternate choice
that should accompany each option. These options include the right of Palestinian
refugees “to return to a future Palestinian state, return to a swapped territory, limited
return to Israel, resettlement in third countries, or rehabilitation in host countries”.
That is not limited only to Palestinian refugees but to Jewish refugees from Arab
states as well. The return should not be on a large scale, and should abide by spe-
cific criteria and rules. In other words, they should consider the small size of the land
(whether the newly established Palestinian state or Israel), and its economic ability
to absorb more people. The feasibility of such suggestions is still to be tested.
Refugees are people that have been “deliberately denied citizenship and kept in
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political limbo in their host countries for decades” (Dyszy, 2011, p. 10). Bell (2011,
p. 16) described the living standards and the legal, political and socio-economic
discrimination refugees are frequently suffering from:
‘There is no such thing as a typical day in the life of a Palestinian refugee.
Their experience depends on factors such as what identity papers and permits
they hold and the attitude of the people and government of the host country
towards them. But the common bond that they all share is the insecurity of
statelessness and the sense of loss and the longing for a homeland that could
promote and protect their identity as Palestinians: an identity that continues
to be challenged and threatened’.
For example, Palestinian refugees were considered non-citizens in Syria, were fac-
ing numerous employment restrictions and were banned from owning properties in
Lebanon, and were always under the threat of deportation or expulsion. In addi-
tion to the “lack of mechanisms for the protection of human rights that are usually
ensured by the state, is their vulnerability to rights violations either by host coun-
tries or hostile entities” (Ibid, p. 13). For Palestinians, the end of the conflict starts
with the eradication of discrimination and injustice forcibly applied to displaced
refugees; sufferings they experience on a daily basis. For the Israelis, the applica-
tion of such process should guarantee the persistence of Israel as a secure state for
Jewish people. These two positions although hard to maintain combined, but still, a
viable solution that complements both sides and secure a “future for both peoples,
a future that respects the right of all to live in peace with security, economic pros-
perity and equity” is possible (Ibid, p. 5). Scham et al. (2013) believed that when ‘a
mutually acceptable statement of shared responsibility for the events of 1948 is pro-
claimed by the respective Palestinian and Israeli governments, the healing process,
a real process of moving forward, can begin’.
2.2.2 Jerusalem and Holy Places
The status of Jerusalem and the holy places is undoubtedly at the core of any serious
attempts to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, primarily due to Jerusalem’s his-
toric, political, and religious significance to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, specif-
ically due to the status of the Old City and the Holy Basin, including the Wailing
Wall or Western Wall, the Haram al-Sharif or Temple Mount, and Al-Aqsa Mosque
or Dome of the Rock. The issue of Jerusalem is one of the most contentious, in-
tractable issues of the conflict, that is crucial for achieving peace.
On one hand, Israelis consider Jerusalem a red line that should not be crossed
and are not ready to territorially negotiate any inch of it (Chow et al., 2008, p. 15).
For them, it is the only capital that the Jews ever had for 3000 years. According to
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their history records, it has been populated by a Jewish majority since the middle of
the nineteenth century (Dowty, 2008, p. 202). Accordingly, Israel tries all its best
to change the demographic balance as well as the socio-political and geographic
nature of the city to ensure a Jewish majority. Moreover, it declared Jerusalem al-
ready few months after the end of the 1967 war as the “entire and unified capital
of Israel” (Abuzayyad et al., 2013, p. 8). Palestinians, on the other hand, affirm the
Arab identity of Jerusalem since the seventh century. For them, Jerusalem is “the
natural linchpin of a Palestinian state, being at its geographic center and dominat-
ing its economic and cultural life”, and without it there will be no viable Palestinian
state (Dowty, 2008, p. 203). All these and more facts suggest the reasons for rising
contention between Arabs and Israelis in the city of Jerusalem, the holiest spot on
earth.
Arab Citizens of Israel
The Jewish identity of Israel and the application of democracy mainly to the wel-
fare and benefit of its Jewish population, alienate thereby automatically other ethnic
groups from the very essence of the State. This is how Israeli-Arabs view the status
of their living in Israel. They are suffering a day-to-day “extreme structural dis-
crimination policies, national oppression. . . land confiscation policy, allocation of
unequal budget and resources, discrimination in rights and threats of being trans-
ferred” (Merriman, 2007; Khatib-Natour et al., 2006, p. 5). In particular, problems
concerning the issue of land planning and housing, and racial and legal discrimina-
tion. Khatib-Natour et al. (2006, p. 17) elaborated that the Israeli planning policy
includes:
1. The elimination of the Palestinian historical and geographic features as to
prevent the return of the Palestinian refugees.
2. Forcible expropriation of Arab land and the adoption of a central, collective
land system.
3. Preventing “state land” of being allocated to the Arab towns and villages in
Israel.
4. Adoption of administrative division (areas of local authorities jurisdiction)
that guarantees control over Arab land.
5. Marginalizing the Palestinian Arabs in Israel and preventing them from taking
part in the decision-making process.
6. Demolition of Arab houses.
East Jerusalem Palestinians, called Jerusalemites, who are living in their city for
centuries since the Arab Conquest are now, in fact, stateless; “they hold an Israeli
residency permit known as a ‘Blue ID’ and a Jordanian travel document and are not
citizens of either” (Abuzayyad et al., 2013, p. 2).
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2.2.3 Belonging to the Land
As mentioned in the previous section, the UN partition plan of 1947 allotted 55.0%
of Historic Palestine to Israel, and then an additional 23.0% was captured by the
Israelis in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Following the 1967 war, Israel expanded its
territory to include the remaining 22.0%; the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, defined
as the territory across the ‘Green Line’ (the pre-1967 armistice line) which is now
called ‘the occupied territories’ (Aziz, 2007, p. 5; Avnery, 2010, p. 10). For the
Palestinians “it is their land, but in fact they claim less than 21.4% of it. The same
territory is being infiltrated by Israeli settlements, projects, and roads for settlers”.
On the other hand, for the Israelis, it is the promised land of Israel and should
cover the whole area (not only 78.6% of total area). Reich (2008) described Jewish
identification with and in connection with the Land of Israel:
‘The empires tried many ways to eliminate the historical and religious links of
Jewish people to the Promised Land, however, clearly, it is not the case, and
no one can stamp out the Jewish identification with and in connection with
the Land of Israel through history’.
For Jews, Palestine is considered as their ancestral homeland where most historical
events mentioned in the Old Testament took place, making it the focus of their
religious practices and rituals (Aziz, 2007, p. 3). These beliefs are fueled by the
myth of “the few against the many”, and how 650,000 Jews managed to defeat an
entirely fragmented Arab military (Avnery, 2010, p. 8).
Palestinians on the other hand claim that the land is theirs, which they were in-
habiting since the Canaanite era, even before the Hebrews guided by Moses left
Egypt around 1200 B.C. and invaded their land, Palestine. They believe that the Is-
raeli occupation will come one day to an end (Aziz, 2007, p. 3). That is how many
Palestinians think: ‘One day the occupation of Palestine will end. . . We, Palestini-
ans, generation after generation, went through and survived many brutal wars and
occupations. . . Nevertheless, it is still our land, our ancestors stayed here and so
we are. Even if it takes some time, one day the occupation over holy Palestine will
come to an end’. These notions are linked with the religious belief that Palestine is
“part and parcel of the Muslims’ identity”. Khatib-Natour et al. (2006, p. 10) once
noted:
‘The Zionist movement used religious and secular terms to convince the Jew-
ish people and the world of its right over Historic Palestine. Terms from the
Torah such as the ‘holy land’ and ‘Land of Israel’ were and are still used.
These were flavored with secular proverbs ‘such as ‘a land without a people
for a people without a land’. These were like a fuel that thrusts the Zionist
cart and unites the ‘Jews of the Diaspora’ and link their future to Palestine’.
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Some Muslims believe that the end is near, and in the world-view eventual vic-
tory is assured. This means, “they see recent history as a series of victories: the
expulsion of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the exit of the United States
from Lebanon in the mid-1980s and later from Somalia, Israeli withdrawals from
Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and the resistance to US forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Consequently, they see Israel’s eventual demise as inevitable” (Dowty,
2001, p. 9). Avnery (2010, p. 4) described the conflict as ‘War of traumas’, where
Palestinians view it as “the continuation of the oppression and humiliation by West-
ern colonialists”, and Israelis view it “as just a continuation of anti-semitic perse-
cution”. Arabs reject Israel as a Jewish state and reject its Zionist identity; “the sole
instance of Jewish cultural and political autonomy in a region populated with Arab
and Muslim regimes” (Dyszy, 2011, p. 13). In this context, Haneen Zoabi(41) stated:
‘Recognition of Israel’s Jewish character would delegitimise the citizenship
of Palestinians in Israel, give a legal and ethical justification to discrimina-
tion against them, and effectively block the right of return of the Palestinian
refugees’, and then concluded ‘Israel should be a democratic state, not an
ethnic state’.
Israel, on the other hand, does not recognize Palestinians as the rightful owners of
this homeland.
2.2.4 Israeli Settlements
Israeli settlements are the subject of an inevitable issue that is considered one of
the largest stumble blocks in the peace process, and a source of tension in nego-
tiations (Chao, 2011, p. 12). Particularly in the West Bank, where more than two
hundred Israeli settlements (that brought over 500,000 Jewish settlers), and unrec-
ognized outposts were established since Israel’s occupation in 1967 (Christian Aid,
2007, p. 1). Rania Kutteneh from the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) further
explained:
‘Land and water are particularly significant for both, Israeli and Palestinian
viability. The construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and the frag-
mentation of land by the construction of bypass roads that serve mainly the
settlements continue to undermine the prospects for future viability by threat-
ening territorial contiguity. The restrictions imposed by Israel on access to
water resources are a significant restriction to Palestinian development, both
in terms of agriculture and industrial growth’.
The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has called upon Israel to halt its settle-
ment activity as to resume the peace talks. Nevertheless, Israel continued to expand
(41)An elected member of the Israeli parliament (Knesset).
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the construction of settlements despite international condemnation of these actions
(Chao, 2011, p. 15). Israel considers the settlements in the West Bank as a “de facto
part of its territory and as such eligible for preferential treatment” (Voltolini, 2012,
p. 39). The EU and the US have assertively condemned the settlement construc-
tion, which contravenes the international law (Ibid, p. 12; Avnery, 2010, p. 12). The
Roadmap of 2003 has demanded from Israel to “immediately dismantle settlement
outposts erected since March 2001 and to freeze all settlement activity (including
natural growth of settlements)” (Chow et al., 2008, p. 13).
The Palestinian side is unwilling to negotiate with Israel unless it stops the set-
tlement program, a program that decreases the amount of land allotted to the newly
established Palestinian state, slices up the West Bank and separates Palestinian ar-
eas (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 1). Furthermore, the settlement program “imprisons the
Palestinians in isolated enclaves, each of which is surrounded by settlements and the
occupation forces” (Avnery, 2010, p. 13). Not to mention the negative economic ef-
fect it implies. According to Chao (2011, p. 13): ‘Israeli communities are located in
the most fertile regions of the West Bank. If Israel were to annex these regions, a new
Palestinian state would not be economically sustainable without much international
aid’.
An Israeli point of view suggests that the settlement activity as a cause of the
‘deadlock’ is a false premise. In their argument, there are many instances of proof
that the issue of settlements is not the main reason behind the collapse of any pre-
vious attempts at reconciliation. For example, the withdrawals that were carried out
in Gaza Strip and West Bank in 2005, and the dismantling of settlements in Sinai in
1982.
The Israeli settlement policy of transferring hundreds of thousands of Israeli cit-
izens into the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) was condemned by the interna-
tional law and is certainly accountable for creating a hostile setting that jeopardizes
the lives of Palestinian and Israeli citizens. Needless to mention, that the legitimiza-
tion of this policy by the Israeli judicial system and the manipulation of the law
to serve its goals. Jabarin (2014) once stated: ‘Despite the consensus of the inter-
national community as to its illegality, the lack of political will from many states,
especially the United States, has also played a significant role in appeasement, al-
lowing Israel to operate with impunity’. His work revealed that the driving force
behind the settlements is “the exploitation of Palestinian natural resources” (Ibid.).
Natural Resources
As I referred to above, the settlements are strategically located in the occupied terri-
tories of the West Bank, the matter which allowed for their control over land, water,
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mineral natural resources and marine rights. For instance, the Israeli exploitation
and control of the gas reserves offshore the coast of Gaza deprives the Palestinians
of gas revenues and makes them dependent on the gas supply from Israel. According
to the World Bank report, the Palestinians could derive over an estimated 3 billion
US dollars annually from these resources. To put it in another way, the Israeli en-
terprise of settlements in the oPt is boosting the Israeli economy on the one end,
and resulting in more confrontations between Palestinian and Israeli citizens on the
other end, thus jeopardizing Israel’s national security (Jabarin, 2014).
Studies confirm that the Palestinian economy is deprived of access to 40.0% of
the resources in the West Bank, and 82.0% of its groundwater. Israel is currently
exploiting more than 90.0% of the Palestinian water resources used exclusively in
Israeli settlements, and allocates less than 10.0% for Palestinian use that does not
meet the needs of water for the ordinary citizen of Palestine (Abu-Yunis, 2014).
Legitimate control of these natural resources without any discrimination(42) is very
vital for the “sustained development and growth of any society, and should be con-
trolled by a sovereign power for the benefit of the whole population textquoted-
blright (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 6). In short, a strong economy and sustainable de-
velopment in the state of Palestine are unattainable without achieving freedom and
sovereignty over natural resources at least in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza.
2.2.5 Security
‘Security’ is essential for a viable solution. It is a legitimate right for all; Palestini-
ans and Israelis alike. The security of one side is inseparable from the security of
the other. The roots of the conflict should be eliminated, and violence should stop
(Christian Aid, 2007, p. 5). As a first step for peace, security should be achieved.
Palestinian suicide bombings ended after the establishment of the wall and fence by
the Israelis. However, Palestinians’ lives became highly restricted with what they
consider a segregation barrier or wall. Chao (2011, p. 21) added:
‘Both Israelis and Palestinians must realize that security for one side must
mean security for the other. Israeli security and defense cannot mean the loss
of Palestinian security, because that would only cause additional Palestinian
violence, creating a threat to Israeli security once more’.
Palestinians and nearby settlers are having confrontations on a daily basis, kid-
nappings, and innocent kids are murdered on both sides. These are often referred
to in Israeli media as ‘residents’ in order to label any attack against them as a
(42)“Palestinians receive on average between 57 and 76 liters per person a day, one-quarter of the
amount consumed on average by the Israelis. The World Health Organization’s recognized minimum
domestic consumption for an individual is 100 liters per day” (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 6).
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crime against citizens. However, for the Palestinians, settlers are considered “the
spearhead of a dangerous enemy who is dispossessing them their land” (Avnery,
2010, p. 19). Israeli armed operations against the Palestinians without any regard
of human rights extend from mass detentions, house demolitions, confiscation of
lands, encroaching on the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, assassinations and vi-
olations of international law. Not to mention the Israeli excessive use of force and
responsibility for massacres committed against Gaza, violations against the Haram
al-Sharif and other Islamic and Christian sanctities in the occupied Palestinian ter-
ritories (oPt). Add thereto the daily attempts of stamping out the Arab and Islamic
identity of Jerusalem, and the settlers continuous attacks on Palestinians, their lands
and properties.
The same applies to the Israelis with the renewed violence in the West Bank,
the firing of home-made rockets from Gaza at Israel, and the endangering of Is-
raeli lives. Hamas and Islamic Jihad believe that radical means lead to radical ends.
From this perspective, suicide bombings were considered to make an unbearable
pain to Israel that other modes of resistance fail to accomplish. They caused a deep
feeling of insecurity and undermined the credibility of Israel’s security measures
and strategies. Many Palestinians have condemned the horrifying bombings because
they made their lives much harder. The destructive and intolerant consequences of
these bombings on the Palestinian people, and the way Israel responds to them, sim-
ply are making their lives ‘a living hell’ (Telhami, 2004, p. 9). Avnery (2010, p. 20)
once noted:
‘. . . suicide bombings brought the bloody confrontation at the center of Israeli
cities. . . caused other damage to Israel, paralyzing tourism and stopping for-
eign investment, deepening the depression, causing the national economy to
contract and social services to collapse, thereby widening the social gap and
increasing domestic tensions in Israel’.
‘Hardliners’, ‘spoilers’ or ‘extremist’, are all words describing a group of people
who are often called crazy or fanatics, but are very rational on the tactical level. The
main aim of this group is to subvert any efforts toward resolution (Dowty, 2001,
p. 8). They have a remarkable influence on the peace process that should never
be underestimated. Examples of hardliners vary from political movements/parties
to religious groups or a mix of them. Dowty (2001) added: ‘the extremists on the
two sides are in fact allies, with the same goal: disrupting any move toward rec-
onciliation. They need each other as validation for rejection of compromises’. An
example of extremists is Hamas movement, which fundamentally rejects Israel, and
is committed to the destruction of Israel as set out at the start of its founding charter
(Dyszy, 2011, p. 5): ‘Israel will exist, and will continue to exist, until Islam abol-
ishes it, as it abolished that which was before it’. On the Israeli side, it includes
those movements, groups, or political parties that follow ideas of Zionism, Reli-
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gious Zionism, Kahanism, anti-Islamism, and anti-Arabism. Meir Kahane(43) once
stated: ‘I know that elections must be limited only to those who understand that
the Arabs are the deadly enemy of the Jewish state, who would bring on us a slow
Auschwitz - not with gas, but with knives and hatchets’.
2.2.6 One-State Solution
A one-state solution in this context means a bi-national state that contains the terri-
tory and inhabitants of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Palestinians advocate the
belief that a unified state will be able to accommodate all returning refugees, some-
thing that a solely Palestinian state will fail to accomplish. Israel, on the other hand,
bitterly refuses a one-state solution that contradicts the Jewish identity of the state
of Israel. Also, for them, accepting this plan will rapidly, if not immediately, flip the
demographic characteristics of the country to an Arab majority and a Jewish mi-
nority (Dyszy, 2011, p. 14). Chao (2011, p. 26) believed that although the one-state
solution remains less popular than the two-state solution, it is gaining popularity in
light of the deterioration of the situation on the grounds, and he pointed out to the
numerous advantages of the one-state solution:
‘The one-state solution would be easy to implement. . . the cessation of vio-
lence and hostilities. . . the establishment of equal rights for all religions and
ethnicities. . . Jerusalem will remain undivided, and there will be free and open
access for all the citizens of the new state. . . there will be no need to deal with
the extensive Israeli settlements on the West Bank. . . the creation of one gov-
ernment in the region decreases the possibility of a radical group takeover in
the proposed Palestinian state such as the 2006 Hamas takeover of the Gaza
Strip’.
Avnery (2010, p. 26) had an opposite stance on the issue:
‘The idea sometimes voiced that it is possible and desirable to replace the
two-state with a one-state solution. . . is unrealistic. The vast majority of Is-
raelis will not agree to the dismantling of the State of Israel, much as the vast
majority of Palestinians will not give up the establishment of a national state
of their own. This illusion is also dangerous since it undermines the struggle
for the two-state solution, which can be realized in the foreseeable future, in
favor of an idea that has no chance of realization in the coming decades. This
illusion can also be misused as a pretext for the existence and extension of the
settlements. If a joint state were set up, it would become a battlefield, with one
side fighting to preserve its majority by the expulsion of the other side’.
(43)An ultra-Zionist political figure, teacher of Torah ‘rabbi’, and writer.
69
2.2. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF CENTRAL DIMENSIONS
2.2.7 Two-State Solution
Coined in 1947, the proposal for a two-state solution has become nowadays one of
the most popular and internationally accepted viable solutions for the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict (Stein, 2002, p. 10; Chao, 2011, p. 15). It suggested the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state using the occupied territories of the pre-1967 war. The
solution foresees “a region where two States, Israel, and Palestine, live side by side
within secure and recognized borders” (Butenschøn, 2006, p. 290). Nevertheless,
this solution fails to solve all the main obstacles of the conflict. Firstly, neither the
Palestinians nor the Israelis will agree on dividing Jerusalem to Eastern-Arab part
and Western-Israeli part. Secondly, the newly-established Palestinian state will not
be able to absorb all Palestinian refugees, and the likelihood of the Israelis to evacu-
ate their settlements in the West Bank is extremely low (Chao, 2011, p. 26). Finally,
the establishment of a Palestinian state will give Israel a reason to force their Israeli
Arabs citizens to evict into the newly established Arab state (Ibid., p. 27).
Scholars and political actors vary in their opinion regarding the viability of this
solution. Some advocate a unity state as a result of “deeply-rooted pessimism” to-
ward the two-state resolution, rather than “any ideological rejection of Israel’s le-
gitimacy” (Dyszy, 2011, p. 17). Others, like Shimon Peres, stated in 2009 that ‘the
two-state solution remained the only realistic and moral formula to end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict’ (Ibid., p. 21). Dov Waxman’s article where he noted ‘a difficult
divorce is better than turbulent cohabitation’. Nevertheless, the failure of reaching
peace on the grounds since more than 65 years unearthed another resolution that
includes the confederation of the West Bank with Jordan and the Gaza Strip with
Egypt, a resolution that neither the Palestinians nor Egypt or Jordan found attractive
(Dowty, 2001, p. 16).
2.2.8 International Role in the Conflict
The role of the United States in the arena is indispensable, and the power it practices
over both parties is unparalleled (Chow et al., 2008, p. 2), particularly that it views
Israel as a strategic ally through which it exerts control and influence in the Middle
East, which is an important oil production region” (Aguiar, 2009, p. 11). Israel’s
economy depends heavily on US support, and US military assistant, with which
Israel is controlling the oPt (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 4). Donway (1997, p. 591) crit-
icized the influence US military assistance plays on the grounds: ‘US military assis-
tance for Israel encourages it not only to adopt policies that ignite anti-American
sentiments among Arabs but also run contrary to Israel’s interest of integrating it-
self into the Middle East’. Arabs are convinced that they have to defeat the US in
order to control Israel, a notion they established due to the US support of Israel’s
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strategy of latching itself to this superpower (Telhami, 2004, p. 10). In line with
this, Chao (2011, p. 20) added: ‘The US Government must adopt a stricter policy
with Israel, not only for peace but also for its image in the Middle East’.
International financial support played and is still playing a crucial role in the
conflict. On the one side it is supporting the poor, empowering people, rebuild-
ing damaged infrastructures, and more, but on the other side, however, it is one of
the factors behind the sustainability of the conflict. Donway (1997, p. 591) sug-
gested that Washington should break the wheel of support and cut the Israelis from
economic aid(44) (IfAmericansKnew.org, 2000, p. 1), at least by the amount Israel
spends on building settlements and military aid. Moreover, the US should terminate
the financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. This would eventually normal-
ize the relationship with the US, and subsequently, boost the Palestinians faith in
the US foreign policy. In addition, this will motivate Israel to reform its economy
and open a new capital for its political assimilation in the region. The same ap-
plies to the European Union and its role in the conflict. The EU always condemned
the illegal status of the Israeli settlements, and called for the Palestinian right of
self-determination(45) (Christian Aid, 2007, p. 3). The EU is advocating the “two-
state solution and the respect for human rights, international humanitarian law, and
international law” (Voltolini, 2012, p. 11). Rosemary Hollis(46) added:
‘The EU has many stakes in the region and a primary interest in the reso-
lution of the conflict. . . the EU, the largest donor of the PA, provides the PA
with the funds necessary to pay salaries and run basic services like education
and health, but it is also politically relevant as a member of the Quartet, the
international forum, that comprises of the EU, the UN, the US and Russia,
and tries to mediate the peace process. Moreover, the EU bilateral ties with
the parties are well-developed, demonstrating the EU’s particular interest in
the area’ (Ibid., p. 13).
The report of Christian Aid (2007, p. 7) pointed out to the importance of ending the
impunity for actions committed by any party. Both, the Palestinians and the Israelis
should be fully made accountable for their attacks. Observation of the human rights
and the rule of law should not be undermined, and a third neutral body should be
assigned to intermediate the peace process. Besides, it should for the sake of peace
and humanity be able to impose an objective view of reality that both parties should
obey and follow. In this context, the report included:
‘The Quartet powers, particularly the European Union, rightly condemn any
violence as counterproductive to peace. They correctly call upon the Pales-
(44)The American economic aid to Israel reaches an average of 7 million US tax dollar per day.
(45)For instance, at the Venice Declaration in 1980.
(46)A British political scientist.
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tinian Authority to do everything within its power to confront militant groups
and bring about an end to attacks on Israel. However, Israel is rarely held to
be accountable for its military raids and incursions that cause civilian deaths.
Israel continues to expand settlements, impose closure situations and build the
separation barrier on Palestinian land with impunity, thus threatening a pop-
ulation already struggling to cope with extreme poverty and unemployment’.
2.2.9 Borders
The American-Israeli offer of establishing a Palestinian state using the present
Green Line as the border of this state is unacceptable for the Palestinians. They con-
sider it “entirely consistent with an apartheid model, where a pacified Palestinian
population on both sides of the Green Line is encircled, controlled, and separated
by large pockets of Jewish Israeli presence” (Taraki, 2006, p. 450). Add thereto the
fractured geography of the West Bank and its lack of contiguity and integrity due
to the expansion of the settlement blocs, the establishment of the wall, and the cre-
ation of bypass or ethnic roads (Yiftachel & Israel, 2005, p: 126-127). According
to the report of Christian Aid (2007) “the West Bank is controlled by 540 Israeli
checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds and gates, plus an average of 100 ‘flying
checkpoints’ on Palestinian roads every week”. Rania Kutteneh(47) explained how
this threatens the Palestinian future:
‘Gaza is separated from the West Bank. The West Bank is separated from
Jerusalem. Inside the West Bank there are now 75 separate “clusters” where
you need to pass through a checkpoint or apply for a permit to get from one
cluster to another. All of this, if made permanent, will kill the idea of having
one Palestinian society’.
These and more dimensions of the conflict and peace process were thoroughly
investigated in successive sections of this dissertation. Obviously, the formation of
perceptions requires not only the present and the future. However, also a whole set
of cumulative ideas and beliefs that humans learn from the past, if not as witnesses,
then as learners, and then pass them to others.
(47)A member of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO).
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The knowledge gap between the majority of studies and projects about the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict regardless of the topic in focus and this study is that they
lack the use of multiple approaches to their research. Especially when investigating
the crucial issues of the conflict. Added to that, this study highlighted the role of
historic facts and their contribution to nowadays conflict through a thorough review
of history and its claims, coupled with political stakeholders and media theories
and models, and the influential role they play in shaping individuals’ perceptions of
the conflict and peace process. Besides, this study controlled for many interesting
independent factors using sophisticated data analysis tests and methods. Since the
shaping of Palestinians and Israelis’ perceptions is a broad topic on many aspects
and a complex one on others, it incorporated the results and methods of previous
research in the process of understanding individuals’ perceptions and used them to
develop a matrix according to which respondents made their distinct meaning of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict as they take a stance. The matrix constituted of retrospec-
tive, political, attitudinal, cognitive, sentimental, communicational and demograph-
ical components that I elaborated on later. The aim was to define the components
that constituted, shaped and influenced the basis of these perceptions. One of the
main components that could have a critical impact on the situation, particularly in
conflicted areas, are the media. Therefore, it is considered a solid start to understand
how media work for launching the negotiations for a final solution and for reaching
a permanent settlement.
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3.1 Variable Model
I explained in the Approach section above the combination of survey, content and
document analyses this dissertation is using to answer the following questions. Be-
low is the variable model that illustrates this multi-method approach, based on his-
torical review of the conflict. Now, in order to achieve the goals set by this disserta-
tion a review of media and conflict literature is presented hereunder, from which
theories were established and hypotheses were determined for testing. Theories
of Media effects and connection with public opinion and political discourse were
part and parcel of this process, coupled with previous research with regard to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
FIGURE 3.1 VARIABLE MODEL
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In respect of the variable model shown above, the main questions to be answered
in this dissertation are:
i. To what degree there is an accord between..
RQ1. media and audience frames on either side of the conflict? (E)
RQ2. audience and political parties frames on either side of the conflict? (F)
RQ3. media and political parties frames on either side of the conflict? (D)
ii. To what degree there is a discord..
RQ4. between news frames in Palestinian and Israeli media? And what are the
patterns of news reporting? (A)
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RQ5. between audience frames in Palestine and Israel? (B)
RQ6. in the frames pertaining to Palestinian and Israeli political parties, press re-
leases, announcements and statements? (C)
RQ7. what other relevant factors that shape the audience frame perceptions? And
to what extent? (G)
Introduction
Psychologists tend to compare humans information acquisition-storage-retrieval
processes with computer components of data processing for easier illustration of
this complex system; thus, referring to it as ‘Humans information processing’. Af-
ter all, human beings encode received information (entering data), store them tem-
porarily or permanently (saving data), and finally, recall this stored information to
be used for solving problems or to generate direct responses to the stimuli (loading
data) (The Information Processing System, 1993). Davis and Olson (1985, p. 236)
once noted, humans as information processors in their simplest forms “consist of
sensory receptors (eyes, ears, nose, etc.) that pick up signals and transmit them to
the processing unit (brain with storage). The results of the processing are output
responses (physical, spoken, written, etc.)”.
Unfortunately, the capacity of humans processing systems is limited and; there-
fore, their abilities are restricted to absorb all the inputs the world provides. Hence,
humans unconsciously develop a selection process, through which they manage and
filter the overload of information, and ease their participation and adaptation to the
challenges of social life (Ibid., p: 236-237). This includes a filtering mechanism
that is based on prior knowledge, experience, background and more, which consti-
tute the “patterns or frames of reference that are collected into use in processing
the input” (p. 238). Experience in this context is the accumulation of effective use
of relevant frames in a specific field over a long period of time. The use of these
pattern-directing frames does not only block unwanted inputs but ignores others
when defined as being inconsistent with existing frames. However, due to humans
limitations as data processors, they tend to ease this process by adopting strategies
to deal with. For example, the concreteness strategy, where humans “use informa-
tion that is readily available and only in the form in which it is displayed” (p. 249).
In this stage of developing strategies, individuals establish their ‘cognitive style’; a
style that blends both, their characteristics and preferred modes or manners when
processing information (Riding & Sadler-Smith, 1997).
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Cognitive Style
A ‘cognitive style’ is “a psychological term used to describe individual differences
in the way one habitually tends to perceive, organize, analyze, or recall information
and experience” (Hansen & Stansfield, 1980, p. 350). There are two main dimen-
sions of cognitive styles; the field-independent style and the field-dependent style.
The former refers to individuals that are highly independent of processing perceived
information while bypassing the surrounding, and building their perception of an is-
sue in accordance with their inner cues. Moreover, they are able to ignore unrelated
information and focus on central tasks, and they act on information on highly au-
tonomous fashion with the greater level of perceptual and cognitive restructuring
(Hansen & Stansfield, 1980, p. 350; Riding & Sadler-Smith, 1997, p. 200). Witkin
et al. (1977, p. 7) stated that dependence field is “when the person experiences items
as more or less separate from the surrounding field” and perceives them more ana-
lytically. On the other hand, dependence field mode is when “the performance range
perception is strongly dominated by the prevailing field” (Ibid., p. 7). It includes
people, whose perceptions of information is highly dependent on the environment
surrounding them and that are established incoherence with the external context
within they occur. Field-dependent individuals are more sensitive to interpersonal
cues, social information, and manipulation, and are less cognitive restructuring and
tend to accept information from the environment as they appear (Riding & Sadler-
Smith, 1997).
The purpose of differentiating between the two dimensions of cognitive styles
is to demonstrate the degree to which the environment surrounding the Palestinians
and the Israelis matters in establishing their opinion of the conflict and the peace
process. Most importantly, how people with different cognitive styles adapt them-
selves to the context in which events occur - to what degree on the dependence-
independence field dimension are influenced by the society and mass media? And
to which extent they prevail, resist and analyze the overload of frames sent to them
through these information channels? A brief introduction of the role mass media
play in shaping public opinion during the conflict will follow as a first step for an-
swering these questions.
Different studies in public opinion research and its quality revealed different re-
sults of whether public opinion is a rational, consistent, stable and informed process
or it is an irrational, inconsistent, unstable and ill-informed process. One stream of
studies found huge variations of quality opinions within the same society; others did
not. Questions to be investigated are: what factors drive public opinion? and to what
extent do mass media contribute to the process of shaping peoples’ perceptions?
A vexing phenomenon in public opinion research known as ‘framing effects’ is a
particular phenomenon that will be addressed below as a first step of investigat-
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ing these questions. However, before doing so, an explanation of the concept of
‘schemata’ will be introduced.
Schemata
Plato and Aristotle were the earliest to introduce the concept of schema or schemata
in their philosophies, but, Kant (1929) was the first to introduce schema as mental
frameworks that organize thoughts around some aspects of the world and control the
ability to comprehend these aspects. Schemata is a cognitive structure in long-term
memory that mediates and guides the process of encoding, processing and under-
standing a stimulus. For instance, when an individual encounters a stimulus, he or
she will interpret that stimulus in accordance with the matching schema in his or her
mind (McVee et al., 2005, p. 535; Jörg, 2008). In this context, a schema is a concep-
tual system for understanding knowledge - how knowledge is represented and how
it is used (Diaz, 2008). For Kant (1929) “a schema stood between or mediated the
external world and internal mental structures; a schema was a lens that both shaped
and was shaped by experience” (McVee et al., 2005, p. 535).
All individuals have a schema that varies from one person to another. They vary
in the way of organizing peoples’ thoughts; what they pay attention to, what is im-
portant to them and how they make meaning of situations. The reality where they
live and the way they make meaning of the world is a response to the schema that
individuals have in their mind. For example, some peoples’ behavior may not make
sense to you because the schema that they employ to form their meaning of events
is very different from the schemas that you have. Simply, schemas drive meaning
and change behavior from one person to another. Brain psychologists focused on
the relationship between learning ability and schemas, once Medina (2008) noted:
‘prior knowledge can disturbingly shape how individuals memorize and retain from
long-term storage of future knowledge’. Accordingly, individuals’ schema can be
critical to their understanding of events and their behaviour towards these events,
because, he or she will inherently rely on existent schemata to understand new in-
formation, and the more that information is consistent with the schemata in their
minds, the more likely he or she will comprehend that information (Schema The-
ory, 1995; Medina, 2008). Furthermore, “if the schema is triggered near the moment
of learning, that learning becomes more permanent”.
As mentioned earlier, individuals unconsciously attempt to process incoming in-
formation economically. Therefore, media news automatically becomes subject to
‘schematic filtering’. It is the process when attention is mostly directed towards
some aspects of news because of their relevance and consistency with one’s’ self-
schemas, and the rest tend to be ignored due to their irrelevance or inconsistency
with these schemas. It is true that the more the schemata is organized, the better
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the memory is, and the more contingent the event with the schema in the individ-
uals’ minds, the more likely to be remembered. Nevertheless,“the more typical an
event, the more likely it will be recalled falsely as occurring because it will be
‘filled-in’ by the schema rather than actual perception” (Schema Theory, 1995).
From this perspective, Campbell (1989, p. 90) described schemas as being “a sort
of bias inherent in the mind”. Nevertheless, schemas as organizational units still
clearly affect our recall of events, our ability to learn things and help us understand
the interaction of key factors influencing the comprehension process.
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3.2 Objectives of Media Analyses
The media are a reflection of the political environment, a mirror for regional, local
and international events, conflicts and interactions at the political level. The politi-
cal environment is established by the media and the media make us recognize this
reality. Accordingly, the media legitimize or socially accept certain concepts and
perceptions and exclude other concepts and perceptions from the political contro-
versy or debate, and that by putting in order the list of political issues or concerns in
a framework of values, information and views that are compatible with each other
and excluding such views and ideas, that are dissonant; this all in a form that dis-
plays political issues, information and topics in a coherent form and present them
on the basis of accuracy and clarity of the facts, the matter which creates a mental
image of the objectivity of these issues. The media play so primarily a persuasive,
political function as they (the media) take-over the process of convincing the masses
(Swanson, 1992; Stewart, 2000; Eskjaer, 2012; Croteau & Hoynes, 2013)
Therefore, a content analysis of 8 newspapers was done to examine the fram-
ing of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by newspapers in both countries in accordance
with specific criteria mentioned in successive chapters of this dissertation. The gen-
eral objectives of the content analyzes were as follows:
1. Gauge the amount of news dedicated to the conflict in each media.
2. Estimate the depth of emphasis on particular topics/dimensions related to the
conflict and peace process.
3. Capture the density of news coverage in certain areas of the conflict.
4. Observe the direction of media in each country when it comes to covering the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
5. Compare frames in the Palestinian and Israeli media.
6. See how do pictures frame the conflict.
Accordingly, the following questions about media coverage in both countries
were answered:
1. What are the dimensions of emphasis concerning the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict?
2. How significant the topic of the conflict?
3. The focus was more on promoting peace or fueling up the conflict?
4. To what extent were they similar to their frames?
5. How did they cover core issues of the conflict?
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3.2.1 Media Function, an Overview
The world is witnessing today a special attention to the media and its mission. We all
are also witnessing the development of the media means and the diversity of their
methods and updating until they reached the emergence of new communication
channels, that know no boundaries or barriers. The emergence of cable TV, the
Internet, and satellite communications have turned the world into what looks like a
small village and enabled everybody to know what’s going on thousands of miles
away from him while he is sitting in his closed room in front of the TV or computer
screen. In this context comes the term of ‘global village’ coined by McLuhan in the
sixties, who described the media as the nervous system that rapidly integrate the
world together, as was the case when human territories were scattered in the shape
of small villages. This has led to enabling the media to fulfill its mission over a
broader and deeper range, reflecting a general affirmation of the importance of the
modern media and its ability to play an active role in various humanitarian issues.
The media with their broad philosophy and developed means are considered as the
most powerful modern communication means that help the citizen to live his era
and interact with it (Stewart, 2000).
Despite their ideological and perceptual differences in their representation of
the role of communication in human reality, numerous models of communication
as in Shannon and Weaver model of communication (1948), Berlo’s (1960) Sender-
Message-Channel-Receiver (SMCR) model, Osgood-Schramm interactive model of
communication (1954), DeFleur’s (2005) Transactional model, the Action model of
Berko et. al. (1992), and more agreed on that the media industry is focusing on
three principles main: the media mission; that could be an event or news story or
theme or idea, the human element; that is represented by the sender and receiver,
and finally, the technical means through which the media message from the sender
to the receiver will be transmitted or aired. The information process is aimed to
promote the commodity (physical or intellectual) in order to achieve the benefit of
the producer and satisfy the desires of the consumer.
The communication process in this context is a deliberate link between two par-
ties; the sender and the receiver, that aims to perform a specific function in the
context of human activity. It is a selective, social process, and its purpose is the in-
dividual and the community access to information and knowledge and understand-
ing of the experiences of other individuals and groups on the one hand, while at the
same time conveying one’s opinions and experiences to others, ensuring thereby the
creation of a bilateral interactive process in all cases. In the context of the previous
determination of this concept, it is physically associated with the formation of the
social and political individual and the concepts of freedom and democracy and their
application within the community, such as participation and discussion, dialogue
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and expression of opinion and its choice, as well as the expression of one’s opinion
on the political and economic system. This means that the communication, its meth-
ods, and operations, are leading the public to the formation of the public opinion at
all levels (Croteau & Hoynes, 2013, p. 299).
Media in the Context of Political Communication
The media occupy a significant position among the gauges that indicate the level of
civilization and progress in any country of the world and the extent of democracy
in this society or that. The media intervene in shaping people’s attitudes and per-
ceptions regarding the reality in all aspects of life. There is no doubt that modern
societies have become almost entirely dependent on the means of mass commu-
nication in the transfer of communication messages to be delivered to the masses
and, subsequently, this means the ability of the media to intervene in the formation
of the public agenda, especially visual media, as it transmit intended contents that
intervene in moving and identifying the trends of the public about a specific issue,
such as the mobilization of masses to take a certain decision, as well as formation of
convictions and notions that ultimately form a general public opinion in some way
towards the intended idea or issue (Eskjaer, 2012, p. 3). The objective and profes-
sional media are therefore almost rarely available today one hundred percent, but
there is a disparity in the rate of approaching them.
Many recent scientific studies in the field of political communication, as well as
within the scope of political science, have shown that the media have an independent
power in the society and that they play key roles on the political level through the
communication materials they provide. Furthermore, they play an influential role
in the political decision-making process, as we play various roles in our contempo-
rary political life. The media intervene in the formation of people’s concepts and
perceptions regarding the reality in all ways and aspects of life. Furthermore, me-
dia provide the people’s awareness with political experiences, through which public
opinion in the local and international community is formed. There is no doubt that
contemporary societies have become totally dependent on mass communication in
the transfer of communication messages intended to be delivered to the masses.
This role is played by governmental and non-governmental organizations with the
assistance of sophisticated and effective systems and devices, on the top of which
are the press, radio, television, movies, and others. According to McCombs (2002,
p. 2):
‘What we know about the world is largely based on what the media decide to
tell us. More specifically, priorities of the media strongly influence the priori-
ties of the public. Elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent
in the public mind’.
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It is worthy to note that the governments have discerned the active role, and the im-
pact of the media means, in general, and the newspapers in particular in their ability
to create public opinion in the community and move and polarize it for the defense
of a certain tendency or a particular concept and even to intervene in moving the
course of things and guiding a certain public in the desired direction. In this con-
text, Aguiar (2009, p. 16) stated: ‘a crisis will be global if the media portrays it as
such as well as an issue will be newsworthy if it fits in the pre-determiners already
established not only by the media but also by the economic and political institutions
surrounding them’. Consequently, this means the ability of the media to interfere
with the formation of the public agenda, which is what I wanted to reveal by apply-
ing that to the Palestinian and the Israeli daily newspapers, the matter that brings
me to clarify the role of the media in shaping the public opinion in these countries.
Newspapers, for example, by publishing certain contents reflect the situation and the
prevailing conditions of their communities and feed other targeted purposes. They,
with these constituents, can intervene in the order of the public’s priorities; con-
sequently to intervene in the formation of public opinion. The persuasion process
might be either through information, facts, figures, statistics or others.
3.2.2 Political Media
The individual in contemporary societies is - to a large extent - permanently exposed
to ‘paragraphs’, contents, and comments of political nature, that are conveyed to him
or her by the various channels of mass communication. Hardly a day passes without
these political implications appear in newspapers, magazines, radio and television.
In this context, I would like to focus on the term of ‘political media’, which consti-
tutes one of the significant and necessary media branches, an approach and a process
aiming at publishing news and facts about individuals with the aim of expression
and awareness. The capacity of the awareness circle might even increase aiming at
creating a public opinion and a unified humanitarian will that has a certain attitude
towards an issue of public interest, whether on a regional or national level. This
political awareness might be directed to the public opinion or not. In addition, the
political media also form a communication activity conducted by specialized orga-
nizations in broadcasting information, concepts, and attitudes about governmental
affairs. These are, therefore, genuine efforts to spread the ideas and beliefs in order
to anchor the state’s point of view in the hearts of the people. If these information
efforts, however, are used in the war with any outside party, they convert to a psy-
chological war against the enemy to influence its members and direct them (Norris,
2004, p. 1).
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FIGURE 3.2 THE INTERACTIVE PROCESS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS.
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Figure 3.2 above shows the interactive process and the transmission of informa-
tion between politicians, the media, and the public. According to Norris (2004),
the process “operates downwards from governing institutions towards citizens, hor-
izontally in linkages among political actors, and also upwards from public opinion
towards authorities” (p. 1).
Wang (2012, p. 9) in his Resultant Acceleration Model (Figure 3.3) emphasized
on the interactional process between Media, Public Opinion and Government for-
eign policies, and how each of them is deepened through such interaction. In its
simplest forms: (1) Media report the event, (2) government policy is triggered by
this event, (3) and then both of them lead to Public Opinion, which in turn (4) build
news agenda and therefore (5) amplify media coverage. Then, (6) Public Opin-
ion and the newly established media coverage trigger a local government policy,
which (7) generates bigger public opinion, and conclusively lead to an amplified
government policy. On one hand, Public Opinion as a reference plays a vital role in
shaping policy agenda’s for political stakeholders and their governments. Moreover,
it is reflected and represented by Media outlets, which ultimately contribute to the
formation of agendas and frames in the public (Ibid., p. 1).
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FIGURE 3.3 RESULTANT ACCELERATION MODEL
T(M)       
   N(PO) 
       LGP     
GP          
   T(M)  
       N(PO) 
 
Note: “T”= “traditional media”; “N”= “new media”; “M”=“media”, “PO”= “public opinion”;  
“GP”= “government policy”; “LGP”= “local government policy” 
 
 
 
 
 
GP 
Source: Wang (2012).
Baum and Potter (2008, p. 41) in Figure 3.4 hereunder outlined a comprehensive
review of literature “maintaining that the media influence public opinion, public
opinion influences the media, public opinion influences decision makers, decision
makers influence public opinion, decision makers influence the media, foreign pol-
icy influences public opinion, decision makers influence events, and the media in-
fluence foreign policy. This is further complicated by feedback from both foreign
actors and the emerging ‘facts on the ground’”. They added, that every conceiv-
able link between these actors was thoroughly investigated and that any “further
investigation into these narrow individual pathways is likely to produce diminish-
ing returns”. Baum and Potter (2008) incorporated in their research the strategic
actor of mass media, which they believe contribute alongside citizens and elites
to the shaping of public’s attitudes to foreign policy. Furthermore, they empha-
sized on the “multifaceted relationships between these actors and foreign policy
outcomes” (p. 1).
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FIGURE 3.4 REPRESENTATION OF THE LITERATURE; THE INTERACTION
BETWEEN PUBLIC, LEADERS, AND THE MEDIA
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of public opinion on foreign policy requires an
interdisciplinary approach that incorporates
public opinion, elite preferences, and the mass
media as independent strategic actors with
distinct preferences and incentives.
The literature outlines a dizzying array of
interactions between the public, leaders, and
the media, the complexity of which is evi-
dent in Figure 1. Even this highly stylized
representation of the literature reveals studies
maintaining that the media influence public
opinion, public opinion influences the media,
public opinion influences decision makers, de-
cision makers influence public opinion, deci-
sion makers influence the media, foreign pol-
icy influences public opinion, decision mak-
ers influence events, and the media influence
foreign policy. This is further complicated by
feedback from both foreign actors and the
emerging “facts on the ground.” In short,
scholars have investigated every conceivable
causal link between the public, decision mak-
ers (foreign and domestic), and the media. We
believe this web of causal arrows has become
so dense that further investigation into these
narrow individual pathways is likely to pro-
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Figure 1
Prior specifications of causality in relationship(s) between the mass media, public opinion, and foreign
policy. The citations associated with each arrow are illustrative rather than exhaustive. They represent
simplifications of the authors’ arguments, intended to highlight the absence of a clear causal chain across
the broader system.
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Media Dependency Model
Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) developed a theoretical approach toward the in-
fluences of mass communications on audiences and the society, and how most are
determined through the relationship of the audience-media-society tripartite. They,
in their theory of media dependency investigated the degree of audience dependence
on media as a “a key variable in understanding when and why media messages al-
ter audience beliefs, feelings, or behaviour” (p. 5). Audience dependency on mass
media leads to alteration effect on three main spectrums; cognition, affection and
behavioral:
(1) Cognition alteration effect is a result of resolution of ambiguity, either due
to individuals’ insufficient knowledge and adequate information to grasp facts, or
the existence of conflicting information about a particular fact. For instance, people
first resort to mass media for information when an unexpected event take place.
They become aware of that event through the media. That does not mean that the
media unclear ambiguity, on the other hand, in the case of conflicting media reports,
people tend to search for further media channels to fill knowledge gaps and clear
uncertainty. The question here is “the extent to which people are dependent on the
media for continuous or ongoing ambiguity resolution” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur,
1976, p. 9). The more dependent people are on information mediated by media, the
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more considerable media effect is in constructing social reality. Nevertheless, it does
not mean that audiences with the same ‘degree’ of dependency on media-mediated
information have the same construct of perceptions and ideas. More or less, the
media has the power to control ‘the range of interpretations’ in peoples’ minds
(Ibid, p. 10). Ambiguity is part and parcel of citizens’ lives in Palestine and Israel,
where instability is the only stable reality, and thus the power of media is pervasive.
Attitude formation is the second cognitive effect investigated by Ball-Rokeach
and DeFleur (1976). An attitude is a quantifiable hypothetical construct that in-
volves negative or positive evaluation of an object in a specific context. An object
can be anything; an idea, a group, a phenomenon and more. Evaluations are the
product of many interactive sources toward the object, including beliefs, behaviour,
and affective reactions. According to Schiff (1970, p. 7): “an attitude is the collec-
tion of feelings (affects) and beliefs (cognitions) which predispose an individual to
react in a certain way to the object of these effects and cognition”. Pickens (2005,
p. 44) defined it as “a mind–set or a tendency to act in a particular way due to both an
individual’ s experience and temperament”. In other words, individual’ s response
to a stimulus or any related objects is dynamically driven by their experience with
that stimuli. However, the responsiveness of attitudes is susceptible to change to
the context in which it was expressed, as well as its magnitude (Roskos-Ewoldsen,
2008). Attitudes formation is a continuum process reinforced by various important
figures (e.g., political or religious leaders) and social movements in the society who
selectively attract people’s attention “to events and influence the content or inten-
sity of the attitude formed” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976, p. 11). It is true that
the psychological and social processes have the lion’s share of determining what
people think and the intensity of their attitudes, but less of influence on shedding
the light on what objects or events to be nominated for attitude formation.
There can be no doubt about the fact that there is more news every day than
the media can possibly accommodate. Therefore, media have to use news judgment
criteria ‘pick and choose’ in order to constitute the day’s news. In this context,
Agenda-setting as the third cognitive effect is the process whereby the mass media
determine what we think and worry about, which McCombs and Shaw pointed out
that it is related with gatekeeping (McCombs, 2002). McCombs (2002, p. 2) added:
‘What we know about the world is largely based on what the media decide to tell
us. More specifically, priorities of the media strongly influence the priorities of the
public. Elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent in the public
mind’.
Relating to this, Walter Lipmann; a prominent American journalist and scholar
from Harvard University was the first to analyze the impact of the media on people’s
perceptions, noted in his book (Public Opinion): ‘the news media are a primary
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source of those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs, a
world that for most citizens are ‘out of reach, out of sight, out of mind’ (Lippmann,
1946, p. 29). Lippmann then described the media as a dominator over the creation
of pictures in the public heads. He believed that the public reacts not to actual events
but to the dominated pictures in their heads. Therefore, the agenda-setting process
is used to alter all the events occurring in our environment, into a simpler model
before we deal with it (Sanchez, 2002).
According to the agenda-setting theory, first developed by McCombs and Shaw
(1968) in their Chapel Hill study, mass media set the agenda for public opinion by
highlighting certain issues. Through their studying of the way political campaigns
were covered in the media, Shaw and McCombs found that the main effect of news
media was agenda-setting; in particular, the correlation between the rate at which
media cover a story and the extent to which people think that this story is important.
This correlation has been shown to occur repeatedly (McCombs & Shaw, 1972);
Bernard Cohen stated: ‘The press may not be successful much of the time in telling
people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to
think about’ (Cohen, 1963).
The agenda-setting function is three part-processes (See Figure.3.5): First, ‘Me-
dia Agenda’; issues discussed in the media, second, ‘Public Agenda’; issues dis-
cussed and personally relevant to the public and third, ‘Policy Agenda’; issues that
policy makers consider important. Roger and Dearing (1988) concluded: “(a) The
media influence the public agenda; (b) the media agenda seems to have direct, some-
times strong, influence upon the policy agenda; and the media indirectly influence
policy as well because (c) the public agenda, once set by, or reflected by, the media
agenda, influences the policy agenda” (Reese, 1991, p. 103).
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FIGURE 3.5 THREE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE AGENDA-SETTING PROCESS
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‘Agenda setting’ has the power to explain and clear why most people prioritize
the same issues as important, moreover, on the one hand, it can help in predicting
if people are exposed to the same media, since that they will prioritize the same
issues if they do. On the other hand, it can prove that people are not exposed to the
same media if they do not. In addition, it is not complex, not costly and it is easy
to understand. Also, “its meta-theoretical assumptions are balanced on the scientific
side”, and it is considered the springboard for further researches. Finally, it has an
organizing power since that it helps organize existing knowledge of media effects
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 176).
Finally are the ‘people’s system of beliefs and values’, The concept of ‘belief’ or
‘belief system’ has been defined by Converse (1964) as “a configuration of con-
straint or functional interdependence”, meaning that it is a set of idea-elements that
are connected by an interrelated function (p. 207). In this context, he emphasized
on the term ‘centrality’, which is the “tendency of new information to necessitate
changes in belief” (Ibid.). Simply, the more central the idea-element in the individ-
ual’s belief system the more likely he or she will stick to it and not be influenced
by the newly gained information, and the less central the idea to the belief system
the more likely that the individual will forgone or replace that idea with a new one.
In definition, beliefs are those pertaining to one’s “religion, family, politics, and the
like reflect the major areas of a person’s social activity” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur,
1976, p. 13).
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Palestinian and Israeli people have a different set of beliefs that do not corre-
spond to each other. In turn, these difference in beliefs are translated into differ-
ences in ‘emphasis, interpretation and selection’ of the same events. Bar-Tal (1990)
referred to the incompatibility of beliefs between two groups under the same con-
ditions (i.e., in conflicts) as ‘cognitive discrepancy’ (p. 10). According to Bar-Tal
(1990b): ‘In a conflict situation, the cognitive discrepancy involves incompatibility
of beliefs regarding solutions, incompatibility in the accounts of the background or
the course of the conflict, and other contents’, which enhances the magnitude of
that conflict. Two main factors determine the centrality of belief: how frequent is
that belief-accessible in the cognitive system and that belief’s degree of relevance
to the individual’s evaluations (p. 11). The Palestinian, as well as the Israeli be-
liefs, were described to be motivated for specific conclusions (or contents). It is the
case when undesirable information is rejected, while the desired one is accepted.
Accordingly, each nation tend to view their own beliefs as being ‘objective and cor-
rect’ and the rival or other group’s beliefs as being ‘distorted and incorrect’. These
motivations that constitute the individual’s belief systems are the results of “wishes
that individuals try to fulfill and / or fears that they try to avoid” (p. 12).
(2) Affection effect: In their opinion, this effect is inevitable, and is insepara-
ble of the cognitive effect. Also, they referred to the lack of studies that pinpoint
and examine the influence of media messages on audience’s feelings and emotions.
They suggested to research Fear, anxiety, and trigger-happiness as illustrations of
affective effects, which this dissertation successfully tackles in addition to further
illustrations of emotions. In line with this, they referred to the next step of morale
and alienation where individuals label themselves as ‘we’ versus ‘them’, which in
conflict-related matters might deepen the conflict and reinforces misperceptions of
the self and the other. Finally, (3) Behavioral effect, the degree to which past ef-
fects influence individual’s behaviors and actions, which he or she would not have
done if they were not triggered by media messages.
Further to the explanation of attitudes formation above are the elements that
constitute attitudes, which were used in line with the Media dependency model to
develop the dissertation’s Matrix. Therefore, I am introducing below the tripartite
model of attitudes or the ABC model of attitudes.
ABC Model of Attitudes
According to this model, an attitude is defined by three main elements; affective,
behavioral and cognitive components. The affective component toward an object de-
velops certain attitudes towards it; people’s reactions, feelings, or emotions against
war explain their tendencies to compromise for peace. The behavioural component
of how people behave toward certain compromises suggested by their government
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explains their attitude toward peace. The cognitive component; knowledge and be-
liefs people hold about how harmful a war is will most likely predict their attitudes
toward it. It is worth noting that attitudes can sometimes have a kind of reciprocity
correlation with some of these components; it is not only the case that attitudes are
always the predictive outcome of these components. For instance, a strong attitude
toward killing civilians develops certain behavior of how people will act against
it and stronger affective reactions to these killings. Or, knowing people’s attitudes
ease the prediction of their behavior. An attitude filters information that is inconsis-
tent with someone’s own attitude and instead accepts only those that conform with
it, leading to bias when people perceive new information (Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2008).
According to McLeod (2009) “the basic idea behind the functional approach is
that attitudes help a person to mediate between their own inner needs (expression,
defense) and the outside world (adaptive and knowledge)”. Measuring attitudes and
beliefs should not only be limited to explicit but to implicit attitudes as well. Recent
research in the psychology of attitudes developed several methods in an attempt to
measure or define the latent side of attitudes, which normally do have an influence
on individual’s general behavior and cognitions. Also, that are mostly not controlled
by the individual, and sometimes they themselves fail to acknowledge (Cunningham
et al., 2001). A general mistake might be to assume that “individuals have both the
ability and the motivation to report their attitudes and beliefs accurately”. We should
consider the degree of stability these attitudes and beliefs hold; do they change
dramatically over time? and how can we border its influence or at least differentiate
between valid and invalid ones?
Since explicit attitudes are the obvious side of attitudes that can be accurately de-
fined by individuals, they are easily measured by typical means of statistical instru-
ments, and that can be directed with ‘standard persuasive techniques’. Whereas, im-
plicit attitudes are harder to measure, and they are driven by hidden ‘affective reac-
tions’ that individuals learn over time in certain circumstances (Roskos-Ewoldsen,
2008).
Inspired by these models, media literature and theories, and conflict-related stud-
ies mentioned below, the matrix at the last section of this chapter highlights these
reactions and their connection with the causes, consequences and suggested solu-
tions to the conflict.
3.2.3 Theories of Media Effects
The relationship between the media and the public is one of the most issues that
preoccupied scientists and researchers in the public communication field. Where
these heed for the impact of these means in individuals through what they publish
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or display while focusing on the interpretation of this type of effect and its nature,
the matter led to a multiplicity of views and visions and theories that try to give a
convincing explanation of the method and the type of leverage of these media.
There is a consensus on the media impact, but to what extent? Under what cir-
cumstances? And how? That’s what scientists and researchers unanimously didn’t
agree upon in the field of mass communication. The differences were pushing for a
large number of studies and experiments; all crystallized in the form of theories and
specimen, mostly tried to explain how the media affect public opinion.
The impact of the media means is of multiple dimensions, but originally it is
a psychological phenomenon associated with psychiatric cases of the individual in
the communicative information process. Despite the development of research on the
subject of media influence, all of them handled the multiple complex relationships
associated with some changes in the message future, the terms of the reception and
content of the message as well. This is in addition to the social background of the
receiver and the sender, as well as the beliefs, and many other variables. In other
words, the effect is the result of several overlapping conditions and levels to ef-
fect the impact. Due to the multitude of these levels, one must view the effect from
different dimensions or aspects: First, from the psychological point of view as a
psychological condition upon receipt of the media message, second, from the so-
cial aspect considering the impact as the product of social relations of the circles,
to which the individual belongs and which plays a major role in the formation of
the impact resulting from the exposure of that person to the content of the media.
There are also other dimensions that play a role in determining the impact of such
educational and cultural level, cultural affiliation, and the standard of living, and as
such the effect remains a very complex issue that requires overlapping of several
approaches to understanding and attempts to gauge. Studies that were made on the
subject, each according to its direction, linked this process to one of the previous di-
mensions. Taking into consideration that it is a set of processes, surveys were unable
to reach a decision limiting access to a single level of these standards. I was keen in
this thesis to understand the application of these relations on the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict from a practical perspective to be in the media influence in every country,
and the differences between media frames and their role in promoting conflict or
peace. I will try here briefly to mention the most important theoretical perspectives,
through which scholars sought to interpret the phenomenon of media influence and
the way of its application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite my cognition
that the cultural and historical contexts that helped the emergence of those theories
differ in form and content from the contexts in which I want to apply, but handling
it in some detail without going into the trends one’s intend, is essential to building
a background knowledge of the subject of this thesis.
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Most significant theories to explain the impact of the mass media -
The impact of the media on individuals is not a new subject on the scale of re-
searchers’ interests in different fields of knowledge. Accordingly, I will be review-
ing the most important theories of media impact, but with further emphasize on
Framing theory because it falls at the core of this dissertation’s objectives and re-
search questions. Particularly that journalists play a significant role in activating the
role of the press in the peace-building process through their ability to frame the
media treatment of war and peace news, and this means that the press is not alone
at stake, but also the journalists themselves who provide the reality in which we
live. The inclination of the journalist towards the conflict and the stance he adopts
towards this conflict impact the style he molds for the news story (Kempf, 2007,
p. 3). This role falls under what is known ‘Framing’.
Hypodermic Needle Theory
The theoretical stream that advocates the strong impact of the communication
means emerged in the period between the First and Second World War. This the-
ory received many names. The most important one among them was the theory of
the impact of the Magic Bullet effects. This means that the media mission is very
powerful in its impact and likened to a shot which, if precisely shot, will not miss
the target whatever strong its defenses are. It is also called the theory of the syringe
or the theory of the Hypodermic Needle. It likened the message here to the solution,
that is injected into a vein and it arrives in moments to all parts of the body through
the blood circulation and has such a strong impact that cannot be slipped or avoided.
The roots of this belief might revert to the war conditions and the emergence of a
new publicity as a way to guide and influence the masses, through the radio stations
in particular. This theory means that the individual is automatically and directly im-
pacted by the content of the media outlet, as the advocates of this theory believe
that the media have a strong and direct impact on the individual and the commu-
nity that might reach the extent of domination (E. Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). This
impact is strong and as effective as a bullet, and nobody can escape from it. As we
perceive, its impact is strong, fast and direct such as the impact of a gun bullet, but
it’s a short–term impact. Researches, however, have shown later that the impact of
media is not absolute and that other variables should be pursued to be included in
this framework, such as economic, social and cultural variables that impact the atti-
tudes and choices of individuals (Shaw, 1977, p. 96). The same is applicable to the
Palestinian–Israeli conflict, a conflict that is full of variables that might prevent the
absolute impact of the media on the minds of the two peoples. This will be one of
the questions that I’m going to answer in this study and which reads as follows:
• Up to what extent might the media affect the minds of the people, or rather,
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what is the extent of harmony between media frames available in the minds
of peoples with media frameworks in each country, and whether actually the
impact / harmony is absolute as this theory assumes?
The opinion of the Palestinian author Zarra’ (2013) agrees with this theory, as
he said in the light of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between Fatah and Hamas
supporters:
‘The bullet or the hypodermic needle theory is agreed to be futile and inef-
fective for more than half a century, and means of local media still try its
approval by disparaging the viewer’s mind and cutting him from the broad
media environment, in which we live today under the satellite TV’s and the
widespread use of the internet and social media. The Palestinian law defines
the powers and freedoms of the press by dead and buried (gone) laws since
the demise of colonialism, but restricts other liberties by the supreme powers
and interests of the state !! The executive authority usurps these rights from
those, who disagree in opinion with them and apply other rights in a manner
that commensurate with their authoritarian and political mood ’.
Two-Step Flow Theory
Paul Lazarsfeld is the founder of this theory. He conducted with Berelson and Judy
Gaudet a study in 1940 during the US presidential campaign, in which the former
President Franklin Roosevelt was engaged and who was at that time sick and unable
to assume the presidential responsibilities, especially that the country is on the verge
of a world war (Bostian, 1970, p. 109).Therefore, most of the media mean called
upon the voters not to re-elect him and were hostile to him. Lazarsfeld decided to
conduct this study as to ascertain the extent of the impact strength of the mass com-
munication media on the public. If it proves effective, the American voters wouldn’t
vote for Roosevelt. If not, or to a very small extent effective, then Roosevelt will
win. The election results were contrary to all expectations since Roosevelt was re-
elected, unlike the media directives. Lazarsfeld concluded that the process of form-
ing the electoral public opinion does not take place on an individual level, but within
the framework of groups living similar social conditions and are brought together by
common interests and needs: it has been found that interpersonal communication is
more effective and influential than the media, and these findings constituted a major
shift in the levels of influence of the media from powerful to limited (Mattelart &
Mattelart, 1998).
This shift has paved the way in the media research studies to the formulation of
the Two-Step Flow Theory, which depicted the information transfer movement from
the media to the individuals who are even more vulnerable to the media, then the
information is transmitted from these individuals to individuals who rely on others
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in receiving information and are not exposed to the media, or that they have been
indirectly exposed, the matter which led to a theoretical fission in media studies
and the emergence of a new phase that conduced to the statement of the limited
influence of the media on individuals, and the emergence of the role of reference
groups within the community.
FIGURE 3.6 TWO-STEP FLOW THEORY
 
Source: www.communicationtheory.org (2016).
The purpose of this theory is the transmission of information and thoughts in
two phases through the people’s reception of the information that is broadcast by
the media and through the interpretations of the opinion leaders of this information.
In the previous theory, one believed that the media have an absolute influence on
the receiver, but this theory proved the contrary, as messages are transmitted from
the media to opinion leaders, and then to the opinion followers. Direct media might
not affect us, or its impact is limited, particularly when the opinion leader accedes
the equation, as he enjoys the physical and moral power and interprets the me-
dia messages the way he sees it on the basis of his cultural education. This theory
received many criticisms and amendments by many researchers: Westley (1971),
Rogers (1962), Lin (1971), Troldahli and Van Dam (1965), Robinson (1976) and
others. But at the same time, it produced the impact theory in two phases and had
undergone fundamental changes, as it has laid a new concept of the individual re-
lationship with the media. It is, however, largely led beyond the impact of social
relations in the individual against dwarfing the role of the media and other external
factors, the presence of which might be noticed upon impact. Other points opened
wide discussion doors wide debate is that whether the opinion leader constitutes
alone a link between the media and the rest of the individuals, or whether there is
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a series of opinion leaders? It has been observed through the studies carried out
in this context that in some cases opinion leaders resort to those who make up an
information and impact link. Furthermore, a proposal has been made to extend the
hypothesis of the ‘two-phase impact’ to that of the ‘multiple phases impact’ as there
are several levels of impact between the sender and the receiver (Weimann, 1982,
p. 764). This thesis has produced the hypothesis about the impact of the political
leaders and the extent of their influence on public opinion, namely:
• The extent to which political leaders influence through their speeches, deci-
sions and evaluations the perceptions of the two peoples, or rather, what is the
extent of consistency between the media frameworks available in the minds
of the two peoples and the media frameworks promoted by political leaders
and their parties?
Function of Opinion Leaders
Opinion leaders are a group of individuals who impact the conduct of others as a
result of being distinguished from others in different ways, such as their personal-
ity, their skills, or being well-acquainted with matters of public affairs. They often
benefit from the most widely used means of communication than others. They are
the people who play a double role in conducting the communication in two stages,
as they are primarily exposed to the communication sources and then transmit the
information they receive from these sources to other citizens, with whom they are
bound by positive and strong relationships: They work on converting mass com-
munication via different media sources (radio, television and newspapers) to direct
and personal contact depending on their social influence and their personal abilities
through transmitting and interpreting the content of the messages, the matter which
increases the impact on the preliminary individuals and groups (Page et al., 1987,
p. 39). This means that the information does not reach directly to the people, but
by means of the opinion leaders who make up the final version of the communica-
tion messages. The opinion leaders are the persons, to whom others resort asking
for advice or for getting information because the opinion leaders are usually more
committed than others to social standards and norms prevailing in the society or
in social organization, the matter which grants them leadership recipes and credi-
bility in directing and guidance. Furthermore, communication methods of opinion
leaders are innovative and open in terms of accuracy, or quality of information or
their sources, as this information are enhanced by multiple external sources, that
are not limited to channels of familiar mass communication. In addition, they enjoy
widespread attention by the media, and that due to their deep influence on people’s
minds and their significant leverage on them. To explore the leaders of public opin-
ion, we must find out who are the most influential people, and how to employ them
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for this purpose (De Vreese, 2004, p. 45).
Key features and characteristics of influential opinion leaders in the community
(Hermann, 1980):
• Religious character: a feature that is mentioned in more than one location
of researchers studies in the field of the two-phases information transmission
theory, which is the most prominent attribute of opinion leaders mentioned in
the scientific accumulation of the theory, which might be clearly observed in
Palestine and Israel.
• Confidence and social acceptance: it is the basic attribute among the opin-
ion leaders attributes. The one who enjoys this attribute will experience the
figures of the public opinion heading to him to know his opinions and his
views about public issues in the community, and he, consequently, will per-
form his job trying to shape the public opinion and impact it. Therefore, the
opinion leaders who enjoy the trust of the community are considered as in-
fluential sources when there is a public inclination to know their views. And
those who are pursuing knowledge or advice for certain issues are the public
groups that are mostly affected by the opinion leaders, especially if the com-
munication is on the personal or collective level, as established by the results
of opinion leaders surveys based on the accumulated knowledge of the theory
of information transmission in two phases.
• Exposure to the means of communication: In this golden age of media, ac-
cording to Cohen, in which these means are subject to competition in how to
satisfy public needs and reflect the voice of the community rather than be-
ing just a political tool for the governments, the responsibility of the opinion
leaders seems to be more distinct in encountering these means and restricting
their impact on the public opinion. It is therefore, the most significant char-
acteristic of opinion leaders in any society that they are exposed to the media
more than others. The researchers describe the opinion leaders in the theory
of information transmission in two-stage that they are subjected to various
means of communication in order to obtain the necessary information they
re-formulate or re-interpret and then transfer to the public intended to be in-
fluenced.
Objectives of Opinion Leaders Analyses
Politicians talk to people through the media to impose their authority, and the indi-
viduals engage in the political process through the media to express their opinions
about national issues. Hence, the flow of information from the media to opinion
leaders and vice versa best describe the political process. Accordingly, the primary
objective of the document analysis is to measure the level of contingency between
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issues discussed by the major political parties/movements and their respective lead-
ers with those presented in the newspapers of each country and perceived by the
people.
Uses and Gratification Theory
The uses and gratification theory means that individuals and public use information
material to gratify their internal wishes and needs as the individuals and the public
are the ones who determine the type of the media content they want and that the
role of the media is only to meet the needs and desires. According to the use and
gratification theory, the individuals are described as motivated by psychological and
social influences to use media in order to obtain special results, dubbed ‘Gratifica-
tions’ (Blumler, 1979, p. 10).
Uses and gratification researchers seek to answer the question: Why does the
recipient use the means of communication? Through this question we might real-
ize that these studies consider the receiver as the starting point and not the media
message or means of communication. Through this focus action on the receiver, the
advocates of this trend perceive that individuals use the media and their contents for
many things that may not be related to the objective the ‘communicator’ wants. The
reason is that the individuals, rather than to be receptive to contact messages, they
seek to use the means of communication in accordance with their needs, and thus
satisfy so many of their needs, and not necessarily to have them satisfied through
the media. The individual might resort to alternatives other than the media to satisfy
his needs Ruggiero (2000, p. 3). The use and gratification theory is a qualitative
shift in media research from the public aspect, is however, an ineffective element,
rather than effective so that members of this audience select media means and con-
tents they prefer. They actively participate in the process of mass communication,
in other words, the public is (Active) and connects to the needs and the choice of
means of communication, so that it uses means that reach the goals intended to
meet his expectations. Individuals are thus those who use the means of communica-
tion, not the media. The individual is the one who determines what accounts for his
interests and what cannot meet his interests. This theory, however, has faced cer-
tain criticism, mainly due to the lack of a distinct definition of its most protruding
concepts (Blumler, 1979, p. 10).
In terms of the extent of this theory’s application to the conflict, if we adopt the
most important things written by E. Katz et al. (1973) about the wishes of indi-
viduals and arrange them, the study theories at these levels would be branched as
follows:
Cognitive Needs and Affective Needs focus on the need and the desire of the
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Palestinian and Israeli peoples to obtain clear information about what is happening
around them, and to clarify and understand who is responsible for the event and the
latest developments. This is in respect of the cognitive field. In the affective field,
however, the wishes of the two peoples are concentrated on their need to satisfy
their affections towards their beliefs and the narratives, as well as the holy land. I
will revert to it in a more detailed form in later chapters of this thesis. In this context,
I’m going to test the basic frameworks’ directions of the conflict in the Palestinian
and Israeli media (negative, positive or neutral frames), and the assumption that the
frames in every media will be focused on the oppressed spirit and the other on the
oppressor of this spirit, that’s to say, the media frames will reflect what the two peo-
ples want to know about each other (by focusing on the negativism in the coverage
of the event frameworks) which I reached in the historical overview. Here appears
to some extent the public’s ability to impact the media. These needs complement
the content of other needs mentioned by Katz and his colleagues, which include
personal and social integrative needs, which are clearly reflected in the analysis of
the wishes of the public in the research form (Ibid.; Noelle-Neumann, 1974, p. 44).
Spiral of Silence Theory
It emphasizes that the media and mass communication are, in general, sometimes
biased to the side of one of the issues or personalities, so that leads to the support of
the bulk of the audience for the direction adopted by the media in search of the social
harmony. Individuals, however, opposed to this issue or that personality are taking
the position (of silence) in order to avoid the persecution of the big pro-community,
or in fear of social isolation. Consequently, if they believe in opinions contrary
to what the media suggest or present, they would withhold their personal views
and would be less willing to talk about these views with others. Those, however,
who have views consistent with those aired by the media would be more active and
aggressive in presenting these views and talking about them to get social acceptance
(Scheufele, 2008b, p. 175).
Because a large portion of the public believes that the side supported by the
media reflects the trend in the society, the opinion adopted by the media continues to
be stronger and possibly effect pressure on those, who oppose the opinion adopted
by the media, so they turn to be silent. We therefore, get (a spiral) effect, that is
increasingly inclined toward the prevailing side adopted by the media, regardless of
the true position of the public (Noelle-Neumann, 1977, p. 144).
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FIGURE 3.7 NOELLE-NEUMANN SPIRAL OF SILENCE THEORY
176 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
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Figure 16.1 The spiral of silence as a dynamic, macrosocial process
Note: Based on ideas first outlined in Scheufele & Moy (2000)
perceived minority to express their opinions
will establish the majority opinion as the
predominant view, or even as a social norm.
Noelle-Neumann’s (1984) theorizing
comes out of two broad theoretical traditions.
The first theoretical tradition that the spiral of
silence theory evolved from are the works of
philosophers, such as Locke or Montaigne,
whose writings had dealt extensively with
the effects of public opinion and public
ostracism. The second theoretical foundation
of the spiral of silence theory is social-
psychological, particularly theories about
conformity to majority pressures (Asch,
1955, 1965) and the influence of group norms
on judgments and attitudes (Sherif, 1967).
THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE AS A
DYNAMIC PROCESS
The most critical component of the spiral of
silence is also the one that has been overlooked
most in previous research on the theory: its
dynamic character. The spiral of silence is a
process that works over time. As people who
perceive themselves to be in the minority fall
silent, perceptions of opinion climates shift
over time, and ultimately the majority opinion
is established as the predominant one or even
as a social norm.
Figure 16.1 illustrates this spiraling process
over time. People’s willingness to publicly
express their views depends heavily on
their perceptions of which viewpoints are
represented by a majority of citizens or which
viewpoints are gaining ground. As people
with minority viewpoints fall silent over time,
perceptions of the majority opinion gaining
ground increase. This creates a mutually
reinforcing spiral where the reluctance of
the minority group to speak out leads to
perceptual biases in favor of the majority
group, which, in turn, further discourages the
minority group from speaking out.
There are two contingent conditions for this
spiraling process to take place. The first one is
the nature of the issue that is being discussed.
Previous research suggests that the spiral of
silence only works for issues with a moral
component, or value-laden issues ‘by which
the individual isolates or may isolate himself
in public’ (Noelle-Neumann, 1993, p. 231).
The recent debate about embryonic stem-cell
research in many countries is a good example
of an issue where religious and moral concerns
are intertwined with more rational, scientific
arguments in public discourse. Public debate
around this issue is therefore morally charged,
and it is impossible to ‘objectively’ answer
the question if a given country should proceed
with this new technology and provide federal
Source: Scheufele (2008b, p. 175).
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann suggests a group of approaches or methods in the
research, that combines field and survey standards for the public and those in charge
of co mu ication in order to re ize the power and influenc of the media, s well
as the use of the approach ‘content analysis’ approach that this survey has pursued.
Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann has developed her theory on the basis of the pilot
researches she has conducted during her work on this theory. She has identified
three key variables that contribute to and enhance the power of the m di i pact,
(Ibid.), namely:
1. The quantitative impact through repetition: Whereas the media provide sim-
ilar and frequent media messages about an issue or on a ubject or a specific
personality so that this cumulative presentation leads to the influence of the
recipient in the long run, without actually willing it, so willy–nilly, whatever
the strength of the recipient immunity against the media message might be.
2. Involuntary guidance of the recipient and influencing him totally: This means:
The media controls the human-being and beleaguer him everywhere, in th
street, at the workplace, at home, and also dominate the information environ-
ment available to him, and the sources of infor ation, resulting in compre-
hensive impacts on the individual, which he hardly can get rid of, so forming
without his will both, the whole of his vision and his view of the world and
things.
3. Media homogeneity and dominance: This means that those in charge of com-
munication and work in the media centers and provide informati nal mes-
sages in line with stakeholders of media organizations in which they work,
and which in turn are in harmony and agreement with beneficiaries of major
interests in shaping or directing public opinion to the public, so that it leads to
the similarity of attitudes and the similarity of moral logic of the media work
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they are doing, which leads by its part to the similarity of media messages re-
ported by various media, the matter which increases the strength of its impact
on the recipient.
All of these factors lead – as Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann views them – to the diminu-
tion of the receiver’s chance to adopt himself an independent opinion on the issues
raised, and thus increasing the opportunity for the media in the formation of ideas
and trends influencing public opinion.
• In the context of how far this theory is applicable to the Palestinian and Israeli
media, I assume with reference to the historic overview and the results of
previous studies that the silent majority in the conflict will be those calling
for peace and recognition of the other party.
3.2.4 Framing
Conceptual Definition
There can be no doubt about the fact that there is more news every day than the me-
dia can possibly accommodate. Therefore, news editors and reporters were urged to
develop distinctive procedures, values, and work ways to aid them in their challeng-
ing task of constituting everyday’s news quickly and regularly (Price et al., 1997,
p. 481). Lippmann (1932) was the first to analyze the impact of mass media on shap-
ing peoples’ perceptions. Once he noted: “the news media are a primary source of
those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs, a world that for
most citizens is ‘out of reach, out of sight, out of mind’”. He then described the me-
dia as a dominator over the creation of pictures in public heads. Lippmann (1932)
believed that the public does not react to actual events but to the dominated pictures
in their heads (Ibid., p. 29). The framing concept has been widely applied by schol-
ars in psychology, political science, and communication studies (Nelson et al., 1997,
p. 222). It is the process were “meaningless and non-recognizable happenings” are
turned into a “discernible event” through their framing representation in the news.
According to Gamson (1988), frames are “templates (ideas and principles) embed-
ded in news texts” (Pan, 2008; Scheufele, 1999, p. 106). Gamson and Modigliani
(1987) have defined this representation as “the central organizing idea or story line
that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Ibid., p. 119). One of the
prominent scholars to write about framing was Entman (1993, p. 52) who stated
that “framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text,
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation,
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.
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Cohen (1963, p. 13) pointed out that “the press is significantly more than a pur-
veyor of information. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people
what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think
about”. More emphasize was put by Price et al. (1997, p. 482) on the packaging
and presentation of news in a certain way by mass media, which systematically can
affect how recipients come to understand the news.
Framing is “the routine procedure of sizing-magnifying or shrinking elements
of the depicted reality to make some ideas more or less salient” in the text and
others entirely invisible, in order to facilitate for the journalists the process of
“identifying, classifying, packaging and presenting the information to their au-
diences” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106; Entman, 1991, p. 7). There is no commonly
shared theoretical model underlying framing research or a general statement of
framing theory that has a precise explanation of how frames are exactly “embedded
within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences think-
ing” (Entman, 1993, p. 51; Scheufele, 2008a). In other words, there is no consensus
among scholars about the conceptual clarity and consistency of what exactly frames
are and how they influence public opinion (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 222; Scheufele,
2008a). Indeed, “each political communication scholar provided a definition of this
concept with respect to his or her underlining assumptions or hypotheses”, leaving
no single commonly accepted definition of framing. Therefore, research on framing
is sometimes characterized by theoretical and empirical vagueness, partly because
conceptual problems are sometimes translated into operational ones (Scheufele,
1999, p. 103).
How Does Framing Work
On the one hand, the process of framing serves as a mean of making bits of infor-
mation more salient; “more noticeable, meaningful, and memorable to audience”,
through the continuous repetition of specific phrases, putting them in a culturally
familiar context and relating them to concepts; stereotype, categories and scripts
that guide the individuals’ “processing of information” and that “renders into one
basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than
others” (Entman, 1993, p. 53; Entman, 1991, p. 7).
Minor changes or alternative phrasings of the same basic issue significantly
alter its meaning to respondents, and the more the frame comports with the re-
ceivers’existing beliefs schemata, the more likely to enhance “the probability
that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it,
and store it in memory” (Zaller, 1992b, p. 34; Entman, 1993, p. 53; Lopez &
Sabucedo, 2007, p. 152). On the other hand, it distracts attention away from other
aspects through calling attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring oth-
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ers, or through “constraining the available interpretative alternatives for the audi-
ence” (Huang, 2010, p. 48; Entman, 1993, p. 54). According to Entman (1993,
p. 54), “most frames are defined by what they omit as well as include, and the
omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recom-
mendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience”.
Accordingly, frames can be meaningful and important determinants in shaping
individuals’perceptions and providing a context for processing information, and
therefore making mass media and other institutions of mass political communi-
cation as means of profound influence on public opinion, even without any overt
attempt at persuasion or manipulation (Hallahan, 2008; Nelson et al., 1997, p: 224-
236). To summarize: framing effects occur when minor changes, whether in the
keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and / or visual images, in the presentation
of an issue or an event are transferred into (sometimes major) changes in public
opinion and therefore evokes different kinds of thoughts, feelings and drives be-
haviours (Price et al., 1997, p. 483; Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 104; Entman,
1991, p. 7; Lopez & Sabucedo, 2007, p. 150).
Framing as an Active Process
Price et al. (1997, p: 485-486) have empirically examined the knowledge activation
process, in particular, the influence of news frames on the applicability of ideas and
feelings in individuals’ minds. They differentiated between applicability effect as
a ‘first-order effects of stimuli’ (media messages) that occurs during message pro-
cessing, and accessibility effect as a ‘second-order effect of stimuli’ of messages
that is when “ideas and feelings retain some residual activation potential, making
them more likely to be activated and used in making subsequent evaluations”. More-
over, they examined how the knowledge that is subject to be processed or activated
is highly dependent on the characteristics of the individual established knowledge
storage or capacity.
Frames appear to “activate existing beliefs and cognitions, rather than adding
something new to the individual’s beliefs about the issue”. Basically, framing ef-
fects “result from schema activation or modification, and whether an individual’s
internal construct is activated is related to the applicability effect of the attributes of
a media message” (Huang, 2010, p. 51; Nelson et al., 1997, p. 236). And through
this activation process of some ideas, feelings, and values rather than others, the
news can stimulate particular ‘trains of thought’about political phenomena and lead
audience members to arrive at more or less predictable conclusions (Price et al.,
1997, p. 483).
Consequently, the output of opinions or interpretations of news that audiences
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hold are considered to involve the interaction between the input of news frames
and audiences’ predispositions (Huang, 2010, p. 47). In view of that, framing can
work on all three levels, “by making new beliefs available about an issue, mak-
ing certain available beliefs accessible or making beliefs applicable or ‘strong’ in
peoples’ evaluations” (Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 111). Therefore, researchers
decomposed framing into media and audience frames and investigated the linkages
between them (Scheufele, 1999, p. 106).
Media and Audience Frames
Kinder and Sanders (1990) referred to media frames as “devices embedded in po-
litical discourse”, and to individual or audience frames as “internal structures of
the mind” (Scheufele, 1999, p. 105). Entman (1991, p. 7) in his turn referred
to media frames as attributes of the news itself’, and to individual frames as
‘information-processing schemata’. Minsky (1975) was from the first to refer to
audiences’ frames as cognitive frames, which he defined as “mental structures that
facilitate organizing and interpreting incoming perceptual information by fitting it
into already learned schemas or frames about reality”, and that rely on “a version
of reality built from personal experience, interactions with peers, and interpreted
selections from the mass media” (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 158; Neuman et al., 1992,
p. 120).
To sum up, audience framing is a result of “information integration process” that
includes both the ‘news discourses’ and the ‘audience’s existing predispositions’. In
other words, how individuals come to assess and understand news issues is a product
of the interaction between individual-level factors and specific frames adapted by
the media (Huang, 2010, p. 47). However, “the presence of frames in the text, as
detected by researchers, does not guarantee their influence in audience thinking”.
Simply, the frames that guide the receiver’s thinking and conclusion may or may
not reflect the frames in the text and the framing intention of the communicator,
because “the idea behind framing implies that the frame has a common effect on
large portions of the receiving audience, though it is not likely to have a universal
effect on all” (Entman, 1993, p: 52-54). Price et al. (1997, p. 481) once stated that
“messages can serve to direct in various ways, but not completely control a message
recipient’s train of thoughts”. As individual-level factors can “condition audience
frame choice in specific issue contexts, it is expected that these factors can affect
the range of views or, the number of frames audience members employ to see public
issues” (Huang, 2010, p. 52).
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Limitations of Framing Effect
Druckman and Holmes (2004, p. 112) mentioned in their article the moderator vari-
ables that limit framing effects. They started with the most powerful one; individual
predispositions such as values. Individuals with strong values are less amenable to
frames that contradict those values. In general, strong predispositions reduce fram-
ing effects by increasing one’s resistance to disconfirming information. Elite frames
“aim to appeal to the partisan and ideological leanings of the audience”, and frames
delivered by credible sources are more likely to shift opinions, as are frames that in-
voke long-standing cultural values. There was no consensus among scholars about
the role of the third moderator - knowledge - in limiting framing effect, where some
scholars found stronger framing effects on less knowledgeable individuals, others
report the opposite.
König (2008) pointed out in his writing to the concept of Framing Viability,
which says that “not all frames have the same chances of catching on”. There are
several mechanisms that affect the frame viability, such as the frame’s narrative fi-
delity; the degree to which a frame is rooted in or depicted from the audiences’ per-
sonal life experience, and the frame’s empirical credibility; the fit between a frame
and real world events, which for instance can be maintained from mass media dis-
courses (e.g., public opinion about nuclear power).
The results of other scholars’ (e.g., Huang (1996); Price et al. (1997); Neumann
et al. (1992)) revealed that “media frames not only find their way into audience
frames, but that when media and audience frames overlap, the media and the au-
dience accord different weights to those frames”. However, in the case of congru-
ent individuals, who like to drive to the heart of the issue or problem in order to
construct a rational decision or idea, the media and “the audience focus on differ-
ent dimensions of those frames”, or they had very different priorities in terms of
framing issues (Scheufele, 1999, p. 112). In other words, individuals frames do not
exclusively depend on media coverage of an event or issue. Rather, “participants
demonstrate a capacity to introduce their own thoughts, going beyond the infor-
mation provided and drawing out some basic implication on their own” (Ibid., p.
113). Audience frames can be influenced by “several social-structural or organi-
zational variables, and by an individual or ideological variables” (Ibid., p. 107).
Despite this, reporters and editors “may not be driving the engines of audience de-
cision making, they may nonetheless have some capacity to guide those engines by
switching tracks” (Price et al., 1997, p. 504).
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Functions Constituting a Frame
Entman (1993, p. 52) have developed four main functions that a frame may include
enabling people to understand how discourse forms common meanings about par-
ticular social and political problems. Entman (1993) once noted that frames: “define
problems–determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usu-
ally measured in terms of common cultural values; diagnose causes - identify the
forces creating the problem; make moral judgments - evaluate causal agents and
their effects; and suggest remedies - offer and justify treatments for the problems
and predict their likely effects”.
He then specified, at least, four locations of frames in the communication pro-
cess. First, the communicators (e.g., journalists, editors and more); who consciously
or unconsciously use “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presenta-
tion” to organize reality for the audience. The text, which contains frames that “are
manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereo-
typed images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically re-
inforcing clusters of facts or judgments”. The receivers or audiences, who receive
that text, and finally, the culture; which is a “set of common frames exhibited in the
discourse and thinking of most people in a social grouping” (Ibid., p. 52).
Conventional Expectancy Model – A Psychological Approach
What happens when an individual fails to develop an attitude toward a political topic
because he or she is ignorant or holds a blurred idea about that topic? Individuals
will probably draw upon few shortcuts or considerations that are available at the
top of their heads when for instance responding to survey questions and will be
unable to determine the relative importance or develop an overall evaluation or score
for these responses. In such cases, “a survey question at best elicits an imperfect
representation of a person’s feelings based on the subset of beliefs that are accessible
at that moment” (Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 105).
Druckman and Holmes (2004, p. 105) referred to what they call ‘the conventional
expectancy model’ as “a summary of a definable set of beliefs that an individual
holds about a subject”. The expectancy-value model in its simplest form assumes
that individuals assign different weights to various considerations about a subject,
resulting in viewing some issues as more important than others. Hence, the model
is considered a useful abstraction for discussing the psychology of framing.
This conceptualization applies to any object of evaluation, for instance, an indi-
vidual’s attitude toward a specific policy or issue may depend on several dimensions
that are of varying weights of importance (e.g., he or she may view security issues as
more important than immigration and economic issues when voting) and therefore,
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attitudes will be highly dependent on their evaluation of security issues, or the case
might be that all of these issues are important, thus, his or her frame of thought will
consist of this mix of considerations. Another case, when attitudes rely on just one
dimension, he or she will place all of the weight (wi= 1) when taking their decision.
These sets of dimensions that affect individuals evaluation constitute their “frame
in thought” that is likely to have a remarkable impact on their overall opinion or
evaluation”.
Nelson et al. (1997, p. 225) studied the psychological mechanisms by which
framing influences political attitudes. They emphasized on the psychological dif-
ferences between the framing as a tool that persuaders use to influence opinion and
what they referred to as ‘standard persuasive argument’. The latter, which is the
typical communication process that involves a source who encodes and sends a new
message about an attitude object to an audience, at the same time, the audience
receives and decodes the new message from their counterparts. If the audience un-
derstands and believes the message, and if the message opposes a prior attitude in
the audience’s thought, then the attitude should change in the direction implied by
the message and so the communicator will succeed in changing the audience’s be-
lief about that attitude object. In other words, the message was able to influence the
audience opinion because it contains either positive or negative information about
the attitude object that is not already part of the recipient’s knowledge or belief
structure.
Nevertheless, what Nelson et al. (1997) argued is “that framing effects are not
reducible to the new information that the framed message provides. Instead, frames
operate by activating information already at the recipients disposal, stored in long-
term memory”. They represented the above-mentioned correlation in the equation
below which “portrays attitudes as summary evaluations based on a weighted aver-
age of a sample of beliefs about the attitude object” (p. 225) in a simple equation
form:
A = ∑ vi ∗ wi
‘A’ represents the summary attitude, ‘vi’ is the individual’s evaluation or belief
of the object on attribute I, and ‘wi’ represents the subjective weight of that belief.
We can think of I as a “dimension, a consideration, a value, or a belief” (Druckman
& Holmes, 2004, p. 105). With reference to this equation, two possible procedures
may change individuals’ attitudes: firstly, changing the individual’s beliefs or cog-
nitions about the attitude object (traditional persuasion). Secondly, changing the
balance of considerations that individuals weigh when assessing political issues or
information (framing) (Nelson et al., 1997, p: 226-235)
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A Process Model of Framing Research
Scheufele (1999, p. 114) has developed a process model of framing that conceptu-
alizes framing “as a continuous process where outcomes of certain processes serve
as inputs for subsequent processes”. In particular, the model consisted of four main
processes: frame building, frame setting, individual-level effects of framing and a
link between individual frames and media frames.
FIGURE 3.8 FRAMING AS A THEORY OF MEDIA EFFECTS
Source: Scheufele (1999, p. 119).
Frame building is the process that describes the influence of the creation or
changes of frames adopted by journalists and incorporated in their coverage of an
issue or event. These influences may be a result of the “journalist–centred influ-
ences”; ideology, attitudes and professional norms, “organizational routines”; po-
litical orientation of the medium, or external sources of influence (i.e., political
actors, authorities, interest groups and other elites (Ibid, p. 115). Frame setting is
the process that describes the influence of frames on opinions through repetition,
placement, reinforcing associations between the words and images on an issue and
by stressing specific values, facts, and other considerations to that issue (Nelson
et al., 1997, p. 569; Scheufele, 1999, p. 116 Entman, 1991, p. 7). Individual-level
effects of framing, “these individual-level outcomes include attributions of respon-
sibility, support for various policy proposals, or citizen competence” (Scheufele,
2008a, p. 4). Journalists as audiences, this process entails the reciprocal relation-
ship between frames in the text and these even schemata or frames in the audiences
thinking. It demonstrates the link between Individual-level variables (as a feedback)
and media frames. The fact that journalists; like their audiences, can be ‘cognitive
misers’ (Entman, 1991, p. 7).
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Journalists themselves can be susceptible to frames set by other news media. For
instance, when a small number of local media portrays the coverage of an event in a
specific frame, other journalists will unconsciously adapt that frame into their cov-
erage. This phenomenon of journalist influenced by other news media was labeled
by Fishman as ‘news wave’ (Scheufele, 1999, p. 117), which, according to Entman
(1991, p. 7) in the case of an entirely new breaking events, it is the initial interac-
tions of sources and journalists that set this framing process (or wave) in motion.
Entman (1991, p: 11-20) has mentioned in his analyzes of framing differences in the
KAL and Iran Air incidents four aspects of the texts that help in creating analyzed
frames. This study will adapt these aspects in investigating frames formulation of
the conflict in Palestine and Israel. First, the agency; an especial common attribute
adapted in the headlines that answer the questions of, who did it? And what causal
force created the newsworthy act? Second, the identification; how were the victims
identified. It shows the differences in coverage of, who were the victims? How much
attention they were given and the way they were covered. Third, the categorization;
the choice of labels for the conflict, which tends to place them in categories “that
conventionally either elicit or omit moral evaluations”. Finally, the generalization;
the degree to which frames portraying the conflict are generalized to hinder the ac-
tual representation of the public in Palestine and Israel, and to convey a different
one.
Generally speaking, messages from any source of information may change peo-
ple’s attitudes and perceptions “by adding information to an individual’s stockpile of
considerations about the issue (belief change), by making particular considerations
temporarily more accessible (priming), or by altering the weight of particular con-
siderations (framing)” (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 236). Framing Theory and changes in
beliefs were explained above, thus I will introduce below the Priming Theory, and
later see to what extent does the increased exposure to certain news goes parallel
with frames in people’s minds, as suggested by this theory.
Priming Theory
Priming theory argues that the increased exposure to new stories that megastory
dominates total media attention enhances the salience of the issue in people’s minds
(Iyengar et al., 1984, p. 785 ; Pan & Kosicki, 1997, p. 4). While at the same time
crowds out “other news in terms of its impact and visibility” (Pan & Kosicki, 1997,
p. 4). Pan and Kosicki (1997, p. 10) summarized the affects priming can have on
audience’s cognitive process: Priming can “increase the ease with which the related
thought elements are being activated, increase the breadth of the accessible thought
elements related to the issue, and increase the closeness in how these thought ele-
ments are linked”. This in turn, boost the possibility of considering the representa-
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tion of the recently-salience issue into the individual’s calculus of evaluating events
and leaders. Nevertheless, priming affect does not imply that individuals will des-
ignate the same proportion the media allocates to that issue into the proportion it
will occupy in their evaluation process (Druckman & Holmes, 2004, p. 758). Ad-
ditionally, priming does not occur equally on all people and is dependent on the
circumstances surrounding that issue, the personal importance/relevance attached
to it, the news-source credibility, and the characteristics of audiences (e.g., experts
or novices), more or less, their political knowledge. Which as well explains why
some people may be more vulnerable to manipulations of accessibility than others
(Iyengar et al., 1984, p. 779).
3.2.5 Role of Media in Conflict Resolution
As expected from the literature described above, mass media in conflict resolution
matters are fundamental parts of the problem and its solution (Lopez & Sabucedo,
2007, p. 150). Audiences use the message delivered by the media to compre-
hend and form opinions on domestic and international events, incidents and issues
(Simons, 2008, p. 1). Indeed, the general public is much more dependent on media
and experts, as compared with other domestic actors to get up to date information
on the negotiations and the actual meaning and implications of news (Shamir, 2007,
p. 16). In a way or another, opinions expressed by the press influence the opinion
adopted by the public. For example, when individuals read or hear about an issue
they tend to adopt their attitude with how the issue was portrayed by the media.
Therefore, mass media can be both an opportunity and a threat for the sides engag-
ing in a conflict. An opportunity, “if the power of the mass media can be harnessed
to one’s advantage and the message relayed”. A threat, “if this ‘power’ is harnessed
by an opposing party, who might use it to generate negative sentiment and publicity
towards the other party” (Simons, 2008, p. 1).
Mass media in conflict resolution is considered a “fundamental force shaping the
lives of individuals and the fate of peoples and nations” (Manoff, 1997). The role
of media in conflict takes two opposed and different routes, the first route when
the media plays an active part in the conflict and has responsibility for violence
escalation, or the second route, that is to stay independent and out of the conflict,
and therefore contribute to the resolution of conflict and lessening violence. Zelizer
(1997) pointed out that the absence of neutral journalism coverage of conflictual
social reality is a correct fact however the present of it is an incorrect one. Moreover,
he added: journalistic elite are usually “part and parcel of the political, cultural and
intellectual elite in every society”, and the active role the journalists and media
institutions play in the “power games of society” is overwhelming and should not
be underestimated (Jamal, 2007, p. 2).
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Nobody questions the significant role of mass media in shaping the configura-
tion of peoples’ beliefs, social representations, and opinions, and the remarkable
impact it plays in the creation of perceptions and ‘relational frames’ mediating be-
haviors and attitudes toward political facts. This composes an inevitable influence
on peoples’ perceptions that should be considered in solving political conflicts. Not
to mention the nowadays increased demand for explanations and clarifications to
everything that goes on in political conflicts worldwide, forcing people to turn more
to mass media seeking for answers and validations of their points of views, which
again, emphasizes the significant contribution mass media provides in the devel-
opment of political conflicts (Ibid, p. 150). This led to the emergence of the new
trend of peace journalism, which offers an approach for media professionals en-
abling them to research into the structural and cultural causes of the conflict and its
impact on the lives of citizens and to provide a content that reflects the commonal-
ities between all conflict parties in a particular community and produce proposals
and initiatives to mitigate this conflict. In line with this, I will explain below how
Galtung defined peace journalism, its goals and the Hierarchy of Influences Model.
Peace Journalism
This new trend emerged at the beginning of the nineties of the last century under
the name of the alternative press or peace journalism at the hands of John Galtung
(Galtung, 2002), in which he identified the role of the press in conflict management
and peace-building. It stems from the ability of the media to narrow the differences
between the parties of the conflict and try to focus on the commonalities between
these parties. Especially that the media in all its forms audiovisual, electronic and
written has become the most powerful weapon as viewed by some people. Tradi-
tionally viewed, it’s no more the fourth power, but it might be considered now as
the first power. This assumes the journalist responsible for additional burdens in the
commitment to turn and moves the news and picture objectively, balanced and im-
partial and without misguidance, incitement and sedition or distortion of the facts,
and without the use of vocabulary that might fuel conflicts, as well as seditious
speeches that encourage violence. In any case, the functions of the peaceful media
are to highlight the humanitarian aspects and reject disputes (Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 2).
The concept of peace journalism emerged as an opposite reaction (backfire) to
the concept of the war press that covers issues of violence in a biased manner by
focusing on violent incidents and details of their own, such as the number of casu-
alties and the type of the weapons used, but doesn’t care about the processes and
the reasons that led to the violence and its consequences on human life. It believes
that the conflict consequences should end with the victory of one of the parties and
the defeat of the other party (it was described by Galtung and Fischer (2013) as the
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the low road). Peace journalism, however, seeks to leave the interpretation to the
reader or viewer or listener on the background of the conflict and its causes with-
out bias, and that through conflict analysis and focusing on the facts broadcast as
these are without bias in favor of a party at the expense of the other one, and with-
out manipulation of the emotions of masses through the use of emotional words
like ‘tragedy’ or ‘innocent’ in order to achieve a higher rate of follow-up, which
is the responsibility of the media parties to highlight conflicts and their causes and
how to develop solutions to the causes by experts and specialists (or the high road)
(Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 96).
Goals of Peace Journalism
The concept of peace journalism offers an alternative entry point for journalists.
The media here focus on the structural and cultural causes of conflicts and their
impact on the lives of citizens. They reflect the views of all conflict parties and sug-
gest possible solutions and initiatives to reduce the level of violence (Ibid.). The
aim of peace journalism is to provide background on how the conflict began and
its dimensions so that the public recognizes these dimensions through transparency.
It investigates the causes of conflict and approaches solutions thereto through the
presentation of perspectives and vision of all parties about the conflict. The press
here takes this relying on the strategy of all parties advantage from conflict resolu-
tion (Win-Win Strategy) and focusing on the conflict itself as a problem rather than
focusing on a particular party as the reason for this conflict (Hanitzsch, 2007, p. 3;
Hanitzsch, 2004).
In the case of a lack of trust between the conflict parties, peace journalism comes
as a third party that can facilitate communication between these parties and reduce
the degree of tension between rivals and prevent the conflict from widening and
works as means to build and not to tear down. Although the responsibility for re-
solving the conflict should be assumed by all groups and institutions of the society,
journalists, however, with their ability to have access to information and influence
the decision-making process can cover the conflict news in a manner that reduces
its effects and provide the principles to overcome it (Shinar, 2007; Mitchell, 2012).
With the development of modern means of communication and the trend to-
wards the so-called globalization, there has been an overlapping between the role
the means of communication can carry out at the national and international levels.
It has become an imperative for the means of communication to change its media
strategy in light of the diminishing role of the national state in the field of media,
and thus it has been associated with that role played by modern means of com-
munication to add a new force at the international level to countries that acquire
these means. After we had two types of powers that countries enjoy and employ to
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achieve their goals, namely the Hard Power and the Soft Power, developed countries
have now a third power, which is called the Smart Power, and which has emerged
after the events of the 11th of September. This power is associated with the use of
modern means of communication in the information collection and decision-making
process. Despite the claims of Western countries for the inevitability of employing
their smart joined powers to fight terrorism, but it has become one of the fundamen-
tal powers that are used to impact decision-making at the international and national
process level (Chetail, 2009).
Hierarchy of Influences Model
Hackett (2006) in his article ‘Is Peace Journalism Possible?’ investigated the con-
ceptual framework of the ‘hierarchy of influences’ model by Shoemaker and Reese,
and he highlighted the importance of this micro-to-macro model “to identify spe-
cific influences on the news, and to explore relationships between them” (p. 6),
moreover, it “helps to assess pressures for and against peace journalism at each of
five levels of factors” (Ibid., p. 6). The model comprise of the following levels: (1)
individual, where media content is driven by newsworker’ attitudes, ideologies and
socialization, (2) routines; where the content is influenced by organizational struc-
tures and constraints, (3) extramedia (institutional); where it is shaped by “eco-
nomic, political, and cultural forces”, and ideological (sociocultural); where news
content go along with the status quo and in support of those in power in the so-
ciety, as shown in the figure below (Reese, 2007, p. 35). Sujoko (2013) described
the process of influence: ‘Organizational factors play a major role in managing
other factors in order to win media business competition. Within the political and
economic context, the existence of media (organization) can create “power-making
space”’.
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FIGURE 3.9 HIERARCHY OF INFLUENCES MODEL
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Source: Shoemaker and Reese (1996).
Role of Journalists’ Media Framing in Conflict Resolution
Journalists and the neutrality of their reports are becoming targets in modern con-
flicts. In this context, the absence of pure neutrality in political conflict reports does
not mean that journalists are “dishonest or deliberately manipulate the informa-
tion” (Hackett, 2006, p. 5). On the contrary, it is the status where neutrality is some-
thing undesirable to appeal, especially in the situations of violence, injustice and
so forth. As has been said, “the worst place in hell is reserved to those who stay
neutral in times of crisis” (Lopez & Sabucedo, 2007, p. 151). Luhmann (2000) once
stated: “the news that ‘sells’ are those that captures the attention of the audience is
spectacular, unforeseen, and dramatic facts”.
Although scholarly attempts to pinpoint the complexity of the heuristic process
of news decisions have failed to have a firm grasp of the pattern used by journalists
to include or exclude a story, scholars agreed on the following main factors that ap-
parently seem to have an influence on this process: news factors. It was empirically
proven that the more personalized, negative, and factual the story, the bigger the
chance to be included. At the same time, this type of news factors seems to explain
lots of news selection by the audience. Institutional objectives; it summarizes the
pressure imposed by the employer and the journalist employment status to high-
light specific kind of news and disregard others, how to present it, and to follow and
frame it in line with the political agenda of the institution or employer (Donsbach,
2004, p. 134). Figure 3.10 hereunder illustrates the elements of journalists’ dilemma
in news decisions.
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FIGURE 3.10 JOURNALISTS’ DILEMMA IN NEWS DECISIONS
make factual and evaluative decisions. As this is a feature of many professions,
journalists face four additional problems. They have to make these decisions
usually under severe time constraints and under the pressure of competition.
For many news decisions they lack objective criteria and their decision
becomes immediately public, i.e. visible to many others, which carries the
risk of public failure. Figure 1 summarizes this dilemma of the journalistic
profession.
The lack of objective criteria does not, however, apply to all kinds and
objects of reporting. Decisions of truth can often be verified objectively
and good and professional news-reporting can be distinguished from a poor
reporting by the extent to which available sources and data have been
exploited. This is a question of research activity, of professional knowledge
about sources and the readiness to ‘falsify’ one’s own assumptions and hypo-
theses (Stocking and LaMarca, 1990). For instance, in many cases reporters can
prove the truth of a spokesperson’s assertions by asking the right experts or
digging into the relevant databanks, thus building their final decision about
the legitimacy of a particular assertion on an objective basis.
But often such criteria for evaluation do not exist or cannot be supplied
under the typical constraints of the business. Claims made by scientists that,
for instance, BSE can be transferred to humans or forecasts by an economist of
how the economy will develop in the next 12 months can hardly be verified by
a journalist him- or herself even if he or she has been trained in these fields.
Other than factual decisions, evaluative judgements such as the news
value of an event or the moral acceptability of a political actor’s behavior lack,
by definition, such objective criteria. They are always based on value judge-
ments which can neither be verified nor falsified (Popper, 1977; Albert, 1980).
Figure 1 Journalists’ dilemma in news decisions
Donsbach Psychology of news decisions 137
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Source: Donsbach, 2004, p. 137.
Tankard (2001) believed that journalists at times circulate frames to skew audi-
ences’ attitudes toward an issue, and viewed frames as a mean to manipulate and
spin the interpretation of messages by audiences, which can be true. Other scholars
believed that frames were being used as tools to reduce the complexity of issues
and to convey, identify and classify information in a way that allows audiences to
have easy accessibility to and to make sense of that issue even if they were ignorant
of it (Scheufele, 2008a). Reese (2001) however moved beyond all this to the con-
scious side of framing and suggested that “it always implies an active process”, and
analysts should determine the degree to which framing is prevailing (König, 2008).
A lot of questions are raised on the subject of peace journalism. Can a journalist
maintain peaceful coverage or write while his country is under a certain external
aggression? Can this concept remain theoretically sound, whilst it’s actually diffi-
cult to achieve, where the journalist is exposed to pressure from the management
of the media institution in which he works as to follow a particular style that serves
the interests of the management? It’s the duty of the journalist to cover the facts,
but instead of fomenting the psychological situation of the public, he can draw at-
tention to the existing peace initiatives. Furthermore, the journalist can highlight the
humanitarian demands rather than focusing exclusively on the stances of politicians.
Hackett (2006, p. 11) concluded with three approaches for changing journalistic
strategies, one of which focused on reforming journalism from within, meaning,
to let journalists take the lead away from an agency restrictions or whatsoever. He
added: ‘PJ is likely to derive from the victims of war, from activists committed to
peace-building processes, and/or from social justice movements marginalized by
current patterns of national or global communication’.
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3.2.6 Mass Media Propaganda in the Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict
The term propaganda is a communication pattern that aims at consolidating certain
convictions and ideas in the recipient public through ‘the manipulation of significant
symbols’, and consequently, ‘the management of collective attitudes’ (Lasswell,
1927, p. 627). In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the prevailing vision
between the two parties about the media of the counterpart is that it belongs to
a media propaganda system that lacks credibility and does not tell the truth and
that it’s a media that present non-innocent and tendentious information. It is a key
vision with the Arab journalists and researchers, as well as with the ordinary Arabs
alike towards the Israeli media. The same applies to the vision of the Israeli party
towards the Arab media system. The reason is that it’s the enemy media (Liebes &
First, 2003, p. 61).
There are those who believe that this psychological war is one-sided, imposed
by the Israeli strongest media side against the most vulnerable Palestinian side. The
psychological war, being the control of the information directed to the public in
order to create confusion, affect the psychological condition and propagate despair
among the ranks of the enemy and their proponents. In this sense, the Israeli media
system wages in its totality a psychological war against the Palestinians, and here
the assessment of this psychological warfare and media power, as well as the ac-
quisition of the power features and the clarity of the media mission, are different.
Each party accuses the other of exercising propaganda and psychological warfare
propaganda and incitement against him and his community. The conflict came to
be seen not as mere acts of mutual violence and balance of deterrence, but also as
a balance in media images and narratives, and that the collective self-portrayal is
targeted and that the party concerned is the victim (Shinar, 2003, p. 6).
Narratives
Many Arab and Palestinian experts wrote about the Israeli media’s role and its em-
ployment of all printed and audio-visual means and harnessing them as to serve the
objectives of the Zionist project which stipulates that Palestine is a liberated Jewish
land and not a Palestinian occupied territory, and that the present Israel is a rep-
etition of ancient Israel, and that Palestine’s history begins with the Kingdom of
David in the tenth century BC and ends with the new Israel, which represents a res-
urrection of ancient Israel and a revival of this latter. In the context of these Israeli
allegations (Yiftachel, 1999, p. 8), the former Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Be-
gin, addressed the Knesset during the visit of the Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat
to Israel in 1977, saying:
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‘We did not seize any foreign land. We are back home, and the tie that is
between our people and this land is an eternal tie, that has been established
since the dawn of history, and was never loose, at any time. In this land,
our ancestors established our civilization, and it prophesied the coming of
the prophets, and when we were displaced under the bulk of the force used
against us and moved away from our country, we have not forgotten this land,
even for one single day’.
This has been referred to by Abdul Qader Abdul Ali (2003) as the land nar-
ratives, which include legends (narratives) that are consistent with the idea of the
promised land Palestine as a poor land, almost empty of dwellers and of any other
people, which in his view is a biblical legend that has been developed by the Zion-
ists with the emergence of the Zionist movement and the Zionist romantic litera-
ture, allowing the Zionist movement to become a national, secular movement, but
on ethnic-religious principles inspired by Jewish religious narratives that are secu-
larized (Bein, 1990, p. 284; Rowley & Taylor, 2006, p. 45). For example, the Torah
has been viewed not as a divine book, but as a historic document, and the religious
traditions and rites have been seen as national folklore that has preserved the Jewish
people from being dissolved. Abdul Ali also added that the legend of forced exile,
through which the Jewish people in his opinion believe that they have incurred twice
a forced exile(1) from their country. The historical fact refers to the broad dispersion
of Jewish communities across the major cities of the Mediterranean (Alexandria,
Athens, Rome, and more) much earlier than this date through migrations and move-
ments dictated by the commercial interests of the Jews in that era. This narrative
is for the media of benefit as it encourages migration and proves the legitimacy of
Jewish immigration to Palestine and the establishment of settlements at the expense
of the indigenous population (Gavison, 1999, p. 55).
In response to these Israeli allegations, the Palestinian writer Zakaria Mohammed
(2004) commented saying:
‘The Palestinian citizen found himself in the light of these false claims sud-
denly without history, without a past, and became just a guest of this history.
Where Israel ancient history seems to be a moment in the long Palestinian
history, this moment has been focused on the Israeli propaganda machine,
pretending that it is the core of this history. Everything before it is void. It
seems that the moment of Israel’s creation in 1948 has swallowed all forego-
ing moments embodied in the Palestinian history, which is rooted in Palestine
since its first era’.
(1)The first one in the era of the Babylonian Assyrian Empire led by Nebuchadnezzar when the
Israelis were exiled to Babylon, and the last exile was in the Roman era, during which the temple
has been destroyed in 70 AD.
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This led to the formation or promotion of counter-narratives passed by the Pales-
tinian media, which is considered as a model for the Arab media and is dedicated
to discourses post-Nakba (catastrophe) and post-setback (1967 war) (Alray, 2010).
The Palestinian media have developed a set of narratives in its entirety. These were
a response to the Zionist discourse and were coping with it. Among this is the Is-
raeli denial of the identity and the continuous Palestinian history. The reaction is
the production of a national discourse that restores the Palestinian folklore and the
local traditions and a display of the history of the region before and during the bib-
lical era and during the Islamic period, enabling thereby the Palestinian media to
produce a narrative history of a Palestinian nationalism throughout the whole his-
tory, which shows that the contemporary Palestinian is a descendant of the people of
the ‘Giants’ and the Canaanites (Dabash, 2011, p. 1; Zarley, 1990, p. 11). Further-
more, Arab analysts view that the Israeli media promote the notion of the Islamic
fundamentalism as to delude the world that extremism is the origin of Islam and
the essence of its teachings. It is noted that the Western media, the American in
particular, fell prisoner to this notion until the distance shrunk between the Islamic
fundamentals and the political extremism movements that ‘abolish’ the other, shed
his blood, and harm these Islamic fundamentals in the light of the developments
that take place in the Arab world, as is the case in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and the
spread of ISIS and the radical political thought that distorted the image of Arabs
and Muslims (Abu Sway, 2009).
Among the topics that fuel the conflict is the term anti-Semitism, which for Jews
is a reality and tragedy suffered by the Jewish people in the Diaspora, where the
Israelis think that a Jew remains hated outside his homeland. In this context, the
phrase ‘Siege Mentality’ pops up, which according to Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992a,
p. 633) “denotes a mental state in which group members hold a central belief that the
rest of the world has negative behavioral intentions toward them”. Therefore, Jew-
ish people must have, they say, a homeland or a refuge that shelters them and lets
them live like other peoples, the matter which promotes immigration and adherence
to the Promised Land allocated to the Jews. Most of the Arabs, and the Palestinians
in particular, consider this fact as a merely Zionist narrative that reduces the histor-
ical reality of the presence of Jewish groups and distorts the facts and shortens the
position towards the Jews to a binary, namely either with or against, and omits the
third position, which includes indifference to the Jews, and overlooks the historical
objective reasons for the hatred of Jews associated with the conditions of the so-
cial and economic life of the Jews and their representation of professional groups
working in trade and certain special crafts and ally themselves with the supreme
authorities in any country they dwell in (Neuberger, 1998). Therefore, many Jewish
groups were left vulnerable to persecution whenever the status of power has altered
and became the victim of popular uprisings as happened in Russia, Ukraine and
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Poland during the eighteenth and nineteenth century.
It’s noteworthy to refer also to the legend of the besieged fortress, in which the
world stands against the people of Israel. This is what Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992b,
p. 251) referred to as the ‘siege mentality’, which he defined as “a belief held by
group members stating that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioral
intentions towards them”. This narrative in its various diversities instilled in the
psyche of Jewish Israeli individuals and in the Jewish collective memory the no-
tion of being in a permanent and present danger, caused by the hostility of gentiles
(non-Jews) to the people of Israel (Laqueur, 2003, p. 3). It reflects, in fact, an accu-
mulated experience of a collective memory of Jewish groups, especially the Jews of
Eastern Europe, who have had a long experience with repeated massacres and per-
secutions. Such a legend is reinforced by a set of historical narratives, for example,
the narrative of ‘Masada’, created by secular Zionism(2), the Jewish fortress that has
been besieged by the Romans in 70 A.D. after the fall of Jerusalem, where Jewish
fighters, according to the narrative, refused to surrender and committed collective
suicide. They preferred to commit suicide rather than to fall prisoners into the hands
of the Romans. This narrative, which projects the story of ‘Massada’ in this form, is
intended to foster the national affiliation and the revival of Jewish heroism, which
refuses to surrender to pagans. There is also the narrative of the permanent danger
delimited by the facts of the Holocaust or the Nazi holocaust as a historical happen-
ing, the actual events of which are exaggerated or hyper-dramatized (Ben-Yehuda,
1995, p. 9).
These set of narratives and more contribute to the building of self-awareness and
solidarity among members of the group towards the danger and the enemy, who
gains legendary dimensions as to create the so-called ‘Ethos’, which constitutes a
set of beliefs or convictions inside the group, including a range of ethical and value
constants that determine the orientations of the group towards the enemy and within
everyday life.
Societal Beliefs and Conflict Ethos
Societies in intractable conflicts like the case of Palestine and Israel generate and
define societal beliefs to cope with such ethnonational conflict, and meet the de-
mands of the conflict. The process of coping with the conflict is not solely limited
to military, human, and economic resources, but extend to developing psycholog-
ical mechanisms or societal beliefs that prepare and reinforce citizens in conflict
to bear hardship including physical and mental loss/stress, costs, personal scarifies,
and to evoke feelings of solidarity and unity, and much more. Through socialization
(2)“Religious Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists were, to a vast extent, not part in the creation of the
myth. Many even objected fiercely to the myth” (Ben-Yehuda, 1995, p. 9).
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process beliefs are being imparted into the public shaping the eyes through which
they view the conflict, and through which the ethos is formed. Ethos is part and
parcel of the group’s “language, stereotypes, images, myths, and collective mem-
ories”, through which they react, take actions and decisions (Rouhana & Bar-Tal,
1998, p. 765). Haddad (2004, p. 765) once stated that in definition societal beliefs
are “society members’ shared cognitions on issues that are of concern to society
and that contribute to their sense of uniqueness. Their contents refer to society’s
characteristics and structure and to processes of its development, and they include
beliefs about societal goals, self-images, aspirations, norms and values, images of
out-groups, and so forth”. This makes the conflict, in the case of ethos being formed
around it, approaching the zero solution and remains transmitted from generation to
generation so that mobilization on this basis from the media aspect becomes easy.
As a result, the mutual hostile perception and the dehumanization of the other party
will be enhanced. Accordingly, core beliefs in the conflict ethos are formed from
the (a) Negative image of the enemy (b) Positive image of the collective self and
legitimacy of its goals (c) Self-portrayal as a victim (d) Positive image of the group
and self-determination (e) Self-perceptions of security (f) Own perceptions about
the homeland and nationalism (g) Issue of national unity (h) Issue of peace and
final settlement (Ibid.).
Perceptions of Israeli Media in the Arab World
Arabs and Palestinians believe that the Israeli media, with their organized and
planned propaganda and their distinct, strategic goals seek to silence the Pales-
tinian history and cut off any Arab and Palestinian ties with it. That is the same
history that bequeathed the Palestinians a sense that their past and their presence
have been usurped in the light of this Zionist propaganda and distortion of history
(Abu A’rqoub, 2015). Many Arab sociologists believed that the discourse the Is-
raeli media pass was a deceitful one, in which the numerous speeches end up with
so many discrepancies and contradictions as the addressed groups or communities
count. The outcome is an inconsistent image to Israel as a state and society. It is a
kaleidoscopic discourse that turns to the US and Western European world portray-
ing Israel as a garden or an oasis amid barren desert, as a democratic, liberal and
secular state that faces the threat of genocide in the Arab world with its authoritarian
countries, that are full of hatred and intolerance against Western democratic values
(Abid Elhahmeed, 2014). The same discourse turns to the Asians to portray Israel as
an Asian country and a successful pattern in development, and to the Africans with
the portray of a state that is suffering from wars and that it is a young country, that
has achieved independence and sought development and cooperation with countries
of the South.
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Edward Sa’id; a Palestinian scholar viewed the Zionist propaganda as the most
intimidating propaganda machine in the world that deforms the image of an entire
people, as the Israeli media apply the method of the information dumping, reitera-
tion of the media mission, the use of contrasting and binary reductionism style by
presenting Israel as the pioneer, developed country in the Middle East, and, in ex-
change, presenting information, studies, reports and statistics about the backward-
ness in the Arab world and the rate of illiteracy in it, as well as fanaticism, acts of
terrorism, repression by the authorities and ill-treatment of minorities (Said et al.,
1998, p. 7). The Israeli media cover truth with falsehood, and portray the victim
as executioner and the murdered as a killer; all that to mislead the public opinion,
inverse facts or erase them. In this context, Israeli media depict Israel as ‘a vic-
tim of Palestinian violence’. It is the overall picture of the Israeli, Western and the
US-American media that highlights Israel as being surrounded by violent people
attacking it with rocks, and that the Israeli missiles and tanks are used to protect Is-
raeli citizens from the Palestinian violence (Hallas, 2014; Abid Elhahmeed, 2014).
On the one hand, the Israeli Media suffers from an inadequate self-censorship.
Kasbari (2011, p. 2) added:
‘In times of serious crisis Israeli media coverage adopts an absolute mili-
tary agenda; the majority of the media gives an exclusive platform to military
personnel and to military correspondence, justifying their attitudes and inter-
pretations without offering alternative viewpoints’.
It reports the event as in war situation without any criticism or different views dis-
cussed or shown in public. On the other hand, the majority of Palestinian journalists
think that the profession is kind of national patriotic task, which hinders the actual
role of the press and media during the Israeli occupation (Ibid.). Khaleel Shaheen
of Al Ayyam of Ramallah said in an international seminar on the role of media in
the peace process (2005):
‘The Palestinian media reflected a realistic image of what was taking place,
the barricades, the destructions, the shootings, the settlers uprooting land
and destroying houses and the imprisonment of thousands. There could be no
peace with occupation’.
In the same seminar, Gideon Levy a Journalist and Columnist of Ha’aretz of
Israel said:
‘The majority of journalists were telling the truth, but not all the truth. They
wrote maybe that a house of a Palestinian had been demolished, maybe, but
they would never write about the 12 children that had now become homeless,
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or who would probably grow up to be suicide bombers. Telling only part of
the truth was a betrayal. The Israeli reader’s whole political thinking was
manipulated towards terrorism and terror. This was a dehumanization of the
Palestinians, and it was the biggest crime of the Israeli media’.
Israeli media achieved a great success in portraying ‘the Palestinian struggle’ to
the American public opinion by attempting to match between the struggle of the
Palestinians and that of Taliban, particularly after the horrific events of September
11, 2001, suggesting that the Palestinian struggle is just ‘acts of violence’, which are
not different from the ‘terrorism’ the US administration is combating to secure the
US citizen, trying to describe Palestinian youths, holders of guns, and Palestinian
children with explosive belts around their waists, with violence and terrorism. The
Israeli justification for the targeted assassinations and the indiscriminate bombing
is supported by allegations that the bombing targeted weapons’ depots, missiles
factories or shelters harboring terrorist stores or that the attacks were to thwart terror
acts (Al-Shaer, 2013; Abu Ghneima, 2014; Abu Sa’da, 2010). Al-Qutbi (2015) once
added that the Israeli media have been teaching - and continue to teach - the Jewish
mind the two complexes: fear of the Arabs and the technical and moral superiority
over them as means to achieve their objectives for instilling feelings of resentment,
antagonism, and hatred against all that is Arab. There is no doubt that the various
media methods pursued by the Zionist media are distinct evidence that the Zionist
movement is one of the few movements in this world that has successfully applied
the media as a weapon and made the best use of it as to become a powerful and
influential tool in their hands. The methods used in the Zionist media are complex,
ramified and overlapping one another, but they all meet the wished requirements, be
it on the level of extortion, propitiation or as a maneuvering style.
Perceptions of Palestinian Media in Israel
The Israelis view the Arab media as a propaganda media that promote anti-semitism
(anti-Jewish) and incite against Jews, against the State of Israel and the people of
Israel, and that it’s a non-independent media that target brainwashing of helpless
citizens. Such media are held responsible for the hostility and incitement against
Israel. Rather, the media conflict between Arabs and Israelis reached a stage of
psychological warfare, especially in the circumstances of the second Palestinian in-
tifada (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a, p. 633). Expressions and remarks about Palestinian
incitement are common in Israel, and it might reflect the most common Israeli per-
ception about the Palestinian media according to which, the Palestinian media is
another branch of the Palestinian authority / Hamas movement. One of the distinc-
tive speakers about it is the Prime Minister of Israel; Benjamin Netanyahu, who
referred to what he calls ‘the Palestinian incitement’ in some occasions. For ex-
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ample, in a special Cabinet meeting in January 2015, the discussion was about the
Palestinian Authority incitement and the ‘culture of hatred’ in the Palestinian Au-
thority. According to the Prime Minister Office’s website, “the findings show that
incitement against Israel and the Jewish People is continuing on official media chan-
nels including inter alia by bodies that are very close to the Palestinian Authority
Chairman and in educational and religious networks”.
There are more examples of government leaders in Israel blaming the Pales-
tinian Authority and its Prime Minister’s incitement for impeding a peace agreement
(Beer, 2014). Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon claimed, “The Palestinians still ed-
ucate toward incitement and bigotry based on quotes from Hitler. They claim that
there are no Jewish people’. Minister Steinitz said, ‘We must not ignore the fact that
the Palestinian educational system and media, under the patronage of Abu-Mazen
and during the negotiations, are educating and inciting on a daily basis for the
destruction of the State of Israel’. Justice Minister Tzipi Livni accepts the served-
up-as-truth campaign as unassailable: ‘The incitement on the Palestinian side is
horrible. It’s terrible to educate children to hate’, she said, despite her conclusion
that it is precise because of this that we need a diplomatic solution (B. Ravid, 2015).
Netanyahu also said in a cabinet meeting that ‘True peace cannot come into being
without a halt in incitement against Israel and without education toward peace. The
refusal of the Palestinians to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish People and
declare the end of national demands this is the root of the conflict’. Netanyahu
mentioned the Palestinian media also in a statement during a visit of Secretary of
State John Kerry on January 2014(3):
‘I know that I am committed to peace; but, unfortunately, given the actions
and words of Palestinian leaders, there’s growing doubt in Israel that the
Palestinians are committed to peace. In the six months since the start of
peace negotiations, the Palestinian Authority continues its unabated incite-
ment against the State of Israel. This Palestinian government incitement is
rampant. You see it in the state-controlled media, the Government-controlled
media, in the schools, in textbooks, in kindergartens. You see it in every part
of Palestinian society. So instead of preparing Palestinians for peace, Pales-
tinian leaders are teaching them to hate Israel. This is not the way to achieve
peace. President Abbas must lead his people away from terror and incitement
towards reconciliation and peace’.
He added in an another speech at the Institute for National Security Studies
(INSS) on 28.01.2014:
(3)Statement by PM Netanyahu and Secretary of State John Kerry, 02.01.2014, Website:
http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/mediacenter/events/pages/eventkerry020114.aspx.
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‘Now, since you know very well that throughout these 90 years there was and
continues to be unceasing incitement against the State of Israel - against the
Zionist movement before the establishment of the country and then, without
any difference between them, it continued both in the Palestinian Authority
and in the Hamas. Actually, there is one difference: Hamas uses terror, and
the PA doesn’t, and that is important. But incitement and non-acceptance of
the State of Israel, unfortunately, continue in both places. We see it in school
books; we see it in schools; we see it in the Palestinian media, which as you
know is controlled by the Palestinian government; we see this also in mosques,
in sermons, in things that are regrettably said by Palestinian leaders inter-
nally’.
However, according to Ravid (2012), the sources of information on which the
prime minister based regarding the Palestinian incitement might be biased. He ar-
gued that since the intelligence unit does not cover this topic, the Palestinian Media
Watch(4)- a right-wing organization, sends updates about it to Prime minister’s office
and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The website of the Palestinian Media Watch,
an Israeli research institute that was founded in 1996, contains detailed overviews
about the Palestinian media. The editors describe their activity as a study of the
Palestinian society from a broad range of perspectives by monitoring and analyzing
the Palestinian Authority through its media and schoolbooks. The website’s major
focus is on the messages that the Palestinian leaders, from the Palestinian Authority,
Fatah and Hamas, send to the population through the broad range of institutions and
infrastructures they control. The website includes overview about what the editors
call: ‘demonization of Jews/Israelis’; ‘PA depicts a world without Israel’, ‘Violence
and terror’, ‘Rewriting history’, ‘Holocaust denial and distortion’; ‘Jerusalem under
assault’, ‘Views on peace-making’, and more.
Fishman (2011) described the pervasiveness and intensity of Palestinian incite-
ment against Israel. According to his argument, the Palestinian Authority is an oli-
garchy whose purpose is a war against Israel. Its leaders consider deception and the
‘armed struggle’ as the legitimate means by which they can achieve their goals and
have adapted their educational system to fill the younger generation with hatred and
the desire to perpetrate terrorist acts. Because of the reality behind it, incitement is
the real ‘deal-breaker’. One side wants peace while the other does not.
(4)http://www.palwatch.org.
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3.3 Objectives of Public Opinion Analyses
Analyzing public opinion through up-to-date data, public attitudes, as well as their
needs and wishes, enable better assessment and understanding of the actual status
quo. This provided a real and true relic of data on public opinion, its components
and directions, which in turn helped me make appropriate decisions in agreement
with available facts that direct public opinion to certain conclusions.
Therefore, a representative sample was conducted in each country that investi-
gate the opinion of each side on fundamental issues, which are considered as an im-
portant start for the commencement of the negotiations on the final solution and the
reach of a permanent settlement with the other side. Fundamental issues included:
1. Settlements.
2. Prisoners.
3. Jerusalem.
4. The security of both Israel and the Palestinians.
5. Borders and crossing points.
6. The Refugees.
7. Control over natural resources like water.
8. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders.
9. Recognizing the Jewish state.
10. Having control over holy places.
11. One-State solution.
12. Two-State solution.
Moreover, it’s pivotal to understand how citizens’ perceptions of the peace pro-
cess and the conflict are shaped, and which factors influence the formation of these
perceptions. Below are some factors or extraneous variables that were mentioned in
the survey:
• Individual-level factors like gender, age, education, income, party identifica-
tion, concern for and knowledge of the issues.
• Personal experience: it dealt with conflict-related experiences as an outcome
of direct interaction with citizens. For instance, in the case of casualties or
injuries: if someone lost a family member in the conflict, then, an acute per-
ception of the conflict is to be expected. Other examples were the daily humil-
iation and movement/traveling restrictions imposed by Israeli checkpoints in
the West Bank, in particular for those working in different cities in the West
Bank or inside the green line. In addition to the firing of Al-Qassam rockets at
nearby Israeli settlements, especially for those living in these areas or around
them. Accordingly, this level (if active) is regarded to have a significant influ-
ence on citizens’perception of the conflict, which urges recognizing its effect
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and defining the extent to which it skews perceptions on both sides.
• Various beliefs and emotions: it incorporated perceived senses of vulnerability
(threat/lack of safety and security), freedom, victimization, injustice, distrust,
helplessness, and original affinity to the land. The combination of these self-
concept emotions and beliefs formed an Index of citizen’s quality of life in
both societies, which I believe added a significant and direct influence on the
structuring of perceptions.
• Acceptance, grievance and sympathy towards the other: it addressed the ex-
tent to which the Palestinians and the Israelis accept each other, and how deep
they allocate senses of grievance against or sympathy towards each other. It
focused on exchanged feelings of grievance and sympathy, and the legitimacy
each party attaches to the other, which stimulate distinct perceptions, rather
than others. The added value of this level was that it produced a clear-cut hint
of the citizen’s readiness to compromise for peace and to put an end to the
conflict. For instance, the more sympathy (or less grievance) feelings a cit-
izen have towards the other, the more he or she is ready to compromise for
peace and vice versa.
• Willingness and hope of reaching a solution: it looked into the willingness and
desire of the Palestinians and the Israelis to reach a solution to the conflict. To
what degree each side is ready or willing to compromise for achieving peace,
and the hope each party holds to realizing this peace.
These and much more factors and extraneous variables were examined in the
survey analysis of this dissertation. The matrix in the upcoming section includes a
thorough description of each variable in addition to other interesting factors derived
from the matrix, literature review, and desk research. This despite my certain knowl-
edge that any attempt at a long-term prediction and evaluation of the public opinion
will be just a rough estimate that should be treated very conservatively. Mainly be-
cause both the Palestinian and Israeli public opinion can be easily affected by many
events surrounding the conflict, the results of which are very hardly predictable.
However, to deal now with the central issues of the peace process could give an in-
dication or, at least, a sign of the general standing of the matters to be settled and the
solutions to be reached through the negotiation of the final settlement in the future.
Finally, the results revealed the size of the gap between published opinions and
dimensions in the media and the real salient views and dimensions in people’s
minds. Therefore, it minimized the gap between the “individuals’ own opinion and
their perceived opinion of what the majority thinks on political issues” (Donsbach,
1997, p. 21). Furthermore, it helped gauge the extent to which mass media shape
public’s thinking, and, as a result, limit its influence on political decision making of
informed politicians (Ibid.).
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3.3.1 Public Opinion, a Brief Overview
Not to have any opinions is equivalent to not having individuality, personhood,
identity, character, self. This is how it was described by Hirschman (1989, p. 76):
‘It is, in fact, the opposite condition that has been widely commended by social
scientists, psychologists, and philosophers: to have opinions very much of one’s
own’. Converse (1964, p: 215-216) developed five hierarchically ordered levels of
conceptualization that represent different strata of classification: Ideologues, Near-
ideologues, Group interest, Nature of the times, and No issue content. Ideologues
were those respondents who replied in “some active way on a relatively abstract
and far-reaching conceptual dimension as a yardstick against which political ob-
jects and their shifting policy significance over time were evaluated”. According to
Converse, Ideologues only constitute “4 percent of the public that has a political be-
lief system and has the ability to think abstractly making them ideologues” (p. 216).
Near-ideologues mentioned “such a dimension in a peripheral way but did not ap-
pear to place much evaluative dependence upon it or who used such concepts in a
fashion that raised doubt about the breadth of their understanding of the meaning of
the term”. The Near-Ideologues are approximately 12 percent. They use key terms
repeatedly used in the media, such as ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’; however, they do
not know what does these terms represent. Group interest included those respon-
dents who “failed to rely on any such over-arching dimensions yet evaluated parties
and candidates in terms of their expected favorable or unfavorable treatment of dif-
ferent social groupings in the population” (p. 216). This level constitutes almost the
majority at 45 percent. Nature of the times respondents were those who “invoked
some policy considerations in their evaluations yet employed none of the references
meriting location in any of the first three levels” (p. 217). “Twenty-two percent of
the public fall into this category and based their preferences as to whether times
were good or bad”. Lastly, no issue content included “those respondents, whose
evaluations of the political scene had no shared of policy significance whatever” (p.
217). Converse believed that 17 percent of the public fall into this category.
Accordingly, Converse verified in his study and Zaller in the early nineties the
same fact of the uninformed and ignorant public about governmental and politi-
cal issues, and that the idea of “high-quality opinions that are usually described as
being stable, consistent, informed, and connected to abstract principles and values
are rare in the mass public” (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 103). In other words,
they concluded that most respondents chose their answers based on a flip of a coin,
they have no true political ideology, only slight understanding of important debates,
and a tendency to change opinions frequently. The vast majority of the public un-
consciously avoids understanding issues that are not clearly and directly related to
them as individuals.
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The development of scientific polling started in the period surrounding World
War II. Research during the first two decades after this period yielded a broad
agreement; “the ‘Almond-Lippmann consensus’ on three propositions about pub-
lic opinion: (1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable and
effective foreign policies, (2) it lacks coherence or structure, and (3) in the final
analysis, it has little, if any, impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 1992, p. 439). This
traditional view that the public react to issues in an emotional and ill-informed way,
“creating the positional for public opinion to hinder the pursuit of the national in-
terest” has been vigorously challenged in recent researches (Knopf, 1998, p. 544).
One of the first studies to challenge this classical view was Page and Shapiro (1988,
1992) who argued that collective opinion, instead of being volatile and meaningless,
are ‘rational’ and develop and change in a reasonable fashion, responding to new
information and external events (Bélanger & Pétry, 2005, p. 1). A number of re-
cent studies supported Page’s and Shapiro’s argument of public opinion rationality
and consistency, such as Holsti (1992) study on the Vietnam War and its aftermath
that challenged the three propositions of Almond-Lippmann consensus mentioned
above. In addition to Isernia et al. (2002) study on Americans’ public opinion about
foreign policy by using a comprehensive set of quantitative and historical data on
foreign policy opinion changes in the United States from the 1930s to the 1980s.
They have found that American public opinion is neither volatile nor capricious,
and it reacts in a reasonable manner to external changes.
Besides, Bélanger and Pétry (2005) study of the Canadian public opinion in an
analyze of 60 years of trends on policy issues, revealed that the Canadian public
opinion through these years to be stable, which is, as they concluded “a sign of a
rational public opinion”. Accordingly, “evidence based upon analysis have found a
certain amount of stability in the preferences revealed by surveys of public opinion,
which appears to move rationally and consistently with external events” (Knopf,
1998), and simply, “unstable opinions may just reflect an unstable foreign environ-
ment” (Penny & Fielding, 2006, p. 1).
3.3.2 Public Opinion in the Democratic Process
The important role of public opinion in democratic theory has been tough to define,
the term ‘public opinion’ is defined by Glynn et al. (2004: 1929) as an aggregation
of individual opinions, a reflection of majority beliefs, a clash of group interests
and as media and elite opinion. On the individual level, Zaller (1992a, p. 6) has
stated: ‘Every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: information
to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some
conclusion about it’. According to Viola (2006), public opinion is a vital component
of any democratic system for several reasons: First, the fundamental definition of
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democracy is the ‘rule by the people’; therefore, policy in democratic states should
rest on public opinion. Secondly, public opinion plays a huge role in reflecting how
the public view their representatives’ actions and policies - Are the opinions and
needs of the public well addressed by their representatives, or not? (Ibid., p. 5).
Most scholars who studied public opinion and public policy in democratic countries
agree that public opinion influences public policy and “are the more salient an issue
to the public, the stronger the relationship is likely to be” (Burstein, 2006, p. 29;
Monroe, 1998, p. 7).
Indeed, political scientists, scholars of international relations, and public opinion
experts emphasized in their researches the complex nature of the relationship be-
tween public opinion and foreign policy, and the multitude of ways and modalities
public opinion can impact decision-making (Shamir, 2007, p. 6). In this context,
scholars (Naveh, 1998; Yuchtman-Yaar, Herman, & Nadler, 1996) of foreign policy
decision making recognize public opinion as a significant factor influencing policy
choices. Attitudes and beliefs of citizens are described as “forming part of the soci-
etal environment that influences government decisions in democratic states” (Maoz
& McCauley, 2005, p. 792). Accordingly, “leaders must be attuned to public senti-
ment, as public-opinion support becomes critical”, because constraining unrealistic
popular expectations and lack of popular support can handicap them (Shamir, 2007,
p: 1-5).
Studies of Public Opinion Amidst the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict
There are an extensive collection of studies that discussed the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict from various perspectives and points of views. Due to the generality sug-
gested by the objective of study i.e. to investigate the perception of the peace pro-
cess and the conflict, and the role of intervening factors in the establishing of these
perception frames, I attempted to highlight some of the prominent or on-going stud-
ies and projects that touched upon significant aspects of public opinion formation
amidst the conflict.
An interesting longitudinal study of sixteen joint polls from July 2000 to June
2006 done by Shamir (2007, p. 17) in a joint project(5) used Putnam’s classic two-
level game metaphor as it focuses on the important role of domestic factors, mainly,
the important role of public opinion in determining the conduct of the Israeli-
Palestinian two-level games. He compared Palestinian and Israeli public opinion
in its most fundamental dimensions (p. 17), his questions stemmed from Presi-
dent Clinton’s ideas in December 2000 and Geneva initiative of December 2003,
which according to his study comprised of the six most important components of
(5)It was initiated by the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah in 2000.
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a permanent-status framework; the end of conflict component, the demilitarized
state component, the sovereignty/security component, the borders component, the
Jerusalem component, and finally, the refugee component (p. 36).
Adwan et al. (2013); a team of Palestinian and Israeli scholars conducted a com-
prehensive fact-based textbook analysis(6) for Israelis and Palestinian school books
over a period of three years, and found that ‘dehumanizing characterizations’ of the
other was rarely found in school textbooks of both nations, school books tend to
omit important information about the other, which includes information about reli-
gions, cultures and so on so forth. A concrete example is textbooks not mentioning
the other on the map, as if the people and the land of the other do not exist, which in
their opinion denies the legitimate existence of the other and therefore generates a
hurdle to the peace process. Moreover, school textbooks portray the other as an en-
emy aiming to dominate and eliminate the own nation, and any actions to stop this
from happening are acts of peace and self-defense. Further results discussed how
school textbooks are being very selective in presenting and reinforcing historical
events that support the own national narrative. It is worth noting that the majority of
Israeli Jews opposed “adopting a school curriculum that recognizes the Palestinian
state and to abandoning the aspiration to regain parts of the Jewish homeland that
are in the Palestinian state” as shown in Figure 3.11 below:
FIGURE 3.11 RECOGNIZING PALESTINE IN ISRAELI CURRICULUM
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Jews in Israel and a significant segment of the political system – namely that the 
West Bank belongs exclusively to the Jewish people and is now liberated – leads 
to rejection of the notion of compromise on this land, to difficulties in leaving this 
territory, and to the feeling that the Jewish people are the only side that contributes 
tangibly to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Magal, Bar-Tal, 
Oren and Halperin, in preparation, for extensive elaboration of this point).  
In addition, public opinion polls indicate strong opposition to any attempt to 
recognize or teach the Palestinian narrative.  For example, in a 2009 poll, a majority 
of the Jewish public (56%) opposed Israel taking even partial responsibility for 
the suffering caused to the Pal stinians by the 1948 war, including, for example, 
the creation of the refugee problem, even if the Palestinians were to officially 
accept part of the responsibility for the 1948 events (Peace Index, June 2009).  In 
addition, as can be seen in Figure 2, the majority of Israeli Jews oppose adopting 
a school curriculum that recognizes the Palestinian state and abandons the 
aspiration to regain parts of the homeland that are in the Palestinian state, even in 
the context of a peace agreement with the Palestinians and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state that is recognized by Israel. 
Figure 2: Percentage of Israeli Jews op osed to adopting a school 
curriculum that recognizes the Palestinian state and to abandoning 
the aspiration to regain parts of the Jewish “homeland” 
that are in the Palestinian state 
(Source: JIPP data – see http://truman.huji.ac.il/polls.asp)
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Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998, p. 761), at some stages of the conflicts, even edu-
cational and cultural systems become politicized to serve the interest of “knowing
your enemy”, which is evident in the Figure above. Oren et al. (2004) had a different
point of view, according to him, the phenomena of the extreme miss presentation of
(6)The study was initiated by the Jerusalem-based Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy
Land.
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the rival party in schools’ text books, in both nations, has considerably changed to
have a better representation of reality.
Canetti et al. (2015, p. 264) explored how repeated personal exposure to con-
flict violence results in psychological distress, which in turn lead to changes in
interrelated political attitudes and behavior, and physiological and psychological
outcomes. The outcome of the exposure to the different kinds of conflict violence
coupled with increased threat perceptions and poor physical status might ultimately
foster “extremism, exclusionism, and decrease willingness to compromise for peace
in the face of ongoing conflict” (p. 269).
Halperin et al. (2010) among other scholars investigated the role of socio-
psychological barriers in preventing peaceful resolution of conflicts, which they
defined as “an integrated operation of cognitive, emotional, and motivational pro-
cesses, combined with a pre-existing repertoire of rigid supporting beliefs, world
views, and emotions, that result in selective, biased, and distorted information
processing” (p. 28). These barriers preserve and reinforce fundamentally biased
conflict-supporting beliefs that obstruct any attempt at peace negotiations or sug-
gestions by the adversary or any third-party mediator (p. 29). As shown in Figure
3.12 below. They investigated this framework from the perspective of Israeli Jewish
society only.
FIGURE 3.12 SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO PEACEFUL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
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Figure 1: Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peaceful Conflict Resolution
Source: Halperin et al. (2010, p. 30).
Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) examined the psychological dynamics that con-
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tribute to the intractability of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Including (1) Totality,
where the fulfillment of basic needs such as recognition and security are crucial
for survival and persistence, (2) Protractedness, describes how generations inherit
the conflict, adapt to it, and develop animosity and prejudice, (3) Centrality; the
awareness, relevance, and accessibility of conflict information to the public, mainly
controlled by their salience in the media and political and intellectual elites, (4) Vi-
olence; how violent is the conflict, including number of casualties, terrorist attacks,
and more, which according to Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998, p. 762) can “generate
intense animosity that becomes integrated into the socialization processes in each
society”. Finally, (5) Perception of Irreconcilability, where each society view the
other’s positions or solutions as so different that agreement is not possible or zero-
sum, and where “each side perceives its own goals as essential for its own survival
and, therefore, does not see a place for the concessions regarded by the other side
as essential for conflict resolution” (p. 762).
In their opinion, there are many unique characteristics that make the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict more resistance to resolution, firstly, the Perception of exclusive
where each side perceive itself as “the indigenous people on the land”, and which
exclusively denies the right of the other to the land. This supports the idea of zero-
sum, where if Israelis gave up the land occupied in the West Bank, then they are
giving parts of their own right in part of the promised Land of Israel that preserve
their Jewish states, and in the case of Palestinians, it is also an ultimate concession
where they are giving up the majority of their own land to achieve sovereignty over
a small part of the land. This leaves an agreement “almost inevitably accompanied
by a profound sense of loss that can overshadow its potential gains” (Rouhana &
Bar-Tal, 1998, p. 764).
History of victimization, which is summarized in the deeply-rooted senses of his-
torical persecutions and destructions that accumulate over time and leave each group
absent in its own tragic national experience regardless and in the state of denial of
the other group horrific experiences. They also wrote about ‘the Law of Return’ in
Israel, and how Israel consider itself the state of the Jewish people in Israel and
the Diaspora on the cost of the minority of mainly Palestinians living within Israel.
Moreover, they explored the Palestinian Right of return and how the Palestinians
are eager to absorb the refugees back into the newly established Palestinian state at
the expense of Israeli settlers in the West bank. Again, this emphasizes the discrep-
ancy between Palestinians and Israelis, and minimizes the potentiality of reaching a
permanent resolution to the conflict.
What deteriorate the situation even more is the Politiczation of religion on both
sides, where religious segments invoke “deep religious beliefs to rationalize their
political claim”, a rationalization that in turn leads to fanaticism and violence, some-
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thing that mass media easily pick up and miss-feed the representation of the conflict
in the population minds. For instance, Haddad (2004) investigated the perception
of suicide bombings from a data conducted by two Palestinian refugee camps and
found that the influence of political Islam is quite evident and plays a crucial role in
the formation of perception regarding suicide bombings. The mainstream perceived
the conflict as more national than religious, however with current rationalization,
the conflict is being dangerously politicized that it became “a clash of religious
doctrines in which the possibility of reconciliation becomes unimaginable, and that
can, therefore, lead to an unending contest of religiously motivated wills” (Ibid.,
p. 765).
Oren et al. (2004) in the chapter of ‘Conflict, Identity, and Ethos Societal be-
liefs’ outlined the influence of the different societal beliefs between the rival sides
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They studied these social beliefs from three re-
lated dimensions, which are: (1) the societal beliefs in the justness of one’s own
goals that provide the epistemic rationale for the outbreak of the conflict and later
continue to maintain it, (2) the societal beliefs about the opponent’s delegitimiza-
tion, and (3) one’s own victimhood, which “evolve during the conflict and later serve
as an inseparable part of the psychological intergroup repertoire that underlies the
conflict”. The contents of these two themes are a mirror image, as both sides the Is-
raeli and Palestinian - often use the same labels and justifications. They concluded:
‘Palestinians and Israeli Jews hold an ethos of conflict, which is one of the major
foundations for its continuation. Moreover, three themes of the ethos are in direct
contradiction between the two groups’. Simply because the societal beliefs exist to
justify the reasons for and importance of the current existing goals for each nation,
therefore, failing to achieve these goals may threaten the existence of that group. In
addition, the societal beliefs disregard the goals of the other side, describing them
as unjustified and unreasonable (Neta et al., 2004: p. 134-154).
Israelis and Palestinians tend to see themselves as victims, engaging in violence
only in response to attacks initiated by the rival enemy. This process of viewing
themselves in a purely retaliatory role leads to under-appreciation of the extent to
which the violence of the other side is contingent on their own. Therefore, being able
to estimate this bias may lead both sides to better understand their own role in per-
petuating the conflict, and thus, contribute to its resolution (Haushofer et al., 2010).
“Both sides feel they have legitimate historical claims and such a dichotomizing an-
tagonistic strategy only polarizes, stigmatizes, and further entrenches public opin-
ion, rather than having the intended effect of putting an end to abuses” (McLagan,
2006, p. 193). Past researches (as in Arian, 2001; Yuchtman-Yaar & Herman, 1997)
have shown that demographic variables, such as a higher degree of religiosity, lower
socioeconomic status, and a lower level of formal education are related to more
negative and less compromising attitudes toward Palestinians (Maoz & Eidelson,
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2007b, p. 1482). The results of Nachtwey and Tessler (1998) cross-sectional sur-
vey revealed that general confidence in the government is associated with stronger
support for the peace process and that economic satisfaction is positively related to
the favor of ending the conflict (Penny & Fielding, 2006, p. 4).
An interesting study done by Cohen-Chen et al. (2014) about the critical role
of emotional barriers in forming attitudes and behaviors regarding the conflict and
peace-making. They introduced the phrase of ‘cognitive freezing’, which “reduces
openness to new information and opportunities to conflict resolution”. A status that
they found did not have any correlation with recipient’s gatherings of information,
and instead there was an indirect effect of political orientation on the process, as
shown in Figure 3.13 below:
FIGURE 3.13 INDIRECT EFFECT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION ON PROPORTION
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PROPOSAL 
.49** 
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.21** 
-.15* 
Source: Cohen-Chen et al. (2014, p. 20).
Nasie et al. (2014) did an experimental study on three groups of participants aim-
ing at investing the impact of adherence to the own collective narrative of naive re-
alism on the degree of openness to the adversary’s narratives regarding the conflict.
The study emphasized on the importance of bridging the gap between both sides
openness to the narrative of the adversary as a first step towards peace resolution.
There are many joint projects between Palestinian and Israeli institutions and
public opinion centers that aimed to understand the behavior and attitudes of both
people regarding vast topics of the conflict. For instance, (1) the Joint Israeli-
Palestinian Poll (JIPP), which is a joint theory-driven survey research that system-
atically tracks public opinion on both sides since the beginning of the second In-
tifada, (2) A research that was carried out by OneVoice Israel and OneVoice Pales-
tine. OneVoice “is an international mainstream grassroots movement that aims to
amplify the voice of the overwhelming majority of moderates who wish to end
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Peace Polls, n.d.). Added to that the Peace Index
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(PI) research project or ‘The War and Peace Index’, which “monitors trends in Is-
raeli public opinion regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and relations between
Jews and Arabs in Israel and their impact on Israeli society” (The Israel Democ-
racy Institute, 2015). Other interesting comparative studies carried out by Saad and
Mendes (2013) - Gallup, Irwin (2009), Shibley and Kull (2013), Near East Con-
sulting (NEC), a joint project between the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion
(PCPO) and The Israel Project (TIP) in 2011, Ragionieri (n.d.), studies done by
David Pollock at the Kaufman Fellow at The Washington Institute investigating the
regional political dynamics on the grounds, and much more comparative projects.
There is a reciprocal relationship between media and Public Opinion. Donsbach
(1997, p. 20) described how survey research helps the media in fulfilling three im-
portant functions; firstly, it creates an objective basis for the media through which
to express what people think. Secondly, polls and survey research pave another way
for the media to ascertain about public’s agenda from the public themselves, in a
way, “the people - with the help of the news media - can now push politics to follow
up on the issues they wish to be addressed”. Thirdly, Donsbach (1997) mentioned
the significant role of media beyond the classic borders of communication in utiliz-
ing polls to form a community, and to boost citizens integration in their society by
feeding the knowledge of one’s fellow citizen into its agendas.
Public Opinion as a Bridge Between Israel and Palestine
The phenomenon of the increasing number of the public opinion poll centers has re-
markably extended in the last decade in Palestine and Israel. Scarcely a week passes
without reading in the local Palestinian and Israeli newspapers about polling results,
which are then mostly published by Arab, Israeli and international media as a scale
for the development of the Palestinian and Israeli public sentiment in the light of
the internal developments, as well as the total regional and international develop-
ments resulting therefrom. These polls contributed effectively to the probing of the
political power of the Palestinian and Israeli parties and factions, the popularity of
each of them and to the publication of academic, vocational, political, economical
and informative needs or requirements. They played, and still are playing, an im-
portant role in disclosing the point of view of the Palestinian and Israeli citizen on
all issues, which are of present and future significance due to the importance of
the public opinion polls and their role in democratizing the Palestinian and Israeli
societies and the establishment of a sound civil societies (Al-Naba’ Agency, 2005).
No doubt, the Palestinian-Israeli public opinion is expected to play a decisive
and crucial role in any permanent compromise or solution, which would most prob-
ably include longterm concessions on both sides, mainly in respect of the territories
occupied in 1967. When considering a general compromise to settle the Palestinian-
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Israeli conflict, considerable weight will be given to the estimates relating to what
may be accepted or refused by the Palestinian and Israeli public, since the opin-
ions of the leadership of political parties, factions and organizations on both sides
are alone insufficient and indeterminate. Therefore, giving the public opinion the
weight it deserves will most likely reflect then the extent to which Palestinians and
Israelis would accept any agreement that will be signed in the future to solve the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Shamir, 2007, p. 6).
The support of the public in any agreement will represent the real power that af-
fects the implementation of the agreement. The opposite would certainly mean that
the conflict will continue regardless of the agreements signed or the understandings.
The public represents the platform for the success of political agreements, whilst the
disregard of the public opinion and the inability to develop and shape positive pub-
lic opinions can lead to an agreement that is deficient, imperfect and not backed
by a broad public base. To ignore the Palestinian-Israeli public opinion under any
ideological or political aspects as an essential variable in any deal would negatively
influence the public support provided to any agreement that will be signed in future
between the two parties (Saad & Crabtree, 2012).
Accordingly, the decisive issue that will determine the extent to which the Pales-
tinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas or any other Palestinian president is
ready to offer any territorial concessions is the public receptiveness and opinion in
terms of the solutions, suggestions, and arrangements related in particular to the fi-
nal status. Such matters have to receive the support of the majority in the Palestinian
territories and even the support of the Palestinian refugees living in the diaspora, in
the first line those residing in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The same concept applies
to Benjamin Netanyahu or to any other Israeli government that must be backed by
a strong majority support in order to be able to carry out ‘concessions’ about the is-
sues of the final status, such as the borders, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and
others. Attaining the majority’s support is actually regarded as an essential deter-
minant. Most important here is that one should initiate the development of positive
public opinions on both sides of the Green Line towards issues including perma-
nent and static coexistence between the Palestinians and their neighbors. The fruits
of such efforts would be collected in the near future when we are in need of such
support, as the old proverb goes: ‘Tomorrow’s harvest is the fruit of what we sow
today’.
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3.3.3 Matrix of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in the Light
of Cognition, Affection, and Behaviour
“‘Opinion’ in political theories every so often viewed as a judgment is
based on cognition and knowledge, and at others as a result of moral
sensitivity, affection or sentiment”.
– Vincent (2008)
In this section, I used primary dimensions extracted from the historical review
and the previously developed pool of arguments, models and theories to organize
along an analytical framework differentiating between causes, conflict layers, and
possible solutions. Causes of the conflict are usually factors, trends, and conditions
that can be either underlying causes or immediate causes. Underlying causes are
those who are more like deeply-hidden or past motivations for a particular event,
and immediate causes are those that took place during that event. The former ex-
plains why an event happened but does not explain why the event happened in that
timing. The latter does not explain why the event happened but does explain why
then. Moreover, to explain the entire event, both types of causes are needed. In this
context, Dimensions (conflict layers or beliefs) are the heart of narratives that exist
in the minds of the Palestinians and the Israelis, whether about the conflict as causes
or consequences or the peace process as possible solutions.
The matrix below (Table 3.1) covers all the issues of the conflict extended on
two aces; Firstly, the causes of the conflict, the consequences of these causes, and
the suggested solutions to these consequences. Secondly, how they are perceived in
the individual’s cognitive, affective and behavioral functions toward the conflict and
peace process, across different time frames (i.e., past, present, and future). In other
words, how do individuals think, feel, and behave or would act on the causes, con-
sequences and solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The matrix goes beyond
that to measure what they think are the views of the other side on similar issues to
see how these expected views of the other influence their current perceptions of the
conflict.
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Acceptance of Causes as Given Facts
Cognitive x Causes
This cell of the matrix deals with the public’s assent about actual causes of the
conflict. It speculates the responsibility for the current status quo rest on whose
shoulders, and how did it start. Merely, it mirrors their approving of causes behind
the conflict as facts. For instance, to what degree do they agree or disagree that the
persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia before establishing the state of Israel is a
cause of the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict? What about the Jewish immigration
to Historic Palestine during the British mandate? Also, regarding the fact that the
British granted a national homeland to the Jews in Historic Palestine according to
Balfour declaration, followed by their opinion about the 1948 war, the establishment
of Israel and the Division of Historic Palestine.
Other causes include the displacement of Palestinians in 1948 from their cities
and villages, the Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, including
East Jerusalem, and the Arab exploitation of the conflict to serve their agendas at
the expense of Palestinian interests. Add thereto the religious conflict of beliefs
between Jews and Muslims. Jews believe that the land is the historical homeland
of the Jewish people, where most historical events mentioned in the Old Testament
took place, and the Jewish life elsewhere is a life in Diaspora. The Palestinians
believe that Palestine is part and parcel of the Muslims’ identity, and it is their land
they are inhabiting over centuries.
Acceptance as a word refers to the act of accepting or the state of being accepted
or acceptable. This definition reflects how people suppose the world should take
their agreed reasons, and anything that is built on is only an ongoing response to
these causes. Therefore, the ability to identify these “given” causes of the conflict
in the minds of the Palestinians and Israelis is a major step in understanding the
basis from where later opinions can originate. To summarize, in this cell, I answer
the question of “to what extent Palestinians and Israelis accept the causes of the
conflict as given fact?”.
Nature of the Conflict and Notions of Peace Process
Affective x Causes
This cell examines how Palestinians and Israelis perceive the complicated nature
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; to what degree they agree or disagree about its
nature. Is it more of a religious, cultural, national and ethnic, political, economic,
historical or existential one, or is it a complicated structure that comprises of all or
many of these attributes?
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Moreover, this cell touches on important notions regarding the peace process.
For example, to what extent they agree or disagree that Palestinians and Israelis
should currently stop all forms of incitements to hatred? Should they start with the
contribution of curricula in disseminating peace culture and the acceptance of the
other? Moreover, whether the media should positively influence both sides towards
creating a positive atmosphere between the two people for promoting peace or not.
Other aspects will measure the public’ level of agreement regarding peaceful ne-
gotiations as the only way to achieve peace between Palestinians and Israelis, and
whether any agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis must be accepted and
supported by the Arab League? To probe will also be the willingness of both govern-
ments to resume genuinely peace negotiations, and how the international commu-
nity should be ready to assist in the peace building process. Together with how they
feel towards the concessions required on their side, and the perspective of reaching
a comprehensive and just peace resolution for both parties.
To summarize, this cell answers the questions of “to what extent Palestinians and
Israelis agree on the nature of the conflict?”. Also, “to what degree Palestinians and
Israelis agree about notions pertaining to the peace process?”.
Affiliation to History Made by Ancestors
Behavioural x Causes
While the cells above dealt with the cognitive and affective aspects of the causes
of the conflict, this cell looks into the public agreement with or without affiliation to
the actions (of their ancestors) that established the essence of the present conflict and
without which the conflict might not have started. It attempts to grasp Palestinians
and Israelis affiliations towards the behavior of their ancestors in the context of
claimed causes behind the present conflict.
It suggests a hypothetical status where citizens are asked to express how they
would behave if they were to get back to the beginning of the conflict at the begin-
ning of the last century. Would they have kept the history as it is? Would they have
sought out more peaceful changes to it? Alternatively, would they have persisted
with even more extreme actions. For instance, would they have engaged in the 1948
war or tried to stop it? For an Israeli, would he or she have immigrated from all over
the world to Historic Palestine for the same reasons, and for a Palestinian, would he
or she have welcomed immigrant Jews? Add thereto, it investigates if they would
play an active role in the conflict or the peace process; pro or contra peace.
To summarize, this cell responds to the following question: “how would Pales-
tinians, and Israelis behave if they were in the position of their ancestors, will they
play an active role in the conflict or the peace process?”, Or “to what degree Pales-
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tinians and Israelis are affiliated to the actions of their ancestors?”.
Problematic Magnitude of Outcomes
Cognitive x Consequences
This cell probes the general public opinion towards important outcomes of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict; to what extent they believe that these consequences con-
stitute a problem to the peace process? Alternatively, what role does it play in hin-
dering the wheels of the peace process? It investigates their view concerning all
critical matters of the conflict. Firstly, the political aspect, which consists of the
building and expanding of settlements, refugees, borders and prisoners, and the Is-
raeli full control over natural resources. In addition to the issues of not recognizing
Israel’s right to exist, and the lack of communication and contiguity between the
West Bank territories themselves and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
A conjunction is made here with security aspects, which includes security threats
imposed by extremist movements and groups on both sides, such as Hamas and Is-
lamic Jihad’s possession of weapons and their construction of tunnels under the
borders of Gaza Strip. Moreover, Israeli settlers’ possession of weapons and the
presence of permanent Israeli control points throughout the Palestinian territories,
including the border crossings. Other aspects that this cell investigates are religious
aspects, which comprise of Israeli moves and attempts to enhance Jewish access
to the Temple Mount, and assaults on worshipers on both sides. This besides the
Palestinian refusal of the notion of a Jewish state, the difficulty of having access to
places of worship, and the constant refusal on the part of hardliners or spoilers to
achieve any peace agreement. Along with many economic aspects summarized in
the Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products, Israeli economic burden of high mili-
tary costs for the sake of security, and the deterioration of the Palestinian economy
as a result of the conflict. Finally, the lack of confidence between Palestinians and
Israelis, and the PA’s addressing influential international organizations including le-
gal bodies that enjoy international jurisdictions.
To summarize, this cell answers the question of “to what degree Palestinians and
Israelis agree on the problematic magnitude of outcomes across all aspects?”.
Support of Conflict’s Ramifications
Affective x Consequences
This cell explores the Palestinians and Israelis’ perceptions of the conflict’s ram-
ifications or consequences that impede signing a peace treaty between the two par-
ties. This includes their perception concerning launching rockets from Gaza Strip at
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Israel, raids, and incursions by the Israeli army in Palestinian cities, and the Israeli
assassination policy. Add thereto on the part of the Israelis the Jewish settlers’ at-
tacks on Palestinians, as well as on their properties, schools, and cars. Further ex-
ploration of this cell on the other side focused on Palestinian misdeeds, such as
the Palestinians kidnapping of soldiers, stabbing and running over Israelis, in addi-
tion to shooting and stone throwing. Add thereto the Palestinian extremists threat of
launching indiscriminate attacks by suicide bombers, and their leadership’s support
of violence against Israel through supporting families of prisoners and detainees in
Israeli jails.
Further ramifications extend from Israel’s government support of building set-
tlements in the Palestinian territories, building the wall, checkpoints/carriers/import
restrictions against the Palestinians. Furthermore, recurrent daily Israeli arrests of
Palestinians accused by Israel of security issues, Israeli policy of collective pun-
ishment, house demolitions, confiscation of Palestinian properties, and the Israeli
absolute control over border crossings. Lastly, economic ramifications including
the total dependency of Palestinian economy on the Israeli one as enforced by the
Israeli government, and efforts of the Palestinian Authority to isolate Israel interna-
tionally.
To summarize, this cell answer the question of “to what degree Palestinians and
Israelis agree in their support to ramifications of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?”.
Competency of Leaders and Faith in Negotiations
Behavioral x Consequences
Since that the previous two cells dealt with the outcomes and ramifications of the
conflict, this cell gauges the Palestinians and Israelis assessment of the performance
of some political figures in both countries pertaining to the peace process, such as
Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the PA, Khalid Misha’al, the head of Hamas Politburo,
Rami Hamdallah, the PA’s Prime Minister, and Benjamin Netanyahu, Israels Prime
Minister, TzipiLivni, the head of the Hatnuah party in Israel, and Isaac Herzog,
the head of Labor Party in Israel. Moreover, it investigates the opinion of Israelis
and Palestinians on how likely they think the current leadership in their respective
country can make peace with the other side. The idea here is to compare both;
their assessment of their leaders and the leaders of the other side of their opinion
regarding their ability to make peace.
Additionally, this cell compares Palestinians and Israelis general support to the
resumption of peace negotiations between both governments under the current cir-
cumstances, with the extent to which they believe negotiations between the PA and
Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in the coming years. In addition
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to 1) their view of resuming peace negotiations as being more important to the
Palestinians or to the Israelis, 2) their belief that Israelis and Palestinians have done
all what has been required of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and
treaties a success, or whether they could have gone further to make them a success,
and 3) throughout history, who was responsible for the failure of peace negotiations
and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis?
Finally, this cell examines if citizens were given the ability to impose a solution
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, what would they have done: would they impose
the same solutions proposed by their government? Impose solutions different from
those proposed by their government? Agree on the solutions suggested by the other
government? Alternatively, suggest different solutions than both governments?
To summarize, this cell examines the following questions: “How Palestinians
and Israelis assess their political leaders and the political leaders of the other
side?”, “to what degree Palestinians and Israelis agree that their current leader-
ship can make peace with the other side?”, “to what degree Palestinians and Is-
raelis support resumption of peace negotiations between both governments under
the current circumstances?”, “to what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe ne-
gotiations between the PA and Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in
the coming years?”, “to what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe that resuming
peace negotiations as being more important to the Palestinians or the Israelis?”,
“to what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe that the other party has done all
what has been required of it to do to make peace negotiations and treaties a success
or it could have gone further to make these a success?”, “in their opinion, through-
out history, who was responsible for the failure of peace negotiations and treaties
between Palestinians and Israelis?”, and finally, “to what degree Palestinians and
Israelis agree with solutions imposed by their governments and the government of
the other side?”.
Willingness to Compromise for Peace
Cognitive x Solutions
Numerous solutions were suggested throughout the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
that attempted to reach a permanent resolution of the crucial issues of the conflict.
Therefore, this cell deals with Palestinians and Israelis opinions concerning their
support or opposition to these suggested solutions that can bring an end to the con-
flict. The history of the conflict and the current status quo suggested many solutions
approved by each side’s interest in Historic Palestine. However, this endless num-
ber of solutions ended up without implementation due to many reasons mentioned
in earlier sections.
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This cell suggests an index of the most significant solutions for each decisive
issue of the conflict. These issues include the refugees problem, the question of set-
tlements, Jerusalem, prisoners issue, the establishment of a Palestinian State, control
over natural resources, economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis, and
more. Another interesting aspect of this cell deals with the most appropriate solution
to the conflict. Is it a two-state solution that reciprocally recognizes the legitimacy
of each other; the State of Israel and an independent and sovereign Palestinian state,
a one state, in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obliga-
tions, a binational state, a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, or the West Bank to
become part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt?
To summarize, this cell investigates the questions: “to what degree Palestinians
and Israelis agree in their support to the proposed suggested solutions of each is-
sue?” or “to what degree Palestinians and Israelis are willing to make compromises
for peace?”, “what do the Palestinians and Israelis think is the most appropriate so-
lution to the conflict?”.
Readiness for Peace
Affective x Solutions
A crucial step towards reaching a permanent solution with the other is to have
a prepared set of positive feelings and attitudes towards the other. Feelings and
attitudes extend from “tolerance towards the other party, understanding the other
party, angry at the other party, fear from the other party, trust in the other party,
grudge against the other party, and willingness to make peace with the other” party.
An equally interesting set of feelings and attitudes that this cell controls for, is to
what degree Palestinians and Israelis believe that the other party holds the same
feelings towards them, indexed as “tolerance, understands you, feels angry at you,
fears you, trusts you, bears the grudge against you, suspects you, willing to make
peace with you”.
Other aspects that this cell examines are 1) to what degree Palestinians and Is-
raelis are inclined to know more about the other side in domains that have nothing
to do with politics or the current conflict i.e. music, folklore, general tendencies,
literature, religion, social ideas or other 2) How comfortable would they be if many
of their neighbors were not from their religion 3) In their opinion, do both peoples,
Israelis and Palestinians, have the right to live in peace and security? Moreover, to
what extent they believe that connection and communication among ordinary peo-
ple on both sides are useful?
To summarize, this cell responds to the following questions: “to what degree
Palestinians and Israelis are ready for peace?”, “to what degree Palestinians and
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Israelis think that the other is ready for peace?”, “to what degree Palestinians and
Israelis are inclined to know more about the other side in domains that have noth-
ing to do with politics or the current conflict”, “how comfortable would they be if
many of their neighbors were not from their religion?”, And “to what extent they
believe that interaction and communication among ordinary people on both sides
are useful?”. Additionally, it tests the following hypothesis:
Optimism, Flexibility, and Role of Mediation
Behavioral x Solutions
This cell looks into how optimistic or pessimistic Palestinians and Israelis are
nowadays, in comparison to the past, and what they think is the likelihood of reach-
ing an agreement over the next five years to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
Are they willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian
peace? Alternatively, do they believe that they should not give up any of their de-
mands to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace? Do they believe that the other party
is willing to make peace or not? Moreover, to what extent they think that the other
is weary and tired of the conflict and its repercussions?
Moreover, this cell explores the views of the Palestinians and Israelis regard-
ing whose opinions matter the most when it comes to addressing the issue of
Palestinian-Israeli peace. Are these Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, Palestinians living
in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian Refugees, Israeli settlers, Israeli extrem-
ist parties, Palestinian extremist movements, US government, Arab League, or the
American Jewish community? Besides, it addresses the role of mediation and which
state or international organization they believe could be the best mediator between
Palestinians and Israelis? Moreover, how constructive and balanced they think is the
role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?
To summarize, this cell answers the following questions: “in comparison to the
past, to what degree Palestinians and Israelis are optimistic or pessimistic towards
the peace process?”, “are the Palestinians and Israelis willing to take risks and
make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace or not?”, “to what degree
Palestinians and Israelis think that the other party is willing to make peace?”, “to
what degree Palestinians and Israelis think that the other party is weary and tired of
the conflict, and its repercussions?”, “in their view, whose opinions matter the most
when it comes to addressing the issue of Palestinian-Israeli peace?”, “who, they
think, is the best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis?”, and “how balanced
and constructive Palestinians and Israeli perceive the role of the US in the conflict?”
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3.4 Conclusion
Puddephatt (2006) once noted, ‘one of the underestimated complications of the Mid-
dle East conflict between Palestinians and Israelis is the inflammatory media on
both sides’. No one can deny that there is a mass impact, where the press some-
times falls under its command, which is the public opinion itself, even if this cannot
be seen with the naked eye. The reason is that the press is in writing while the ideas
of the masses are perceptible and invisible. It is, however, inevitable that these ideas
come to the newspapers and, undoubtedly, that this influence is existing (what is
meant here is the impact of the public opinion on the press). The relationship be-
tween the press and the public opinion is strong and firm, as both of them derives
its strength and impact from the other, and each of them affects and is affected by
the other.
Effective peace work is not made easier by the media. Instead of promoting
peace, the media focuses on violence and sensation. Consequently, it often hardens
the conflict, reinforces the concept of the enemy and robs the people of the feeling
that they can act effectively. The lack of joint endeavors or structural cooperation
between Israeli and Palestinian mass media - as a mean for affecting public opinion
and advocating peace - in both countries limits the potential influence of mass me-
dia on reaching the masses, whom the fate of the peace process may ultimately lay
upon (Hassassian & Kaufman, 1999b, p. 5). Puddephatt (2006, p. 4) investigated
the assumption that “a strong independent media contributes to the retention or cre-
ation of peace and stability in conflict-affected and threatened areas”. Nevertheless,
the role of the media in the conflict is restricted to a complex set of elements that
shapes its influence, which includes the relationship between the media and actors
in the conflict, the degree of independence media has from power holders in society,
the relationship between media and public opinion, and finally, the different use of
narratives and media terminologies.
Where the media in general fuel a conflict raging between the various adver-
saries, whether on the political or international level, they do not make halt, with
regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, working towards the local, regional and
international polarization in favor of one people against the other, or one group
against the other, as each one is biased to a party that backs him in the propaganda,
as well as politically and ideologically. These means do not stop all the day, pay-
ing tribute to the identity of a foe and degrading the value of the other. The media
struggle between the Israeli and the Palestinian side through media contents tends
to pass a set of narratives on the basis that they are basic facts that justify the pre-
vailing conditions and the status quo, and give legitimacy to the common objectives
and issues expressed by the media. These myths are working to mobilize the inside
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against the enemy within a concept that exaggerates and is far from the objective
facts and distorts them or ignores some of their elements as to be consistent with the
self-image of the national group. In conclusion, the perceptions about the media of
‘the other’ are connected to the way it covers the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its
history. Most of the references about “the other’s” media are presented as part of the
Palestinian or Israeli propaganda, and as another branch of the Palestinian authority
or Israeli occupation. Like this, it is also seen as another obstacle to reaching an
agreement between Israel and Palestine.
While traditional media show interest in exaggerating the conflict and the violent
accruing from it, we find that peace journalism focuses on non-violent alternatives
to resolve conflicts. In this context, peace journalism can focus on physical effects
of the conflicts to the same degree as it focuses on the psychological effects of
these conflicts on individuals and on their way of living. Instead of highlighting
the decisions and opinions of political elites only, it can also highlight opinions
of ordinary people and reflect their lifestyle and try to present and reflect on the
objectives of the various parties to the conflict and focus on common issues and
visions. The role of media surpasses that of just transmitting events and issues to the
formation of competing speeches that reflect the ideological and political concepts
of the conflicting parties and serve their strategies and political interests. Media
are in the position of alarm and stimulator for the masses as to take care of and
form public points of views on issues and events presented to constitute the public
opinion ultimately.
The communication process is considered as an essential process in conflict and
post-conflict situations. As I mentioned earlier, there is a consensus among re-
searchers on the role of traditional media in providing information and messages
that form public opinion. As these means are used to stimulate and spread violence,
they can also be used to prevent violent conflicts and encourage peace and reconcil-
iation. Modern technology has provided new opportunities to communications. The
spread of these new technologies such as mobile phones and the means of social
media has led to the acceleration of the flow of information and opened new hori-
zons for individuals and communities to play a role in the life cycle of the conflict
and conflict resolution, to response to disasters, to monitor the causes of conflicts
and predict them, to protect the values, build peace and maintain the stability of the
nation.
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The choice of the adequate methodology to conduct research for or discuss the
survey problematic or to achieve the objective from it is one of the most crucial
steps that leads either to the success of the survey or to its failure in achieving that
objective. The methodology is the method applied by the researcher to respond to
the questions raised by the problematic of the research theme. Its observation and
discussion might help its description and illustration.
Due to the variety of the methodologies that might assist the researcher in con-
ducting his research works, the nature of the survey objective is the one that deter-
mines the methodology to be pursued. The nature of the current study and its ob-
jective require the application of the descriptive methodology, which is one of the
main approaches used in behavioral and social research, as this is reliable and can
be heavily relied upon in discovery, descriptive, and analytical research. As I follow
this methodology, I can study the reality or phenomenon in its natural status as it
exists in the field without any intervention by any party, and give it a very accurate
qualitative description that describes the phenomenon and illustrates its character-
istics, or quantitatively gives it a digital description that illustrates the amount of
this phenomenon or its size and the extent of its association with the other different
phenomena.
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4.1 Research Planning
This dissertation examined the effect of macro-level factors (the media, and politi-
cal parties/leaders) on micro-level ones (the audience cognitive processing). Both,
the media content and the range of opinion on a public agenda should be assessed to
examine the media’s function in each country. This dissertation represented such an
attempt. It used framing analysis to address the connection between media content
and audience cognitions in the conflict and peace process. Especially that fram-
ing involves “the construction of views in both news production and consumption
processes”, and therefore, “the concept appears to be a proper analytical tool to ex-
amine the relationship between media content diversity and audience issue cogni-
tions” (Huang, 2010, p. 48). In consequent steps, I applied already validated dimen-
sions from this content analyzes into the document analyzes. It included analyzing
press releases/announcements/statements from political parties and leaders to see
how they influence the process of shaping media frames and public perceptions of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Two progressive trends of methodological approaches that aim for exploring
causality between variables are a) using a multi-method approach where multiple
analysis are being employed, and b) panel or time-series analyzes (Donsbach, 1997,
p. 25). Through the application of sophisticated statistical methods on data extracted
from the use of the former approach that included coding documents of political
leaders and parties, media, surveys, and reviewing history. This dissertation went
beyond the spectrum of observing perceptions and their short-term changes to in-
vestigating and exploring the dynamics behind these perceptions and changes. Fur-
thermore, the integration of various data collection methodologies allows a more
thorough and focused analysis of the topic at hand, and the realization of a more
inclusive and brighter picture of reality. Data analyzes were carried out by more
conventional techniques such as pies, histograms, crosstabs, and more. Alongside
more sophisticated techniques such as multiple regression analyzes, factor analysis,
and conjoint analysis.
4.1.1 Data Sources
This dissertation used multiple sources for collecting data:
Secondary Data
The secondary data of this dissertation was mainly based on the review of the his-
tory of the conflict, in which I summarized the timeline of the motivates behind
the conflict, beliefs, and notions, claims, consequences, crucial events and agree-
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ments, attempts for peace resolution, suggested solutions, and more. Complemen-
tary data was used from secondary sources of information emanating from the desk
research including published articles, papers, documents, and literature related to
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The general nature of this dissertation (i.e., to study
the perceptions of the conflict as a whole with a focus on the obvious aspects of it,
and not to explore the very deep specifications of each main issue of the conflict)
restricted the use of specific previous studies for developing the research instru-
ments. At the same time, this allowed for more innovation and added originality to
the topic. Nevertheless, previously published work or complementary studies as I
referred to above were used to carve out the final questionnaire with an extra spin
that undergoes with the goals of this dissertation.
Primary Data
There were several primary tools for data collection: surveys, content analyzes of
newspapers, and document analyzes for political parties and leaders. All were ex-
plained thoroughly below.
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4.2 Content Analysis
There is a wide variety of content analysis methods that make undertaking content
analysis research a challenging task, and selecting the suitable method for a particu-
lar study a more critical one. In definition, content analysis is “a process for system-
atically analyzing messages in any type of communication” (Kondracki et al., 2002,
p. 224). It comprises of coding raw messages from textual material transcripts of
interviews, speeches and discussions, newspapers, magazines, visual images, and
illustrations. In addition to the narrative and form of films and TV programs and
more. All with accordance to a classification theme (Macnamara, 2003, p. 1). The
traditional communication model of Lasswell (1948) captured briefly what media
content analysis is about: Who (communicator) says what (message) through which
channel (medium) to whom (receiver) with what effect (effect).
This dissertation integrated what I would call a condensed qualitative and quan-
titative content analysis. It is scientifically less reliable to assume that the process of
systematic counting and recording (i.e., the size and frequency of media message)
as the only and main determinants of media impact. Mainly because this ignores
the relationship between the text and its likely audience. Meaning, media impact
can vary from reader to reader depending on the “prevailing perceptions of me-
dia credibility (e.g. a report in a specialist scientific or medical journal will have
greater credibility than a report on the same subject in a popular press); Context
(e.g. a health article published or broadcast during a disease outbreak will be read
differently than at other times); and Audience characteristics such as age, sex, race,
ethnicity, education levels and socio- economic position which will all affect ‘read-
ings’ of media content” (Macnamara, 2003, p. 5).
In other words, I dealt with a manifest content analysis, which is the analysis of
what the text says. It investigated the content aspect and summarized the visible,
and obvious components. I followed an inductive strategy in developing the content
analysis schemes, as follows:
1st in an interactive process between a careful reading of the text,
2nd design of preliminary coding categories,
3rd fitting of texts into these categories,
4th and refinement of categories till most text can be fitted into the existing set of
categories given the specific research needs.
4.2.1 Study Framework
The dissertation adopted the Framing Theory of News, through the hypotheses of
which one can gauge the contents of the news coverage of various issues in the
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media during a certain period of time; where this theory assumes that the events do
not contain themselves a particular meaning, but they gain significance or a meaning
by putting them within a framework that allocates them and gives them certain
consistency by focusing on some aspects of the topic and omitting other aspects; so
is the media framework the pivotal concept, which arranges around it events of a
particular issue.
4.2.2 Investigating Unit
The study was restricted to newspapers published from 1st of August 2013 up till
30th March 2014. In this period, the United States made vigorous attempts to bring
the Palestinians and the Israelis back to the negotiation table after a nearly three-year
hiatus, this has been reflected in the numerous visits of John Kerry; US minister of
foreign affairs, to the region. The visits paid off, and resulted in a series of nego-
tiation that lasted approximately 9 months. Nevertheless, negotiations collapsed at
the end of March 2014 when Israel refused to release the 104 Palestinian prison-
ers as promised, coupled with their decision to establish 700 housing units in East
Jerusalem. Consequently, Abbas declared that the PA is going to apply for member-
ship in 15 United Nations organizations, and later on the 23rd of April he declared
the plan of forming a unity technocratic government with Hamas. Netanyahu was
very irritated by the plan breaking off the already collapsed negotiations (Judis,
2014). Thus the choices of investigation were the following months:
TABLE 4.1 TIME PERIOD FOR CONDUCTING THE CONTENT ANALYSIS
Year Month
August
September
October
November
2013
December
January
February2014
March
Here is a summary of events that went off the negotiating track in the specified
period, and which did not primarily entail the major issues of the conflict or peace
process.
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Summary of Events
On the 15th of August 2013, the Israeli authorities released the first batch of pris-
oners who were arrested before the Oslo accord. On December the same year, they
released Samer Al-Issawi after a nine months hunger strike, breaking the record
with the longest hunger strike in history. Followed by Mahmoud Abbas’s signing
of decrees officially naming the adoption of (State of Palestine) in January 2014,
the death of Ariel Sharon; the former Israeli Prime Minister in the same month,
and the Israeli removal of a tape propagandizing the disappearance of the Dome of
the Rock. The signing of the Fateh-Hamas Gaza Agreement in April 2014 calling
for new elections to take place, in an attempt to put an end to a seven-year clash
between the rival Palestinian factions. Followed by Netanyahu’s objection to this
unity plan and accusing the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas “of sabotaging
peace efforts by seeking rapprochement with Hamas”. This resulted in Israel’s fail-
ure to release the promised last batch of 26 prisoners, the continuation of settlement
expansion, and hence, the ending of peace talks by the end of April 2014.
4.2.3 Media Sample
Since I intended to study the influence of media in shaping perceptions of the con-
flict and the peace process in Palestine and Israel, then the sampling scheme em-
ployed was communication sources (in this study, newspapers). The political nature
of the subject suggested taking into consideration the political orientations of sam-
pled newspapers in each country.
Political decision-makers stress on the importance of the daily press. They see
them with a high degree of importance because they include treatments of the ‘quan-
tity and quality’ of the news and international events. Moreover, they can cover a
broader range of events and approach at the same time the decision-makers on the
same day the event takes place. Daily newspapers, provided with a communications
network, can fully cover the events that become accessible to readers from the pub-
lic and to decision-makers, where decision-makers can take the subject of the news
and elucidate its aspects better, and, at the same time find out public opinion trends
and tracks toward internal and external issues.
Accordingly, media sample included a total number of eight newspapers, four
newspapers on each side. The Palestinian newspapers were: Al-Quds newspaper,
Al-Ayyam newspaper, Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda, and Felesteen. The Israeli newspapers
were: Israel Hayom, Yediot Ahronot, Haaretz, and Maariv. The criteria for choos-
ing these newspapers were mainly their high circulation (large readership), and the
newspapers representativeness of political orientations in both countries. Addition-
ally, all are published in their respective language (understandable) on a daily basis
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(same frequency). Alongside their popularity and political orientation, another ma-
jor reason to select these eight papers was that most of their websites republish
articles from the print newspaper, allowing easier access to them. Below a brief
description of each newspaper:
Al-Quds newspaper
Language: Arabic
Established: 1951
Website: http://www.alquds.com
Circulation: 20,000 (est.)
It is the oldest still running Palestinian daily newspaper that predates the estab-
lishment of the Palestinian National Authority, and it has the largest circulation in
the region. In general, it is politically independent and support a peaceful solution
to the conflict (BBC news, 2006).
It was the first Palestinian newspaper to resume publication after the defeat of
1967. General Director is Dr. Marwan Abu Zuluf, and its chief editor Walid Abu
Zuluf. The headquarters of Al-Quds newspaper in the city of Jerusalem, and the
number of pages, ranging from 16 to 24 pages. Al-Quds newspaper is distributed
in all the Palestinian territories. The newspaper covers local, global and regional
events, and it has a distinctive touch in terms of output and content. It perhaps has
the highest periodical publications and most profitable (WAFA, 2011).
The number of workers in the Al-Quds newspaper is more than 150 employees
working in the fields of media, ideas and computing technologies, management,
distribution and archive and art direction. Also, it has a network of correspondents,
professionals, and distributors to large parts of the country and abroad (Ibid.).
Al-Ayyam newspaper
Language: Arabic
Established: 1995
Website: http://www.al-ayyam.com
Circulation: 10,000 (est.)
It is a Palestinian daily newspaper that has the second-largest circulation in the
territories. It is a Fateh-affiliated newspaper (BBC news, 2006). It is published by
the “Al-Ayyam Foundation for Press, Printing, Publishing and Distribution” in Ra-
mallah, and the institution is a joint-stock limited company. The first issue of Al-
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Ayyam newspaper was in 25/12/1995.
Al-Ayyam newspaper was launched by the efforts of young and promising schol-
ars, and the competencies of a group of the brightest journalists and writers in the
diaspora who returned home following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Editor of
Al-Ayyam newspaper is the writer Akram Haniyeh and is chaired by Ghassan Al-
Amin. The agency owns a modern and high-efficient press, and the newspaper deals
with a range of number from 20 to 40 pages. It classifies distinct and dynamically
various threads of political, economic, sporting, cultural; national, regional and in-
ternational topics. Besides, it is unique in the deployment of selected topics from
Hebrew press on a regular basis (WAFA, 2011).
Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper
Language: Arabic
Established: 1995
Website: http://www.alhayat-j.com
Circulation: 5,000 (est.)
Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda was founded in November 1994, and initially was a weekly
political newspaper, and then turned in August 1995 to a daily newspaper. Al-
Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper is strongly affiliated to the PNA, and this is evident
in the founding statement of the newspaper ‘We are with the PNA in support of the
achievement of a successful historic opportunity to build a community and indepen-
dent national entity, and we will not stand to watch any negligence or breaching
in opinions and structure, and will address issues relating to the PNA with a high
degree of sensitivity and responsibility for the sake of development, not to drag the
cart back’.
The founder of the new Al-Hayat newspaper is Nabil Amr, and was its general
manager before transferring ownership and subordination to the Palestinian Invest-
ment Fund, and edited by Hafez Barghouti. The newspaper based approach is to
benefit from the efficiencies of creative outsiders other than newspaper owners; to
enrich the content of the newspaper articles and topics and the various comments.
The number of pages per issue is 28 pages, and the number of staffs is 60 employ-
ees officially distributed among reporters and editors and administrators (WAFA,
2011).
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Felesteen newspaper
Language: Arabic
Established: 2006
Website: http://www.felesteen.ps
Felesteen newspaper is a Hamas-affiliated newspaper that was founded in
September 2006 in Gaza. The first issue of the newspaper was in 03/05/2007. It
is a daily political and comprehensive newspaper that seeks to raise public aware-
ness of the Palestinian cause in particular. It aspires to be a bridge between the
different views and attitudes from the Palestinian national approach and the mod-
erate Palestinian democratic editorial policy. It employs media staff and technical
and administrative specialist, and the issue consists of 32 pages a day. The news-
paper holds specialized courses in all art media and with the participation of senior
coaches (FelesteenOnline, 2010).
Israel Hayom
Language: Hebrew and English
Established: 2007
Website: http://www.israelhayom.com
Circulation: 350,000 (est.)
Israel Hayom is a free daily leading newspaper published throughout Israel to
homes, workplaces and on a range of public locations. The first issue of Israel
Hayom appeared on 30.07.2007, and nowadays it has the highest circulation with
39.3%(1) of readership compared with Yediot. The owner of Israel Hayom is the US-
based billionaire Sheldon Adelson, who is a supporter of Benjamin Netanyahu and
against the two-states solution, which defines its right-leaning political orientation.
The main goals of the newspaper stem from the belief that Israeli public “deserves
better, more balanced and more accurate journalism. Journalism that speaks, not
shouts. Journalism of a different kind” (Israel Hayom, 2007; Greenslade, 2010).
The vision of Israel Hayom is summarized in the following headlines: (1) To tell
the truth straight and to the point, (2) to support the rule of law, (3) to be fair and
balanced, (4) to examine the facts and, if we make a mistake, to correct it, and (5)
to remember that we are Israelis.
(1)A poll conducted by TGI market research company.
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Yediot Ahronot
Language: Hebrew
Established: 1939
Website: http://www.ynetnews.com
Circulation: 250,000
Yedioth Ahronoth (or “Latest News” in English) is nowadays second largest and
widely-read daily newspaper in Israel. It had the largest circulation for six decades
until recently, was surpassed by the establishment of other competitive newspaper
such as Israel Hayom. It has an online version written in Hebrew and English called
“Ynetnews” published since 2005. Yedioth Ahronoth tackles the local and inter-
national arenas, with a special focus on Israel, the Jewish World, and the Middle
East. All designed and drafted by Israel’s most high-profile writers coupled with
an unmatching level of proficiency and journalistic ethics. Concerning its political
leaning, Yedioth Ahronoth is by large centre-right (Ynetnews, 2005; Johnson, 2014).
Haaretz
Language: Hebrew
Established: 1919
Website: http://www.haaretz.com
Circulation: 85,000 (est.)
Haaretz (in English “The Land”) is a leading liberal Israeli newspaper and oldest
daily newspaper founded in 1919. It has a broad impact and is considered the most
powerful for its reporting and commentary by the country’s leading commentators
and analysts. Moreover, Haaretz plays a significant role in shaping public opin-
ion and is widely reflected in “government and decision-making circles”. Haaretz
also tackles both domestic and international spheres, and its journalistic team com-
prises of an estimated 330 reporter, writers, and editors (Haaretz, 2001; CRL, 2001).
Haaretz is considered the “flagship broadsheet of Israel’s left-wing intelligentsia”,
and most critical of Netanyahu (Jeffay, 2012).
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Maariv
Language: Hebrew
Established: 1948
Website: http://www.nrg.co.il
Circulation: 200,000 (est.)
Maariv (in English ‘Evening’) is a mainstream daily newspaper that had a fierce
six decades competition with Yediot Aharonot, until its financial crisis particularly
in 2012. It is a widely read newspaper, especially that it was established with the
declaration of the state of Israel in 1948, making it the second oldest newspaper in
Israel. Nevertheless, according to Rafi Mann, Maariv failed to cope with the social
map of the country, and therefore, did not manage to sustain its status as the “most
connected newspaper with the political, economic and social elite”. The newspaper
used to be published in the evening from where its name was derived, however
nowadays it is being published in the morning. The political orientation of Maariv
is center aiming for secular audience (Jeffay, 2012; Kershner, 2012).
4.2.4 Sampling Units
I used the method of ‘industrial week’ in collecting the data for the content analysis.
In this method, I chose a different day every week for each issue. For instance, If I
coded the issue of Saturday on the first week, for the same newspaper, I coded the
issue of Sunday on the second week, Monday on the third week, and Tuesday on
the fourth week, and so on so forth. This method ensured the representation of all
days of the week and took into consideration all themes, issues and events. Besides,
this method reduced any possible bias in the sample and minimized the effect of
events, or “any shortsightedness that can result from looking at society through the
lens of events” (Patterson, 2008, p. 37). In line with this, Patterson (2008, p. 37)
added: ‘Events are like anecdotes; they are examples, not systematic observations’.
Furthermore, event-based stories are occasionally framed thematically and instead
are mostly framed in an episodic frame that “focuses on a particular event without
placing it in a larger context” (Ibid., 38).
As mentioned above, the sampling units included 8 daily newspapers; 4 in Pales-
tine and 4 in Israel, for the period between August 2013 and March 2014. From
each newspaper 4 issues were coded every month using the method of ‘industrial
week’, which sums up to 16 issues per county per month, and to a total of 32 issues
per month, as shown in Table 4.2 below:
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TABLE 4.2 NUMBER OF INVESTIGATED ISSUES PER NEWSPAPER PER MONTH
Palestine
Newspaper Al-Qudsnewspaper Al-Ayyam
Al-Hayat
Al-Jadeeda
Felesteen
newspaper Sub-total
No. of issues / month 4 4 4 4 16
Israel
Newspaper Israeli Hayom YediotAhronot Haaretz Maariv Sub-total
No. of issues / month 4 4 4 4 16
Total 32
4.2.5 Coding the Sample
The coding of the sample was determined in two steps (see Figure 4.1 below). In the
first step, all articles during the investigation period were selected from the media
research units and sections where the heading title or sub-title contained keywords
*Palestine, Israel or conflict*. It did not matter whether the keyword was typed in a
big or small font, or if it was preceded by a prefix as in ‘anti-terrorist’, followed by
a suffix as in ‘terrorism’, mentioned alone as in ‘terrorist’, or was in a context as in
‘a terrorist attack’.
In the second step, selected article was read completely and then over-checked
if it addressed the main issues of the conflict (e.g., casualties, Palestinian refugees,
Jewish settlements, Palestinian prisoners, security of Israel, the status of Jerusalem,
Natural Resources, borders, beliefs, feelings and principles, and Gaza). If not then,
the article was not coded.
Access Criteria
Coded units were all articles in the news and commentary sections of the newspaper
that discussed, mentioned or portrayed suggestions/ideas/points of views regarding
the main issues of the conflict, history, accords, peace agreements, resolutions, po-
litical actors and speeches, events, day-to-day reports of confrontations, attacks and
casualties, ideologies, and public opinion. Posts that did not address the conflict
directly was not investigated.
Exclusion Criteria
Articles from the following sections were excluded: sport, travel, housing, culture,
motor/auto, fashion or entertainment were not coded, because they included very
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few articles related to the conflict. The same applies to any magazines/brochures
attached to the newspaper.
Context Unit
Context unit for this analyzes is the whole article. Encoders had to code the articles
mentioned as in the codebook, whether as causes, consequences, or solutions.
4.2.6 Developing Dimensions
Public strata vary significantly when their political knowledge is being questioned,
and so the quality of their opinions. As summarized by Neijens (2008, p. 27) “people
who discuss public affairs are better educated, more attentive to media messages,
more knowledgeable about politics, and more politically involved”. Therefore, I
considered Price and Neijens (1997) collective ‘decision-quality’ concerns when
validating and listing the dimensions. He accounted for (1) the degree to which
dimensions addressed appear responsive to popular concerns, (2) their magnitude
to popular discussion, mass media, and debate, (3) the linkage between political
actors and their representation of their respective public, (4) the various available
options/solution/viewpoints at hand, and finally (5) the legitimacy and fairness of
suggested dimensions (Vincent, 2008, p. 22).
FIGURE 4.1 STRATEGY OF SAMPLE ENTRY
 
KEYWORDS 
*PALESTINE, 
ISRAEL, 
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ARTICLE WAS 
NOT CODED 
 
YES 
NO 
ARTICLE WAS 
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ARTICLE WAS 
NOT CODED 
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4.2.7 Reliability
After a thorough reading and revision of the codebook, I met with the Palestinian
coders in the headquarters of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) in
Beit-Sahour, Palestine. In this meeting, I gave them a training session that included
an explanation of terms, expressions, terminologies, abbreviations used, general
concepts, scrutinizing data in the field, and how to decide which articles to code.
The same training took place for the Israeli coder but on Skype due to mobility
restrictions imposed by the political status quo, and inability to travel to Israel.
The coding rules of the codebook were simple, clear, and required only cod-
ing the availability of pre-determined dimensions with “mentioned” or “not men-
tioned”. This ensured higher stability when coding newspapers, and smaller chances
of being skewed in their coding due to personal views. In line with this, Cognitive
change is another issue that can influence the stability of coding text. Nevertheless,
the fact that coders belonged to two purely different groups - Palestinians or Israelis
and were dealing with issues that were directly connected to them determine higher
cognitive stability and lower chances of any significant change in their position.
On the other hand, it could have the opposite influence, were coders automatically
filtered information that did not support their view. Therefore, a pilot sample was
conducted in contemplation of testing the Reproducibility or intercoder reliability,
which refers to “the extent to which content classification produces the same results
when the same text is coded by more than one coder” (Weber, 1990, p. 17), and the
Intra-coded reliability as well.
4.2.8 Validity
I used multiple validity methods in asserting the validity of research results based
on content analysis. Face validity, which is the degree to which categories appear to
measure the construct it is designed to measure. This kind of validity test depends on
the correspondence between the researcher’s definitions or theories and construction
of categories that measures them. The categories or dimensions were extracted from
a thorough review of history, a closer observation to previous studies and question-
naires in the field, and finally, they were reviewed and assessed by experts on both
sides; Dr. Nabil Kukali(2) on the Palestinian side, and Dr. Aaron Lerner(3) on the
Israeli side. Even though content analysts relied heavily on face validity, however,
according to Weber (1990, p. 18) “some social scientists have viewed their results
sceptically”, and that “stronger forms of validity involve more than one variable”,
(2)President of the PCPO (Palestinian Center for Public Opinion).
(3)Director of IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis).
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which can be used more effectively to assess the validity of results from the content
analysis.
Consequently, I checked the Construct validity of categories. “A measure has a
construct validity to the extent that is correlated with some other measure of the
same construct. Other scholars differentiated convergent from discriminate valid-
ity” (Ibid., p. 19). Accordingly, I categorized the items in terms of positive, negative,
and neutral tendencies for each country, and compared polarized evaluations within
each country’s newspapers. For example, an item that had a high construct validity
had a high correlation with other items of the same construct (convergent) and at the
same time was uncorrelated with measures of dissimilar constructs (discriminant).
Finally, I used Hypothesis validity to test if items behave as it is projected to (Ibid.
p 19).
Testing Coding
A small sample of 50 articles across all newspapers was coded to test the clarity
of category definitions, and to offer suggestions and insights regarding any amend-
ments or classification scheme.
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4.3 Survey
This descriptive methodology is a general study of a phenomenon found in a group,
and in a particular place. At present it’s a method of analysis and interpretation
in a scientifically organized form to reach specific purposes of a social status, or
a social problem or a specific population. The research steps in this methodology
included the allocation of the survey problematic and the scientific considerations
of the survey objectives. It furthermore determined the scope of research regarding
sample, time and place required for its implementation, as well as the selection of
the research tools that were used to obtain information or data in accordance with
the nature of the research problematic and its hypotheses, then codified these tools
and assessed the extent of their reliability and contrast.
4.3.1 Data Collection
Representative samples were selected through the Palestinian Center for Public
Opinion (PCPO)(4) in Palestine and Maagar Mochot Ltd.(5) in Israel(6).
It was critical to ascertaining how thoughts are structured in the questionnaire in
order to understand the general framework people use in organizing their thinking
about the peace process and the conflict. Therefore, I used a closed-ended question
format to facilitate to the respondents the establishment of their frame of reference.
They were particularly well-suited for this purpose. The general goals of the survey
were to determine the methods applicable to the following:
1. Descriptive design and quantitative research as two supplementary systems in
conducting the surveys.
2. Application of a definite pattern of the descriptive design in the public opinion
studies.
3. Sources of the secondary data resulting from the Bureau research.
4. The field survey, on the distribution of 1500 questionnaires among a repre-
sentative and random samples of the Palestinian and Israeli societies. Besides,
(4)PCPO, one of Palestinian’s leading research institutions, was established back in 1994 as a
private institution. It has over 21 years of experience in working with clients in the media, gov-
ernment and NGOs on opinion research projects of all descriptions (PCPO’s official website,
http://www.pcpo.org).
(5)Maagar Mochot - The Israel’s leading research institution, was established back in 1992 as a
private corporation. The institution specializes in supporting major decision-makers in the public,
private and third sector organizations, with vital information through the collection and analysis
of data, based on surveys and other quantitative and qualitative research methods (Maagar Mochot
official website, http://www.maagar-mochot.co.il).
(6)PCPO and Maagar Mochot Ltd. has been commissioned to do the data collection for this disser-
tation in Palestine and Israel.
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processing and analyzing the data.
4.3.2 Operational Definitions
The following terms were defined as used in this study:
• Affiliation to historic events – On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very
low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree, respondent were asked to
evaluate the following historic events: (a) Persecution of Jews in Europe and
Russia. (b) Jewish immigration to historic Palestine. (c) The British granting
the Jews the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine -Balfour Dec-
laration. (d) The 1948 Arab-Israeli war. (e) Israel’s occupation of the Pales-
tinian territories in 1967 - Six Days War. (f) Arab exploitation of the conflict
to serve their own agendas. (g) The Palestinian belief that they have lived on
this land over centuries and are entitled to own it. (h) The Jewish belief that
the land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people.
• Affiliation to the past – Respondent’s affiliation to the past was measured by
asking them about which statement they feel is closer to their opinion, if they
were to get back to the beginning of the conflict in the beginning of last cen-
tury: (1) Would have kept the history as it is. (2) Would have sought out more
peaceful changes to the history. (3) Would have persisted with even more ex-
treme actions. (4) Do not know.
• Actions pertaining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – Respondents were asked
if the following actions pertaining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were almost
always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified: (a)
Launching rockets from Gaza at Israel. (b) Military actions by Israeli army in
the Palestinian Territories. (c) Palestinian actions against Israelis. (d) Jewish
settlers’ actions against Palestinians. (e) Movement restrictions imposed by
Israel. (f) The PA funding families of those who are in Israeli prison. (g) Ef-
forts of the PA to isolate Israel internationally. (h) Building the wall between
the Palestinians and the Israelis.
• What the conflict is about – Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to
a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree, respondents were
asked to answer what they thought the between the Palestinians and Israelis
is about? (a) Religion (b) Culture (c) Nationalism (d) Politics (e) Economics
(f) History (g) Existence (h) Ethnicity.
• Most appropriate solution – Respondents were asked about the most appro-
priate solution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict: (1) Two states that recipro-
cally recognize the legitimacy of each other, the first is Israeli and the second
is Palestinian. (2) One state in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the
same rights and obligations. (3) A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. (4)
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The West Bank becomes part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt. (5).
None.
• Prioritizing major issues of the conflict – Respondents were asked about the
issues that they that both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on address-
ing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the
two parties. The scale was from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most important
issue and 10 represents the least important issue these days, issues included:
(a) Settlements. (b) Prisoners. (c) Jerusalem. (d) The security of both Israel
and the Palestinians. (e) Borders and crossing points. (f) The Refugees. (g)
Control over natural resources like water. (h) Establishment of a Palestinian
state on 1967 borders. (i) Recognizing the Jewish state. (j) Having control
over holy places.
• Plans of economic cooperation – Respondents were presented with plans of
economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis, and then were asked
to specify the extent to which they accept the following plans using a scale
from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very unacceptable to them, and 5 meaning very
acceptable: (a) Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors i.e., water,
health, environment, tourism, etc. (b) Allowing Palestinian workers to work
inside Israel. (c) Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange be-
tween the two states. (d) Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon
between Palestinians and Israelis. (e) Building a Palestinian airport. (f) Build-
ing a Palestinian seaport. (g) Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza
Strip.
• Establishing a Palestinian state – Respondents were asked to evaluate their
support of the following elements as a part of establishing a Palestinian state
using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning they are completely opposed, and 5
meaning that they are in full support: (a) Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders
with some changes upon an agreement on equivalent areas of land swap. (b)
A demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for
some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces. (c) Interna-
tional presence on the borders between the newly established Palestinian state
and Israel. (d) A Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings.
(e) The presence of Israeli permanent control points over Palestinian border
crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority. (f) Building a “Safe
Passage” between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (g) Demarcating the present
location of the wall as permanent borders of the established Palestinian state.
(h) Security coordination between Israel and Palestine.
• Evaluation of political figures – Respondents were asked to evaluate the per-
formance of some political figures on both sides pertaining to the peace pro-
cess. They were asked to evaluate them with highly positive, somewhat posi-
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tive, somewhat negative or highly negative.
• Actions hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process – Using a scale of 1
to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very seri-
ous respondents were asked how do they evaluate the role of the following
items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process: (a) Building settle-
ments. (b) Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount. (c)
Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state. (d) Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s
possession of weapons. (e) Israeli settlers’ possession of weapons. (f) Having
tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip. (g) Detained Palestinians pris-
oners’ by Israel. (h) The Israeli full control over natural resources. (i) Pales-
tinian refugees’ right of return. (j) The difficulty of having access to places
of worship. (k) Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine. (l) Not rec-
ognizing Israel’s right to exist. (m) Hardliners constant refusal to any peace
agreement. (n) The Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products. (o) Deteriora-
tion of the Palestinian economy. (p) Lack of territorial contiguity in Pales-
tine. (q) The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides. (r) Lack of
confidence between Palestinians and Israelis. (s) Dependency of Palestinian
economy on Israeli economy. (t) Israel’s absolute control over border cross-
ings. (u) The freezing of the funds’ transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the
Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.
• Feelings and attitudes towards the other side – Respondent were presented
with a list of words and phrases that describe how would they express their
feelings and attitudes towards the other side. They were asked for each word
or phrase, if they you don’t share this feeling, they share it to a low degree,
they share it to a moderate degree, or they share it to a very high degree: (a)
Tolerance towards the other side. (b) Understanding the other side. (c) Angry
at the other side. (d) Fear from the other side. (e) Trust in the other side. (f)
Grudge against the other side.
• Feelings and attitudes of the other side towards you – This battery of ques-
tions asked the respondents to what degree they believe that the other side
holds the following feelings towards them: (a) Tolerance. (b) Understands
you. (c) Feels angry at you. (d) Fears you. (e) The other side trusts you. (f)
Bears the grudge against you.
• Newspaper – Respondents were asked about the local daily, weekly, or
monthly newspaper they you usually read the most? In Palestine: (1) Al-Quds
newspaper. (2) Al-Hayat newspaper. (3) Al-Ayyam newspaper. (4) Filistin
newspaper. (5) Other. In Israel: (1) Israel Hayom. (2) Yediot Ahronot. (3)
Haaretz. (4) Maariv. (5) Other.
• Political identification – Respondents were asked if new elections, agreed to
by all factions, were held today and this list were presented, for which would
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they vote? If they were not sure, the question asked to which would they
lean?In Palestine: (1) Fateh. (2 Hamas. (3) Third Road. (4) Palestinian Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). (5) Palestine National Initiative. (6)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). (7) Palestinian Is-
lamic Jihad Movement. (8) Independent Islamists. (9) Independent Nation-
alists. (10) Other. (11) No comment/Refused to answer. (12) Do not know.
In Israel: (1) Likud. (2) Zionist Union. (3) Jewish Home. (4) Yesh Atid. (5)
United Arab List. (6) Kulanu. (7) United Tora Judaism. (8) Israel Beitenu. (9)
Shas. (10) Meretz.
• Degree of religiosity – Respondents were asked how do they introduce them-
selves from the religious point of view: (1) Very religious (religious activist).
(2) Somewhat religious. (3) Religious to a mediocre degree. (4) Somewhat
irreligious. (5) Irreligious at all.
• Quality of life – Respondents were asked if the following battery of items ap-
ply to them, using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree
and 5 meaning to a very high degree: (a) Poverty (b) Low wages/pensions (c)
Unemployment/lack of job opportunities/ (d) Shortage of health care and edu-
cation (e) Lack of security and safety/crime/violence. (f) Restrictions imposed
on freedom of movement/blockade. (g) high cost of living/Inflation/high
prices (h) Energy or fuel shortages (i) Electricity shortages (j) Water short-
ages (k) Housing problems
4.3.3 Instrumentation
There should be no separation between the research methodology and the methods
that were used in data collection. The research methodology and its tools are inter-
related, integrated stages, thus forming a unity that is influenced by the nature of
the study and the sample type. The survey topic and objective determined together
the type of the data required to be collected and the nature of the methodology used
in the survey determined the sample type and the methods of the data collection re-
quired. Relying thereon, the nature of the target of this survey and the nature of the
method used required the collection of as much data as possible. Among the most
powerful methods of data collection that might help to implement this survey was
the Questionnaire.
The questionnaire form has been chosen as a research tool for many reasons; the
most crucial one is that it secures the frank and free answers where respondents were
not obliged to give their names or any connotation referring to them. They were not
obliged to fill in the questionnaire form if they were not willing to, or when they
might even be not prepared, psychologically and intellectually, to answer the ques-
tionnaire. The respondents were therefore very distant from any accountability or
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blame. This aspect was important in the questionnaire because it secured scientific
openness and objectivity in the results.
As the questions for all respondents were standardized and the formulation of
the questions did not vary with the change of the interviewer, it was thus easier to
collect data in masses and, subsequently to interpret them and have access to ap-
propriate conclusions. Also, the questionnaire made it easier for the researcher to
collect much information from several people at a specific time. Finally, the na-
ture of the research that I have carried out was a comparative study between the
Palestinian and Israeli public, and thus it served and facilitated the use of the ques-
tionnaire as a tool for the survey to achieve the goals of the research at a high level
of effectiveness and accuracy. Youngs (1969, p. 291) contended that:
‘Many investigators believe that through a questionnaire they are able to elim-
inate personal influence upon the subject and thereby achieve a greater degree
of objectivity. The questionnaire also provides the possibility of covering large
areas and diverse groups with minimum time and effort’.
4.3.4 Data Analysis
The required statistical processing of the data has been carried out by extracting the
figures and the Percentages. The hypotheses of the survey were examined at the rate
of α = 0.05 through the following statistical tests:
• Stepwise multiple regression
• Pearson correlation coefficient (r.)
• Effect size of Rosnow and Rosenthal
• Cronbach-Alpha stability coefficient (α)
• Chi-square (χ2) - goodness-of-fit test
• Independent-samples t-test
• One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
• Tukey’s HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) test
• Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy
• Bartlett’s test of sphericity - Measure of Appropriateness of Factor Analysis
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS test) and Shapiro-Wilk - Testing for Normality of
Residuals
• tolerance and VIF - Testing for Collinearity
• bpktest test(7)
• Breusch-Pagan and Koenker’tests - Testing for Heteroskedasticity
• Durbin-Watson coefficient (d.) - Testing for Independence
By using Excel and SPSS 22.0 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).
(7)A macro that was developed for SPSS to test for Heteroskedasticity with numbers.
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However, Backward stepwise multiple regression analysis was the main test
statistics used in this research because it determines the correlation between a crite-
rion variable and some combination of two or more predictor variables. This study
incorporated thirty-three independent variables for each model (Table 4.4), from
which, only significant predictors remained in the models. The dependent variables
for my models were about the prioritization of major conflicting issues that respon-
dents thought both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on addressing as the first
step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties. They
were ten major issues that respondents rated from 1 to 10, where 1 represented the
most important issue and 10 represented the least important issue to be addressed.
This suggested ten multiple regression models for each side, however, due to the
use of a split-ballot method when collecting the data, I ended up with 20 regression
models for each side split to A and B as shown in Table 4.3 hereunder.
TABLE 4.3 DISTRIBUTION OF MODELS
Country Palestine Israel
Split A B A B
# of models 10 10 10 10
Dummy variables were used to measure gender, social status, refugee or not,
and more. Dummy variables were used to insert a nominal scale variable into a
regression equation. Since the numbers assigned to categories of a nominal scale
are not assumed to have an order and unit of measurement, they cannot be treated
as ‘scores’ as they would be in conventional regression analysis.
4.3.5 Method
To achieve the targets that are pursued by this dissertation and to be able to respond
to the study questions in a satisfactory manner, I with the assistance and support
of PCPO in Palestine and Maagar Mochot Ltd. in Israel agreed upon the following
modes of administration:
In Palestine
With regards to the method of data collection in Palestine, I used face-to-face in-
terviews instead of phone interviews for many reasons confirmed by the team in
the PCPO. Some of the benefits of conducting face-to-face interviews in Palestine
were:
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1. The respondent felt safer meeting the interviewer at his/her home rather than
on the phone, which keeps the interviewer more anonymous.
2. The face-to-face interview gave the respondent more time to think and elabo-
rate on his/her answer as there is sometimes a sense of urgency on the phone.
3. A face-to-face interview secured the right environment for the respondent
because, during a phone interview, the respondent could likely be at work at
times or the timing of the call could be inconvenient for him/her.
4. A land line is less common these days with the affordability of mobile phones;
roughly 60 percent of the Palestinian population has land lines in comparison
to 92 percent who own mobile phones. The use of this method might not allow
us to have a representative sample.
5. Facial and physical expressions, body language, are vital when conducting a
face-to-face interview, but are unfounded during a phone interview.
6. Due to the difficult and non-transparent political situation and the manifold
parties and factions in the country, people were scared to answer survey ques-
tions on the phone as they do not know the identity of the caller.
Therefore, I concluded, for the best results for this dissertation a face-to-face
interview would be the most recommendable, safer, and convenient option to be
conducted in Palestine, hopefully bringing about the quality of results I seek to
obtain.
In Israel
After meeting with a group of specialists on the Israeli side, I decided that despite
the accuracy and objectivity of the questions in portraying the reality of the conflict
that it may still face some practical and technical problems with the Israeli people.
Thus, might scoreless accurate results, as the topic in its nature addressed issues that
are sensitive to the two peoples. However, as I mentioned earlier, I have used the
face-to-face method for data collection on the Palestinian side, which significantly
reduces the proportion of those respondents, who refused to cooperate or even to
fill in the questionnaire form.
On the Israeli side, however, the face-to-face method is less commonly used and
is very high in cost. Surveys are usually conducted in Israel by phone or electron-
ically. But for the same reasons mentioned above, the phone as a mean to collect
data for this dissertation has been excluded and was agreed to carry out the survey
online on a sample, which is scientifically representative of the Israeli people. The
survey was conducted using a Web Panel (by ‘Midgam Project’). Today, the panel
includes over 50,000 ‘panelists’ that participate in different studies for a fee. This
panel has proven itself in hundreds of studies conducted since 2008.
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4.3.6 Sample - in Palestine
Technical Details
The Central Elections Committee has selected about 998 polling centers in the West
Gaza Strip and West Bank including East Jerusalem. The PCPO ascertains that the
centers are selected according to precise scientific standards. It is also taken into due
consideration, that the distribution of these centers in each town, village or camp has
been carried out in a way as to cover all the areas so that these centers become easily
accessible to the residents.
In each selected refugee camp, village/town or city (after stratification), the
PCPO chose at random a number of polling centers. A total of 180 were selected.
The selection is subject to certain considerations, such as the number of the election
centers in each of the 16 governorates and the geographic distribution of the voters
in towns, villages, and camps. The polling centers are distributed among the con-
stituencies by the density of the voters and the number of the poll centers in each
district (governorate).
Having selected from every district (governorate) the polling centers, their num-
bers and names were given to the field supervisors, who distributed them by their
turn among the researchers. The following duties then followed:
1. A list was made of all streets located in the vicinity of each polling cen-
ter, which were considered as the starting point for each residential quarter.
Streets that had no names were given certain numbers by the researchers.
2. A certain street was randomly selected in each area by using the simple ran-
dom sample method.
3. Either side of that particular street was selected. Then every other house i.e.
those with odd or even numbers were interviewed.
4. In the case of a multi-apartment building, each apartment were considered as
a separate household.
Other streets mentioned on the list were taken as an alternative in the follow-
ing cases:
5. If work is completed on the first street before all necessary data were gathered.
6. If for a reason or another, the first street was not found.
7. If the first street was found to be deserted or slightly inhabited.
8. If the first street was found to be commercial or industrial.
If a certain house or apartment was found to be uninhabited or the inhabitants re-
frained from receiving the interviewers, work would continue as normal, i.e., every
other house. Only one member of any one household was interviewed. For the se-
lection of the respondent, all 18+ residents in a household were listed by name and
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dates of birth according to their ID cards. After listing the household members, the
designated respondent was the person (male or female) who had ‘The Last Birth-
day’ among all listed individuals before the date of the interview. In cases where
the designated respondent was not at home after three visits to the same household
at different times of the same day or different days of the field period, or in cases
of definite refusals, or when the interview could not be completed with the desig-
nated respondent, the interviewer continued going ahead to the next household on
the route from the same sampling point.
Sampling Plan
A representative sample of 1015 Palestinian adults per survey, 18 years and older,
were selected for this research from Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem). This sample was based on the 16 districts, called “governorates”, in
which a random 180 of primary sampling units (PSUs) were chosen, as presented
in Table 4.5 below:
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TABLE 4.5 PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS IN A NATIONAL SAMPLE IN
PALESTINE
Age groups (%)
District 15-24 25-39 40-54 55-64 65+ Total (%)
Jenin 2.5 2.2 1.3 0.4 0.3 6.7
Tubas 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.4
Tulkarem 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 4.0
Qalqilya 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 2.4
Salfit 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.5
Nablus 3.1 2.7 1.6 0.5 0.4 8.3
Ramallah & Al-Bireh 2.8 2.5 1.4 0.5 0.4 7.4
Jerusalem 3.4 3.1 1.8 0.5 0.5 9.2
Jericho 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.1
Bethlehem 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.3 0.2 4.6
Hebron 5.5 4.9 2.8 0.9 0.8 14.9
West Bank 22.9 20.4 11.9 3.7 3.2 61.5
North Gaza 2.8 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.4 7.5
Gaza City 4.9 4.4 2.5 0.8 0.7 13.3
Dier Al-Balah 2.1 1.8 1.2 0.3 0.3 5.6
Khan Yunis 2.7 2.4 1.4 0.4 0.4 7.2
Rafah 1.8 1.6 0.9 0.3 0.2 4.7
Gaza Strip 14.3 12.7 7.4 2.2 2.0 38.3
Total 37.2 33.1 19.3 5.9 5.2 100.0
Source: Palestinian Center for Public Opinion.
Sampling Design
To obtain the most representative sample of the districts mentioned above, the fol-
lowing methods of sampling were used in collecting the data:
1. Stratified random sampling: a random stratified cluster sample of 1030 indi-
viduals 18 years or older was selected from the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. This involved selecting 156 clusters “out of
998 polling centres” with populations of 1,000 or more individuals (after
stratification by district and type of community- urban, rural, and refugee
camp) with probabilities proportional to size.
2. Simple random sampling: choosing the street (starting from the polling cen-
ter).
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3. Systematic random sampling: this stage involved randomly selecting house-
holds in each of the chosen clusters (Left-side houses in even order).
4. Last Birthday Method: this is the last stage, which involved selecting one
individual in each household using the Last Birthday Method. Face-to-face
interviews were then conducted with the selected individuals.
4.3.7 Sample - in Israel
Sampling Plan
A representative sample of (520) adult Israeli population (aged 18 and above) means
a sample representing all segments of the population, including both the Jewish and
Arab sectors. The Jewish sector consisted of a number of segments, including new
immigrants, orthodox Jews and the general Jewish segment. All of these segments
were represented in the national sample in proportion to their relative size in the
population, as shown in Table 4.6:
TABLE 4.6 PROPORTION OF RESPONDENTS IN A NATIONAL SAMPLE IN
ISRAEL
Sector
Age groups (%)
Total (%)
18-34 35-44 45-64 +65
Jewish Sector 21.6 11.0 19.0 10.4 62.0
New Immigrants 5.6 3.6 5.2 3.6 18.0
Arab Sector 8.6 4.6 5.0 1.8 20.0
Total 35.8 19.2 29.2 15.8 100.0
Source: Maagar Mochot Ltd.
To be qualified as a representative sample as I defined it, a representative sample
of the adult Israeli population must meet some basic objective parameters relating
to sex, age, segment and geographic location that can be validated based on the data
from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS).
Sampling Design
People signed up to the panel by references to search engines (especially Google).
Also, there are some sites that referred visitors to the panel, and finally, the partic-
ipants themselves referred others and receive compensation through their affiliate
program. Respondents were paid for participation, and the reward was determined
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in dialogue with the clients. In most cases, as a rule of thumb, about 10 Agorot per
question are maintained.
To Ensure No Duplicate Registrations to the Panel - During registration,
registrants submitted identifying information that included an e-mail address, phone
number, and ID number. That does not completely rule out duplicate registrations,
but it certainly makes it more difficult. In any case, the reward was such that the
trouble of creating false registrations is too big.
Maintaining the Security and Confidentiality of Participant - Registry, in
which they gave the identifying information, is done using a secure communication
protocol (SSL). The actual data is stored in an encrypted form in the database. The
panelists login is made by using a username and password. Password recovery re-
quired answering correctly on the verification question. Finally - the data submitted
to the customer never included identifying information.
Quality of Data - After most of the surveys, the system automatically marks about
20% of the participants on ‘suspicion’of invalid participation. If a participant is
marked, again and again, he/she will stop receiving invitations to participate. This
method is good for the participants, whose “participation history” we have, but it
does not cover new subscribers. Therefore, we recommend to include reading test
questions when it is relevant.
Sampling Participants - The method of stratified sampling was used, based on
data published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. Then quotas were made
by gender and age groups following the research requirements.
4.3.8 Questionnaire
Questionnaire Completion
In the beginning, I allocated the goals anticipated from making the questionnaire in
the light of the research topic and its problematic, and then determined the data and
the information to be collected, and after that compiled and converted these objec-
tives into a set of questions and inquiries. After having completed the design and
selection of the questionnaire, I conducted a pilot test on a limited group of respon-
dents identified in the research sample as to give me a feedback about their opinion
on the quality of the questionnaire in terms of their understanding, inclusiveness and
significance, as well as their quantity and adequacy to collect the required informa-
tion on the topic of the research and its problematic. In the light of the observations
and comments obtained, I modified the questions and compiled the questionnaire in
its final form as to obtain the required outputs.
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Pre-test
The pre-test main objectives were to:
• Test the translation into the local language;
• Check the questions wording if they are fully understood by the interviewee,
and if there are any “local expressions” that could fit better into the transla-
tion;
• Verify the total length of each section and the complete questionnaire;
• Identify the questions that are particularly difficult to understand, check the
survey’s flow, and more;
• Verify the skip patterns.
The pre-test report provided complete information on:
• Comments and suggestions for improving the questionnaire. For example, on
the general comprehension, the understanding of the questions, the sections
flow, and more.
• Comments on particular questions
• The length of the questionnaire, per section and in total.
Questionnaire Design
I made sure when designing the questionnaire to write in an understandable and
clear manner that did not bear multiple interpretations to avoid any confusion or
ambiguities by the respondents, or obtain inaccurate answers from them. Further-
more, I have taken into account the time available to the respondents and, therefore,
was keen not to have as much as possible long questions, which might lead to the
rejection of the interviewees to respond to the questionnaire or give fast and inac-
curate answers.
Due to the nature of the research, length of the questionnaire, and to minimize
context effect among items I decided to use a split ballot design, as shown in Ta-
ble 5.10 in the next chapter. Moreover, after having reviewed the objectives of the
study, I was keen to give a sufficient number of options enabling the respondents to
express their different opinions in a precise way. As I mentioned earlier, the ques-
tionnaire has been designed according to the study matrix and the review of the
history of the conflict. Add thereto the different previous studies that investigated
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I, therefore, made sure of the correlation between
the various questions in the different sections of the questionnaire, as well as of the
correlation between these and the research topic and its problematic.
Emphasis should be given here to the sensitivity of the research topic to both
peoples. I therefore tried as much as possible to stay away from any embarrassing
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questions that might discourage the respondents to respond to the filling-in of the
questionnaire, or even the use of any complex questions that might include more
than one notion of the subject required to be examined, as that could cause confu-
sion or embarrassment to the respondents. Finally, and after a thorough review of
history and literature I managed to carve out four final questionnaires (Palestine -
Split A and B, Israel - Split A and B) that investigated peoples’perspectives regard-
ing almost every single and important aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The
questionnaire comprised of many indexes of items regarding different aspects of
the conflict and peace process and asked the respondents about their perceptions of
these items. Questionnaires A and B in each country investigated the same indexes
but with different items that complement each other.
I was cautious when developing the questionnaire especially that attitudes are
highly dependent on the context in which they are depicted (Tourangeau & Galesic,
2008, p.145). Therefore, the wording of the questionnaire was characterized by sim-
plicity, clearness and consistency across questions. Moreover, the sequence of ques-
tions was carefully studied to avoid dependency of responses on previous relevant
answers. Afterward, the questionnaires were proofread and revised thoroughly.
Translation
The master copy of the questionnaire was developed in English and then was trans-
lated into Arabic and Hebrew. The translation was done by an experienced and
qualified team of translators, who already translated books from various languages,
particularly from English into Arabic and Hebrew and vice versa. The translation
was subject to possible modifications, since some expressions, terms and ideas were
culturally grounded. Experience shows that the Hebrew questionnaire can also be
used to interview respondents from both the Arab sector and the new-immigrant
segment in Israel. The interviews for a particular sector were carried out in its lan-
guage by interviewers who speak the language (Arabic speakers in the Arab sector
and Hebrew speakers in the Jewish sector).
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4.4 Document Analysis
Political leaders, elites, and parties are a well-informed politically active stratum
of every society that exercises influential power in the decision-making process,
which implies unique value orientations and political attitudes that differ from those
of non-elites or the broader public. Therefore, a complementary document analysis
of both societies main political parties/movements and leaders is a core stone de-
terminant of public opinion and media frames that should not be overlooked, but
instead be incorporated hand in hand with public opinion surveys and content anal-
ysis for further and clearer understanding of the formation of public opinion and
media frames (Hoffmann-Lange, 2008, p. 54). Also, there is a close relationship
that should be considered between political media and the political process, where
the media is the link between the public and the regime. These media contribute
through their political activities and functions significantly to the success or failure
of the political system. Once Swanson (1992, p. 397) noted: ‘Politicians, officials,
and interest advocates try to manipulate reporters and editors to manage rather
than inform public opinion’.
4.4.1 Unit of Analysis
Units of analysis are documents that include political parties’ activities, actions, de-
cisions, secretary announcements, public speeches and press releases. The goal of
this analysis was to observe how political parties and leaders influenced the me-
dia and people’s perceptions of the peace process and the conflict, and vice versa.
Principally, it included exploring documents that wrote about the conflict and coded
them using the same comprehensive pre-defined and already validated dimensions
in the codebook of the content analysis.
4.4.2 Documents Sample
In Palestine
The major neck–to–neck political movements in Palestine are Fateh and Hamas.
Statistically, these movements won a majority of 86.3%(8) of Palestinian votes in
the 2006 legislative elections. These political movements are familiar with their
distinct ideologies (Islamism; a type of religious-nationalism vs. Secularism; a type
of secular nationalism that is not based so much on the repression or restriction
of religion). Although Fateh forms the government, Hamas supporters constitute a
(8)Hamas (43.9%) and Fateh (42.4%).
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very high percentage of the society, particularly in Gaza, and play a very influential
role on the grounds that should not be ignored. Therefore, I used the archives in
Fateh’s official website for analysis, and I contacted the office of Hamas in Gaza
who provided me with all official documents needed for my analysis.
Fateh - literally means ‘Victory’ or ‘Conquest’. It is a reverse acronym of ‘Harakat
al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini’ (Palestinian National Liberation Movement), the
dominant faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Lybarger, 2007,
p. 4). Fateh was founded by Yasser Arafat and a small group of Palestinian na-
tionalists in the late 1950s in Kuwait (Bullock, 2007). As mentioned earlier, Fateh
lost its majority in the Palestinian parliament to Hamas. However, Fateh still holds
the presidency, the highest elected position in the Palestinian Authority, as well as
roughly 70,000 police and security forces throughout the West Bank (Ibid.)
The main principles of Fateh’s ideology advocated the liberation of Palestine
through armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. It embraced the idea of solo
Palestinian resistance with the policy of noninterference in the affairs of the Arab
states, and one of its major concerns was “to get rid of the patronage of the Arab
brethren over Palestinian problems” (Flapan, 1979, p. 53). It aimed to liberate Pales-
tine without waiting for the Arab states to do so and to establish an identity and a
sense of empowerment for the Palestinian people. The Palestinian cause for Fateh
cadres could not wait any longer for Arab unity; they stressed its independence from
pan-Arab unity and instead defined it as ‘Palestine first’ (Dunn, 2004). ‘The ideol-
ogy we adopted was unique in the Arab world’, Arafat said. He elaborated, ‘We were
not Baathists, not Muslim Brothers, not Communists and not pan-Arab nationalists.
We were not part of any existing parties’. Fateh’s ideology, he said, was Palestinian
nationalism (Viorst, 1995, p. 215).
In 1967, Fateh became the dominant body in the PLO coalition, and the PLO
became virtually synonymous with Fateh. Two decades later, the PLO, headed by
Arafat, decided to move on the negotiation track. Therefore, many amendments on
their core principles and the national constitution had to be taken; starting with the
PLO’s acceptance of three American conditions for opening a dialogue with the
USA. Arafat “denounced terrorism, recognized Israel’s right to exist and accepted
the UN Security Council resolution no. 242 calling for Israel’s withdrawal to the
pre-1967 war borders” (Araj & Brym, 2011, p. 843). Furthermore, Fateh amended
and eliminated articles calling for the destruction of Israel and those articles that
were incompatible with Oslo’s agreement.
Hamas - literally means ‘zeal’. It is an acronym for ‘Harakat al-Muqawama al-
Islamiyya’ (the Islamic Resistance Movement). Hamas was formally established
and took part in the Palestinian national struggle after the outbreak of the first In-
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tifada in 1987 (Abu-Amr, 1993, p. 5; Weinberg et al., 2008, p. 90). It is a “Pales-
tinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Palestine, itself a part of the
Muslim Brotherhood; an Islamist group founded in Egypt in 1928, by Hassan al-
Banna” (Aaron, 2005, p. 5). The origins of Hamas can be traced to late 1970s in the
Gaza Strip by its founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who was en-
gaged in efforts to spread the movement’s extreme fundamentalist ideology among
the Palestinian population (Weinberg et al., 2008, p. 90).
In 1988, Hamas published its charter which was a combination of Palestinian
patriotism and radical Islamic ideology. The charter emphasized absolute subordi-
nation to the law of Islam, the non-recognition of Israel, and the commitment to be
engaged in activities that aim to establish the institution of an Islamic Palestinian
state. (Weinberg et al., 2008, p. 91). Hamas appeals to the religious sentiments of
the public, and it uses the mosques as venues for interaction with the people to win
their trust (Zayyad, 2005, p. 108). Hamas’ main political leaders are Ismail Haneyya
- the premier of the deposed Hamas government, Khaled Misha’l - Head of Hamas
politburo’and Mahmoud Zahar (Aaron, 2005, p. 2).
The Islamic Resistance Movement or Hamas ‘consists of Muslims, who are de-
voted to Allah and worship Him verily’ and who ‘have raised the banner of Jihad
in the face of the oppressors in order to extricate the country and the people from
the [oppressors] desecration, filth and evil’ (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 3). The
movement “draws its guidelines from Islam; derives from it its thinking, interpre-
tations and views about existence, life, and humanity; refers to it for its conduct,
and is inspired by it in whatever step it takes” (Article 1). The slogan of Hamas is
‘Allah is its goal, the Prophet its model, the Qur’an its Constitution, Jihad its path
and death for the cause of Allah its most sublime belief ’ (Article 8).
In Israel
The document analysis was based on archives of two of the most senior and influ-
ential parities in Israel. The first is the Israeli right-wing party Likud, which is the
one that rules in Israel in the last six years, and the party which scored the highest
number of Knesset seats in the recent elections of March 2015. The second party
for the document analysis was the Israeli Labour party Ha’avoda, which scored the
highest number of Knesset seats among the parties in the opposition in the last two
elections.
Likud - The ideological and intellectual roots of the party date back before its
establishment, which was inspired by the Liberal National Movement ‘Beitar’ led
by the revisionist Zionist leader ‘Ze’ev Jabotinsky’. It was established by the merger
of two parties; ‘Herut, ’ founded by ‘Menachem Begin’ in 1948 and the Liberal
180
4.4. DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
Party to form together in 1973 this right-of-center secular-nationalist political party.
Therefore, the Likud party is defined as a Zionist party of liberal right that believes
in the ideas of new conservatives. Likud came into power for the first time since
its foundation in 1977 (the victory of Menachem Begin over the Labor Party leader
Shimon Peres), which was the first defeat of the Labor Party since the establishment
of the State of Israel (Toler, 2011, p. 245). For decades afterward, the Likud party
alternated in government with Labour. It became the ruling party in Israel in the
years between 1977 - 1984, 1986 - 1992, and 1996 - 1999. The party came to power
between 2001 and 2005 under the leadership of Ariel Sharon, before it split to form
a new centrist party ‘Kadima’, taking from the mother party prominent moderate
politicians with it. Finally, Likud came to power under the leadership of Netanyahu
in 2015. The party still adopts the stance of firm opposition to a Palestinian state, to
the Palestinian right of return, and to the dismantling of Jewish settlements. Likud
leaders also assert Israel’s sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem and rule out the
withdrawal from the Golan Heights (Shlaim, 2005b, p. 253).
Traditionally, the Likud party opposed the withdrawal from any land occupied
by Israel during its wars with neighboring Arab states. Furthermore, it supported the
establishment of settlements in the “occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank”,
which were and still are “a constant source of tension between the Obama admin-
istration and the European allies”. Nevertheless, modern history witnessed Israeli
withdrawals from occupied territories under Likud’s governments as happened in
the Sinai after the Camp David Accords with the Egyptian government, as well
as Gaza disengagement plan after Oslo Accord. This resulted in an ideological
clash that ended with the split of Sharon and others from the Likud to form the
‘Kadima’ political party (BBC News, 2013).
Likud’s most important principles are Israel’s right to exist on the entire histor-
ical land of Palestine and Eastern Jordan, to eventually conclude peace with Arabs
through direct negotiations, the continuation of large-scale settlement operations in
‘all the territories of the liberated Eretz Israel (Greater Israel)’, the emphasis on free
market economy and the reduction of state intervention. Likud’s platform neither
endorsed nor ruled out “a two-state solution, but simply condemns any further uni-
lateral withdrawals on the model of Lebanon in 2000 or Gaza in 2005” (Dowty,
2001, p. 15).
Ha’avoda - ‘Mifleget Ha’avoda Hayisra’elit’ was a merger between Mapai, Ahdut
Ha’avoda Po’alei Zion, and Rafi. In the beginning, this confederation of factions
was headed by PM Levy Eshkol. Golda Meir stated at the unification convention in
Jerusalem:
‘Though we come together today to restore our unity, we are not about to
create a large party with a single point of view, but one of freedom of opinion
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and discussion. . . We have united not against, but for so that we can call
upon the Jewish people: ‘Come to Israel: we are waiting, the land and the
country await you’. . . We have united to serve the nation with greater strength
to educate the youth and the workers, to create a just society’ (Dishon, 1973,
p. 541).
It is a center-left party that went through many transformations and upheavals since
it sat out. However, it always derived its strength from being a Zionist, social demo-
cratic, centralized and a party of pragmatic position. The Labour party was leading
every government from 1948 until the Likud first came to power in 1977 led by
Menachem Begin. Lately, the popularity of the party among voters was steadily
waning over (Haaretz, 2014), particularly after the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel
Sharon, established the centrist ‘Kadima’ party, Shimon Peres and several other
members of the Labour Party left the party and joined Sharon in 2005. Furthermore,
Sharon managed to attract some of its voters, who felt comfortable with Sharon’s
policy of ending Israel’s presence in the Gaza Strip as described earlier in this dis-
sertation. The era of the Labor Party witnessed the signing of the Oslo agreement in
1993 between the late PLO leader Yasser Arafat and the leader of the Labor Party,
late Yitzhak Rabin, who was later assassinated (Ibid.; Dowty, 2001, p. 8).
The most important principles of the Labour party are: to improve the social
and economic life of the Israeli people, to strengthen the Israeli economy based
on free market principles, and to achieve comprehensive peace and security in the
Middle East. It always wished an egalitarian society, and the deep responsibility of
the State of Israel and its citizens, regardless of race, religion or gender, as well as
peace with the neighbors. Military power was always accompanied by a realistic
vision of reality, and the ability to turn a dream into fact. Fair economy and a just
society are the condition for a strong and prosperous nation, and are also derivatives
of the IDF’s military strength, on the one hand, and the ability to strive courageously
for peace on the other (Ha’voda official website).
The Zionist Union; a centre-left political alliance between the Labor Party
(headed by Isaac Herzog) and the liberal political party ‘Hatnua’ (formed and led by
Tzipi Livni), was established in December 2014 in an attempt to win the 2015 Israeli
elections and take over the governance from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
(Haaretz, 2015).
4.4.3 Investigating Units
The strategy of sample entry and access criteria is similar to the one of the content
analysis as shown in Figure 4.1 above.
The study was limited to documents published from 1st of August 2013 up till
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30th March 2014, which is the same period of the content analysis, and for the same
reasons mentioned before.
4.4.4 Sources of Data
The online archives of the Palestinian and Israeli political parties were easy to ac-
cess, arranged by dates and included information on the parties’ activity, part of
speeches, political vies, press releases, announcements, statements, decisions, leg-
islations and attitudes toward ‘the other’ political leaders and the peace process. The
analysis referred to the relevant issues of the peace process. Finally, the nature of
documents reported in the Palestinian websites was similar to those reported by the
Israeli websites, making them very useful and unique sources of data.
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4.5 Limitations of the Study
The limitations of the research were:
1. It was limited to Israelis in Israel, and Palestinians in the West Bank (includ-
ing East Jerusalem), and Gaza Strip.
2. The surveys were limited to the period between 15.04.2015 - 15.05.2015,
and the content and document analysis were limited to the period between
01.08.2013 - 30.03.2014.
3. A different research instrument was used for the survey in each country; a
face-to-face survey in Palestine, and a web-based survey in Israel.
4. The content analysis was confined to newspapers only.
5. The document analysis was limited only to the major political par-
ties/movements in each country.
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5.1 Content Analysis
5.1.1 A Brief Overview of Terminologies
Israeli newspapers used the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ because they consider the prin-
ciple of Islamic jihad as ‘terrorism’. They, in general, connected the essence of
Islam with extremism and showed that Israel and America are partners in being tar-
geted by terrorism on the one hand and partners in the fight against terrorism on
the other hand. That is in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims a fallacy that offends the
Islam because Jihad in Islam is only legitimized for self-defense, for defending the
religion and one’s country, and no way for aggression against the others as empha-
sized by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Ahmed Tayeb. What Israel considered as
Islamic terrorism is considered by the Palestinians as Jihad for the sake of God and
the homeland. In both cases, the blood of unarmed, helpless citizens is shed. Other
topics that were abundant in the Israeli media is the term ‘martyrdom operations’ or
‘suicide operations’, which the Palestinians and their media considered as opera-
tions of ‘Palestinian resistance’ against the Israeli occupation, which Palestinian
militants view as “terrorist” occupation and are entitled to resist the occupiers, who
kill, assassinate, demolish their houses, arrest their people and besiege their towns
and villages.
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What Israel views as self-defense, is regarded by Palestinians as acts of resistance
and the cycle of conflict continues at the media level and on the ground. And where
the Israeli media are keen to frequently use the term ‘Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF)
instead of the term ‘Israeli army’ as to give the world the impression that Israel
is always in the state of self-defense against a vast hostile Arab environment that
seeks to eliminate it, are the media on the Palestinian side keen to use the term
‘Israeli army’, which should tell the world that Israel’s occupation applies military
repression and attacks against the occupied Palestinian citizens. It is in this regard
worth mentioning that the Israeli media focus on the use of the term ‘Arab-Israeli
conflict’ which in turn, suggests that there are two conflicting parties, who are Arabs
and Israelis, and each of them has a right in Palestine, and that their conflict revolves
around this right, while the means of the Palestinian media use the term ‘Palestinian
issue’ which clearly indicates that there is one issue to one titular / claimant, who
is the Palestinian people, and puts Israel in the position of a one that basically has
no rights since the whole issue is the issue of people, whose homeland has been
usurped, who have been displaced from their land, whose rights are violated and
whose sanctuaries have been desecrated. The term ‘Arab-Israeli conflict’, however,
used by the Israeli media, imposes a conflict between two parties that deals in the
first place with the settlement of the border, and not with the right to exist. Further-
more, Israel uses through its media the term ‘Land of Israel’ as to suggest to the
world that it is an Israeli land and belongs to the Jews, and the Palestinians have
no right to it. The Palestinians, on the other hand, name the land ‘Palestine’ as to
suggest to the world that Palestine is a Palestinian land, and the Jews have no right
to it.
Other examples include the use of the Israeli media of the term ‘Judea and
Samaria’ as substitute for the use of the term ‘West Bank’. The Israeli term refers
intentionally to two kingdoms in the West Bank after the death of Solomon, one
in the South, which is the ‘Kingdom of Judea’, and the other in the north, that is
called the ‘Kingdom of Israel’, the matter which Palestinians find as unjust and il-
logical as these two kingdoms lasted only eighty years, which in the age of nations
is considered a very short period. The Arab Muslims stayed in Andalusia (Spain)
almost eight hundred years, but, however, did not claim any historic right to it. The
term frequently used in the Israeli and Western media is ‘Middle East’ instead of
the term ‘the Arab world’ which confirms the Arab identity of this land from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. For the Arabs, Israel is only a foreign body in the Arab
world. This term has developed to ‘Greater Middle East’ which includes beside the
Arab countries, Israel, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. This underlines the
role Israel plays as guardian of the Americans’ interests and their leadership of this
region. This term is also based on the suggestion that Israel is an integral part of its
geography, and that its presence is natural, and Arabs have to accept it.
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General description
In earlier chapters, I elaborated the sampling units of observation that included eight
daily newspapers; 4 in Palestine and 4 in Israel, for the period extending between
August 2013 and March 2014. The investigating units of analysis were chosen using
the method of ‘industrial week’. In this method, issues were chosen in different
days every subsequent week. For instance, the first issue of Al-Quds newspaper
was the 1st of August 2013 (that is Thursday), for the second issue of the same
newspaper it was Friday the next week (9th of August 2013), and the third issue
was the one on Saturday in the third week (17th of August 2013). Keeping in mind
that Israeli newspapers are not published on Saturdays, I excluded Saturdays from
the sample in Israel and applied the same sampling method to Israeli newspapers.
Figure 5.1 below illustrates the total number of coded articles in Palestinian and
Israeli newspapers per month.
FIGURE 5.1 NUMBER OF CODED ARTICLES PER MONTH
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As described in earlier chapters, any articles within the specified time-frame that
mentioned or investigated the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was coded. A total number
of 2519 articles were coded in both countries. 77.7% (a total of 1957 articles) were
coded in the Palestinian newspapers and 22.3% (a total of 562 articles) were coded
in the Israeli newspapers, as shown in Table 5.1 below:
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TABLE 5.1 NUMBER OF CODED ARTICLES PER NEWSPAPER
Country Newspaper Frequency %
Palestine
Al-Quds newspaper 555 28.4
Al-Ayyam newspaper 486 24.8
Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper 611 31.2
Felesteen newspaper 305 15.6
Total 1957 100.0
Israel
Israel Hayom 154 27.4
Yediot Ahronot 91 16.2
Haaretz 204 36.3
Maariv 113 20.1
Total 562 100.0
Also, results revealed that 78.2% and 66.5% of news related to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict were reported in the first ten pages of the Palestinian and Israeli
newspapers respectively. 21.5% of conflict-related news were mentioned on the
main page of Palestinian newspapers, and 13.3% were referred to on the main page
of Israeli newspapers. The majority of conflict-related articles: 85.8% in Palestinian
newspapers and 70.3% in Israeli newspapers - were mentioned in the sections of
political news and localities, 12.9% of Palestinian news and 26.9% of Israeli news
were mentioned in the editorial section (i.e., as opinions, comments, and/or dialogs)
and only 1.3% and 2.8% of conflict-related news were mentioned in other sections
of the Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively, including business and vari-
ety sections.
5.1.2 Reliability
Reliability test for content analysis is paramount, particularly because the main goal
of this kind of analysis is “to identify and record relatively objective (or, at least,
intersubjective) characteristics of messages”, which, if not correctly done, will lead
to invalid and useless results. Lombard et al. (2010) emphasized on the importance
researchers should allocate to inter- and intra-coder reliability tests because it carves
out a more efficient coding, without which data collection and results would likely
be misleading and, therefore, be rejected by reviewers and critics.
I used both inter- and intra-coder reliability to be certain that the content-coding
is reliable. Intercoder reliability, or in more specific terms interrater agreement
between or across coders reliability is “the extent to which independent coders
evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same conclu-
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sion” (Lombard et al., 2010). Intracoder reliability within single coder, refer to
the level consistency by which coders code.
Intercoder reliability test
Since there were three independent coders coding the four newspapers in Palestine,
and only one coder in the Israeli side, I used inter-coder and intra-coder reliability
tests to test for the level of agreement among Palestinian coders and within the
coders themselves, and I used intra-coder reliability test for the Israeli coder at the
beginning of data collection, in order to secure a better research quality.
I used Krippendorff’s alpha (KALPHA) to test for inter-coder reliability for
many reasons determined by Krippendorff and Hayes (2007, p. 1), mainly because
“sample size, multiple (more than 2) coders or missing data are not problematic
for calculating KALPHA, and all measurement levels can be tested”. Furthermore,
Krippendorff’s alpha “is well regarded and very flexible (it can be used with multi-
ple coders, accounts for different sample sizes and missing data, and can be used for
ordinal, interval and ratio level variables)” (Ibid.). However, at that time, automated
softwares were not widely available, the matter which explains why researchers
tended to use different inter-reliability tests. Fortunately, this is not anymore the
case thanks to the macro-developed by Swert (2012).
I applied the KALPHA test for content analysis using SPSS on a previously
developed macro(1) by Swert (2012). A subsample that consisted of the main page
of 15 randomly chosen newspapers across three months were coded independently
by all coders. One problematic issue of using this test is that KALPHA provides
information on the reliability of variables, not coders. Therefore, I applied the macro
for the items of Causes, Consequences, and Solutions separately.
Causes
The Kalpha test for the causes was very good, the value of Alpha was .86, which
is quite high. Additionally, the bootstrapping procedure indicated that there is only
0.01 percent chance that the KALPHA would be below .80 if the whole population
would be tested.
Consequences
The Kalpha test for the consequences was excellent, the value of Alpha was .98,
which is optimal. Additionally, the bootstrapping procedure indicated that there is
only 0.001 percent chance that the KALPHA would be below .90 if the whole pop-
ulation would be tested.
(1)See Appendix G.
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Solutions
The Kalpha test for the solutions was excellent as the value of Alpha was .90, which
is high. Additionally, the bootstrapping procedure indicated that there is only 0.001
percent chance that the KALPHA would be below .90 if the whole population would
be tested.
The results above suggested a high level of agreement among Palestinian coders,
a good and clear operational definition, categories, items, and well-trained coders.
Intracoder reliability test
To test for intercoder reliability or the level consistency by which coders code, 120
random articles were chosen and analyzed for content, twice at different times, T1
and T2 (approximately after 3 to 4 weeks) in order to see how consistent their cod-
ing methods were based on the content codebook. Reliability statistics were then
computed using the two sets of data.
I used the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) as a measure of the intercoder
reliability. The ICC is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 where 1 stands for perfect
reliability with no measurement error, and 0 represents no reliability. Table 5.2 be-
low shows that all the ICC values were very high for all the three coders on the
Palestinian side (ICC = 0.92, 0.93, and 0.96), and for the coder on the Israeli side
(ICC = 0.91) as well, for the same amount of articles. Accordingly, this confirms
the repeatability of measurements between both periods, and all of the ICC values
are above the required reliability needed to conduct a reliable analysis of content.
TABLE 5.2 INTRACLASS CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Country Coder
Intraclass
Correlation
95% Confidence
Interval
Ahlam 0.92 0.87, 0.95
Ehsan 0.93 0.90, 0.96Palestine
Salwa 0.96 0.92, 0.98
Israel Dana 0.91 0.85, 0.94
Accordingly, I can safely state that my data was conducted reliably by different
coders, and that the same coders maintained consistent results over time (From T1
to T2).
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5.1.3 Findings
Distribution of news
Figure 5.2 hereunder shows the distribution of news across causes, consequences,
and solutions. The results show evidently that Palestinian newspapers slightly more
focus on the consequences of the conflict, whilst Israeli newspapers focus to a
greater extent on the solutions of the conflict.
FIGURE 5.2 DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS ACROSS
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOLUTIONS
(A) Palestinian newspapers
29.9%
45.6%
24.5%
CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SOLUTIONS
(B) Israeli newspapers
27.4%
36.2%
36.4%
CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SOLUTIONS
This can be a consequence of the extremely skewed balance of power on the
grounds, which leaves the Palestinians with a fragile immunity to pressures and ac-
tions imposed by this imbalance. Moreover, it makes the Israelis more inclined to
discuss solutions related to “control” any “backlashes” resulting from the fragility
of the Palestinian grounds by imposing actions that serve Israel’s own interests.
Furthermore, this imbalance is evident in the style of articles on both sides, where
86.8% of Palestinian newspapers and 65.5% of Israel newspapers reported factual
news, reports, documentaries about the conflict, and only 13.2% of news in Pales-
tinian newspapers were mainly opinions (i.e., comments, reader letters, or reviews)
in comparison to 34.5% on the Israeli side. This reflects a higher interactivity level
between Israeli newspapers and their readers that highlights more or fewer solutions
and national interests.
Tendency of articles
Figure 5.3 hereunder shows that the tendency of articles, when describing the peace
process, is symmetrical in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers. The results revealed
that most of the articles describing the peace process were neutral (50.5% in Pales-
tine, and 61.0% in Israel), and quite high percentages of 45.4% in Palestine, and
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32.9% in Israel were negative. These raise the questions, whether ‘authors are adopt-
ing a negative tone when covering the peace process’, or ‘is it the case that targeted
issues were already negative, and the authors only reported them?’ For Example,
reporting the number of casualties on either side will not carry within its lines a
positive vibe. Finally, as shown in the figure hereunder, only 4.1% of Palestinian
newspapers and 6.0% of Israeli newspapers inclined to be positive when covering
the peace process. Again, is it the case that authors on both sides are seldom positive
when conveying the news, or simply a consequence of the scarcity of positive issues
to write about when dealing with Palestinian-Israeli conflict?
FIGURE 5.3 TENDENCY OF ARTICLES TOWARDS PEACE
45.4%
50.5%
4.1%
32.9%
61.0%
6.0%
NEGATIVE NEUTRAL POSITIVE
PALESTINIAN NEWSPAPERS ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS
Coming back to my questions, 1) are authors negative towards peace or 2) are
they reporting items that are already characterized by negativity? After converting
the variable of ‘tendency of article’ into a dummy variable (where negative = 1,
and the rest = 0), and crosstabing it with all dimensions, I found that 90.0%(2) of
the main dimensions with high frequencies(3) already imply negativity and can’t
be reported otherwise, as shown in Table 5.3 hereunder. Consequently, referring to
them already suggest negativity, unless the author decided to take a different route
than usual and present his or her ideas in bizarre and uncommon way, for instance,
if he or she presented Israeli actions against Palestinians as a good thing to protect
the Palestinians themselves from radical movements and groups, or if Palestinians
frame resistance actions against Israelis as the only way to peace!
The same applies to Israeli newspapers but with lower intensity since that the
(2)Sum of negative items (i.e., 9) divided by total number of items (i.e., 10).
(3)In sum, they accounted for 61.1% of negative tendencies across the whole sample in Palestinian
newspapers.
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dimensions with high frequencies(4) did not explicitly suggest negativity, and only
30.0% did so, the rest of the dimensions were either positive or neutral. Accordingly,
I can conclude that the high level of negativity referred to above in Figure 5.3 might
be overestimated, particularly for Palestinian newspapers, due to the implication of
negativity within items that, if not directly, still account for significant amount of
negativity of what was written.
5.1.4 Testing Hypotheses
Episodic vs Thematic Frames
In order to pinpoint the emotional angles of episodic versus thematic content, the
target of photos appearing in connection with frames were analysed for the pres-
ence of episodic or thematic nature. Iyengar and Simon (1993) distinguished be-
tween these two types of frames: Episodic frames are “references to isolated news
events without providing broader context” and that tend to attribute responsibil-
ity on specific groups or individuals. Thematic frames, on the other hand, “pro-
vide broader societal context to issues and events and thus present more complete
pictures and collective evidence” and that attach responsibility to societal/political
forces (Muralidharan et al., 2011, p. 26). Kamhawi (2002) in their analyzes of me-
dia frames in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict found that the dominant frame was the
conflict frame, which is categorized as episodic, followed by the blame frame that is
considered a thematic frame (Ibid.). Accordingly, I hypothesize below that photos
appearing in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers in the context of the conflict will be
more episodic than thematic in nature.
H0: The presence of episodic nature will be more dominant than thematic one
in photos appearing in connection with frames in Palestinian and Israeli news-
papers on α = .05 level of significance.
Results in Table F.1 show that there is a significant difference between the target
of photo in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers X2 (1) = 60.2, p<.001, where 90.4%
of photos attached in Palestinian newspapers adopted an episodic frame, in com-
parison to 64.7% in Israeli newspapers. Moreover, 9.6% of Palestinian newspapers
and 35.3% of Israeli newspapers adopted a thematic frame. Cramer’s V value is
.31, p<.001 which means that there is a difference between the target of photos in
Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, and the difference is moderate.
(4)In sum, they accounted for 53.5% of negative tendencies across the whole sample in Israeli
newspapers.
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Interestingly, Figure 5.4 illustrates that 50.9% of photos in Palestinian news-
papers portray an aggressive act/action, in contrast to 6.2% in Israeli newspapers.
Moreover, 90.2% of photos in Israeli newspapers adopted a neutral position, and
only 21.3% of Palestinian newspapers adopted this position. Finally, the results
show that 27.8% of Palestinians newspapers and only 3.6% of Israeli newspapers
advocated peace or a positive vibe in their photos about the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict.
FIGURE 5.4 TENDENCY OF COVERAGE
(A) Palestinian newspapers
50.9%
27.8%
21.3%
AGGRESSIVE NEUTRAL PEACEFUL
(B) Israeli newspapers
6.2% 3.6%
90.2%
AGGRESSIVE NEUTRAL PEACEFUL
Crosstabs of photos tendency across episodic and thematic frames show that
episodic frames account for 48.8% of negative tendencies in Palestinian newspa-
pers, and 2.5% of neutral tendencies in Israeli newspapers, as presented in Figure
5.5 hereunder:
FIGURE 5.5 TENDENCIES OF PHOTOS ACROSS EPISODIC AND THEMATIC
FRAMES
48.8%
2.0% 2.5% 3.6%
25.1%
2.6% 2.5% 1.1%
16.4%
5.0%
59.6%
30.5%
EPISODIC THEMATIC EPISODIC THEMATIC
PALESTINE ISRAEL
AGGRESSIVE
PEACEFUL
NEUTRAL
Episodic frames in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are higher on both sides be-
cause they simply represent the day-to-day status quo, a status quo full of casualties,
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destruction, detentions, and so on. Newspapers in both countries report all these acts
as part of their duty to “convey” what is happening on the ground, regardless of how
is it framed. Numerous statistical data describe the fragile grounds, on which peace
lies. For instance, this lively infographic below based on data(5) “publicly avail-
able from credible international, national, and local human rights and civil society
organization” illustrates the ‘reigniting cycle of killing’ in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict since September 2000 (VisualizingPalestine, 2012).
FIGURE 5.6 TIMELINE OF VIOLENCE SINCE SEPTEMBER 2000
Source: VISUALIZINGPALESTINE (2012)a.
aData was updated in 2014.
Almost no single month passes without casualties. Figure 5.6 above shows that
in the last 14 years(6) more than 7000 Palestinians were killed by Israelis, and more
than 1100 Israelis were killed by Palestinians. The figure also shows that the pe-
riod between August 2013 and March 2014, during which the data of this content
analysis was collected, was quiet a calm period casualty-wise. However, it was after
the ‘Operation Pillar of Cloud’ and before the ‘Operation Protective Edge’. Conse-
quently, most probably, episodic frames portrayed more or less post-war destruction
of the first operation, and the events leading to the commencement of the second op-
(5)[A] B’ Tselem, 2012. Statistics (accessed on November 2012). [B] Huffington Post, 2009.
Reigniting Violence: How Do Ceasefires End? (accessed on November 2012) (VisualizingPalestine,
2012).
(6)Excluding the last war/operation on Gaza that resulted in the death of more than 2100 Palestini-
ans and 73 Israelis.
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eration in April 2015.
News Dedicated to the Conflict
I referred previously to Priming theory and how the increased exposure to specific
news enhances the salience of the issue in people’s minds. Moreover, the persistent
nature of the conflict (as discussed before) and the situation in the Middle East in
general suggest that the topic of the conflict is inevitable and that both media would
allocate a high percentage of their news to cover it. After all, it is critical to draw the
line of how much news is dedicated to the conflict in each media, which in sense
explains the gap of perceptions that exists in the minds of both people as will be
proved in later stage of this dissertation. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
H0: There is no significant difference between the percentage of articles dealing
with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per issue in Palestinian and Israeli newspa-
pers on α = .05 level of significance.
The results unveil that there is a significant difference t(250) = 12.3, p<.01, r=
.61 between the percentage of articles dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
per issue in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, and the difference was in favor of
Palestinian newspapers (M = 23.8%, SE = .01) in comparison to Israeli newspapers
(M = 10.2%, SE = .01). The effect size was very large (r=.61)(7). Figure 5.7 hereun-
der illustrates the average percentage of articles dealing with the conflict across the
8 newspapers:
(7)=SQRT((12.3*12.3)/(12.3*12.3+250)).
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FIGURE 5.7 AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES DISCUSSING THE CONFLICT
ACROSS NEWSPAPERS
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Resemblance of News Coverage
The percentage of news dedicated to each dimension of the conflict is an interest-
ing issue to investigate. It aims to see the level of congruence between the focus
of media in Palestine and Israel toward the aspects of the conflict. The literature
suggests that Palestinian and Israeli media are similar in their dedication to certain
news topics, but are different in their direction of coverage to those topics.
H0: There is no significant correlation between the percentage of news dedicated
to each dimension in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers on α = .05 level of
significance.
The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the per-
centage of news dedicated to each topic in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, r =
.45, p<0.001, and the effect size is quiet large. As shown in the figure below:
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FIGURE 5.8 RESEMBLANCE OF COVERAGE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND
PALESTINIAN NEWSPAPERS
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Note: Pearson correlation was calculated across a total number of 63 items; 13 items referring
to Causes of the conflict, 18 items summarizing the Consequences or problem dimensions of the
conflict, and 32 items discussing suggested Solutions to these consequences.
These results in some sense represent the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; a conflict
where both parties attached the same level of importance to the same objects. Both
the Israeli and Palestinian media are equal in the extent of their interest (the pro-
portion of articles) in the coverage of those topics . This indicates the credibility of
both media in broadcasting the event, albeit their perspectives differ in broadcasting
the reality.
Density of Coverage to Causes
Before moving a step forward, it is important to define what I mean by the density
of coverage. It refers to the number of dimensions mentioned in each article across
causes, consequences, or suggested solutions. In other words, how focused is the
article in discussing causes/consequences/solutions of the conflict. For example,
an article that includes eight causes and one consequence is clearly denser in its
coverage of causes than an article that includes two causes, two consequences, and
three solutions. Here the questions of focus, diversity or digression are to be tested.
As discussed in earlier sections of this dissertation, the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict was identified in the literature, the historic review and later on in the matrix
as causes, consequences and suggested solutions. Therefore, it is significant to un-
derstand how journalists activate the role of the press in the peace-building process
through their ability to frame the media treatment of war and peace news within this
context.
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspa-
pers density of coverage to causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article
on α = .05 level of significance.
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The results show that there is a significant difference t(1606) = -4.57, p<0.001,
r= .11 between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to causes
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, where on average Israeli newspapers
cover the causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more densely per article (M =
1.60, SE = .04) than Palestinian newspapers (M = 1.40, SE = .02). Although the
difference is highly significant, its effect size - using the equation of Rosnow and
Rosenthal (2003, p. 224) - is small. (r=.11)(8).
Density of coverage to Consequences
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspa-
pers density of coverage to consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per
article on α = .05 level of significance.
The results show that there is a significant difference t(1849) = -2.90, p<0.01, r=
.07 between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to consequences
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, where on average Israeli newspapers
cover the consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more densely per article
(M = 2.00, SE = .05) than Palestinian newspapers (M = 1.81, SE = .03). Again,
although the difference is highly significant, the effect size is very small. (r=.07)(9).
Density of Coverage to Solutions
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspa-
pers density of coverage to proposed solutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
per article on α = .05 level of significance.
The results show that there is a significant difference t(1012) = -4.45, p<0.001,
r= .14 between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to solutions
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, whilst on average Israeli newspapers
cover suggested solutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more densely per article
(M = 2.54, SE = .09) than Palestinian newspapers (M = 2.04, SE = .06). Although
the difference is highly significant, the effect size is small (r=.14)(10).
(8)=SQRT((-4.57*-4.57)/(-4.57*-4.57+1606)).
(9)=SQRT((-2.90*-2.90)/(-2.90*-2.90+1849)).
(10)=SQRT((-4.45*-4.45)/(-4.45*-4.45+1012)).
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Density of coverage to all dimensions
Accordingly, we will expect a significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli
newspapers density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
per article, which proved to be the case when testing the following hypothesis:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspa-
pers density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per
article on α = .05 level of significance.
The results show that there is a significant difference t(2503) = -10.97, p<0.001,
r= .21 between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to all dimen-
sions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article, whilst on average Israeli news-
papers cover conflict-related issues more densely per article (M = 4.20, SE = .11)
than Palestinian newspapers (M = 2.91, SE = .05). The effect size is moderate.
(r=.21)(11).
These differences suggest the following directional hypotheses that:
H0: Articles in Palestinian newspapers tend to expand in covering news across
the three aspects of causes, consequences, and solutions.
Table 5.4 below shows that there is a significant and positive correlation r =
.30, p<0.01, between reporting causes and consequences in Palestinian newspa-
pers, which means that newspapers pick up and report topics that are not exclu-
sively about causes or consequences but more or less a combination of both, and
this correlation is moderate. Also, results revealed significant and positive correla-
tions r = .22, p<0.01 and r = .34, p<0.01 between reporting causes and solutions,
and reporting consequences and solutions respectively. Both correlations are also
moderate. Accordingly, we accept our null hypothesis that Palestinian newspapers
tend to expand in covering news across the three aspects of causes, consequences,
and solutions, instead of focusing on one aspect.
(11)=SQRT((-10.97*-10.97)/(-10.97*-10.97+2503)).
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TABLE 5.4 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS
Newspapers Comparisons Causes Consequences Solutions
Causes 1 .30** .22**
Consequences 784 1 .34**Palestinian
Solutions 324 521 1
Causes 1 .06 -.12
Consequences 293 1 .27**Israeli
Solutions 226 270 1
*p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001
H0: Articles in Israeli newspapers tend to be more aspect-oriented and focused
more on reporting only causes, consequences or solutions, instead of expanding
across the three aspects.
The table above demonstrates that there were no significant correlations between
reporting causes and consequences r = .06, p>.05, and between reporting causes
and solutions r = -.12, p>.05. Nevertheless, there is a significant and positive corre-
lation between reporting consequences and solutions r = .27, p<0.01, which means
that newspapers tend to report topics that are not exclusively about consequences or
solutions, but more or less a combination of both, and this correlation is moderate.
As a result, I can conclude that Israeli newspapers tend to be more aspect-oriented
when it comes to writing about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, the in-
clusion of causes in most articles of both Palestinian and Israeli newspapers shows
how they keep tracing back to the causes of the conflict on their issues and the
connection of these causes whether as history, religious beliefs or belonging with
the current status quo and consequences. The question to be asked here is ‘to what
extent this inclusion of causes in newspapers is represented in the minds of the
public?’ This question and more will be investigated in further sections of the dis-
sertation.
5.1.5 Comparisons
This section is divided into three main parts: the first part is discussing and com-
paring the most important common dimensions that were highly covered by both
newspapers; A total of 8 dimensions in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers. The sec-
ond part is discussing those dimensions (a total of 7 dimensions) that were mainly
covered in Palestinian newspapers only with less attention in Israeli newspapers,
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and the third part is discussing the dimensions (a total of 8 dimensions) that were
mainly covered in Israeli newspapers with less attention in their Palestinian coun-
terpart.
As stated above, the codebook consisted of 65 dimensions distributed across
causes, consequences, and solutions. Now, the 23 (8 + 7 + 8) dimensions I am
discussing below accounted for 80.1% of total news in Palestinian newspapers, and
77.2% of news in Israeli newspapers, as shown in Table 5.5 hereunder:
TABLE 5.5 DISTRIBUTION OF MAIN DIMENSIONS
IN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS
Importance of dimensions
Distribution in:
A) Palestinian newspapers B) Israeli newspapers
In both newspapers 39.7% 42.5%
More in Palestinian newspapers 31.3% 7.6%
More in Israeli newspapers 9.1% 27.2%
Total 80.1% 77.2%
As shown in Table 5.1 above, the total number of coded articles that investigated
or referred to the conflict and peace process were 1957 in Palestinian newspapers
and 562 articles in Israeli newspapers. These 2519 coded articles comprised of 5671
and 2347 conflict-related dimensions in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respec-
tively. Accordingly, the comparisons of percentages below were always drawn from
the frequency of each dimension divided by the total number of dimensions (i.e.,
5671 and 2347) in each respective country.
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Common dimensions
Figure 5.9 below demonstrates the percentages of common dimensions between
Palestinian and Israeli newspapers:
FIGURE 5.9 COMMON DIMENSIONS
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Israeli military actions against Palestinians
Undoubtedly, Israeli measures against Palestinians were intensively covered by
Palestinian newspapers where 14.8% (853 out of 5671) of total dimensions focused
on Israeli measures against Palestinians. For Palestinians, these measures include
actions of demolishing houses, expropriating lands, confiscation of privately owned
land in the West Bank, uprooting of plantations, mass detentions, military presence,
excessive use of force by the Israeli army, incursions of the army into Palestinian
towns, targeted liquidations, and extra-judicial assassinations. The same issue got a
fair share of coverage in Israeli newspapers, specifically 4.3% (101 out of 2348) of
total dimensions. These were, however, from different perspectives, where Israeli
actions are mainly defensive against Palestinian acts, or a backlash of their actions,
and how Israel is unwilling to remove security measures for fear of fundamentalist
terrorism, and that the strategic goal of the wall is to guarantee the security of Israel.
Israeli intransigence
Israeli position and unwillingness to negotiate directly with Hamas, and the oppo-
sition of both sides to any meeting/resolution/decision that does not go with their
plans, particularly in the case of right-wing hardliners and Islamist groups, consti-
tuted almost an equal amount of coverage (5.8% and 5.6%) in Israeli and Palestinian
newspapers respectively.
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Third-party mediation
Another common issue that was focused on in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers
is the issue of third-party mediation, for example an International Observer on the
borders of a future established Palestinian state and Israel, and how any process
towards viability must be guided by international law and resolutions, be impartial,
hold both sides to account, and bring an end to impunity. After all, a viable process
must hold both sides to account for any breaches of human rights and international
law, to build the necessary trust that enables both parties to engage and reach a
settlement. Moreover, it focused on the role the international community should
play in exerting pressure on both sides to commit to a negotiated peace in the region,
and how each government must show their respective dedications and commitments
to the peace process, or there will only be broken promises. The results in Figure 5.9
above revealed that 6.9% (162 out of 2348) of total dimensions in Israeli newspaper
referred to this issue, in comparison with 3.3% (187 out of 5671) in Palestinian
newspapers.
Lack of trust between Palestinians and Israelis
The results revealed that 5.9% (139 out of 2348) of the total number of dimensions
in Israeli newspapers and 4.3% (244 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers men-
tioned the lack of trust between both sides, and emphasized on the belief that there
is no reliable and trustworthy partner to make progress in a two-sided peace process,
and how negotiations are not advancing and will likely collapse, as was the case in
the failure of past agreements.
Palestinian actions against Israelis
The results above revealed that 6.6% (155 out of 2348) of the total number of dimen-
sions in Israeli newspapers were dedicated to discussing Palestinians actions against
Israelis. For Israelis, actions include acts of vandalism/terrorism, a constant threat
of indiscriminate attacks from suicide bombings, attacks on settlements and Israeli
citizens, Qassam rockets and mortar shells at Israeli targets, kidnapping, hijack-
ings, stabbings, shootings, and stone-throwing, in addition to Palestinian political
violence and fundamentalist terrorism against Israel. On the other hand, 2.5% (142
out of 5671) of a total number of dimensions in Palestinian newspapers referred
to these actions as retaliation for Israel’s armed operations and actions against the
Palestinians, administrative detentions, and occupation.
US and EU strict measures against the conflict
Both Palestinian and Israeli newspapers, 2.3% and 4.2% respectively, emphasized
the active role of the US and EU in the peace process, because they have the leverage
to influence greatly and impose pressures on Israelis and Palestinians. Also, how
they must, for the sake of peace, utilize a more aggressive form of diplomacy if
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Israelis and Palestinians do not respond to the peace process. As mentioned above,
they and the international community must continue to place pressure on Israel and
the Palestinians to commit to the peace process and to take the necessary steps to
promote a lasting peace.
Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between
both sides
The results revealed the importance both Palestinian and Israeli newspapers allocate
to building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both sides by
prohibiting all forms of incitement to hatred and educating for peace. Furthermore,
they point out to the positive role media should play in promoting peace and pro-
peace ideologies and programs. Figure 5.9 shows that 4.1% (96 out of 2348) of the
total dimensions related to the conflict in Israeli newspaper referred to the impor-
tance of building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both
sides, in comparison with 2.4% (136 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers.
Exclusive dimensions in Palestinian newspapers
Figure 5.10 below demonstrates the percentages of dimensions that were exclu-
sively important in Palestinian newspapers with minimum attention in Israeli news-
papers:
FIGURE 5.10 PRIMARY DIMENSIONS IN PALESTINIAN NEWSPAPERS ONLY
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TABLE 5.6 EXCLUSIVE DIMENSIONS IN PALESTINIAN NEWSPAPERS
Dimensions %
a. Violations of International law and Human rights 25.9
b. Acts against Palestinian prisoners 21.6
c. Judaization of Jerusalem 13.1
d. Settlers acts of vandalism 12.8
e. Restrictions on freedom of movement 12.2
f. Israel Procedures against Gaza 8.1
g. United Nations as an active side 6.3
Total 100
Note: The percentages mentioned in this table are calculated only
from 31.3%a of total dimensions.
aIt is equal to the sum of percentages in Figure 5.10.
Violation of international law and human right
One of the most important issues that were mainly referred to in Palestinian news-
papers was the violation of international law and human rights by Israeli defense
force or Israeli occupation force as referred to by Palestinians. The results revealed
that 8.1% (459 out of 5671) of the total issues reported in Palestinian newspapers
mentioned this issue, which extends from preventing women in delivery condition
from reaching hospitals, to blocking food and medicine from entering Gaza, to the
bombardment of hospitals and schools, and the killing of children and women. In
comparison, only 1.0% (24 out of 2348) of all issues mentioned in Israeli newspa-
pers referred to this issue. Table 5.6 shows that 25.9% from the issues that were
exclusively mentioned in Palestinian newspapers were dedicated to Israeli viola-
tions of international law and human rights against the Palestinians.
Acts against Palestinian prisoners
The second most important dimension that was exclusively covered in Palestinian
newspapers dealt with Israeli’s actions and acted against Palestinian prisoners. This
includes the frequent physical abuse and torture of Palestinian prisoners and the de-
teriorating situation of the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Results revealed that
6.8% (386 out of 5671) of all dimensions in Palestinian newspapers referred to these
acts. The same issue constituted only 0.4% (9 out of 2348) of the issues mentioned
in Israeli newspapers. Its evident that the issue of prisoners makes up 21.6% of the
news that was primarily mentioned in Palestinian newspapers, as shown in Table
5.6 above.
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Restrictions on Palestinians freedom of movement
The result revealed that 3.8% (215 out of 5671) of the news in Palestinian newspa-
pers raised the issue of checkpoints and the segregation wall and their effect on the
freedom of movement, as well as the lack of contiguity and integrity in the West
Bank. In addition, to the siege of Gaza, the indignities and restrictions imposed by
the occupation, the building of an elaborate network of settlers-only “bypass roads”,
and Israel’s absolute control over border crossings. On the other hand, 1.7% (40 out
of 2348) of the dimensions in Israeli newspapers highlighted this issue. Table 5.6
above shows that the issue of restrictions on Palestinians freedom of movement
constituted 12.2% of the dimensions that were exclusively mentioned in Palestinian
newspapers.
Settlers actions against Palestinians
Another issue that received almost the same attention to coverage (12.8%) in Pales-
tinian newspapers is the issue of settlers’ actions against Palestinians and their
lands/schools/cars. For Palestinians, settlers are considered dangerous enemies who
are usurping Palestinians’ lands and daily lives, and whose activities are expand-
ing in many cities, such as in Hebron and East Jerusalem, where their actions went
beyond the Jewish Quarter. In total, this issue constituted 4.0% and 1.5% of total
issues covered in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively.
Judaization of Jerusalem
The Judaization of Jerusalem has received a fair share of coverage; namely, 13.1%
of the total dimensions pointed out mainly to this issue by Palestinian newspapers
(4.1% of total issues) with only a quarter of this attention by Israeli newspapers
(1.1% of total issues). For Palestinians, the Judaization of Jerusalem stands for the
daily attempts of stamping out the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem by Is-
rael’s violations of and encroaching on the Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic and
Christian sanctities in Jerusalem; not to mention their intentions to have a vertically
divided sovereignty over the Temple Mount or Noble Sanctuary, and to open a new
gate for Jews to enter Al-Aqsa Mosque to pray.
Israel’s procedures against Gaza
The period of investigation is bordered by two operations/wars on Gaza. Conse-
quently, Israeli’s procedures and wars on Gaza constituted 2.5% (142 out of 5671)
of the total issues covered in Palestinian newspapers and 1.3% (30 out of 2348) in
Israeli newspapers. These actions include imposing restrictions on bringing build-
ing materials to prevent Gaza from rebuilding its infrastructure, the naval blockade,
the Israeli army counter of any rearmament or tunnel construction along the Eastern
borders between Israel and Gaza, and their staging ground incursion into the Gaza
Strip. All these wars or so-called “operations” on Gaza left nothing but destruction
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as mentioned previously in the historical review. Table 5.6 above shows that this
issue scored 8.1% of the news that was mainly covered by Palestinian newspapers.
The United Nations as an active party
Finally, the role of the United Nations as an active party. In total, this issue con-
stituted 2.0% (113 out of 5671) and 0.6% (15 out of 2348) of the total dimensions
covered by Palestinian and Israeli newspapers respectively. It focused on how the
UN should play a more active and progressive role on the ground, and how it should
be detached from the influence of the US and its domination. This dimension con-
stituted 6.3% of the news that were exclusively covered by Palestinian newspapers
and was referred to only 15 times in 562 coded articles in Israeli newspapers.
Exclusive dimensions in Israeli newspapers
Figure 5.11 below demonstrates the percentages of dimensions that were exclu-
sively important in Israeli newspapers with minimum attention in Palestinian news-
papers:
FIGURE 5.11 PRIMARY DIMENSIONS IN ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS ONLY
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TABLE 5.7 EXCLUSIVE DIMENSIONS IN ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS
Dimensions %
Palestinian intransigence 17.6
Israeli-American backed-strategy 16.8
Release under certain conditions 12.9
Economic burden 10.5
1967 Borders 12.1
Hamas threats 9.9
Israels right to exist 10.4
Palestine will become a “terrorist” state 9.9
Total 100
Note: The percentages mentioned in this table are calculated only
from 27.2%a of the total dimensions.
aIt is equal to the sum of percentages in Figure 5.11.
Palestinian intransigence
Not surprisingly, results revealed that the main topic of focus in Israeli newspapers
with less attention in Palestinians newspapers was the issue of Palestinian intransi-
gence (4.8% and 1.9% of total dimensions respectively). Mainly, this issue investi-
gates Hamas’s denial of the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state, the negotiations
with Hamas, the continuous objection of Palestinian Hardliners, the Palestinian in-
transigence and their objection to any meeting/resolution/decision that does not go
with their plans. This issue constituted the highest percentage of 17.6% of Israeli
news that was mainly covered by Israeli newspaper in comparison to its counterpart
on the Palestinian side, as shown in Table 5.7 above.
Israeli-American backed-strategy
The second issue that gained high attention in Israeli newspapers with much less of
attention in Palestinian newspapers is the issue of Israeli-American backed-strategy,
and how Israel is highly dependent on US support, and US military assistant, with
which Israel is controlling the occupied Palestinian territories. The results in Figure
5.11 below revealed that 4.6% (108 out of 2348) and 1.3% (74 out of 5671) of
the news in Israeli and Palestinian newspapers respectively were dedicated to the
issue of American-Israeli backed strategy. This issue made up the second highest
percentage (16.8%) of Israeli news that were mainly covered in Israeli newspapers.
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Release of Palestinian prisoners under certain conditions or circum-
stances
One of the most important issues that were mainly referred to in Israeli newspa-
pers was the issue of releasing Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails under certain
conditions or circumstances (12.9% of exclusive dimensions). This issue discussed
whether the Israeli government should release Palestinian prisoners A) who stayed
in Israeli jails for a long time, B) who are suffering from illness, C) who were im-
prisoned in the pre-Oslo-era, and finally, women and children. The results revealed
that 3.5% (82 out of 2348) of total issues mentioned in Israeli newspapers referred
to this issue, in comparison to 1.6% (91 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers.
An end to the Israeli occupation of 1967 territories
The results revealed that 2.9% (68 out of 2348) of the issues that were exclu-
sively covered by Israeli newspapers investigated the Palestinian demands for Is-
rael’s withdrawal from territories captured in the 1967 War, the disengagement from
its borders with Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, the consideration of the
Green Line as a border between the two states, or the demarcation of the borders of
the Palestinians entity. On the other hand, 1.6% (91 out of 5671) of the total issues
discussing the conflict in Palestinian newspapers emphasized on this issue. In to-
tal, 10.6% of the coverage that was primarily mentioned in Israeli newspapers were
dedicated to the issue of the 1967 borders (as mentioned in Table 5.7 above).
Economic burden and Boycotting Israeli products
Results revealed that 3.3% of news related to the conflict in Israeli newspapers were
dedicated to discussing how Israel’s economy is being hampered by the high costs
of settlement construction and incentives to settlers. Coupled with military costs
of securing them, the pressure applied by the International community boycotting
Israeli products manufactured in Jewish settlements, and the added burden of Pales-
tinians boycotting Israeli products. The results in Figure 5.11 show that only 0.7%
of Palestinian newspapers mentioned this issue when speaking about the conflict.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that boycotting Israeli products, mainly in Palestine,
played a vital and influential role in later stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
No doubt that the percentage of the news dedicated to this issue has increased in
both countries.
Not recognizing Israel’s right to exist
Not surprisingly, the issue of not recognizing Israel’s right to exist, the Palestinian
notion that the struggle (Al-Jihad) against Israel is an Islamic obligation, the neces-
sity to destroy Israel, Palestine as an Islamic trust, resistance is still the force that
unifies Palestine as one nation, and that Palestinians are the original inhabitants of
the land; all this accounted for almost 10.0% of Israeli news that was mainly con-
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sidered to be crucial in Israeli newspapers. Figure 5.11 shows that 2.7% (63 out
of 2348) of news covered by Israeli newspapers raised this issue, in comparison to
1.0% (57 out of 5671) in Palestinian newspapers.
Hamas’ threats
Another issue that received almost the same attention of coverage (10.3%) in Israeli
newspapers is the issue of threats imposed by Hamas and their pledges to free all
fighters/militants in Israeli prisons by using force and kidnapping Israeli soldiers.
Results revealed that 2.8% of the total issues that were covered by Israeli newspa-
pers raised this issue, in comparison to 0.7% in Palestinian newspapers.
Palestine will become a “terrorist” state
The results in Figure 5.11 above show that 2.7% of the total issues covered in Israeli
newspapers described how Palestinians had never intended to make peace and that
their true objective is to throw the Jews into the sea. Add thereto the PA’s incitement
against Israel, Hamas’s incitement to launch a third intifada against Israel, and that
pursuing negotiations with the PA from a position of weakness would only result in
more terror.
Harmony between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers
Table 5.8 hereunder shows the level of harmony or similarity between the percent-
age of news dedicated to dimensions of the conflict or peace process between Pales-
tinian and Israeli newspapers. It is clear that among the 23 items (which constitute
81.0% of total Palestinian news, and 77.0% of total Israeli news) 20.4% of the items
are somewhat highly contingent, 56.5% are moderately contingent, and only 13.0%
are contingent to a low degree. Figure 5.12 below shows a detailed illustration of
the level of contingency or agreement between Palestinian and Israeli newspapers
across the 23 items (See also Table F.2).
TABLE 5.8 LEVEL OF HARMONY BETWEEN DIMENSIONS
Harmony n of items %
Very high 3 13.0
High 4 17.4
Moderate 13 56.5
Low 3 13.0
Total 23 100.0
However, it is worth-mentioning that being contingent does not mean that the
dimensions have the same direction or tendency (i.e., positive or negative, pro or
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contra peace). It means that the issue or topic had quite the same attention or cover-
age by both media. For instance, as we saw before the dimension of Israeli military
actions against Palestinians was covered by Palestinian media, where Palestinians
were the victims and Israelis were the perpetrators. On the other hand, the same
issue was covered differently in Israeli newspapers, where Israelis were in the posi-
tion of defending themselves by any means from the Palestinians perpetrators, even
if they had to attack first to crush these perpetrators.
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli newspa-
pers harmony level in covering issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict α = .05
level of significance.
The results show that there is no significant difference t(44) = 0.16, p>.05 be-
tween Palestinian and Israeli newspapers contingency level in covering issues of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict on α = .05 level of significance. Therefore, I accept the
null hypothesis, which proves the conclusion confirmed in Figure 5.8 to be correct,
namely that Palestinian and Israeli newspapers tend to be contingent in covering
major issues of the conflict.
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5.2 Survey Analysis
5.2.1 Reliability and Validity
As I mentioned earlier, I conducted two representative surveys for Palestinians and
Israelis, aged 18 years and older, to capture their perceptions of the conflict and
peace process. Verification of the accuracy, validity(12), and reliability(13) of the
questionnaire were carried out by conducting a pilot test on a random sample of
50 interviews that were not included in the final sample as to ensure that the ques-
tions were relevant, unambiguous, smooth and efficient. This helped to verify and
improve the wording of each question and mechanism in order to give the field in-
terviewers the opportunity to practice data collection as if they were in a real setting.
After revising and making the necessary amendments, the final form of the ques-
tionnaire was presented to the advisor for approval. In addition, the correctness of
the questionnaire has been ascertained by the judgment of the validity trustees. The
remarks and evaluation of the experts and consultants about the first draft were of
great value and benefit.
Furthermore, the questionnaire’s validity was verified by the determination of
the internal arrangement of the standard paragraphs that reached the rate of (0.92)
according to Cronbach-Alpha, which is a very good rate. This rate is an evidence
for the survey’s reliability and its instrument. Additionally, the results in subsequent
stages of this study revealed values of standardized coefficients for different items of
the same battery (across the Splits of A and B) in the same direction in all regression
models, which emphasize on the accuracy of questions, and thus, the validity of
used instrument. The survey standard was applied on samples consisting of 1019
Palestinians and 520 Israelis.
(12)Validity: the extent to which used measurement reflects the concept that I am trying to measure.
(13)Reliability: the extent to which the questionnaire is measuring real rather than random values.
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5.2.2 Findings
Sample Distribution
The distribution of data in accordance with the area in each country was as follows:
TABLE 5.9 DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLES
Country Area / City n
Palestine
Jenin 68
Tubas 14
Tulkarem 41
Qalqilya 24
Salfit 16
Nablus 84
Ramallah & Al-Bireh 75
East Jerusalem 93
Jericho 12
Bethlehem 47
Hebron 151
North Gaza 76
Gaza City 135
Dier Al-Balah 57
Khan Yunis 73
Rafah 48
Total 1015
Israel
West Jerusalem 42
North 84
Haifa 71
Center 129
Tel-Aviv 107
South 52
Judea and Samaria 35
Total 520
Source: Dissertation survey data.
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And the distribution of the split ballot was a follows:
TABLE 5.10 SPLIT-BALLOT DISTRIBUTION
Splits
Country A B Total
Palestine 501 518 1019
Israel 267 253 520
Total 768 771 1539
Source: Dissertation survey data.
Sources of Information
Not surprisingly, the large majority of Palestinians (96.8%) and Israelis (93.2%)
do follow news related to the conflict. Furthermore, a cumulative of 78.5%(14) of
Palestinians and 90.0%(15) of Israelis were to some extent interested in news related
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the sources of their news were distributed as
follows:
FIGURE 5.13 SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE CONFLICT
37.6%
77.8%
40.7%
34.3%
29.0%
34.1%
62.4%
77.1%
82.3%
47.4%
67.7%
43.4%
RADIO TV INTERNET SOCIAL  MEDIA NEWSPAPERS FAMILY  AND 
FRIENDS
PALESTINIANS ISRAELIS
Note: What are your sources of information regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?
As we can see in Figure 5.13 above, there was a big difference between newspa-
per readership in Palestine and Israel, where 29.0% of the Palestinians read newspa-
pers printed or online in comparison with 67.7% of Israelis who read newspapers.
The result also shows that 89.0% of news read by Palestinians and 86.6% read by
Israelis were from the same newspapers that I used in the content analyses of this
(14)19.6% extremely interested, 33.1% very interested, 25.8% somewhat interested.
(15)2.6% extremely interested, 43.6% very interested, 43.8% somewhat interested.
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dissertation, which is an evidence of the high level of readership of these newspa-
pers, as shown in Table 5.11 hereunder:
TABLE 5.11 READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS AMONG PALESTINIANS AND
ISRAELIS
Country Newspaper Frequency % Cumulative %
Palestine
Al-Quds newspaper 138 37.1 37.1
Al-Hayat newspaper 59 15.9 53.0
Al-Ayyam newspaper 84 22.6 75.5
Filistin newspaper 50 13.4 89.0
Other, please specify 41 11.0 100.0
Total 372 100
Israel
Israel Hayom 122 33.2 33.2
Yediot Ahronot 170 46.3 79.6
Haaretz 21 5.7 85.3
Maariv 5 1.4 86.6
Other 49 13.4 100.0
Total 367 100
Figure 5.13 above shows that 40.7% of the Palestinians and more than double
of this percentage (82.3%) of Israelis used the Internet as a source of information
regarding the conflict. Moreover, when asked about how frequent do they read the
news on Internet, 55.4%(16) of the Palestinians replied that they read news on the
Internet at least once a day, in comparison with 78.1%(17) of Israelis. Moreover, the
results revealed that 15.5%(18) of the Palestinians read news on the internet at least
once a week, and 17.3%(19) of Israelis do the same.
What the Conflict is About?
A crucial index is measuring to what degree the Palestinians and Israelis think that
their conflict is about Religion, Culture, Nationalism, Politics, Economics, His-
tory, Existence, or Ethnicity, has shown interesting results. Figure 5.15 hereunder
presents the responses in an ascending order, where the brighter the color the lower
degree, and the darker the color, the higher degree they thought the conflict was
(16)28.9% several times a day, 26.6% once a day.
(17)55.8% several times a day, 22.3% once a day.
(18)4.4% 2-3 days a week, 6.1% 4-6 days a week, 5.0% once a week.
(19)6.9% 2-3 days a week, 6.3% 4-6 days a week, 4.1% once a week.
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about that item. The results revealed that all the items mentioned above were very
critical for the Palestinians and Israelis (Figure 5.14 below).
FIGURE 5.14 THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT
(A) Palestinians
Religion Culture Nationalism Politics Economics History Existence Ethnicity
LOW 27.5 27.6 18.2 11.2 9.9 8.7 12.9 18.4
MIDDLE 15.0 21.5 18.0 13.8 20.9 15.4 9.2 14.5
HIGH 54.9 48.2 61.4 72.6 66.6 74.1 75.0 62.8
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(B) Israelis
Religion Culture Nationalism Politics Economics History Existence Ethnicity
LOW 22.1 52.3 3.3 8.8 26.5 9.2 9.8 24.5
MIDDLE 15.9 20.2 10.9 8.0 29.7 16.4 12.3 20.2
HIGH 59.8 26.7 82.2 79.8 42.7 72.5 75.3 52.7
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Note: Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 means a very low degree and 5 means a very
high degree, please tell me what the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis is
about?
Nevertheless, differences still exist, where the matter of Existence was ranked
first, Politics second, History third, Nationalism fourth, Economics fifth, Religion
sixth, Ethnicity seventh, and finally Culture ranked eighth at the bottom. These re-
sults if put in another way describe the current status quo, one that is all about
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self-existence; an existence that is being manipulated by politics, driven by history,
fueled by nationalism, with less emphasis on economy and religion. The influence
of economy and religion is there, but not anymore at the very core of the conflict.
Maybe we should stop for a second and rethink the theory of the conflict as a reli-
gious one, or the recent uprising theory of the conflict as an economic one. Recent
confrontations during the third quarter of 2015 showed how governments and lead-
ers politicized religion to serve their agendas, and how they effortlessly managed to
unleash religious beliefs and escalate these confrontations to further bloodshed.
FIGURE 5.15 WHAT THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT?
(C) Both people
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(D) Palestinians
CULTURE
10.8%
RELIGION
11.6%
ETHNICITY
12.0%
NATIONALISM
12.2%ECONOMICS
13.0%
POLITICS
13.3%
HISTORY
13.4%
EXISTENCE
13.7%
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Note: I recoded the values of “Don’t know” to missing, and I summed up all the responses for each item.
Sensibly, the higher the sum, the higher the degree of importance allocated to that particular item, and vice
versa. Afterward, I calculated the total sum of all values, and then the percentages of these values across all
items.
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5.2.3 Testing Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were formulated with respect to the developed matrix
of the dissertation, which covered the issues of the conflict extended on two aces;
Firstly, the causes of the conflict, the consequences of these causes, and the sug-
gested solutions to these consequences. Secondly, how they are perceived in the
individual’s cognitive, affective and behavioral functions toward the conflict and
peace process, across different time frames (i.e., past, present, and future); The past
was represented by hypotheses stemming from Historical events, the present in-
cluded hypotheses about actions appertaining to the conflict and realities hindering
the peace process, and finally, the future summarized by hypotheses of solutions to
core issues of the conflict. Other hypotheses driven by logic and literature of the
conflict tested differences in perceiving the most critical issues of the conflict, the
most appropriate solution to the conflict and finally the prioritization of these issues.
Historical Events
The respondents were asked ‘To which extent you might find the following historical
events as a cause of nowadays conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. Using a
scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means a very low degree and 5 means a very high degree’.
The battery of questions included 8 main historical events and beliefs that took place
before and during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
For the Palestinians
As shown in Table 5.12 below, Palestinians still referred to the 1967 war and the
Jewish beliefs that the holy land is the historical homeland of the Jewish people;
a belief that many Palestinians bitterly deny as the main causes of the nowadays
conflict. Followed by the 1948 war and the importance Palestinians allocate to their
belief of belonging to this land, and how the British Mandate did not have any right
to grant the Jews the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine (through
Balfour Declaration). Add thereto, the results revealed the Palestinian view of the
crucial role of the Jewish immigration to Historical Palestine and the Arab exploita-
tion of the conflict to serve their agendas in nowadays conflict. Finally, the table be-
low illustrates the Palestinian view of the persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia
in the past as having a moderate impact on nowadays conflict. The scaled average
(X) for this index was 3.9 (on a scale from 1 to 5) which means that, in general,
Palestinians assigned quite a high degree of importance to historical events as a
player in the nowadays conflict.
For the Israelis
Table 5.12 hereunder shows how the Israelis view the Palestinian belief that they
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have lived on this land for centuries and are entitled to own it as the main cause of
nowadays conflict; a belief that the Israeli consider illegitimate and clearly contra-
dicts their belonging to the promised land of Israel, followed by the Arab exploita-
tion of the conflict to serve their agendas at the expense of the Palestinians, the Six
Days War, and the Jewish belonging to the land. Moreover, the results revealed that
Israelis to a high degree believed that the 1948 War was as a cause of nowadays con-
flict, maybe due to the creation of the refugees problem that, as mentioned before,
is considered a milestone issue in the past, present, and in any future negotiations
with the Palestinians regarding the peace process. Finally, the table below shows
how Israelis had moderately emphasized the role of the Balfour Declaration and the
Jewish immigration to historic Palestine in nowadays conflict, and even allocated a
lower emphasis on the persecution of Jews in Europe and Russia as a player in the
current status quo. The scaled average (X) for this index was 3.7 (on a scale from
1 to 5) which means that, in general, Israelis assigned a bit higher than a moderate
degree of importance to historical events as a player in the nowadays conflict.
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ evalu-
ations of the role of historical events in nowadays conflict on α = .05 level of
significance.
The results show that there was a significant difference t(1529) = 4.37, p<.05
between Palestinians and Israelis’ evaluations of the role of historical events in the
nowadays conflict on α = .05 level of significance. Therefore, I reject the null hy-
pothesis, and the results revealed that the difference was in favor of the Palestinians
with a X value of 3.9, in comparison with a X value of 3.7 on the Israeli side, which
also was apparent in the question of ‘Which statement do you feel closest to your
opinion, if you were to get back to the beginning of the conflict at the beginning
of last century’. The answers revealed that both, Palestinians and Israelis (44.8%
and 48.3% respectively) would have sought out more peaceful changes to the his-
tory, 17.9% of the Palestinians and 22.7% of the Israelis would have persisted with
even more extreme actions (without specifying the direction of these actions), and
only 15.2% of them and 16.5% of the Palestinians would have kept the history as
it is. These answers demonstrate that more people on both sides were not affiliated
with the history and were ready to seek out different approaches with the other, and
although a significant difference of evaluation of the historical events existed, how-
ever, the difference was small (3.7 to 3.9). Furthermore, the effect size using the
equation of Rosnow and Rosenthal (2003) was very diminutive (r=.11)(20).
(20)=SQRT((4.37*4.37)/(4.37*4.37+1529)).
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Actions appertaining to the Conflict
This part aimed to investigate how Palestinians and Israelis perceive actions about
the conflict, and, therefore, I tested the following hypothesis:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ percep-
tions of actions pertaining to the conflict on α = .05 level of significance.
This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses:
There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ perceptions
of:
• Launching rockets from Gaza at Israel?
• Military actions by the Israeli army in the Palestinian Territories?
• Palestinian actions against Israelis?
• Jewish settlers’ actions against Palestinians?
• Movement restrictions imposed by Israel?
• The PA funding families of those who are in Israeli prisons?
• Efforts of the PA to isolate Israel internationally?
• Building the segregation wall between the Palestinians and the Israelis?
Fairly enough the results revealed that there was a highly significant difference
(p<.001) between Palestinians and Israelis’ perceptions of actions pertaining to the
conflict(21), and the differences were in favor of the one’s people, which means,
Palestinians significantly justified the actions of Palestinians, and Israelis signifi-
cantly justified the actions of Israelis, as shown in Figure 5.16 below.
(21)See Table F.3.
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FIGURE 5.16 ACTIONS PERTAINING TO THE CONFLICT
(A) Actions by Israelis
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(B) Actions by Palestinians
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Mean
Note: Using a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 means never justified and 4 means almost always justified. Do you feel that
the following actions appertaining to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are almost always justified, sometimes justified,
rarely justified, or never justified?
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Realities hindering the Peace Process
A battery of questions was asked to see how Palestinians and Israelis evaluate
the role of ongoing realities in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and
therefore, I tested the following hypothesis:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ eval-
uations of the role of the following in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace
process α = .05 level of significance.
This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses: There is no signif-
icant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ evaluations of the role of the
following ongoing realities in hindering the peace process:
• Building settlements.
• Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount.
• Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state.
• Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s possession of weapons.
• Israeli settlers’ possession of weapons.
• Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip.
• Detained Palestinian prisoners’ by Israel.
• The Israeli full control over natural resources.
• Palestinian refugees’ right of return.
• The difficulty of having access to places of worship.
• Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine.
• Not recognizing Israel’s right to exist.
• Hardliners constant refusal to any peace agreement.
• The Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products.
• Deterioration of the Palestinian economy.
• Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine.
• The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides.
• Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis.
• Dependency of Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy.
• Israel’s absolute control over border crossings.
• The freezing of the funds’ transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Pales-
tinian taxes and customs duties collected by Israel.
The results in Table F.7 revealed that there was a highly significant difference
(p<.001) between Palestinians and Israelis’ evaluations of facts in hindering the
peace process, and the differences were in favor of the Palestinians who evaluated
these facts as being serious (X = 3.88) in comparison with the Israelis, who evalu-
ated them as being somewhat serious (X = 3.56) (See Figure 5.17 below):
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FIGURE 5.17 EVALUATIONS OF REALITIES IN HINDERING THE PEACE
PROCESS
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Note: Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 standing for not serious at all and 5 for
very serious, how do you evaluate the role of the following items in hindering
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process ?.
As I mentioned earlier, there were significant differences (p<.05) between Pales-
tinians and Israelis across all items (see Table F.7) except for the refugees’ right of
return, where there was no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis
in their evaluation of this issue, t(767) = 1.8, p>.05, which means that both peo-
ple equally recognized this issue as a serious obstacle and is hindering the peace
process.
The results in Table F.5 show that for Palestinians, detained prisoners by Israel
was ranked in the first position (X = 4.21) as most serious in hindering the peace
process, coupled with Israel’s absolute control over border crossings (X = 4.17),
and the freezing of funds’ transfer to the Palestinian Authority of the Palestinian
taxes and customs duties collected by Israel (X = 4.12). Moreover, the issues of
refugees’ right of return, Israeli settlers’ possession of weapons, and the continued
building of settlements were all ranked in the fourth position with X = 4.07. As
noticed in Table F.5, 42.9%(22) of these realities were ranked by the Palestinians
as somewhat very serious (between 4.00 and 5.00), another 42.9%(23) as somewhat
important (between 3.50 and 3.99), and the rest 14.2%(24) were ranked as somewhat
neutral (between 3.39 and 3.49). On the other hand, Palestinians evaluated Hamas
and Islamic Jihad’s possession of weapons, the tunnels underneath the borders of
the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products as the least serious
problems to hinder the peace process with X = 3.40.
Not surprisingly, most of the issues that were ranked by the Palestinians as least
serious when it comes to hindering the peace process were ranked by the Israelis
as very serious problems, such as Palestinians having tunnels under the borders of
the Gaza Strip ranked first (X = 4.70), and Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s possession of
weapons (X = 4.66), followed by not recognizing Israel’s right to exist (X = 4.48)
(22)9 items out of 21.
(23)9 items out of 21.
(24)3 items out of 21.
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and not acknowledging the notion of the Jewish state (X = 4.37). Other realities were
evaluated as somewhat very serious by the Israelis: the lack of confidence between
Palestinians and Israelis (X = 4.19), hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to
any peace agreement (X = 4.18), and the security threat imposed by extremists on
both sides (X = 4.16). The Palestinians also evaluated these issues as quite serious
but with less emphasis (X s =3.80, 3.96, 3.86 respectively). Again, most of the issues
that were considered by the Palestinians to play a very critical role in hindering the
peace process, were for the Israelis at the bottom of concern, for example the Israeli
settlers ’ possession of weapons (X = 2.78), detained Palestinian prisoners’(X =
2.62), Israel’s absolute control over border crossings (X = 2.56), and the Israeli
full control over natural resources (X = 2.42). As shown in Table F.6, 33.3%(25) of
these realities were ranked by the Israelis as somewhat very serious (between 4.00
and 5.00), 14.3%(26) as somewhat serious (between 3.50 and 3.99), 28.6%(27) as
somewhat neutral (between 3.00 and 3.49) and the rest 23.8%(28) as somewhat not
serious (between 2.50 and 2.99).
Solutions to Core Issues of the Conflict
The respondents were asked by one primary set of questions about the most and next
acceptable solutions to the core issues of the conflict, specifically, these issues that
mainly constitute the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and on which the consequences of
what is happening on the grounds stem. The concept behind these questions was
to control for expected suggestions people have in their minds about what should
be done to each issue. It will be noticed below how the majority of both people
responded with very idealistic self-centered answers (Win-lose solution) as the most
acceptable choice for each issue, and how they dramatically switched to a more
reasonable one when asked about the next acceptable solution to these issues. A
solution where making compromises is not a choice but a painful reality that should
be considered.
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ percep-
tions of the most and second acceptable solution to the core issues of the conflict
α = .05 level of significance.
This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses: There is no signif-
icant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ perceptions of the most/second
(25)7 items out of 21.
(26)3 items out of 21.
(27)6 items out of 21.
(28)5 items out of 21.
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acceptable solution to the issue of:
• Palestinian refugees?
• Israeli settlements?
• Jerusalem?
• Prisoners?
• Natural resources?
Table 5.13 hereunder reveals that there were significant differences between
Palestinians and Israelis’ perceptions of the most and next acceptable solutions to
all investigated issues (p<.001), and the differences were as follows:
TABLE 5.13 MOST ACCEPTABLE AND NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS
Questions
11 - 15
Pearson
Chi-Square
df
Asmp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Palestinian refugees
Most acceptable 1040a 6 .000
Next acceptable 368a 6 .000
Israeli settlements
Most acceptable 846a 9 .000
Next acceptable 414a 9 .000
Jerusalem
Most acceptable 586a 6 .000
Next acceptable 221a 6 .000
Prisoners
Most acceptable 831a 5 .000
Next acceptable 394a 5 .000
Natural resources
Most acceptable 517a 4 .000
Next acceptable 50a 4 .000
Note: With regard to the issue of. . . , which of the following you consider to be the
most acceptable solution that can be implemented?
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Palestinian Refugees
Most Acceptable Solution
As expected, for the majority of the Palestinians (77.6%) the right of refugees to
return to their homes within Israel proper is the most acceptable solution that can
be implemented to solve the issue of Palestinian refugees, followed by a conditional
return of refugees (11.4%), absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly estab-
lished Palestinian state (5.4%), and the refugees to be assimilated and granted full
citizenship rights in their host countries (3.0%). The Israeli’s positions on this is-
sue were more distributed and less skewed toward a particular solution as was the
case for the Palestinians. The majority (30.5%) answered with “none of the above”,
mainly because for Israelis the right of return means a demographic threat to the
existence of Israel and its Jewish majority. This is followed by the solutions that
refugees to be assimilated and granted full citizenship rights in their host countries
(20.1%), absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly established Palestinian
state (19.5%), and finally relinquishing the right of return and replacing it by finan-
cial compensation (17.4%), as shown in Figure 5.18 below.
FIGURE 5.18 MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEES ISSUE
(A) Palestinians
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(B) Israelis
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Note: With regard to the issue of Palestinian refugees, which of the following you consider
being the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?
Next Acceptable Solution
Away from the most acceptable solution, that might be a solution in a perfect world,
is the question of ‘what you consider the next most acceptable solution?’ A ques-
tion, where rationality and the urgency to compromise for a solution, play a more
decisive role in solving the issue. The results revealed that 27.5% of the Palestinians
considered absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly established Palestinian
state as the next most acceptable solution to the issue, 25.9% preferred them to be
assimilated and granted full citizenship rights in their host countries, 20.4% decided
for conditional return of Palestinian refugees as the next most acceptable solution,
and finally, 7.7% chose the right of refugees to return to their homes within Israel
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proper. As mentioned above, almost one-third of the Israelis believe that none of
the suggested solutions is considered an actual solution to the conflict but a de-
mographic threat to Israelis existence, 22.1% voted for relinquishing the right of
return and replacing it by financial compensation, 17.9% preferred the option of
the refugees to be assimilated and granted full citizenship right in their host coun-
tries, and finally, 12.5% decided for absorbing the refugees in the newly established
Palestinian state, as shown in Figure 5.19 hereunder.
FIGURE 5.19 NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEES ISSUE
(A) Palestinians
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Note: And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?
Israeli Settlements
Most Acceptable Solution
The results in Figure 5.20 revealed that more than half of the Palestinians considered
evacuating all Israeli settlers from the settlements built on 1967 borders as the most
acceptable solution to the issue, 23.7% preferred dismantling all settlements built
within the 1967 borders, and 8.7% thought of freezing settlement activities in the
West Bank and Jerusalem as the most acceptable solution to the issue. Finally, 4.3%
believed in compensation packages, including resettlement of settlers within Israeli
borders, and only 2.7% agreed on keeping all settlements intact. On the other side,
27.6% of Israelis thought that settlements should be kept intact, 13.1% believed
that relinquishing parts of Israeli lands that would commensurate in an area with
that occupied by the Israeli settlements in the West Bank as the most acceptable
solution to the issue of settlement. Another 13.0% found that all settlements built
on the Israeli side of the wall should become part of Israel, and 12.6% considered
the compensation packages, including resettlement of settlers within Israeli borders
as the most acceptable solution to the settlements issue. Finally, 9.5% answered
with “none of the above”.
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FIGURE 5.20 MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT
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Note: With regard to the issue of Israeli settlements, which of the following do you consider
to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?
Next Acceptable Solution
Results in Figure 5.21 below unveiled how Palestinians positions did not change
much, where 27.1% of them thought of dismantling all settlements built within the
1967 borders as the second best acceptable solution to the issue of settlements,
22.5% answered with freezing settlement activities in the West Bank and Jerusalem
and 16.1% believed that all Israeli settlers should evacuate the settlements built on
the 1967 borders. Only 7.0% of the Palestinians raised the solution of allowing
settlers to stay in the West Bank under the Palestinian sovereignty at their discretion
as the next most acceptable solution for this issue. The results also revealed that
17.9% of the Israelis decided to adhere to one main acceptable solution, i.e., their
refusal to consider any of the other suggested solutions as an alternative, 14.0%
believed that all settlements built on the Israeli side of the wall to become part of
Israel as the next most acceptable solution to the issue, and 13.0% decided that all
settlements should be kept intact. Interestingly, 12.8% are for relinquishing parts of
Israeli lands that would commensurate in the area with that occupied by the Israeli
settlements in the West Bank, in addition to 12.2% who agreed upon compensation
packages including resettlement of settlers within Israeli borders.
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FIGURE 5.21 NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT
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Note: And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?
Jerusalem
Most Acceptable Solution
Undoubtedly, the majority (45.9%) of Palestinians thought that the most acceptable
solution for the issue of Jerusalem is to divide the City in East Jerusalem for the
Palestinians and West Jerusalem for the Israelis as was the case before the 1967
War, 22.0% preferred an international control over Jerusalem and its holy sites,
8.6% believed that Jerusalem should be divided into Palestinian and Jewish quar-
ters, 5.4% favored the solution of Jerusalem to remain under Israeli control, with
allowing access to Jerusalem holy sites for both nations. Only 2.6% preferred the
joint Palestinian-Israeli control over the old city, 10.3% answered with none of the
above, and finally, 5.2% did not know. On the other hand, more than half of the
Israelis (57.0%) favored the solution of Jerusalem to remain under Israeli control
with allowing access to Jerusalem proper holy sites for both nations, and 14.1%
were ready to accept dividing Jerusalem; the eastern part for the Palestinians and
the western part for the Israelis as was the case before 1967. A smaller percentage
of 7.8% thought of the international control over Jerusalem and its holy places as
the most acceptable solution. Moreover, 6.3% of the Israelis believed that the old
city should be placed under joint control, and 5.5% agreed that Jerusalem should be
divided into Palestinian and Jewish quarters. Finally, 9.3% answered with none of
the above, as shown in Figure 5.22 below.
233
5.2. SURVEY ANALYSIS
FIGURE 5.22 MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM
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Note: With regard to Jerusalem, which of the following do you consider to be the most acceptable solution that
can be implemented?
Next Acceptable Solution
Results in Figure 5.23 revealed that the Palestinian positions did not change sig-
nificantly, as 22.4% of them preferred international control over Jerusalem and its
sanctuaries as the next acceptable solution to issue of Jerusalem, 16.3% favored
the division of Jerusalem to East for Palestinians and West for Israelis, and 11.2%
thought of a joint Palestinian-Israeli control over the old city as the next acceptable
solution to this issue. Finally, an eye-opening percentage of Palestinians (10.4%) fa-
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vored the solution of Jerusalem to remain under Israeli control with allowing access
to Jerusalem sanctuaries for both nations, and 8.6% believed that Jerusalem should
be divided into Palestinian and Jewish quarters.
FIGURE 5.23 NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM
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Note: And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?
The same applies for the Israelis whose views did not change much when asked
about the next acceptable solution to the issue of Jerusalem. 22.5% of the Israelis
believed that Jerusalem should be united and under Israeli sovereignty with allow-
ing access to Jerusalem sanctuaries for both nations, a quiet impressive percentage
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of 18.5% preferred a joint Palestinian-Israeli control over the old city, 15.8% fa-
vored an international control, 8.2% believed that Jerusalem should be divided into
Palestinian and Jewish quarters, and only 6.9% said that things should be as it was
before the Six days war of 1967 where East Jerusalem belonged to the Palestinians
and West Jerusalem to the Israelis. Finally, 28.2% decided to stick to one main ac-
ceptable solution, i.e., their refusal to consider any of the other suggested solutions
as an alternative.
Prisoners
Most Acceptable Solution
55.8% of the Palestinians are for the release of all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli
prisons when asked about the most acceptable solution that can be implemented to
reach a solution to the issue of prisoners, 30.9% thought at least to release prisoners
for humanitarian reasons only as in the case of illness, long-term prisoners, women
and children, and 6.1% answered to keep only those who killed or were accomplices
in the killing of Israelis, as shown in Figure 5.24 below.
FIGURE 5.24 MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PRISONERS ISSUE
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Note: With regard to the issue of the Palestinian prisoners, which of the following do you
consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?
In addition, the results revealed that 40.4% of the Israelis were of the opinion that
the most acceptable solution is to keep all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons,
a quiet high percentage of 30.5% answered with keeping only those who killed or
were accomplices in the killing of Israelis, 10.7% thought at least to release pris-
oners for humanitarian reasons, and 8.8% considered none of the above-suggested
solutions enough to solve the issue.
Next Acceptable Solution
Results in Figure 5.25 show that a Palestinian majority of 41.6% asked for the re-
lease of prisoners for humanitarian reasons as the next acceptable solution to end
this issue, 25.7% thought that all prisoners should be released, 14.5% replied I dont
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know, and 9.0% answered none of the above. On the other hand, 25.1% of the Is-
raelis decided on keeping in prisoners who killed or were accomplices in the killing
of Israelis. 18.5% further insisted on keeping all prisoners, 17.3% were for the re-
lease of prisoners for humanitarian reasons only, and only 4.4% agreed on releasing
all Palestinian prisoners as the next acceptable solution.
FIGURE 5.25 NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PRISONERS ISSUE
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Note: And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?
Natural Resources
Most Acceptable Solution
Fairly enough, 66.8% of the Palestinians when asked about the most acceptable
solution to the issue of natural resources replied that the natural resources should be
under Palestinian control in the newly established Palestinian state, 16.3% preferred
the solution of joint control over the natural resources for the sake of economic
prosperity for both Palestinians and Israelis, and only 8.3% thought that natural
resources should remain under Israeli control as it is the case today, but equal rights
(price, consumption, and distribution) must be maintained for the Palestinians and
Israelis alike, as shown in Figure 5.26 below.
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FIGURE 5.26 MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
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Note: With regard to the issue of natural resources, which of the following do you consider to
be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?
On the other hand, the results in Figure 5.26 above revealed that 44.4% of the
Israelis are of the opinion that that the natural resources should remain under Israeli
control as it is the case today, but equal rights must be maintained for the Pales-
tinians and Israelis, 21.3% preferred a joint control, and only 10.9% thought that
the natural resources should be under Palestinian control in the newly established
Palestinian state.
Next Acceptable Solution
Figure 5.27 revealed that 30.3% of the Palestinians believed that the next acceptable
solution for the issue of natural resources is that these remain under Israeli control,
as it is the case today but with equal rights, 23.2% preferred that natural resources
to be under joint control, and 12.3% that they should be under Palestinian control in
the newly established Palestinian state. On the other hand, a majority of 30.7% of
the Israelis believed that the next acceptable solution to the issue is that natural re-
sources be under joint control, 25.3% thought that they should remain under Israeli
control with equal rights, and the rest answered with none of the above (26.5%) or
did not know (11.0%).
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FIGURE 5.27 NEXT ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
(A) Palestinians
30.3%
23.2%
16.2%
12.3%
T H A T  N A T U R A L  
R E S O U R C E S  R E M A I N  
U N D E R  I S R A E L I  
C O N T R O L ,  B U T  W I T H  
E Q U A L  R I G H T S
T H A T  N A T U R A L  
R E S O U R C E S  B E  U N D E R  
J O I N T  C O N T R O L
N O N E  O F  T H E  A B O V E T H A T  N A T U R A L  
R E S O U R C E S  B E  U N D E R  
P A L E S T I N I A N  C O N T R O L  
I N  T H E  N E W L Y  
E S T A B L I S H E D  
P A L E S T I N I A N  S T A T E
(B) Israelis
30.7%
26.5%
25.3%
11.0%
T H A T  N A T U R A L  
R E S O U R C E S  B E  U N D E R  
J O I N T  C O N T R O L
N O N E  O F  T H E  A B O V E T H A T  N A T U R A L  
R E S O U R C E S  R E M A I N  
U N D E R  I S R A E L I  
C O N T R O L ,  A S  I T  I S  
T H E  C A S E  T O D A Y ,  B U T  
W I T H  E Q U A L  R I G H T S
D O N T  K N O W
Note: And after that, what do you consider the next most acceptable solution?
Economic Cooperation
Plans for economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis were introduced
to the respondents, and these were asked to rate them on a scale from 1 (very un-
acceptable to you) to 5 (very acceptable to you). The main goal of this battery of
items was to test the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis approv-
ing economic cooperation plans between both parties on α = .05 level of signif-
icance.
This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses:
There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis approving:
• Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors, i.e., water, health, envi-
ronment, tourism, etc.?
• Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel?
• Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange between the two
states?
• Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between Palestinians and
Israelis?
• Building a Palestinian airport?
• Building a Palestinian seaport?
• Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip?
The results of the t-tests revealed that there were significant differences between
Palestinians and Israelis in some items of the battery and not across all items, as
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shown in Table 5.14 hereunder:
TABLE 5.14 HYPOTHESES TESTING - BATTERY OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Null hypotheses Accepted Rejected
Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors
i.e., water, health, environment, tourism, and more
Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel.
Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange
between the two states.
Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between
Palestinians and Israelis.
Building a Palestinian airport.
Building a Palestinian seaport.
Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip.
Note: I want to propose to you plans of economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis.
Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 means very unable to you, and 5 means very acceptable, to what
extent do you accept the following ?:
The results above revealed that there was a significant difference between Pales-
tinians and Israelis’ perceptions in allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Is-
rael as a plan to enhance economic cooperation between both parties, and the dif-
ference was in favor of the Palestinians, where they found it highly acceptable to
them (M = 4.00, SE =.05) to work inside Israel, in comparison with less than a neu-
tral level of acceptance regarding this plan on the Israeli side (M = 2.89, SE =.09).
Another significant difference existed between their level of acceptance to building
a Palestinian airport, and the difference again was in favor of the Palestinians (M
= 4.07, SE =.06) who highly accepted the plan of building a Palestinian airport, in
comparison with (M = 2.32, SE =.06) on the Israeli side who found this plan some-
what unacceptable. The same applied to the plan of building a Palestinian seaport,
where Palestinians (M = 4.32, SE =.05) found the plan highly acceptable for them,
unlike the Israelis who found it somewhat unacceptable (M = 2.33, SE =.09). Fur-
thermore, a significant difference existed between both sides regarding the plan of
extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip, and this was also in favor of
the Palestinians who found this plan very acceptable (M = 4.15, SE =.06), whilst
the Israelis found it somewhat unacceptable (M = 2.63, SE =.06). The effect sizes
for all these differences using the equation of Rosnow and Rosenthal (2003) was
somewhat large, as shown in Table 5.15 below:
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TABLE 5.15 EFFECT SIZES FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES
Hypothesis Effect size (r.)
Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel. 38.2%
Building a Palestinian airport. 53.6%
Building a Palestinian seaport. 60.4%
Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip. 48.6%
The rest of suggested plans that did not have any significant differences between
Palestinians and Israelis, and which both (on average) found somewhat acceptable
comprised of those plans that were solely focused on the trade and economic pros-
perity for both nations without any direct access to people (e.g., workers) through
the borders of the other, or as shown in the table above, does not involve the eco-
nomic prosperity of one side excluding the other (See Table F.8).
Establishing a Palestinian State
The respondents were introduced with elements as parameters of establishing a
Palestinian state and were asked to rate how much they support or oppose each,
using a scale from 1 (completely opposed) to 5 (in full support). The main goal of
this battery of elements was to test the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis approv-
ing of elements as parameters of establishing a Palestinian state on α = .05 level
of significance.
This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses:
There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis level of sup-
port to:
• Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on
equivalent areas of a land swap?
• A demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for
some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces?
• International presence on the borders of the newly established Palestinian
state?
• A Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings?
• The presence of Israeli permanent control points over Palestinian border
crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority?
• Building a ‘Safe Passage’ between the West Bank and Gaza Strip?
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• Demarcating the present location of the wall as permanent borders of the
established Palestinian state?
• Security coordination between Israel and Palestine?
The results of the t-test revealed that there were significant differences between
Palestinians and Israelis across all elements except one element that was about de-
marcating the present location of the wall as permanent borders of the established
Palestinian state (p>.05). Both, Palestinians and Israelis, somewhat opposed this
element (M = 2.75, SE =.06) and (M = 2.66, SE =.09) respectively. Further re-
sults (see Table F.9) revealed that Palestinians somewhat supported (X=3.49) the
Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on
equivalent areas of the land swap, unlike the Israelis who somewhat opposed this
element (X=2.25). Moreover, the Israelis somewhat supported (X=3.19) the ele-
ment of a demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except
for some licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces, something that
the Palestinians somehow opposed (X=2.42).
As noticed, all the results showed that the Palestinians struggle for freedom and
statehood, and the Israelis aim to keep their country safe and secured from the Pales-
tinian counterpart. For instance, the presence of Israeli permanent control points at
Palestinian border crossings that work jointly with the Palestinian Authority is to
some extent supported by Israelis (X=3.43) who want to secure their borders in
case the Palestinians failed to do so. On the other hand, the Palestinians somewhat
opposed this idea (X=2.70) because lacking the ability to fully control ones borders
contradicts the very concept of sovereignty over the newly established state, which
was also fostered by the strong support of Palestinians (X=3.73) to a Palestinian
state with full control over its border crossings, in comparison with a neutral posi-
tion towards this element on the Israeli side (X=3.16). Furthermore, Palestinians to
quite a high degree supported building a ‘safe passage’ between the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, something that the Israeli counterpart opposed (X=2.76). Security coor-
dination between both nations received more support from the Israelis (X=3.72) in
comparison with the Palestinians, who had somehow a neutral position toward this
element (X=3.15). The same view has been established towards an international
presence on the borders of the newly established Palestinian state (X=3.18), unlike
the Israelis who, to a some extent, opposed an international presence on the borders
(X=2.92).
Most Appropriate Solution
A very crucial question probed respondents about their opinion of the most appro-
priate solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the results in Figure 5.28 below
show that the majority of Palestinians (37.3%) and Israelis (46.3%) thought that
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the most important appropriate solution to the conflict is that of the two states, Is-
rael, and Palestine, that reciprocally recognize the legitimacy of each other, which
according to Halperin et al. (2010, p. 33) “indicated the removal of a significant bar-
rier to conflict resolution with the Palestinians”. 19.2% of the Palestinians and 8.8%
of the Israelis preferred a one-state solution in which both Israelis and Palestinians
have the same rights and obligations. Moreover, 15.9% of the Israelis and 7.9% of
the Palestinians favored the solution of the West Bank as part of Jordan and Gaza
Strip part as a part of Egypt. Only 5.2% of the Israelis and 10.3% of the Palestinians
thought of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, and finally, almost a quarter of
the people on both sides believed that none of the above-mentioned solutions were
good enough to solve the conflict. These might be the stratum of the society that
are driven by their eagerness to have the whole land controlled by their respective
government, or simply they have no trust in the other as a partner for peace and,
therefore, are lacking the hope of reaching a peaceful solution.
FIGURE 5.28 MOST APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT
TWO STATES SOLUTION
ONE STATE SOLUTION
A PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN CONFEDERATION
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Note: In your opinion, what is the most appropriate solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict?
Prioritization of Issues
The respondents were asked to prioritize milestone issues of the conflict on a scale
from 1 to 10 where 1 stands for “the most important issue”, and 10 for “the least
important issue” these days, which both, Palestinians and Israelis, think they should
embark on addressing as the first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement
between the two parties. The main objective of this question was to see how they pri-
oritize these crucial issues, and to test the following hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:
243
5.2. SURVEY ANALYSIS
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ priori-
tization of crucial issues on α = .05 level of significance.
This null hypothesis included the following sub-hypotheses: There is no signifi-
cant difference between Palestinians and Israelis prioritization of:
• Israeli settlements?
• Palestinian prisoners?
• Jerusalem?
• The security of both Israelis and the Palestinians?
• Borders and crossing points?
• Palestinian refugees?
• Control over natural resources?
• Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders?
• Recognizing the Jewish state?
• Having control over holy sites?
The results of the t-test in Table F.10 revealed that there were significant dif-
ferences between Palestinians and Israelis across all issues (p<.05) except for the
issue of control over natural resources (p>.05). Both people did not give this issue
a high priority (M = 6.48, SE =.07) and (M = 6.28, SE =.09) respectively. Different
perceptions of what should be addressed first are expected, but the results revealed
even a wider gap between perceptions on both sides concerning how peace should
be processed. As if Palestinians and Israelis agreed to disagree concerning these
milestone issues, for instance:
• Recognizing the Jewish state was ranked second by the Israelis and tenth by
the Palestinians.
• The prisoners issue was ranked second by Palestinians and ninth by Israelis.
• The refugees issue was ranked third by Palestinians and seventh by Israelis.
• Establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders was ranked tenth by
Israelis and fifth by Palestinians.
• Security was ranked first by Israelis and ninth by Palestinians.
Figure 5.29 hereunder illustrates the prioritization of issues by Palestinians and Is-
raelis.
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FIGURE 5.29 PRIORITIZATION OF ISSUES
(A) Palestinians
 
 
 
JERUSALEM (3.43)
PRISONERS (3.48)
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES (4.49)
BORDERS AND CROSSING POINTS (5.09)
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON 1967 BORDERS (5.25)
HAVING CONTROL OVER HOLY PLACES (5.73)
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS (6.28)
CONTROL OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (6.48)
SECUIRTY (6.81)
RECOGNIZING THE JEWISH STATE (7.90)
Mean values are in brackets. 
(B) Israelis
 
 
 
 
SECUIRTY (3.07)
RECOGNIZING THE JEWISH STATE (3.42)
JERUSALEM (4.24)
BORDERS AND CROSSING POINTS (4.54)
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS (5.27)
HAVING CONTROL OVER HOLY PLACES (6.11)
CONTROL OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (6.28)
PALESTINIANS REFUGEES (7.08)
PRISONERS (7.40)
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON 1967 BORDERS (7.58)
Mean values are in brackets. 
Note: In your opinion, what are the issues that both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on
addressing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties?
Please put them in order of priority from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most important issue and
10 represents the least important issue these days.
Performance of Political Figures
The respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of some political figures
on both sides pertaining to the peace process; rating whether such a performance
is highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or highly negative. The
results of the t-test in Table F.11 revealed that there were significant differences
between Palestinians and Israelis’ evaluations of political leaders on both sides,
where each side evaluated the performance of political parties in their respective
country in a more spread and less skewed manner, and the political parties of the
other in a more negative and skewed pattern, as illustrated in the red dashed circles
in Figure 5.30 below:
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FIGURE 5.30 EVALUATIONS OF POLITICAL FIGURES PERFORMANCE
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Note: I’m going to ask you about the performance of some political figures pertaining to the peace process.
Is it highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or highly negative?
The results above showed that 60.4% of the Palestinians evaluated the perfor-
mance of Mahmoud Abbas, head of the PA, positively. 40.0% of them also ex-
pressed a positive rating for Khalid Misha’al, head of Hamas Politburo, and 47.8%
for Rami Hamdallah, the PA’s Prime Minister. On the other hand, the Palestinians
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evaluations of the performance of Israeli political figures regarding the peace pro-
cess were very negative as shown in the figure above. On the Israeli side, 41.7%
of the Israelis evaluated the performance of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime
Minister, positively. The same applies to Tzipi Livni, head of the Hatnuah party
in Israel, and 42.9% for Isaac Herzog, head of Labor Party in Israel. On the other
hand, their evaluations of the performance of Palestinian political figures pertaining
to the peace process were somewhat negative, particularly towards Misha’al , head
of Hamas Politburo.
Hope to Make Peace with the Other Side
The respondents were asked how likely they think that the current leadership in their
respective country can make peace with the other side. Is it most likely (coded 1),
somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or absolute unlikely (coded 5)?
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis trust in
their respective political leaders to make peace with the other side on α = .05
level of significance.
The result of the t-test revealed that there was a significant difference t(1460)
= -4.6, p<0.01 between Palestinians and Israelis trust in their respective political
leader to make peace with the other side, and the difference was in favor of the
Palestinians (M = 2.68, SE =.03) in comparison with the Israeli side (M = 2.92, SE
=.04), which means that Palestinians have a bit more trust in their political leaders
than Israelis to make peace with the other side. The mean values here are translated
to ‘slight likely’. It is highly dependent on how the results are being interpreted,
for instance, the distribution in Table F.12 shows that 27.2% of the Palestinians and
24.0% of the Israelis thought that it was absolute unlikely for their current leadership
to make peace with the other side. Add thereto, 19.1% and 44.8% of Palestinians and
Israelis respectively thought it was somewhat unlikely. On the other hand, 48.5% of
the Palestinians and 31.9% of the Israelis thought it was likely to a certain degree
that they can make peace with the other side. The results of this part showed that
both people were somewhat skeptical about the ability of their political leaders to
make an actual change. A further question was presented to the respondents with
scenarios regarding proposed solutions by their respective leadership. It reads: ‘If
you had the ability to impose a solution on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, what
would you do?’ Almost one-third of the Palestinians and Israelis would impose
the same solutions proposed by their government, 27.0% of the Palestinians and
15.2% of the Israelis would impose solutions different from those proposed by their
government, and only 7.6% and 3.5% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively
would agree on the solutions proposed by the government of the other side. Finally,
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a majority of 52.0% of Israelis and 19.8% of Palestinians would suggest different
solutions than their governments, and the rest responded with “I don’t know”.
Peace Negotiations
The majority of the Palestinians (61.9%)(29) and the Israelis (51.4%)(30) supported
to some degree the resumption of peace negotiations between Palestinians and Is-
raelis under the current circumstances, and 27.7% of the Palestinians and 41.4% of
the Israelis opposed to some degree the resumption of peace negotiations, as shown
in Figure 5.31 below.
FIGURE 5.31 RESUMPTION OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
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Note: Do you support or oppose the resumption of peace negotiations between Palestinians
and Israelis under the current circumstances?
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ support
of the resumption of peace negotiations under the current circumstances on α =
.05 level of significance.
The result of the t-test unveiled that there was no significant difference t(1535)
= -1.4, p>.05 between Palestinians and Israelis support of the resumption of peace
negotiations under the current circumstances. This means that both people realized
to some extent the importance of peace negotiations and the role they play on the
grounds.
(29) 9.5% ‘Strongly support’ + 52.4% ‘Somewhat support’.
(30) 13.5% ‘Strongly support’ + 38.0% ‘Somewhat support’.
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Belief in Peace Negotiations
Further to previous results, respondents were asked if they believed or not negoti-
ations between the PA and Israel will lead to peace between the two parties in the
coming years. Interestingly, only 6.2% of the Palestinians and 4.3% of the Israelis
strongly believed that negotiations will lead to peace in the coming years, in ad-
dition to 34.1% on the Palestinian side and 20.3% on the Israeli side who thought
to a certain degree that negotiations will lead to peace. On the other hand, 39.7%
of the Israelis and 24.3% of the Palestinians did not believe at all that negotiations
can achieve peace, as well as more than one-third of the Israelis and quarter of the
Palestinians who did not believe to a certain degree in the ability of negotiations to
make a change.
Another interesting observation was to test for a significant correlation between
support and trust in negotiations, as follows:
H0: There is no significant correlation between support for the resumption of
peace negotiations and trust in those negotiations to achieve peace on α = .05
level of significance.
Table 5.16 below demonstrates that there were significant and positive correla-
tions (r = .46, p<0.01) and (r = .37, p<0.01) in Palestine and Israel respectively
between the support of resumption of peace negotiations and trust in these negotia-
tions to achieve peace. The correlation was slightly stronger among the Palestinians
than the Israelis, and the positive direction means that an increase in one variable
is correlated with the increase in the other variable. Similarly, the decrease in one
variable is correlated with the decrease in the other variable.
TABLE 5.16 CORRELATION BETWEEN SUPPORT OF RESUMPTION OF
NEGOTIATIONS AND TRUST IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS
Correlations
Group Comparisons Support of resumption Trust in negotiations
Support of resumption(a) 1 912
Palestinians
Faith in negotiations(b) .37*** 1
Support of resumption 1 519
Israelis
Trust in negotiations .46*** 1
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: (a) Do you support or oppose the resumption of peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis
under the current circumstances? (b) Do you believe, or not, that negotiations between the PA and Israel
will lead to peace between the two parties in the coming years?
249
5.2. SURVEY ANALYSIS
Further results in Figure 5.32 below showed that 38.4% of the Palestinians and
only 14.3% of the Israelis thought that resuming peace negotiations is more impor-
tant to the other. This put the Palestinians in either a more self-confident, but fragile
and offensive position, where Palestinians think they have the edge or the superi-
ority to influence otherwise, or in a sympathetic and advisory position where they
believe making peace with the Israelis is a foot step into making peace and integra-
tion with the rest of the Arab world. On the other hand, results revealed that 15.8%
of the Palestinians and almost quarter of the Israelis thought it is more important to
ones self (own people) to resume negotiations. This can be translated into the des-
perate need to live without fear for their own safety and security. Most importantly,
28.1% of the Palestinians and 43.7% of the Israelis realized that resuming negoti-
ations was equally important to both parties, leaving only a minority of 6.0% and
9.9% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively, who believed that it was not im-
portant to either party, which, if translated referred to this stubborn stratum of both
societies that either benefit from the conflict, or were eager to have the land by force
or by any other means except resorting to the negotiations in order to accomplish
their goal.
FIGURE 5.32 RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF WHOM ?
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Note: In your view, to which party resuming peace negotiations is more important, to the Palestinians
or to the Israelis?
Concessions and Efforts in Negotiations
The respondents were asked if they believed that Israelis and Palestinians have done
all what has been required of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and
treaties a success or they could have gone further to make them a success. Results
in Table 5.17 revealed that the vast majority of both, the Palestinians (59.3%) and
the Israelis (79.5%), believed that the other party could have gone further, in com-
parison with only 4.4% of the Israelis and 8.9% of the Palestinians, who admitted
that the other party has done all what has been required of them to do.
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TABLE 5.17 CONCESSIONS AND EFFORTS IN NEGOTIATIONS
Perception Groups
They have done all
what has been required
of them to do
They could
have gone
further
a. Of the other
Palestinians 8.9% 59.3%
Israelis 4.4% 79.5%
*Actual difference
as perceived by
Palestinians -38.3% -25.4%
Israelis -31.1% -34.6%
b. Of the self
Palestinians 42.7% 33.9%
Israelis 40.0% 44.9%
*The difference between the perception of “the oneself” and the perception of “the other”.
Note: Going back to the past, do you believe that Israelis and Palestinians have done all what has been required
of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and treaties a success, or you believe they could have gone
further to make them a success?
The results disclosed that each party perceived the concessions made by his or
her own people (or oneself) as quite high, where 42.7% and 40.0% of the Pales-
tinians and Israelis respectively believed that they have done all what has been
required of them to do. Additionally, 33.9% of the Palestinians and 44.9% of the
Israelis believed that his or her own people could have gone further, which was
quite promising and in some sense referred to this stratum in each society that be-
lieved more efforts should be invested in future negotiations, and were more open
to concessions.
Further to these results, I calculated what I called “Actual perceived difference”,
which is the actual difference between the perception of “oneself” and the percep-
tion of “the other”. This difference shows to what extent both parties were deeply
anchored in their miss-perception of reality - what has been done, and what should
have been done, and who is responsible for the failure of past negotiations, as illus-
trated by the dashed circle in Figure 5.33 hereunder.
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FIGURE 5.33 CONCESSIONS AND EFFORTS IN NEGOTIATIONS
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Note: Going back to the past, do you believe that Israelis and Palestinians have done all what has been
required of them to do in order to make peace negotiations and treaties a success, or you believe they
could have gone further to make them a success?
Responsibility for the Failure of Past Agreements
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ percep-
tions of shouldering the responsibility for the failure of past peace negotiations
and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis on α = .05 level of significance.
Results in Table F.13 revealed significantly different answers between Palestini-
ans and Israelis when asked about whom they thought, is/are responsible for the
failure of past peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis. Ex-
cept for the item of Israeli extremist parties where p>.001. This means that both
Palestinians and Israelis think they have their share of responsibility for the failure
of past agreements. Other than that, Figure 5.34 shows that for the Palestinians, the
majority of answers placed the Israeli government and leaders as the main respon-
sible actors for the failure of past peace negotiations and treaties between Palestini-
ans and Israelis, followed by Israeli extremists and the United States. Interestingly,
Arab leaders were highly ranked as one of the main actors to be responsible for the
failure of negotiations and treaties; they were highly ranked by the Palestinians as
having a bigger share of responsibility than Israeli people, who were ranked in the
fifth position. On the other hand, Israelis ranked Palestinian extremist movements
as the main actors responsible for the failure of past peace negotiations and treaties
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between Palestinians and Israelis, followed by the Palestinian government and lead-
ers, and Arab leaders. Again, Arab leaders were ranked higher as having a bigger
share of responsibility than Palestinian people, who were ranked in the fourth po-
sition. Its worth mentioning that quite moderate percentages of 11.4% and 10.7%
believed that Israeli extremists, government, and leaders were responsible for the
failure of past agreements.
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FIGURE 5.34 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND
TREATIES
(A) Who is responsible from the Palestinian point of view
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Note: In your view, historically seen, who is responsible for the
failure of peace negotiations and treaties between Palestinians
and Israelis?
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Intermediation
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ percep-
tions of how balanced is the role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict on α = .05 level of significance.
Results in Figure 5.35 below showed significantly different results (χ2(3)=568,
p<.001) between Palestinians and Israelis regarding how balanced they thought is
the role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
FIGURE 5.35 ROLE OF THE US IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT
(A) Palestinians
 
(B) Israelis
 
Note: In your opinion, does the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict play towards both parties a balanced role, a biased role towards
the Israeli stance, or a biased role towards the Palestinian stance?
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Clearly, a very high percentage (81.6%) of the Palestinians answered that the
United States role in the conflict is biased in favor of the Israeli, and more than one-
third of the Israelis thought that it plays a biased role in favor of the Palestinians.
This in comparison with 7.5% of the Palestinians and 27.7% of the Israelis who
believed that the US plays a balanced role towards both parties, and only 3.9% of
the Palestinians and quite a moderate percentage of 21.1% of the Israelis thought it
plays a biased role towards the Palestinian and Israel side respectively.
Best Mediator
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ per-
ceptions of which state or international organization could be the best mediator
between Palestinians and Israelis on α = .05 level of significance.
Results in Figure 5.36 hereunder show that both Palestinians and Israelis agreed
on their recommendation of The Quartet (United States, United Nations, European
Union, and Russia) and Egypt as the best mediators between them. Surprisingly,
the highest percentage of one-third of the Israelis thought that none of the suggested
states and international organizations was the best mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, which might stem from their belief that the conflict should be resolved be-
tween the Palestinians and Israelis themselves without international intervention.
Nonetheless, the majority of the Israelis thought that the US is the best mediator,
followed by The Quartet and Egypt. On the Palestinian side, the order was The
Quartet ranked as the best mediator, followed by Turkey, UN, EU, and Egypt. Fi-
nally, the results were significantly different χ2(12)=390, p<.001.
FIGURE 5.36 BEST MEDIATOR BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS
14.1%
7.6%
11.1% 10.6%
4.0%
6.9%
13.1%
5.9%
9.4%
4.0%
5.5% 6.0%
1.8%
14.1%
21.5%
4.4% 3.7%
1.4% 0.6%
1.7%
2.9%
9.5%
1.2% 1.2%
34.6%
3.3%
T H E  
Q U A R TE T
U . S . U N E U R U S S I A F R A N C E T U R K E Y JO R D A N E G Y P T Q A T A R I R A N N O N E O T H E R
PALESTINE ISRAEL
Note: As you see it, which state or international organization could be the best mediator between
Palestinians and Israelis?
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Readiness for Peace
The results of asking the respondents ‘To what degree are you bored and tired of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict?’ revealed that both people were really fed up from the
conflict. In this question I tested the following hypothesis:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis boredom
from the conflict on α = .05 level of significance.
The results were significantly different between Palestinians and Israelis
χ2(4)=39, p<.001, where 44.0% of the Palestinians and 47.8% of the Israelis were
to a high degree bored and tired of the conflict, 35.0% and 33.5% of the Palestini-
ans and Israelis respectively were to a moderate degree, and 7.5% of the Palestinians
and 13.2% of the Israelis were to a low degree fed up from the conflict. On the other
hand, only 9.9% of the Palestinians and 5.6% of the Israelis declined this status of
mind.
Willingness to Make Peace with the Other
‘To what degree are you willing to make peace with the other’ was one of my main
dependent variables that I used to see how other independent variables that I already
investigated above influenced the willingness of individuals to make peace with the
other. In this question I tested the following hypothesis:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ will-
ingness towards peace on α = .05 level of significance.
Results revealed very interesting outcomes; first of all, there was a significant
difference between Palestinians and Israelis χ2(4)=73, p<.001 willingness towards
peace, where 46.6% of the Israelis and 26.6% of the Palestinians were to a high
degree willing to make peace with the other side, and 39.0% of the Palestinians
and 26.1% of the Israelis were to a moderate degree willing to do so. It is noticed
here that both people were willing to make peace to a certain degree; the intensity,
however, was higher among Israelis than Palestinians. Further results revealed that
16.9% and 18.0% of the Palestinians and Israelis respectively were willing to a low
degree to make peace with each other, 10.8% of the Palestinians and 6.0% of the
Israelis did not care about making peace with the other.
Taking Risks and Making Sacrifices for Peace
26.2% of the Palestinians believed that they should be willing to take risks and make
sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace, in comparison with 51.1% of the
Israelis who were willing to do so in order to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace.
257
5.2. SURVEY ANALYSIS
The low percentage on the Palestinian side compared with the Israeli side can be a
result of the Palestinian belief that they already gave up a lot through negotiations
and suggested solutions to the current status quo and that they can’t compromise
anymore to resolve the conflict. Additionally, 73.8% of the Palestinians and 48.9%
of the Israelis believed that they should not have to give up any of their demands
to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace, most probably for the same reason explained
above.
Confidence in Peace
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ confi-
dence in peace on α = .05 level of significance.
Results revealed significant differences (p<.001) between Palestinians and Is-
raeli confidence in peace in the near future. The differences as shown in Figure 5.37
below were in favor of the Israelis M = 3.42, SE =.03. Results indicated that Israelis
were to a great extent not confident of peace taking place with the Palestinians in
the near future. In comparison with the Palestinians M = 2.76, SE =.03 who to a
lesser instinct but still not confident that peace will take place in the near future.
These results simply illustrate how suspicious both people were to peace to occur
soon. Percentagewise, only 2.7% of the Palestinians and 1.7% of the Israelis were
very confident, 37.4% and 11.6% respectively were somewhat confident, and almost
one-third of both people were somewhat not confident that peace will take place in
the near future, and a majority of 55.3% of the Israelis were not confident at all that
peace will take place soon, in comparison with 21.0% on the Palestinian side.
FIGURE 5.37 CONFIDENCE IN PEACE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V E R Y  C O N F I D E N T  S O M E W H A T      S O M E W H A T           N OT  C O N F I D E N T  
                       C O N F I D E N T        N O T  C O N F I D E N T               A T  A L L  
    MEAN VALUE 
 
 
 
 
Note: How confident are you that the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians
will be solved in the near future?
Quality of Life
The respondents were asked to what degree do the following battery of items apply
to them, using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 stands for a very low degree and 5 for a very
high degree. The respondents answered with 0 when the item did not apply at all
to them. Items comprised of issues related to every-day life, including poverty, low
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wages/pensions, unemployment/lack of job opportunities, shortage of health care
and education, lack of security and safety/crime/violence, restrictions imposed on
freedom of movement/blockade, high cost of living/inflation/high prices, energy or
fuel shortages, electricity and water shortages, and housing problems. After all, an
index of all the items was generated that I called ‘Quality of life’, and concluded that
there were significant differences (p<.001) between the quality of lives of Palestini-
ans and Israelis, and the differences were in favor of the Israelis with an average of
3.09, which means a modest quality of life, in comparison with the Palestinian av-
erage of 3.46 indicating a lower quality of life. In-depth sub-hypotheses revealed
significant differences between Palestinians and Israelis among all items except one
that was about low wages and pensions where both people equally felt that they to
a some degree suffered from it, as shown in Table 5.18 below.
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TABLE 5.18 QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX
Group Statistics
Index of items Country N Mean
Std.
Deviation
a. Poverty
Palestine 997 3.02 1.68
Israel 508 3.31 1.55
b. Low wages/pensions
Palestine 1006 3.64 1.47
Israel 509 3.71 1.48
c. Unemployment/lack of job opportunities
Palestine 1007 3.86 1.39
Israel 510 3.27 1.64
d. Shortage of health care and education
Palestine 1004 3.45 1.43
Israel 511 3.07 1.62
e. Lack of security and safety/crime/violence.
Palestine 1007 3.64 1.45
Israel 511 3.20 1.56
f. Restrictions imposed on freedom of movement/blockade.
Palestine 1008 3.94 1.31
Israel 510 2.27 1.57
g. High cost of living/Inflation/high prices
Palestine 1011 3.96 1.31
Israel 510 4.30 1.17
h. Energy or fuel shortages
Palestine 1000 3.63 1.49
Israel 507 2.74 1.62
i. Electricity shortages
Palestine 1008 3.48 1.63
Israel 507 2.39 1.60
j. Water shortages
Palestine 1003 3.09 1.63
Israel 506 2.53 1.66
k. Housing problems
Palestine 999 2.98 1.78
Israel 507 3.56 1.60
Note: To what degree do the following items apply to you, using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree
and 5 meaning to a very high degree.
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Feelings and Attitudes
The main goals of these consecutive questions were to see how do Palestinians and
Israelis feel towards each other, and how do they think the other feel towards them.
Moreover, to test the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ feelings
and attitudes towards each other on α = .05 level of significance.
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis’ percep-
tions of how they feel towards each other on α = .05 level of significance.
These null hypotheses include the following sub-hypotheses:
There is no significant difference between Palestinians and Israelis:
• tolerance towards the other side?
• understanding of the other side?
• anger on the other side?
• fear from the other side?
• trust in the other side?
• grudge against the other side?
Moreover, is there a significant difference between their perceptions of how the
other side:
• is tolerant towards them?
• understands them?
• feels angry at them?
• fears them?
• trusts them?
• bears a grudge against them?
The results revealed significant differences (p<.05) across all items except for
“fear from the other side” and “trust in the other side” where p>.05, and where
both; the Palestinians and the Israelis expressed a low degree of trust (M=2.07,
SE=.03) and (M=2.04, SE=.04) respectively. Similarly, both of them; the Palestini-
ans (M=2.61, SE=.03) and the Israelis (M=2.70, SE=.05) fear to a moderate degree
each other. To sum up, Palestinians and Israelis shared the same low level of trust-
worthiness in the other, and a similar moderate feeling of fear from the other. The
rest of the differences are summarized in Table 5.19 below.
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TABLE 5.19 UNDERLYING AND EXPECTED FEELINGS AND ATTITUDES
Group Statistics
A) Feelings and attitudes towards the other side Country N Mean
Std.
Deviation
Palestine 931 2.00 1.04
a. Tolerance towards the other side
Israel 505 2.69 1.09
Palestine 933 2.29 1.07
b. Understanding the other side
Israel 508 2.64 1.07
Palestine 948 2.91 1.00
c. Angry at the other side
Israel 509 3.09 0.98
Palestine 951 2.61 1.03
d. Fear from the other side
Israel 507 2.70 1.05
Palestine 941 2.07 1.05
e. Trust in the other side
Israel 503 2.04 0.98
Palestine 932 2.93 1.08
f. Grudge against the other side
Israel 503 2.56 1.01
B) Feelings and attitudes of the other side Country N Mean
Std.
Deviation
Palestine 974 1.85 1.05
a. Tolerance
Israel 503 1.69 0.88
Palestine 957 2.07 1.04
b. Understands you
Israel 505 1.65 0.85
Palestine 962 2.91 0.98
c. Feels angry at you
Israel 501 3.30 1.04
Palestine 954 2.89 0.97
d. Fears you
Israel 502 2.69 1.14
Palestine 944 2.08 1.08
e. The other side trusts you
Israel 502 1.69 0.89
Palestine 940 3.10 1.11
f. Bears grudge against you
Israel 502 3.31 1.02
Note: Now I am going to read you a list of words and phrases that describe how would you express your
feelings and attitudes towards the other side. For each word or phrase, A) please tell me whether you don’t
share this feeling, you share it to a low degree, you share it to a moderate degree, or you share it to a very high
degree. B) In this context, to what degree do you believe that the other side holds the same feelings towards
you:
Finally, it is interesting to see if there was a significant correlation between
shared and expected feelings and attitudes. Therefore, I tested the following hy-
pothesis:
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H0: There is no significant correlation between Palestinians and Israelis shared
and expected feelings and attitudes on α = .05 level of significance.
The results in Table 5.20 hereunder show that indeed, there were significant cor-
relations (p<.05) between most of shared and expected feelings and attitudes, and
by most I mean 91.6% (33 out of 36 correlations were significant) on the Palestinian
side, and 77.7% (28 out of 35 correlations were significant) on the Israeli side. Inter-
estingly, the direction and strength of the correlation between shared and expected
feelings and attitudes were as follows:
Tolerance
On the Palestinian side, there was a significant and strong positive correlation
(r.=.558, p<.05) between how tolerant Palestinians feel the Israelis were towards
them and how tolerant they were towards the Israelis and vice versa, the same ap-
plied to the Israelis with (r.=.488, p<.05).
Understanding
Results unveiled that there was a significant and strong positive correlation (r.=.405,
p<.05) between how Israelis understood the Palestinians and how the Israelis be-
lieved the Palestinians understood them and vice versa; the same applied to the
Palestinians with (r.=.520, p<.05)
Anger
Another interesting example was a moderate and positive correlation (r.=.389,
p<.05) between how angry Palestinians were with how angry they thought the Is-
raelis were angry from them, the same applied to the Israelis (r.=.232, p<.05).
Fear
Further results revealed that feelings of fear were quite weak on the Palestinian side
where r.=.199, p<.05, and not even significant on the Israeli side. This means, either
other variables controlled the degree of fear each side have from the other, and/or
it does not matter how fearful Israelis thought the Palestinians were. It does not
influence their own feelings of fear.
Trust
Results revealed that there was a significant and moderate positive correlation
(r.=.321, p<.05) between how Israelis trusted the Palestinians and how the Israelis
thought the Palestinians trusted them and vice versa. The same applied to the Pales-
tinians with a stronger and positive relationship (r.=.493, p<.05).
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Grudge
The more one side thought the other bears grudge against them, the more they were
likely to bear the same feeling and vice versa. The results revealed that there was a
moderate and positive correlation between the feelings of grudge on the Israeli side
(r.=285, p<.05), and quite a very strong correlation on the Palestinian side (r.=.504,
p<.05).
Optimism
The results disclosed that the majority of the Palestinians (63.7%) and the Israelis
(52.8%) believed that things in their respective country were heading to the wrong
direction while only 26.5% of the Palestinians and 32.5% of the Israelis believed
that things were going in the right direction. The rest responded with ‘Don’t know’.
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Summary
1. It is noteworthy that upon asking both Palestinians and Israelis about their
assessment of whether the conflict is of religious, cultural, national, political,
economic, historical, existential or ethnic character, both peoples referred to
all these options with high assessments, which means that, regardless of the
slight difference in the assessment of each option, the two peoples have sug-
gested that the conflict is a mixture of all these options. The conflict is rooted
in different and interrelated forms, although the conflict, according to their
assessment, has been mainly existential, political, historical and national, fol-
lowed by being economical and religious, and lastly labeled as ethnical and
cultural.
2. Scrutiny of the hypotheses has demonstrated the existence of significant sta-
tistical differences between the assessment of the views of the two peoples
about obstacles to the peace process. Their views have differed in 20 items
out of 21 items talking about the obstacles, the matter which shows extent of
the difference and depth of the gap between the Palestinians and Israelis and
their outlook on the reality of the present, and this might be attributed to the
media and their particular framework for the peace process and the conflict
in a way that serves the interests of the state to which they belong. The same
applies to the proposed solutions to the conflict that reinforce the findings I
previously established, since the results indicated the presence of significant
differences between their view of the most intractable issues and in addition
to the differences in points of view even on the second-best solution to the
conflict.
3. Both Israelis and Palestinians have different views regarding the economic
cooperation between the two peoples. As to the results, there were clear differ-
ences when it comes to economic activities that include or require interference
or rather the presence of individuals in the other region (for example, the work
of Palestinian laborers inside Israel) or activities that are aimed at the develop-
ment of the economy of one of the parties only (e.g. construction of an airport
or seaport for the Palestinians). But the two peoples agreed on economic ac-
tivities in general, which include economic cooperation between companies
or institutions without any explicit mention of individuals’ inclusion and their
professional involvement directly in the economic process. These differences
might be attributed in a particular to the Israelis mistrust of the Palestinians
and their fear for their personal security on the one hand, and the weakness of
the Palestinian economy and its direct dependence on the Israeli economy on
the other hand.
4. The majority of the Palestinians and Israelis agreed that the two–state solu-
tion is the most appropriate one, followed by the one-state solution, and then
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other solutions which scored only small rates of support. It is worth mention-
ing here that the rate of those who have opposed all the already mentioned
solutions was very high, reaching a percentage almost close to a quarter of
the respondents in both parties, which might be due to lack of trust in the
other party to reach a peaceful and radical solution to the issue, or due to their
faith and belief in their rights to claim the entire land for themselves, and that
the other party has no right to share with them this land . However, this has
been mentioned in previous chapters of this study.
5. In addition, the Palestinians and the Israelis are divided on the extent of their
trust in their current governments and the ability of such governments to make
peace with the other party, as well as the dissatisfaction of both parties with
the solutions proposed by the other party’s government. The majority sup-
ports the decisions of their government, or are ready to propose solutions
other than those already introduced by their own governments and the other
party’s government. In this context, the results revealed that more than half
of the respondents on the two sides are in favor of resuming negotiations un-
der the current circumstances, while more than a third of the sample refused
to return to negotiations. This calls for understanding this contradiction from
a different perspective, namely that the parties want peace, but want differ-
ent solutions. They do not want to make concessions themselves, but want
the other party to make such concessions. They are inclined towards negotia-
tions, but are not willing to compromise. That’s with regard to the “optimistic
segment in the society”. As for that segment that does not want any of the pro-
posed solutions, and does not want to waive, and does not accept any solution
proposed by their own government and the government of the other party as
well, we must focus on radical changes as to change this unfortunate reality.
6. Both peoples are aware of the fact that negotiations are in the interest of both
parties, especially the Israelis, and that a high rate of the Palestinians believe
that a return to the negotiations table would be in the interest of the Israelis in
exchange for a lower rate on the Israeli side who believed that it is in their own
interest to return to the negotiations table. There is also a proportion within the
two publics that recognizes the importance of a return to the negotiations for
their own people (27.7% on the Israeli side and 15.8% on the Palestinian side)
and another proportion (9.9% on the Israeli side and 6.0% on the Palestinian
side) that do not see in the negotiations any benefit for any party. Nevertheless,
the analyses and the results indicated that the confidence of the two peoples
in the ability of the negotiations to reach a peaceful solution is somehow
affected, as an insignificant minority of 6.2% on the Palestinian side and 4.2%
on the Israeli side strongly believe that the negotiations will bring peace in the
near future.
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7. Each party blames the other for the previous failure of the negotiations, and
both parties have actually agreed to disagree in their views and opinions.
However, it is not surprising that the two parties entirely agree to the effec-
tive role of the Arab leaders in case the negotiations between the two parties
fail. Beyond that, each people blame the government and the people of the
other party as well as the radical groups for the failure of the negotiations in
the past. Even the Palestinians and Israelis perspectives differed clearly about
the extent of the impartiality of the US in the peace process, as the majority
believes that the United States plays a biased role towards the other party, in
particular in the case of the Palestinians, of who more than 80.0% believe that
the role of the United States is biased towards the Israeli side .
8. More than a third of the Israelis does not believe in the necessity for a me-
diator to resolve the dispute, followed by almost a quarter of the respon-
dents, who considers the United States as the best broker. On the Palestinian
side, however, opinions were divided among the Quartet, the United Nations,
Turkey and Egypt.
9. Results demonstrated that both peoples are bored and tired of the conflict,
as almost 80.0% of both parties acknowledged this feeling, which makes us
stand for a moment and probe the reasons and motives behind this feeling;
perhaps it’s the boredom effected by the other party and the certainty that
the other party is not serious in the peace process, and subsequently lack of
faith on both sides that peace will be achieved in the region, a situation that
is prevailing these days; or it might be simply the fact that people are tired of
the conflict and longing for peace. Moreover, 72.0% of the Israelis and 76.0%
of Palestinians wish to varying degrees making peace with the other party and
only 10.8% and 6.0% of the Palestinians and the Israelis respectively are not
interested in making peace with the other side.
10. Both parties are deeply anchored in their miss-perception of reality what has
been done, and what should have been done, and who is responsible for the
failure of past negotiations.
11. Both peoples to some extent do not believe that peace will take place in the
near future.
12. The study revealed that there were significant correlations (p<.05) between
the shared and expected feelings and attitudes of both sides i.e. 91.6% and
77.7% for Palestinians and Israeli respectively. Thus, political leaders and
influential stakeholders can play a significant role in uprooting superseding
miss-perceptions embedded with hatred by tolerance, coexistence and accep-
tance of the other.
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5.3 Formation of Audience Frames
This section answers the research question of ‘What are the factors that influence
the formation of audience frames or perceptions in people’s minds?’. I applied a
principle component analysis (PCA)(31)(32) for the 10 dependent variables: 1) Set-
tlements, 2) Prisoners, 3) Jerusalem, 4) The security of both Israel and the Pales-
tinians, 5) Borders and crossing points, 6) The Refugees, 7) Control over natural
resources like water, 8) Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, 9)
Recognizing the Jewish state, and 10) Control over holy places, in order to ease
the analyses by reducing the number of dependent variables and, therefore, fewer
number of generated models. However, after applying the PCA, I ended up losing
the momentum of data, and, therefore, decided to study the 40 regression models,
and summarize them as seen below. The idea behind these analyzes is that the ten
dependent variables represent to a high degree what the conflict is about. As a re-
sult, summing up the independent variables that significantly predict the variation
in these dependent variables help us understand the intervening factors that consti-
tuted the perceptions individuals hold about the major issues of the conflict and the
extent to which each factor contributed to the shaping of these perceptions. Before
investigating the regression models, I ran some tests to diagnose them for any pos-
sible problems that may occur and have an impact on the analyses (See: Appendix
A). The results of the diagnosing showed that I can comfortably rely on the results,
and the models did not suffer from any serious errors. After applying the multiple
regression models, I found the following:
1. The values of the R2 in Table F.15 show that, on the Israeli side, the highest
variations explained by the independent variables were in the issues of rec-
(31)PCA for the Palestinian side: Bartlett’s test of sphericity X2 (45) = 4995, p<0.001, indicated
that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. The Sig. value for this analysis leads
us to conclude that there were correlations in the data set that are appropriate for factor analysis. An
initial analysis was run to obtain Eigenvalues for each component in the data. Three elements had
eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 55.4% of the variance (as
we can say in the table below). Given the large sample size of 1015, and the convergence of the
scree plot and Kaiser’s criterion on three components, these were the components that were retained
in the final analysis. These components represented the perceptions Palestinians hold for the most
important issues that both people should embark on addressing as the first step towards a genuine
and final peace agreement.
(32)PCA for the Israeli side: Bartlett’s test of sphericity X2(20) = 2742, p<0.001, indicated that
correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA. The Sig. value for this analysis leads us
to conclude that there were correlations in the data set that are appropriate for factor analysis. An
initial analysis was run to obtain Eigenvalues for each component in the data. Four components had
eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and in combination explained 61.5% of the variance (as we
can say in the table below). Given the large sample size of 550, and the convergence of the scree plot
and Kaiser’s criterion on four components, these were the components that were retained in the final
analysis. These components represented the perceptions Israelis hold for the most important issues
that both people should embark on addressing as the first step towards a genuine and final peace
agreement.
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ognizing Israel as a Jewish state and the establishment of a Palestinian state
on the 1967 borders, and were the issues of Jerusalem and also recognizing
Israel as a Jewish state on the Palestinian side. These results reflect a clearer
and a more oriented picture that exists in the minds of the Israelis and Pales-
tinians regarding these issues in comparison to the rest of the issues. However,
still, the Israelis had more driven perceptions regarding these issues because
they got the same results on both splits, A and B. Moreover, the results re-
vealed that for the Palestinians, the issues of settlements, the establishment
of Palestine on the 1967 borders, and to some extent the issue of prisoners
were among the highest issues to be explained by the independent variables,
in comparison with the issues of Jerusalem, security, and prisoners on the
Israeli side.
2. Surprisingly, the variation in the issues of borders, natural resources, and
crossing points were slightly explained by the independent variables on both
side, which reflect less focused views regarding these issues, or to put it in
another way, a more scattered basis, on which they rely their evaluations of
these issues.
3. The variation on the issue of refugees was barely predicted by the independent
variables on the Palestinian side, which might be a result of the absence of a
clear-cut foundation on which they view this issue, or simply, they perceive
it through their sentiments and beliefs, something that individuals themselves
can’t capture.
That was one aspect of the analyzes, another one dealt with the frequencies and
direction of independent variables that were significant after applying the backward
stepwise regression tests. Important variables and their level of significance across
all models were as follow:
5.3.1 Most Influential Variables Predicting Palestini-
ans’ Perceptions
The evaluation of Benjamin Netanyahu was significant (p<.05) in 45.0% of the
20 multiple regression models predicting the variation in the dependent variables,
which means that Palestinians perception frames were highly driven by their eval-
uation of the Israeli Prime Minister and his role pertaining to the peace process.
Further results of the standardized coefficient values as seen in Table F.4 hereunder
show that there was a positive correlation between Palestinians’ evaluation of the
Israeli Prime Minister and their prioritizing of the issues of settlements, Jerusalem,
and prisoners, which means that Palestinians were dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s
policies regarding these issues, and so the same toward his role pertaining to the
peace process. Another crucial confounding variable that was significant (p<.05) in
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45.0% of the models was the dummy variable(33) of not having a clear stand regard-
ing the past. The results revealed that those who had an unclear stand of affiliation
to the past emphasized more on dealing with the issues of settlements, security, and
recognizing the Jewish state, and less on the issues of control over natural resources,
1967 borders, Jerusalem, and prisoners.
5.3.2 Second Most Influential Variables Predicting Pales-
tinians’ Perceptions
The following independent variables were significant in 30% to 40% of the multiple
regression models, as shown in Tables F.16 and F.17.
1. The results unveiled that there was a positive relationship between the eval-
uation of Khalid Misha’al, head of Hamas Politburo, and views of control
over holy place and recognizing the Jewish state, meaning, the more satisfied
Palestinians were with Misha’al’s role pertaining to the peace process, the
less(34) importance they allocated to these issues.
2. Palestinians who thought that things are heading in the right direction in
Palestine put less emphasize on issues I think they consider non-negotiable
(i.e., Jerusalem and the establishing of Palestine on the 1967 borders), or
a painful reality that they are ready to bear (i.e., Security issues). On the
other hand, there was a negative relationship with the issues of settlement
and therecognition of the Jewish state, which reflects that although they be-
lieve things are heading in the right direction, they might be influenced by
settlements, and are bitterly against the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.
3. Palestinians who were ready to compromise for peace were less inclined to
compromise on the issues of refugees, control over Holy places, and the 1967
borders. Further results show that they were more flexible to negotiate the
issues of settlement and natural resources.
4. Surprisingly, Palestinians with relatives or friends that have been killed or
injured over the past years as a result of the conflict put less emphasize on
security, which can be explained as a backlash of not being secured.
5. Results revealed that Palestinians who were willing to emigrate, if they had
the opportunity, cared less about the core stone issues of the conflict (i.e.,
Jerusalem, refugees, prisoners, and settlements). Apparently, this represents
the stratum of the society that is ready to leave everything behind, and travel
abroad seeking for a better life.
(33)In comparison with ‘would sought out more peaceful changes to the history’.
(34)The issues were arranged from 1 to 10, thus, the larger the number is, the less is the importance
they allocated to that issue.
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6. Feelings and attitudes also proved to have an influence on Palestinians’ per-
ceptions of the peace process and the conflict, where having positive feelings
and attitudes towards the Israeli side mattered. The same applies to the ex-
pected negative feelings and attitudes of the Israelis towards themselves.
7. Sensibly, being refugee made, Palestinians care more about the refugees is-
sue, and there was a positive correlation between the two. Added thereto, the
more religious the person is, the more s/he emphasized on the issue of control
over natural resources. Other interesting results were the difference between
Males and Females perception frames of Jerusalem, security, recognizing the
Jewish state, and control over natural resources. Not to mention the quality
of life of the Palestinians, where the worst it was, the more importance they
allocated to the issue of security, and vice versa, as shown in Table F.18.
5.3.3 Most Influential Variables Predicting Israelis’ Per-
ceptions
Results in Table F.19 reveal that, on the Israeli side, being affiliated to the Israeli-
Arab political party of United Arab List - in comparison with those affiliated to
the Likud party - had very influential role in predicting Israelis’ perceptions of the
conflict, where it was significant in 55.0% of the regression models. This variable
prioritized the issues of settlements, refugees, prisoners, 1967 borders (a negative
correlation) over the issues of recognizing the Jewish state, Jerusalem, and Security
(a positive correlation). In addition, the degree of religiosity - an influential variable
that unsurprisingly prioritized the issues of control over holy places, Jerusalem,
and settlements, over security and borders. Another interesting variable that was
significant in 45.0% of the models predicting the perceptions of the conflict’s most
critical parts is the variable of readiness to compromise for peace, a variable that was
also important on the Palestinian side according to the results in Table F.19. Those
who were ready to compromise for peace were less inclined to compromise on the
issues of recognizing the Jewish state, prisoners, Jerusalem, and natural resources,
and more to do so with the issues of settlements and 1967 borders.
5.3.4 Second Most Influential Variables Predicting Is-
raelis’ Perceptions
The following independent variables were significant in 25.0% to 35.0% of the mul-
tiple regression models, as shown in Table F.20. The results were as follows:
1. Education was an important factor that was significant in 30.0% of the mod-
els. According to Table F.20, those who are more educated among the Israelis
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emphasized more on addressing the issues of establishing Palestine on the
1967 borders and Palestinian refugees, and stressed less on present issues,
like crossing points, prisoners, holy places, and natural resource; most likely,
because they understand that former issues, if achieved, will end later ones,
something that less educated Israelis do not realize or view differently.
2. Again, the evaluation of Khalid Misha’l role pertaining to the peace process
was significant in predicting many crucial issues of the conflict. The more Is-
raelis disagreed with his role in building peace, the more they emphasized on
the issues of borders, crossing points, and the building of settlements, mainly,
for security measures. On the other hand, the more they agreed with his role
pertaining to the conflict and peace process, the more they highlighted the
importance of recognizing the Jewish state as if his evaluation is highly con-
nected to how secure they feel, and therefore, the prioritization of issues. Nev-
ertheless, Table F.20 shows that the evaluation of Misha’al was not significant
when predicting the issue of security, which contradicts earlier conclusions.
The only valid explanation is that the majority of Israelis do not trust Misha’al
as a partner for peace, and for them, he will always be coming with more
claims. Accordingly, maintaining a safe and a secure life is not an option that
Hamas or Misha’al offers, but a reality that Israel controls.
3. Being affiliated with the ultra-Orthodox party of United Torah Judaism com-
pared to the Likud was significant in around 30.0% of the models. Results
revealed that being affiliated with this party increases the potential for ad-
dressing the issues of security and crossing points rather than emphasizing on
the issues of settlements and Jerusalem as expected. That is because, for them,
the latter issues are non-negotiable, and, therefore, are not ready to investigate
by any means.
4. In addition to the previous affiliations to political parties, the social-
democratic left-wing party of Meretz has been reviewed, where results show
how being affiliated to this particular party decreases the emphasize on the
issues of Jerusalem and recognizing the Jewish state, and on the other hand,
more focus was put on the issues of 1967 borders and the settlements. These
contingent results support the ideologies of this secular party.
5. Other interesting factors that were crucial in 20.0% of the models included:
(1) Age; the older the respondents, the less emphasis they put on the is-
sues of refugees and security, (2) Gender; males referred to the importance
of addressing the issues of natural resources, borders, and recognizing the
Jewish state more than females, and on the issue of settlement less than fe-
males, (3) Israelis who lost friends or relatives because of the conflict as-
signed more priority to the issues of refugees and recognizing the Jewish state,
and less weight was given to the issue of Jerusalem, as if losing a beloved
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person unleashed nationalistic-historic feelings that dominated religious be-
liefs. Finally, (4) having negative feelings and attitudes towards Palestinians
and/or being affiliated with the center-left political party of Zionist Union
contributed to perceptions Israelis hold about the conflict and peace process.
Table F.22 summarizes all models’ independent variables that were significant when
applying the backward stepwise regression tests.
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5.4 Document Analyses
5.4.1 Summary
The total number of documents in the specified period from August 2013 to March
2014 was as follows: 42 documents out of 102 (41.1%) for Likud, discussed or
mentioned the conflict , 25 documents out of 96 for the Labour Party (26.0%), 53
out of 87 (60.9%) for Hamas, and 38 documents for Fateh(35).
In total, 295 items(36) were distributed across 25 dimensions on the Palestinian
side, and a total of 238 items were distributed across 22 dimensions on the Israeli
side. At the beginning of the analyzes, I found that the Palestinian political doc-
uments included 66 dimensions and the Israeli ones comprised of 42 dimensions.
Therefore, I condensed the answers to 25 and 22 dimensions on the Palestinian and
Israeli side respectively as to ease the analysis and comparisons. All similar dimen-
sions were condensed into one unique dimension that summarized all of them. For
instance, the division of Jerusalem to Eastern and Western Jerusalem as well as
the dimension of Judaization of Jerusalem were recoded to “Jerusalem”. The same
applies to the rest of the dimensions. A brief description of the most prominent
dimensions on each side was mentioned below.
5.4.2 Testing Hypothesis
The function of politicians and opinion leaders was thoroughly described above.
They represent the stratum of the society that talk to people through the media to
impose their authority, and the individuals engage in the political process through
the media to express their opinions about national issues. Accordingly, the primary
objective of the document analysis is to measure the level of congruence between
issues discussed by the major political parties/movements and their respective lead-
ers with those presented in the newspapers of each country and perceived by the
people.
H0: There is no significant difference between Palestinian and Israeli political
parties/movements focuses on the three dimensions of causes, consequences,
and solutions on α = .05 level of significance.
Results revealed that there was a significant difference between Palestinian and
(35)The total number of documents was not counted, because it included international issues and
was not limited to domestic ones.
(36)Items were issues about the conflict.
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Israeli political parties/movements focuses on the three dimensions of causes, con-
sequences, and solutions X2 (2) = 38.1, p<.001, where 32.5% of the Palestinian
political parties focused on causes in comparison to 30.7% on the Israeli side. The
difference was bigger between their focuses on consequences and solutions: The
Palestinians mentioned in their documents more about the consequences of the con-
flict, while Israeli documents investigated more the solutions thereof. Nevertheless,
I should clarify here that each side considered its perspective across each portrayed
causes, consequences, and solutions. This means it might be the case that Israeli
political parties investigated the solutions for the refugees problem, but that did not
imply that they discussed the solutions that matter for the Palestinian side, but the
Israeli ones. The same applies to the Palestinians; each side viewed the right solu-
tion to be the solution that fits more their interest in the country.
5.4.3 Comparisons
Palestinian Political Parties
The results disclosed different focuses of topics when discussing the conflict, as
shown in Tables F.23 and F.24. Figure 5.38 below showed the distribution of the
most significant dimensions or topics investigated by the political movements of
Fateh and Hamas. The following items summed up to 89.8%(37) of total dimen-
sions. The results revealed that the dimension of security was mentioned the most
by these leading political movements. The security of the Palestinians comprises
of a broad range of actions committed against the Palestinians and their lands. For
instance, the Israeli war against Gaza, and their measures of demolishing houses
expropriating lands, mass detentions, military presence and attacks, excessive use
of force by the Israeli army, incursions of the military into Palestinian towns and
targeted liquidations, assassinations, and massacres.
The next most significant issue that was mentioned in their document was the
issue of Jerusalem (13.6% of total dimensions), which comprised of (a) the Ju-
daization of Jerusalem: daily attempts of obliterating the Arab and Islamic identity
of Jerusalem, encroachment on the Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic and Chris-
tian sanctities in Jerusalem, (b) Settlement activities extending into an infiltration
of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, encircling them with Jewish
population, (c) Division of Jerusalem, (d) International control over Jerusalem, and
agreement on managing the Holy sites.
(37)After I condensed the answers from 66 to 25.
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FIGURE 5.38 MAIN DIMENSIONS INVESTIGATED BY THE PALESTINIAN
POLITICAL PARTIES
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The third major topic mentioned in their documents was the issue of prison-
ers; 11.9% of the total dimensions discussed this issue. It included the acts against
Palestinian prisoners extending from the frequent physical abuse and torture of de-
tainees to the deteriorating situation of the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Add
thereto the evacuation of prisoners from jails or their release under certain condi-
tions or circumstances. Other topics falling under this category is Hamas’s readiness
to continue their resistance until all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails are freed.
This is followed by Hamas’s condemnation of the PA’s security cooperation with
the Israelis (6.8%), the lack of trust between Palestinians and Israelis (5.4%), and
the importance of Third-party mediation (4.7%). Surprisingly, only 4.4% of the fo-
cusing was dedicated to the issue of settlements, 3.7% of them stuck in the past
commemorating wars and massacres, and the same percentage encouraged the con-
tinuation of the resistance (mainly in the case of Hamas), as shown in the figure
above.
Israeli Political Parties
The following items summed up to 88.7%(38) of total dimensions. Interestingly, re-
sults in Figure 5.39 below revealed that 21.1% of the total dimensions discussed
the security of Israel, which included Palestinians constant threat of indiscriminate
attacks from suicide bombings, attacks on settlements and Israeli citizens, Qas-
sam rocket and mortar shelling on Israeli targets, kidnapping, hijackings, stabbings,
shootings, and stone-throwing. Add thereto Hamas’s incitement to launch a third
(38)After I condensed the answers from 42 to 22.
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intifada against Israel, and the belief that the State of Palestine will become a ‘ter-
rorist’ state.
FIGURE 5.39 MAIN DIMENSIONS INVESTIGATED BY THE ISRAELI POLITICAL
PARTIES
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The second most investigated issues (with a total of 7.1%) were (a) the issue of
building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both sides by
prohibiting all forms of incitement to hatred, by the education for peace, and how
the media should play a positive role in promoting peace and pro-peace ideologies
and programs. (b) Israeli intransigence, which comprised of Israel’s unwillingness
to negotiate directly with Hamas, and (c) Third-party mediation. Another empha-
sis on the Israeli-American ‘strategic alliance’, which constituted 6.7% of the total
dimensions, followed by recognizing the Jewish state (6.3%), and the two-state so-
lution (6.3%), as shown in the figure above.
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5.5 Integration of Findings
The main objectives of this dissertation are to compare the degree of harmony of
conflict topics and the peace process in the minds of the Palestinian and Israeli
peoples with what the Palestinian and Israeli media, as well as the political parties
and their leaders, disseminate. After the collection of items and the standardization
of their denominators in every data form and their comparison with each other (as
shown in Table 5.21 hereunder), I established a somewhat high similarity between
the coverage extent of the frameworks that talk about the conflict in these segments
of society. Despite the different results between some individuals, the media, and the
leaders sometimes, I noticed from the subsequent results that there was a positive
correlation between the inclination of the segments in covering most of the topics
or frameworks. In certain cases, the compatibility was very high between the order
of priorities given to a specific topic in the media and the minds of individuals and
what has been focused on by the leaders and political parties. In few cases, however,
there was a slight difference in the tendencies, and that due to political reasons I
have explained and interpreted in detail, or due to other reasons that explain my
reduction of the comparison items and my commitment to certain topics I defined
in the basic frameworks of the conflict.
FIGURE 5.40 ORDER OF ISSUES ACROSS ALL LEVELS
63.7% 63.9%
75.0%
69.4% 69.4%
86.1%
M E D I A  X  S U R V E Y S U R V E Y  X  D O C U M E N T M E D I A  X  D O C U M E N T
A
V
ER
A
G
E 
%
 O
F 
SI
M
IL
A
R
IT
Y
PRIOTORIZATION OF ISSUES 
I S R A E L P A L E S T I N E
Figure 5.40 above shows how similar the order of frames were across the three
levels of audience, media and political stakeholders. The results regardless of the
direction illustrates a high average of similarity between frames in every interac-
tion. Relying on my comparison data and linking the results of content, survey and
documents analyzes of leaders and political parties, I came to the following conclu-
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sions:
1. Israeli and Palestinian media ascribe utmost importance to the issue of safety
and security. I mean the safety and security which enables the ordinary Is-
raeli Jew, be it a child, a woman or an old man, to go confident and at ease
to school, or to his office or store, or to the park, where he plays with his
grandchildren, not looking cautiously and terrified to his right or his left, to
someone encountering him, or walking behind him. As for the Palestinians,
the topic security and safety is defined. It will not be achieved unless the
Israeli occupation comes to an end and the State of Palestine is established
with Jerusalem as its capital within the borders of the 6th of June 1967 and
in accordance with the international resolutions. Hence, as the results reveal,
Palestinians do not impute the issue of security and safety a great importance
as explicit as the case is in the Palestinian media, which have placed the issue
of security and safety at the top of their priorities order towards the con-
flict. The reason is that this item has included victims, arrests, demolition of
houses, hospitals and the confiscation of land and many actions, from which
the Palestinian people are suffering on a daily basis as a result of the Israeli
hegemony. As for the parties and political leaders, the analysis results of the
political documents of this category did not differ at all from that of the pub-
lic. The issue of security and safety stood for the same reasons on the top of
both parties’ priorities, as political leaders realize that ensuring the security
of their people is an integral part of the citizen’s fundamental rights that can-
not be waived or ignored for a sound functioning of the political and social
process and the success and prosperity of the state.
2. The prisoners’ issue was one of the topics that were highlighted by each of
the Palestinian media, the leaders, and the Palestinian political parties, and
that is clearly and firmly embedded in the minds of the Palestinians. The pris-
oners’ issue occupies a significant place in the framework of the Palestinian
cause, as it involved a large number of Palestinian people, mainly in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. It was necessary to give this issue a legal and humani-
tarian dimension due to Israel’s lack of commitment to abide by the Charter
of the United Nations and its decisions and to the provisions and regulations
of the international humanitarian law in their dealings with the Palestinian
prisoners. Add to it the certainty of the concerned authorities of the necessity
to speed up programmed diplomatic, political and legal actions in order to
internationalize it and to benefit as much as possible from the relevant inter-
national laws and resolutions.
As for the Israeli party, the prisoners’ issue has been covered by the Israeli
media somehow extensively, including raising the issue of prisoners release
under certain circumstances, such as political, humanitarian or health reasons.
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This coverage, however, did not reflect on the Israeli people, who placed the
prisoners’ issue among the less important issues in the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict. An analogous result has been established by the political parties and
leaders, who found in other issues of the conflict greater importance, such as
the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, or as the state of the Jewish peo-
ple, which is an expression of the self-determination right of people, that is
related to this land in a ‘historical right’ relationship. I have further found
upon my analysis of the perspective of this issue in the minds of the Israelis
that this issue occupies the second priorities or conditions for attaining peace
between the two sides. Nevertheless, the Israeli media did not allocate the
same intensity of media coverage to talk about this topic and contented itself
with referring to this topic in a somehow moderate form. As to the Palestini-
ans, it is expected that the media, the Palestinian public, and their leaders put
this issue at the bottom of their priorities scale. This reflects their unwilling-
ness to accept or grant this recognition due to the political, legal, ideological
and national dimensions that would result from that. The recognition of the
Jewish character of the state means a precedent waiver of the right of return
and admittance of the Palestinians that all Palestinian demands known as fi-
nal status issues have been resolved, especially the refugees, the borders, and
Jerusalem.
3. Not surprisingly, the issue of Jerusalem and the holy places with their reli-
gious, political and historical dimensions have met with interest of the Israeli
and Palestinian parties, in particular the Palestinian people, who put the solu-
tion of the issue of Jerusalem at the core of their priorities to make peace with
the Israelis, the matter which is reiterated in the content of Palestinian media
and speeches of Palestinian leaders and political parties. On the Israeli side,
the intensity of the media coverage of the issue of Jerusalem is less empha-
sized than that on the Palestinian side, it is however ranked in the fifth position
on the priorities scale in respect of the conflict, and in the third position for the
Israeli people. As for the issue of controlling the natural resources, despite its
significance, it received from the Israeli and Palestinian sides little attention
at all the political and media levels and at the level of individuals, who found
on other issues a much more crucial importance.
4. As I mentioned in previous chapters of this study, the settlements issue lies
in the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The resolution of this issue re-
quires resolutions to other intractable issues. The topic of the settlers and the
expansion of settlements at the cost of the Palestinian terrain have occupied
the headlines of the Palestinian media, especially in the light of confiscat-
ing Palestinian lands in violation of the international law, as well as the daily
settler attacks against the Palestinians and neighboring towns. The resonance
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of this media revolution about the settlements did not meet with the same
resonance in the minds of the Palestinian public, who perceived that the set-
tlements issue, which lies at the center of priorities, is preceded by other more
important issues. The same applies to the Palestinian leaders and parties. As
to the Israeli side, the settlements issue has met with extensive media cov-
erage, which is fairly reflected on the Israeli people, who in turn found the
issue of the settlements expansion and protection of the settlers somewhat
crucial, and that is mentioned in the policies of the leaders with almost the
same intensity.
5. It remains to say that the issue of Palestinian refugees, which is considered
as one of the most critical final-status issues, because it affects the largest
proportion of the Palestinian people, as well as the rate of 78% of historic
Palestine, have met with moderate partisan condemnation and a Palestinian
media involvement less than expected, but with a very high interest among
the Palestinians, who ranked the refugee issue in the third position preceded
by the issues of Jerusalem and the prisoners. For the Palestinians, the refugees
issue is the heart of the Palestinian cause. It’s the complex of the Zionist set-
tlement and religious project, the matter which requires the finding of politi-
cal equations, which ensure maintaining it alive until the appropriate factors
are available to empower the refugees to realize their dreams and acquire
their right of return. This equation is inverted in the Israeli street, the public
and media of which did not care about the refugees issue compared with its
leaders and political parties, who emphasized their principle refusal of the
right of return under the pretext that their recognition of this right entails the
acknowledgment of Israel’s responsibility for the rise of the problem, and
subsequently bearing the consequences thereof. Israel, for its part, does not
consider itself responsible for the 1948 war, but it is worth mentioning, how-
ever, that notwithstanding this fact, the Israeli governments, especially gov-
ernments headed by the Labor Party, are willing to enter some Palestinian
refugees to Israel proper within the criteria of family reunification and with-
out any commitment towards these refugees to the right of return.
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Chapter 6
MODEL, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS IN LIGHT OF THEORY AND HY-
POTHESES
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6.1 Dissertation’s Model
In addition to its a) unique multi-methodological approach, b) representative data
on each level of analyses, c) vital scientific descriptions and interpretations in the
context of comparing the perceptions or frames of the peace process and the con-
flict among Palestinian and Israeli individuals, media and political stakeholders,
this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the reading of the conflict from
different angles. A process is defined as a “sequence of interdependent and linked
procedures in which inputs are converted outputs then serve as inputs for the next
stage until a known goal or result is reached”. However, in the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, this process is hindered by the very first stage of it, where results revealed
very different and contradictory perceptions on the individual level, which keeps
the wheels of peace tangled. In light of the theory, literature and hypotheses of this
dissertation, I developed the model hereunder in an attempt to answer why in my
view the conflict still persists, and how the perception gap between both people
stretch over time. As I mentioned before, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of
the most bitter, deeply rooted and protracted conflicts of our century. It has been
so deep-seated that even wars and peace treaties have been unable to bring about
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an end to it. It is considered one of the major intractable conflicts of our time that
has resisted even the most serious attempts towards a resolution. Therefore, I am
not in a position to find a solution to this body of complex, but instead, I am trying
in the model below to offer some explanations of what is happening, on the macro
level, summarized by the interaction between audience, media and political stake-
holders. Notably, that I thoroughly analyzed and compared different perceptions on
each micro-level in previous chapters.
The results of the analyses revealed very opposite opinions between Palestinians
and Israelis on most of the aspects within each level in the developed matrix. I illus-
trated these opinion with stripes of opposing directions in each triangle, which has
three sides; affective, cognitive and behavioral. Bordered by a thick layer referring
to the socio-demographic and more factors that influence the formation of audience
frames. The second stage (in successive period of T2) shows how core issues are
formed, which appear when the two triangles of perceptions intersect, leading to the
third stage (T3). A stage where the ‘core’ issues become the conflict and the rest
fades, regardless of how relevant the rest of information is significant to the persis-
tence of the conflict and its resolution. I referred to the rest of information at this
stage as ‘postponed reality’ which each side; the Palestinians and the Israelis solely
find important, a reality that is less critical at this juncture but can be a huge obsta-
cle in later stages of conflict resolution. I referred to information that was neglected
in the first stage because of media and leaders’ framing of reality an ‘Ignored or
marginalized reality’, which is inevitable and was thoroughly explained in previous
chapters of this dissertation.
From reality into a framed reality: at this stage, the model shows the gap (G1)
between perceptions of the Palestinians and Israelis due to the framing of news in
each country by its’ respective media and political stakeholders. Now, at the second
stage, this gap is widened by the amount of G2+G3, due to the focus of the media
on the core issues of the conflict leaving a wider gap between perceptions of both
people. Finally, the third stage (T3), where the gap is even broader and equal to
the previous gaps plus the focus of each media on “the others” perceptions of the
core issues of the conflict, which the results revealed were negatively/inversely por-
trayed, I referred to it as ‘counter reality’. At this stage, the media becomes more
vulnerable and responsive to the audience frames due to the urgency of the situa-
tion and topics in hand, and therefore, an interaction between the three sides of the
triangle (media, audience, and political stakeholders) become more prominent. To
summarize, by the end of the process, the newly-established reality is not only very
inconsistent with what actually happened but also, it fuels up the conflict by repre-
senting the others’ stubborn and contradictory perceptions of the same ‘core’ issues
of the conflict. Also, the model shows the interaction between the newly-established
reality (i.e., the core issues that we believe in versus the others’ perceptions of the
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same key issues) with media and political stakeholders’ frames. The directions of in-
fluence (or causalities) between these levels of analyses were not determined in this
dissertation and therefore, it is highly recommended to be investigated by applying
a time-series analyses of the same factors across time (T1, T2, Tn. . . ) to pinpoint
causalities between them. Nevertheless, the results in Figure 5.40 revealed that the
order of frames were very close across all levels of analyses particularly between
media and political stakeholders’ frames. Thats why the model below referred to
them as one entity portraying the same reality.
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6.2 Findings
The following hypotheses were tested using different statistical analyses. Signif-
icance was determined at the .05 level of significance and yielded the following
findings:
1. The hypothesis that the presence of episodic nature will be more dominant
than thematic one in photos appearing in connection with frames in Pales-
tinian and Israeli newspapers on α = .05 level of significance was accepted
(V= .31, p <.05).
2. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the percentage
of articles dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per issue in Palestinian
and Israeli newspapers was rejected (r= .61, p<.05).
3. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between the percentage
of news dedicated to each topic in Palestinian and Israeli newspapers was
rejected (r= .45, p<.05).
4. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and
Israeli newspapers density of coverage to causes of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict per article was rejected (r= .11, p<.05).
5. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and
Israeli newspapers density of coverage to consequences of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict per article was rejected (r= .07, p<.05).
6. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian
and Israeli newspapers density of coverage to proposed solutions to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article was rejected (r= .14, p<.05).
7. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and
Israeli newspapers density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict per article was rejected (r= .21, p<.05).
8. The hypothesis that articles in Palestinian newspapers tend to expand in cov-
ering news across the three aspects of causes, consequences, and solutions
was accepted.
9. The hypothesis that articles in Israeli newspapers tend to be more aspect-
oriented and focused more on reporting only causes, consequences or solu-
tions, instead of expanding across the three aspects was accepted.
10. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and
Israeli newspapers harmony in covering issues of the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict was accepted (r= .02, p>.05).
11. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and
Israeli evaluations of the role of historical events in nowadays conflict was
rejected (r= .11, p<.05).
12. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
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Israelis’ perceptions of actions pertaining to the conflict was rejected (p<.05).
13. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians
and Israelis’ evaluations of the role of conflict-related actions in hindering
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process was rejected (p<.05).
14. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ perceptions of the most and second acceptable solutions to the core
issues of the conflict was rejected (p<.05).
15. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians
and Israelis’ approving economic cooperation plans between both parties was
rejected (p<.05).
16. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ approving elements as parameters of establishing a Palestinian state
was rejected (p<.05).
17. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ prioritization of crucial issues was rejected (p<.05).
18. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ trust in their respective political leaders to make peace with the other
side was rejected (p<.05).
19. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ support of the resumption of peace negotiations under the current
circumstances was accepted (p>.05).
20. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between support for the
resumption of peace negotiations and trust in those negotiations to achieve
peace was rejected (r= .37, p<.05).
21. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians
and Israelis’ perceptions of shouldering the responsibility for the failure of
past peace negotiations and treaties was rejected (p<.05).
22. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ perceptions of how balanced is the role of the United States in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict was rejected (r= .12, p<.05).
23. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ perceptions of which state or international organization could be the
best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis was rejected (r= .52, p<.05).
24. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ boredom of the conflict was rejected (r= .54, p<.05).
25. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ willingness towards peace was rejected (r= .42, p<.05).
26. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
Israelis’ confidence in peace was rejected (r= .35, p<.05).
27. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinians and
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Israelis’ feelings and attitudes towards each other was rejected (p<.05).
28. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between Palestinians
and Israelis’ perceptions of how they feel towards each other was rejected
(p<.05).
29. The hypothesis that there is no significant correlation between Palestinians
and Israelis’ shared and expected feelings and attitudes was rejected (p<.05).
30. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between Palestinian and
Israeli political parties/movements focuses on the three dimensions of causes,
consequences, and solutions was rejected (r= .32, p<.05).
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6.3 Conclusions
On the basis of the evidence resulted from the research, the following conclusions
appeared warranted in generalizability to the target populations of Palestine and
Israel:
1. There is quiet a high level of accord between (A) media and audience frames,
(B) audience and political parties frames, and (C) between media and political
parties frames on both side of the conflict. Results on each level of analyses
revealed that indeed how the media frame the conflict goes in harmony with
how the people on each side perceive it. The direction of influence or causality
as to say is not specified here, however, this dissertation supposes that it is an
interactive process where the direction of influence and the transmission of in-
formation between politicians, the media, and the public operates downwards
from governing institutions towards citizens, horizontally in linkages among
political actors, and also upwards from public opinion towards authorities, as
stated in Norris (2004) interactive model of political communication.
2. The answer to the first research question of ‘to what degree there is an ac-
cord between media and audience frames on either side of the conflict?’ is
that the impact of media is not absolute as the Hypodermic Needle Theory
suggests, however, the relationship between the media and the public opin-
ion on the Palestinian and Israeli sides is strong and firm, as both of them
derives its strength and impact from the other, and each of them affects and
is affected by the other. The media on both sides are inflammatory, mobi-
lize the inside against the enemy within a concept that exaggerates and is far
from the objective facts and distorts them or ignores some of their elements
as to be consistent with the self-image of the national group. Additionally, I
found that the majority of the Palestinians and Israelis are field-dependent in
their habitual tends of perceiving, organizing, analyzing, or recalling infor-
mation and experience. Meaning, their perceptions of information is highly
dependent on the environment surrounding them and are more sensitive to in-
terpersonal cues, social information, and manipulation, and are less cognitive
restructuring and tend to accept information from the environment as they ap-
pear. This goes in line with Riding & Sadler-Smiths‚ (1997) definition of this
cognitive style. Or simply, because the large portion of the public believes that
the side supported by the media reflects the trend in the society, the opinion
adopted by the media continues to be stronger and possibly put pressure on
those, who oppose the opinion adopted by the media, so they turn to be silent.
This is what Noelle-Neumann (1977) referred to as the spiral effect in her
theory of Spiral of Silence. Clearly, this effect amplifies in the context of war
to avoid persecution of the big pro-community, or in fear of social isolation.
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Later, the different set of beliefs Palestinians and Israelis hold are translated
into differences in emphasis, interpretation and selection of same events. This
is deepened by the amplification process of public opinion as stated in the Re-
sultant Acceleration Model discussed in earlier chapters of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, the hope for peace is still there, symbolized by a small minority
of individuals that are highly independent in processing perceived informa-
tion, and who bypass the surrounding and build their perception of an issue in
accordance with their inner cues. It is this stratum of individuals that act on
information on highly autonomous fashion with a greater level of perceptual
and cognitive restructuring.
3. The answer to the research question regarding ‘the degree of accord between
media and audience frames with political parties frames on either side of the
conflict’ is simply, very strong. Political parties and leaders on both sides of
the conflict influence through their speeches, decisions and evaluations the
perceptions of the two peoples, and there is a high degree of consistency be-
tween the media frameworks available in the minds of the two peoples and
the media frameworks promoted by political leaders and their parties. This
transmission of information and thoughts in two phases through the people’s
reception of the information that is broadcasted by the media and through the
interpretations of the opinion leaders of this information was depicted in the
Two-Step Flow Theory. The political game in Palestine and Israel is based on
a certain marketing success. The players of this political game resort to polit-
ical marketing through media propaganda and all the means to gain access to
power and promote their ‘goals’. They understand the impact of political mar-
keting to the public, and utilize it to serve their own interests. From here we
have to understand that it is very unlikely for Palestinians and Israelis outside
the political circle to have access to political events without mass media tools;
the political environment embraced by the media. Obviously, it is not easy for
both peoples to evade the effect of structural political process broadcasted by
the media.
4. ‘To what degree there is a discord between audience frames in Palestine and
Israel?’ Analyses of survey data revealed significantly high level of discord
between perceptions of the conflict in the minds of the Palestinians and Is-
raelis. As I mentioned before, results revealed as if Palestinians and Israelis
agreed to disagree in their understanding of the conflict. Most of their prior-
itization of milestone issues are incoherent with one another and are driven
by 1) their need for recognition and security as key factors for survival and
persistence, 2) the awareness, relevance, and accessibility of conflict infor-
mation to the public, mainly controlled by their salience in the media and
political and intellectual elites, and 3) their view of the other’s positions or
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suggested solutions as so different that agreement is not possible, and does not
serve the peace process or their own interests. These and more were proven
to be critical in Rouhana and Bar-Tals’(1998) analyses of psychological dy-
namics in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The conflict is being inherited from
generation to a generation, the only difference is the intensity of developed
animosity and prejudice. Added to that the perception of exclusiveness and
the refusal of each side to recognize the other. Not to mention the history of
victimization, which is summarized in the deeply-rooted senses of historical
persecutions and destructions that accumulate over time and leave each group
absent in its own tragic national experience regardless and in the state of de-
nial of the other group horrific experiences. All these and more emphasize the
discrepancy between Palestinians and Israelis, and minimizes the potentiality
of reaching a permanent resolution to the conflict.
5. ‘To what degree there is a discord between news frames in Palestinian and
Israeli media? And what are the patterns of news reporting?’ The analyses
revealed paradoxical results, on one side, there is a somehow strong positive
relationship among the topics covered by the Israeli and Palestinian media
across 65 items of causes, consequences and solutions. On the other side,
although a similar percentage of attention was given to these issues, how-
ever, the direction and intensity (i.e. number of articles) of coverage were
very different on the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. This to a large extent
defines how the conflict is being deepened by media and political stakehold-
ers’ frames and propaganda, which is evident in audience’s contrasting per-
ceptions of the conflict as shown above. Regarding the patterns of news re-
porting, the majority of Palestinian and Israeli media talked about the causes
of the conflict, or, in particular, history of the conflict, as a conflict of beliefs,
notions and perceptions, and in which the present is rooted, and the future is
leaning. While almost half of the number of articles in the Palestinian media
and a one-third in the Israeli media have focused on the results of the conflict
(or on the present, in particular), the rest however, has included the proposed
solutions, despite the fact that most of the solutions would serve the region to
which they belong, as each side suggests the solutions that fit their interests,
the matter which is reflected on the Palestinian and Israeli public opinion,
where results revealed that both peoples refer to the history somehow a great
importance. Finally, a very marginalized percentage of articles in the Israeli
and Palestinian media have written about the peace process or about the con-
flict in a positive way. Even if we consider that the conflict’s issues implicitly
reflect negativism, or in the best case neutrality, this painful reality aggravates
the conflict. These results and more reinforce the notion that the Israeli and
Palestinian media lack constructive self-criticism, and instead they focus on
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‘the other’ presented as the persecuting intruder, or simply revert to the past
of the conflict and its painful memories and thereby boost these inflammatory
notions.
6. ‘What other relevant factors that shape the audience frame perceptions? And
to what extent?’After summing up the results of all models and reducing them
to a fewer number of representative factors, I found that 1) the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict is a dispute that is to a large extent perceived by individuals
through their affiliations with political parties, 2) the perception of the con-
flict is connected to the notion individual’s hold about the most appropriate
solution to the conflict, whether a two-state that reciprocally recognize the
legitimacy of each other, an Israeli and a Palestinian state, or a one state, in
which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obligations, a
Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, or the West Bank becomes part of Jor-
dan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt. Moreover, 3) the willingness to take risks
and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace is another factor
that plays a significant role in predicting individuals’ perception frames of the
conflict. Equally important factors were actions hindering the peace process.
And 4) as expected, the degree of religiosity does have its share of influence
when it comes to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 5) Feelings and attitudes,
whether positive or negative, contributed to the shaping of individuals’ per-
ceptions of the conflict. Other feelings-related factors comprised of having a
relative or friends been killed or injured over the past years as a result of the
conflict, being skeptic about the past, willingness to immigrate, confidence
in the peace process, and being optimist regarding economic cooperation be-
tween both sides. Finally, 6) demographic factors that had a moderate rela-
tionship with perception frames were the quality of life index, gender, age,
and formal education.
6.4 Recommendations
Based on the findings and the conclusions of this study, it was recommended that:
1. The media on both sides must focus on the peace culture rather than insti-
gate more hatred, fear and belligerency between the two peoples. Media have
great responsibilities ahead such as correcting of misleading images for the
public opinion on both sides and focusing on the peace powers and possibili-
ties rather than to pour oil on the flames and protract violence. Media on both
sides must help to build trust between the public opinions and boost the peace
process.
2. Media must play a decisive role because it’s one of the most effective tools
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for building consensus and achieving cultural diversity. It must focus on the
peace culture and rectify misleading judgments and distorted images between
the peoples. Media should help boost cultural diversity.
3. If a historic reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians is sought, there
must be a genuine peace, for the military confrontation will not deliver, and
the conviction to live in peaceful coexistence is gaining every day more
weight. The horizons of future are open, and the culture of peace and co-
existence has found a ground on the Israeli–Palestinian reality, a matter that
will have positive effects on the formation of the next generation. All this is
a positive shift in the Palestinian Israeli conflict but could however collapse
momentarily if it finds no support and sustenance. Nothing can help more
than a genuine settlement of the conflict, after which all parties can live in
peace, security and economic prosperity.
4. Palestinian and Israeli peace activists should exert hard efforts all over the
world to correct the distorted images of both nations by focusing on the posi-
tive points and the common wish for peace. They can help to reflect credibility
on the voices that call for actions against violence, and by spreading the cul-
ture of peace, enabling the two peoples to deal with each other in a civilized
and humanitarian way and to listen to the needs and aspirations of the other.
Communicating with each other and coming together must replace hatred and
grudge, for today, in the era of globalization and internet, one can not prevent
people from communicating with each other. So how it would like for Pales-
tinians and Israelis, who live on a tiny piece of land? They still find difficulties
in debating and communicating with each other.
5. In seeking a settlement for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we have to bestow a
great importance to the estimates of what Palestinians and Israelis may accept
and refuse. It’s not sufficient to probe only the opinion of the leadership of
the political parties and organizations because ignoring the Palestinian public
opinion will have an adverse impact on the public consent of any accord that
may be signed in future. The support of the public opinion for such accords
gives them the real strength. Otherwise, the conflict will continue whatever
the accords or agreements may be, and whoever may sign them. The public is
the basis for the success of those accords. Ignoring the public opinion on such
issues, or not building a positive public opinion to back them, simply means
that such agreements will remain incomplete and will be lacking the popular
base.
6. Both publics, must work together worldwide to correct their distorted image,
and that by focusing on the common positive aspects and their mutual desire
to make peace.
7. Mutual understanding will build trust between both countries. Education is
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one aspect that should not be underestimated; it should be free from biased
information about the other’s religion, culture and history. Maybe at later
stages, to set up school were Palestinians and Israelis can attend, and taught
by teachers from both sides. Chao (2011, p. 23) once noted: ‘By educating
Israelis and Palestinians on each other, each will begin to see similarities,
which will bring mutual understanding’.
To be acquainted today with the results of the public opinions on both sides,
is a necessary and valuable attribute to the long-term viability of the whole peace
process. When both public opinions, Israeli and the Palestinian, perceive that both
nations are in need for security, peace, stability, economic prosperity and full
sovereignty especially for Palestinians, peace will have a better chance. In order
to bring the peace process to a successful end, the public opinion should be encour-
aged to see the reality in both societies. The two conflict parties are viewing each
other at present in a wrong manner. As noticed above, fear, skepticism and prej-
udices are so far dominating the relations between both sides, and this entails the
mistrust and the feeling of insecurity towards each other. The negative public opin-
ion on both sides, being influenced by such misleading judgments, is then translated
into violence and counter-violence at all public and official levels.
If peace prevails, people in the Middle East will be envied for building a mul-
ticultural and multi-religious societies rather being pitied for the belligerency and
volatile political situation as it is the case now. I want to conclude with a quote by
Lerner (2004) answering the question “does the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has an
end”?
The conflict between Israel and Palestine can end. It is not a reflection of some
eternal struggle that can never be solved. It is not the product of hatred that
is so intractable that they will always defeat good intentions. And when it is
solved, people will look back and wonder why the obvious steps to a solution
were not taken at a much earlier stage and in a more decisive manner.
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REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS
Before explaining the regression tests, I checked some problems that may occur
when running a regression model, which included the following:
A.1 Testing for Normality of Residuals
In short, the rationale behind hypothesis testing relies on having something that
is normally distributed (in some cases it’s the sample distribution, in others the
error in the model) and, if this assumption is not met, the logic behind hypothesis
testing is flawed (Field, 2009, p. 133). One of the assumptions of linear regression
analysis is that the residuals are normally distributed. Therefore, I predicted the
dependent variables from the independent variables. Then, I used the/save command
to generate residuals.
As shown above, I used the examine command to look at the normality of
these residuals. The results revealed that the residuals were relatively normally dis-
tributed: for the 40 models the values of skewness and kurtosis were somewhat
close to zero. Added to that, generated histograms looked to some extent normally
distributed. The results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk were in many
cases insignificant (p>.05) suggesting that those models are not significantly dif-
ferent from a normal distribution (i.e. they are normally distributed), and in other
cases, it was significant (p<.05). The main objective of running these models was
to determine the most influential predictors of the major issues of the conflict, and
if the test of normality or other tests did not meet the requirements in some of the
models that did not mean that I will be constrained by the results since I have plenty
of models.
A.2 Testing for Collinearity
I tested for collinearity to check if any of the models’ predictors have a perfect
linear relationship among each other. Since, if that was the case, the estimates of
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the regression models’ coefficients become unstable and might inflate dramatically.
Additionally, it makes some variables statistically insignificant while they should
be otherwise significant.
One efficient way to test for multicollinearity is by using the ‘tolerance’(1) and
‘VIF’(2) values for each predictor. The number of predictors multiplied with the
number of models i.e. 40 have generated very large tables, which according to them
the values of ‘tolerance’ and ‘VIF’ were very acceptable, and as a results, the models
did not suffer from any multicollinearity problems.
A.3 Testing for Heteroskedasticity
Another assumption of ordinary least squares regression is that the variance of the
residuals is homogeneous across levels of the predicted values, also known as ‘ho-
moscedasticity’. If the model is well-fitted, there should be no pattern to the resid-
uals plotted against the fitted values. If the variance of the residuals is nonconstant,
then the residual variance is said to be ‘heteroscedastic’. Hence, it was advisable to
check the model for robustness. Basically, I aimed to check if the results have robust
standard errors in order to control also for heteroskedasticity.
The results of the scatter plots showed that the standard errors in most models
had trivial changes, which means that the models were unlikely to have the prob-
lems of heteroskedasticity. However, scatter plots can be misleading; therefore, I
applied an advanced test in order to check with numbers if the model suffered from
heteroskedasticity. As a first step, I introduced the SPSS program with a new test
called ‘bpktest test’. A test that required an already developed sophisticated Macro
and can be downloaded from the Internet.
Many of the results revealed significant values (p<.05) which according to
‘Breusch-Pagan and Koenker’ tests mean that the distributions were significantly
different from homoscedastic distributions (i.e. they have no homoscedastic distri-
butions). Accordingly, the majority of the models might suffer from heteroscedas-
ticity. The interpretation of these results might be due to the different sample sizes
in Palestine and Israel, in addition to the usage of a split-ballot technique when
collecting the data for the study.
(1)The ‘tolerance’ is the percentage of variance that cannot be predicted or accounted for by other
independent variables.
(2)The VIF, which stands for variance inflation factor, is (1 / tolerance) and as a rule of thumb, a
variable whose ‘VIF’ values is greater than 10 may merit further investigation.
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Chapter B
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CONTENT
ANALYSIS
B.1 Objectives of the Content Analysis
‘What is said?’ – Subjects / Dimensions
‘Who said it?’ – Which newspaper?
‘Who is affected’ – Palestinians or Israelis
And ‘how?’ – Who is responsible?
The study intends to examine the effect of the macro-level factor (the media), on
the micro-level factor (the audience cognitive processing). Both the media content
and the range of opinion on a public agenda should be assessed to examine the
media’s function in Palestine and Israel.
The study methodology consists of newspapers survey of all articles written on
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It tends to investigate how the most prominent news-
papers in Palestine and Israel frame the conflict and the peace process.
B.2 General Coding Instructions
The coding of each article will be made strictly according to the following steps:
1. First, the entire article is read once.
2. Then, the sequence number is entered on the coding sheet.
3. Then all other formal categories (issue no., date, etc.) to be encoded.
4. The post will be completely re-read to the content categories.
5. Encoding should be done only to what is in the article, and as not what the
coders think of him/herself.
6. Does not matter whether the details mentioned in the article are speculations
or facts.
7. For the coding of content, headlines and leading text are to be used.
8. The codes should be processed in the predefined excel sheet.
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B.2.1 General Processing Instructions
Coders should keep in mind the following steps when processing codes:
1. The code number should be processed under the right item in the coding sheet.
2. A cell is specified for each item in the coding sheet.
3. The respective code number must always be fully recorded.
4. For every article an entire row is provided. This means that the number of
coded articles must match the number of filled rows!
B.3 System of Categories
The codebook consists of two levels of analysis: (1) Article level or Information
source, and (2) Evidence level or Dimensions of the conflict.
B.3.1 Article Level
The Article level or Information source comprises of the formal categories, which
are: the encoder, name of newspaper, issue number and date, section, page number,
type of article, source, style of the article, support by a photo, target of the photo,
tendency, link, occasion behind writing the article, and the size/length of the article.
IS1: Encoder
Definition - The encoder is who analyzed the source of information (i.e., the news-
paper). It must be entered on the coding sheet, as follows:
Encoder Code
Ehsan 01
Salwa 02
Ahlam 03
Dana 04
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IS2: Name of Newspaper
Afterwards, the newspaper in which the article was published will be encoded:
Newspaper Code
Palestinian newspapers
Al-Quds newspaper 01
Al-Ayyam newspaper 02
Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda newspaper 03
Felesteen newspaper 04
Israeli newspapers
Israeli Hayom 05
Yediot Ahronot 06
Haaretz 07
Maariv 08
IS3: Issue Number
Here, the issue number of the newspaper is encoded.
Encoder Note: The Issue number is printed on the front page of the newspapers.
• For example: 7854
IS4: Date
The date the newspaper was published will be encoded in this format DD-MM-
YYYY.
• For example: 21-08-2013
IS5: Section
Here the encoder will note the section where the article was published, whether in
political/news, editorial (including opinion/comment), and business (of economy).
As follows:
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Section Code
Political/news 01
Editorial (Opinion/Comment) 02
Business 03
IS6: Page Number
Here the encoder should code the page number where the article was published.
• For example: Page 4
IS7: Type of Article
In this section, the encoder will specify the type of the article; news story, col-
umn/commentary, reportage/background story, editorial, portrait, interview, bul-
letin, headline only, documentation, public opinion article, letter to the editor, ques-
tion to the newspaper. As follows:
Type of article Code
News 01
Column/commentary 02
Reportage/background story 03
Editorial 04
Portrait 05
Interview 06
Bullet 07
Headline only 08
Documentation 09
Public opinion article 10
Letter to the editor 11
Question to the newspaper 12
Other, please specify: 13
IS8: Source
Here, the encoder should refer to the source of the article, is it the newspaper, the
newsagent, copy of editor, journalist, a reader, or a politician?
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Author/Source Code
Newspaper 01
Newsagent 02
Copy editor by name 03
Journalist 04
Reader 05
Politician 06
Not recognizable 07
Other, please specify: 08
IS9: Style of the Article
Here, the encoder will refer to the style of the article; a fact or an opinion?
Style Code
Factual (news, reports, documentary etc.) 01
Opinion (comment, reader letters, review etc.) 02
Not recognizable/Unknown/Both 03
IS10: Tendency of the Article
Here the encoder will determine the general tendency of the article towards the
peace process, is it positive, negative, or neutral, as follows:
Article tendency Code
Negative 01
Positive 02
Neutral 03
IS11: Accompanied by a Photo
The encoder will indicate here if the article was accompanied by a photo or not, as
follows:
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Accompanied by a photo Code
Yes 01
No 02
IS12: Target of the Photo
The target of the photo should be determined here, whether an episodic or thematic
one.
Target Code
Episodic 01
Thematic 02
IS13: Tonality of the Photo
Here, the encoder will describe the toner of the photo, does it hold an aggressive
(negative), a peaceful (positive), or a neutral toner, as follows:
Toner Code
Aggressive 01
Peaceful 02
Neutral 03
IS14: Link to the Article Content
The encoder here will determine if the photo supports the tonality of the article or
not.
Link Code
Yes 01
No 02
Not recognizable 03
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IS15: Occasion
This section deals with the occasion behind writing the article; what motivated the
author to write the article. The encoders here will code the occasion as follows:
Occasion Code Example
A political event 01 Political conference/convention/
speeches by political figures
A religious event 02 (e.g., In Israel - Yom Kippur,
Passover, Chanukah, in Palestine -
Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, Mawlid al-
Nabi)
A patriotic/nationalistic event 03 Independence or national day /
Commemoration of events (e.g.,
Al-Nakba, Yom Kippur War)
A comment on an article 04 A letter written to an author, edi-
tor, or the newspaper/Commentary
on an article
An attack 05 Acts of vandalism (e.g., mass de-
tentions, attacks by settlers, mili-
tants, IDF force)
Problem dimension 06 This category includes one of the
following: continues expansion of
Jewish settlements, Palestinian pris-
oners, security of Israel
Other 07 Please specify: .
IS16: Article Size/Length
The size/length of the article will be determined with accordance to the space it
occupies in the page. The encoder will estimate the space as follows:
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Size/Length Code
Up to ¼ of the page 01
Up to ½ of the page 02
Up to ¾ of the page 03
More than ¾ of the page 04
More than one page 05
B.3.2 Evidence Level
The evidence level covers the most important aspects of the conflict such as casual-
ties of war and responsibilities towards these casualties, Palestinian refugees, Jewish
settlements, Palestinian prisoners, Security of Israel, The status of Jerusalem, Nat-
ural resources, Borders, Beliefs, feelings and principles, and Gaza. At the very end,
the encoder is asked to specify the total number of articles that did not mention the
conflict.
CL: Casualties
This dimension will include any mention of casualties on either side as a results of
the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The encoder here will code if
casualties were reported or not:
Items Code
Yes (Continue to RS) 01
No (Skip to CSS) 02
Definitions: Casualties are defined as any individuals that were injured, killed,
murdered, captured, or missing in action whether as combatants or non-combatants.
Combatants refers to those who are directly/voluntary involved in the war as
soldiers/resistant movements/militants/settlers. Non-combatants on the other hand
refers to citizens, who were not directly engaged but were forced into action.
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RS: Responsibility
The encoders here will code who was responsible for these casualties, as follows:
Responsibility Code
Israeli forces 01
Palestinian militants 02
Israeli settlers 03
Palestinian citizens 04
Israelis citizens 05
Unknown 06
Not mentioned 07
Other, please specify: . 08
Note: Unknown, is when the responsible individual/s were unknown, and still
under investigation. However, Not mentioned, is when the responsible for the act is
known but was not mentioned by the author of the article.
• Example 1: ‘In its most recent count, the U.N. Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs reports that 2,104 Palestinians were killed in Gaza,
including 1,462 civilians, among them 495 children and 253 women’(1).
Question Code
CL 01
RS 01
• Example 2: ‘Avraham Walz, 29, killed when terrorist runs him over with a
bulldozer. Bulldozer driver proceeds to slam into a city bus, turning it on its
side and injuring six additional Israelis. Israeli soldier, 20, seriously hurt in
separate shooting attack’(2).
Question Code
CL 01
RS 07
(1)Booth, William (August 29, 2014). The Washington post, The U.N. says 7 in 10 Palestinians
killed in Gaza were civilians, Israel disagrees.
(2)Saban, I., Yalon, Y., and Daniel Siryoti (August 5, 2014). Israel Hayom: Israeli killed, another
seriously hurt in 2 Jerusalem terror attacks.
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The following includes the main issues/dimensions/topics of the conflict cate-
gorized as Causes of the conflict, Consequences, and suggested Solutions. Several
items are outlined in each category describing the conflict and the peace process
from the Palestinian and Israeli points of view. Each encoder will code the tendency
(i.e., positive, negative, or neutral) of each particular dimension mentioned in the
article, as follows:
Question Code
Positive 01
Negative 02
Neutral/Ambivalent 03
There is a total number of 63 items; 13 items referring to Causes of the conflict,
18 items summarizing the Consequences or problem dimensions of the conflict, and
32 items discussing suggested Solutions to these consequences. Most of the items
are entitled with a bold description to facilitate the coding process. Under each title
there are several points that refer to the same issue in hand.
B.3.3 Causes
CSS1: 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars.
CSS2: Jewish immigration and its aftermath: Jewish immigration from Russia,
Europe and other countries./ Rise of Zionism. / Balfour declaration of 1917.
/ Buying lands and the illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine after World
War I.
CSS3: Jewish connection and affiliation: Cultural, religious, historical, and bio-
logical connection to the ancient Israelites, over millennia. / It is the Jews
ancestral homeland where most historical events mentioned in the Old Tes-
tament took place, and therefore is the focus of their religious practices and
customs. / The presence in the land continues well after the period covered in
the Old Testament. / Jewish Identity of Israel.
CSS4: The Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif in Arabic); a site of two Temples:
It is prohibited for Jew to pray in Al-Aqasa, and the Dome of The Rock is
the location of the ‘Holy of Holies’ so off limits to Jews for prayer. / The
allocation of some area on the Temple Mount for Jewish prayer that is not
either Al-Aqsa or Dome of the Rock. / Historically there was a period when
there was a synagogue located there while on the other hand, the holiness of
Haram al-Sharif has been extended by others so that it is not permissible for
A12
B.3. SYSTEM OF CATEGORIES
Jews to be near the Western Wall. For that matter there are some who consider
a Jewish presence in the Waqf of Palestine altogether to be an unacceptable
defilement of the area.
CSS5: The Israeli-American (alliance) or American-Israeli backed strategy: Is-
rael is highly dependent on U.S. support, and U.S. military assistant, with
which Israel is controlling the occupied Palestinian territories.
CSS6: Israeli measures against Palestinians: Demolishing houses, expropriating
lands, confiscation of privately owned land in the West Bank, and uproot-
ing of plantations. / Mass detentions, military presence and attacks, excessive
use of force by Israeli army, incursions of the army into Palestinian towns
and targeted liquidations. / Israeli forces/settlers invade almost daily, injur-
ing, kidnapping, and sometimes killing Palestinian civilians. / Extra-judicial
assassinations. / Massacres. / Israel’s unwillingness to remove security mea-
sures for fear of fundamentalist terrorism. / The strategic goal of the security
fence is to guarantee the security of Israel.
CSS7: Palestinians acts of vandalism/terrorism: Constant threat of indiscriminate
attacks from suicide bombings, attacks on settlements and Israeli citizens,
Qassam rocket and mortar shelling on Israeli targets / kidnapping, hijackings,
stabbings, shootings, and stone-throwing / The Palestinian political violence
and fundamentalist terrorism against Israel. / Lethal Palestinian attacks inside
Israel. / Armed operations against the Palestinians. / Administrative detention.
/ Detentions without any legitimate trial.
CSS8: Not recognizing Israel’s right to exist: Al Jihad against Israel and Judaiza-
tion is an Islamic duty. / Palestine is an Islamic trust. / Palestinians are the
original inhabitants of the land. / The necessity to destroy Israel. / Resistance
is still the force that unifies Palestine as one nation.
CSS9: The State of Palestine will become a “terrorist” state: The Palestinians
had never intended to make peace and that their true objective is to throw
the Jews into the sea. / PA’s incitement against Israel. / Hamas’s incitement
to launch a third intifada against Israel. / Pursuing negotiations with the PA
from a position of weakness only results in more terror.
CSS10: Not granting the Palestinians their right to establish their own state -
right of self-determination: The questionable borders of the Palestinians en-
tity. / The necessity to kill all the Arabs. / Not recognizing the Palestinians as
the owners of this homeland.
CSS11: Israel Procedures against Gaza: IDF wars on Gaza. / Restriction on bring-
ing building materials prevents Gaza from fixing its infrastructure. / The Is-
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raeli exploitation and control of gas reserves off shore the Gaza Strip. / The
naval blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza. / IDF counter of any rearmament
or tunnel construction along the western borders between Israel and Gaza. /
The absence of Israeli technology to discover underground tunnels. / Israel
“Defense” Forces staging ground incursion into the Gaza Strip.
CSS12: Settlers acts of vandalism: Settlers continues attacks on Palestinians and
Palestinian lands/schools/cars. / Settlers are dangerous enemies who are
usurping Palestinians’ land. / Settlers are Jewish extremists. / Fear of vio-
lence from extremists among Jewish settlers is a factor in both Israeli gov-
ernment decisions and in the daily lives of Palestinians. / Settlers activities in
Jerusalem’s Old City have expanded beyond the Jewish Quarter.
CSS13: Israel’s military superiority: Palestinians can’t do anything if Israel decides
to impose a certain solution.
B.3.4 Consequences
QSC1: Demographic threat to Israel: The Palestinians demanded right of return is
a demographic threat to Israel. / The Palestinians do not have any right to
immigrate to the land of Israel. / The definition of a ‘refugee’ should be in
accordance with the definition applied to other groups (namely, a refugee is
someone who actually lived someplace and left it. The status is not handed
down for generations).
QSC2: Violations of International law and Human rights: Women in delivery con-
dition are prevented from reaching hospitals (at time resulting in death). /
Food and medicine are blocked from entering Gaza. / Bombardment of hos-
pitals and schools.
QSC3: Restrictions on the Palestinians freedom of movement: Checkpoints and
siege over Gaza. / Lack of contiguity and integrity. / The Separation Barrier
or Security Fence. / Restriction on freedom of movement to East Jerusalem,
Gaza Strip, and within the West Bank. / Indignities imposed by Israeli occu-
pation. / Israel’s restriction /limitations on issuing Palestinians work permits.
/ Building an elaborate network of settlers-only ‘bypass roads’. / Israel abso-
lute control over border-crossings.
QSC4: Palestinian Refugees: Dreadful conditions of Palestinian refugees in refugee
camps in neighbouring Arab countries such as in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon,
Syria, Egypt and more. / Denial by Arab nations of basic human rights (citi-
zenship, unrestricted rights to work, etc.) to Palestinians in their countries.
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QSC5: The influence of settlements on Palestine’s natural resources and state-
hood: Strategical allocation of settlements in the West Bank (Area C) in or-
der to allow for control over water, land and mineral resources. / Settlements
threaten territorial contiguity. / Settlements chop the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip into pieces and imprison the Palestinians in isolated enclaves, each of
which is surrounded by settlements and the occupation forces. / Settlements
continue to occupy some of the most fertile regions of the West Bank.
QSC6: Control of natural resources: Israel controls all the water and natural re-
sources of the land. / Lack of drinking water. / The oPt dependency on Israel
for fuel (gas, petrol) supplies, thus bolstering the Israeli economy.
QSC7: Settlement expansion: The expansion of Jewish settlements in the West
Bank. / The Housing and Construction Ministry issuing hundreds of tenders
for the construction of new housing units in East Jerusalem and the large
settlement blocs. / Settlement activities extending into an infiltration of the
Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, encircling them with Jewish
population. / The movement or transfer of hundreds of thousands of Israeli
civilians into occupied territory.
QSC8: Economic burden and Boycotting Israeli products: The Israelis economy
is hampered by the high costs of settlement construction and incentives to set-
tlers combined with military costs of securing them. / International commu-
nity Boycotting Israeli products manufactured in Jewish settlements. / Pales-
tinians Boycotting Israeli products.
QSC9: Judaization of Jerusalem: Daily attempts of stamping out the Arab and Is-
lamic identity of Jerusalem. / Israel’s violations of and encroaching on the
Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic and Christian sanctities in Jerusalem. /
The Israeli intentions to have a vertically divided sovereignty of the Temple
Mount or Noble Sanctuary. / The intentions to open a new gate for Jews to
enter Al-Aqsa Mosque to pray.
QSC10: Jews arrested for praying on Temple Mount. / Palestinians’ violations of Jew-
ish sanctities in Jerusalem.
QSC11: A new wave of takeovers of Palestinian homes by false measures, forged doc-
uments or as absentee properties, turning them into Jewish property.
QSC12: Life hardship: Unprecedented levels of poverty and unemployment. / Barri-
ers to health care and education. / Unprecedented low levels of internal law-
lessness and instability.
A15
B.3. SYSTEM OF CATEGORIES
QSC13: Hamas threats: There will not be an agreement with Israel as long as there
are Palestinians in prison. / Hamas will free all fighters/militants in the Israeli
prisons by using force. / Kidnapping Israeli soldiers.
QSC14: Acts against Palestinian prisoners: Frequent Physical abuse and torture of
prisoners. / Deteriorating situation for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli Jails.
QSC15: Israeli Intransigence: The unwillingness of Israel to negotiate directly
with Hamas. / Israeli intransigence and their disobedience to any meet-
ing/resolution/decision that does not go with their plans. / The Zionist-Israeli
movement directs to take over the entire country and to drive out non-Jewish
populations. / The constant objection of Israel right wing Hardliners.
QSC16: Palestinian Intransigence: Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel’s right to ex-
ist. / Denying the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state. / The unwillingness
of Hamas to negotiate with Israel. / The continues objection of Palestinian
Hardliners. / Palestinian intransigence and their disobedience to any meet-
ing/resolution/decision that does not go with their plans. / The Palestinian
national movement directs to establish a Palestinian State in the entire coun-
try.
QSC17: Lack of Trust between Palestinians and Israelis: Failure of past agree-
ments. / Negotiations are not advancing and will likely collapse. / The be-
lief that there is no reliable and trustworthy partner to make progress in a
two-sided peace process.
QSC18: Israeli violation of Palestinians lands: Palestinians would not accept an
agreement under which Israel would maintain any military presence on lands
that become part of a Palestinian state.
B.3.5 Solutions
SLN1: The right of return of Palestinian refugees to their lands.
SLN2: Conditional return or compensation: A conditional return for the refugees
of Palestine under family reunification programs. / The right of return to a
Palestinian state within agreed borders with compensation. / A compensation
to be paid for the refugees who do not want to return. / The right of return to
a Palestinian state within agreed borders without compensation, and in some
‘humanitarian’ cases, they are allowed to return to their homes within the
1948 borders.
SLN3: Evacuation/demolishment and/or compensation of settlements: All Israeli
settlers will be evacuated from the West Bank, and the settlements will be
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turned over to returning refugees. / The demolishment of all settlements in the
oPt/West Bank. / Settlers will accept compensation packages for their with-
drawal. / Settlers who stay are obliged to live under Palestinian sovereignty.
SLN4: Refraining the construction of settlements: Israeli government to call a halt
to the settlement program. / The international community, and particularly the
United States, must put pressure on Israel to halt its settlement program. / In
order to mitigate the difficulties Israel may face in evacuating its settlers from
the West Bank, the transfer of territories to the Palestinian control can be
implemented in phases to allow time for Israel to sensitize its public.
SLN5: No change to be made to settlements: All settlements on the Israeli side of
the security wall should be part of Israel. / All settlements should remain as
they are.
SLN6: To evacuate prisoners from Israeli jails.
SLN7: Release under certain conditions or circumstances: Release of Palestinian
Political Prisoners in Israeli jails. / Release of Palestinian Prisoners who
stayed in Israeli jails for a long time. / Release prisoners who are suffering
from illness. / Release of pre-Oslo-era Palestinians from Israeli jails.
SLN8: To keep all Palestinian prisoners for the security and safety of Israel:
Those who killed should stay in jail - to stop releasing “terrorists” who have
blood on their hands. / Israeli belief that releasing “terrorists” only adds fuel
to the terrorists’ fire. / Irresponsible release of “terrorists” will jeopardize the
security of Israelis.
SLN9: PA to stop rewarding “terrorists” with salaries payment to their families while
they are in prison.
SLN10: To abstain resorting to international institutions: Not to resort to influ-
ential, international institutions and corporations, including the legal corpo-
rations that enjoy international competences, in case Israel approves of the
release of Palestinian prisoners.
SLN11: Israeli military presence in Palestine: An Israeli presence at Palestinian bor-
der crossings / the existence of permanent Israeli observation posts in the
Palestinian state / the Israeli “Defense” Force should remain in the Occupied
Territories/West Bank.
SLN12: A demilitarized Palestinian state: To confiscate all illegal weapons, and the
disarmament of Palestinian militant groups / incarceration and trial for all
those associated with “terrorist” attacks / Disarming Hamas and Islamic Ji-
had. / The Israeli condition of a demilitarized Palestinian state with no army.
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SLN13: The demilitarization of Gaza: Israeli demand to disarm Palestinian groups
in the Gaza Strip. / Destroy all missile , mortars, etc. / To destroy all tunnels
under Gaza border.
SLN14: The cease of militants acts against Israel: The P.A. should take dramatic
steps to stop Palestinian attacks against Israel. / Israel’s pressing concern of
the security threat posed by radical Islamist regimes.
SLN15: Third-party mediation: International observer on the borders between the
newly established Palestinian state and Israel. / Any process towards viabil-
ity must be guided by international law and resolutions, be impartial, hold
both sides to account, bring an end to impunity. / The international commu-
nity must exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority and the Arab League to
commit to a negotiated peace in the region. Before negotiations can begin,
each government must show their respective dedications and commitments to
the peace process, or there will only be broken promises. / A viable process
must hold both sides to account for any breaches in human rights law and in-
ternational law, to build the necessary trust that enables both parties to engage
and reach a settlement.
SLN16: The recruitment of a stronger Palestinian police force: Israel cannot be
secure until a Palestinian state is established that will be strong enough to
control Palestinian attacks. / Palestine should have a strong police force. /
Palestinian police and special forces will continue to operate against all those
endangering Palestinian national security.
SLN17: Security coordination between the Israel “Defense” Forces and Palestinian
security forces.
SLN18: Division of Jerusalem: East Jerusalem to the Palestinians and West
Jerusalem to the Israelis. / Division of the city according to Palestinian and Is-
raeli Neighborhoods. / The Old City should be divided into two parts; a Jewish
one under Israeli control and a Muslim and Christian one under Palestinian
control. / Israel will be ‘guardian’ of the Wailing Wall and the Palestinian
State ‘guardian’ of the Islamic Holy site. The status quo of Christian Holy
sites will remain.
SLN19: International control over Jerusalem: Jerusalem to be an international city
under the authority of the United Nations. / Jerusalem to be an international
city under the authority of Multi-faith Municipal Covenant. / Neutral body,
(e.g., the United Nations) will be the guardian of all the holy sites.
SLN20: Agreement on managing the Holy sites: The Old City should be under joint
control. / Free access for everyone to the Holy sites. / No side will have
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sovereignty on the Holy sites.
SLN21: Jerusalem under Israeli control: Jerusalem will remain united and under
Israeli sovereignty. / All the holy places, including East Jerusalem holy sites
to be under Israeli control. / The annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel.
SLN22: To bring an end to the Israeli occupation of territories captured in the
1967 War: Israel withdrawal to the 1967 boarder. / To disengage from its
borders with Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. / The Green Line as a
border between the two states. / To determine the borders of the Palestinians
entity.
SLN23: Conditional withdrawal and land swap: Israel withdrawal to the 1967
boarder with adjustment through agreement of equivalent exchange of land.
/ Israel would annex 3-4% of the West Bank that includes major settlement
blocks with comparable land swaps to be negotiated. / The land taken by the
settlements could simply be ceded to Palestine from other regions of Israel.
SLN24: Borders established by the security wall.
SLN25: Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between both
sides: Prohibiting all forms of incitement to hatred. / To educate for peace. /
The media to play a positive role in promoting peace and pro-peace ideologies
and programs.
SLN26: U.S. and European union strict measures against the conflict: They must
take an active role in the peace process because they have the ability to greatly
influence both the Israelis and the Palestinians. / If Israelis and Palestinians
do not respond to the peace process, they must, for the sake of peace, utilize a
more aggressive form of diplomacy. / They and the international community
must continue to place pressure on Israel and the Palestinians to commit to
the peace process and take the necessary steps to promote a lasting peace.
SLN27: The United Nations as an active side: The UN should play a more active
and progressive role on the ground. / The UN should be detached from the
influence of the U.S. and its domination.
SLN28: To stop IDF acts against Palestinians: The IDF to stop armed operations
against Palestinians. / The IDF to stop the policy of targeted assassinations.
/ The IDF to abandon the policy of collective punishment, the demolishment
of houses, and confiscation of Palestinian lands for alleged security reasons .
SLN29: Lifting of the blockade over Gaza: to be able to visit relatives outside Gaza,
to be able to rebuild the own house, freedom of trade, and to lift the restric-
tions on the Gaza fishing range.
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SLN30: Freedom of movement: The creation of an airport. / The reopening of Gaza
airport. / The creation of a ‘safe passage’ between the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. / Seaport, the borders-crossings and wages’ funding. / Palestinians
consider the taking of serious and real measures by the Israeli government for
lifting up the siege and the security belt will mitigate violence. / Putting an
end to the construction of the segregation wall.
SLN31: Economic Cooperation: Raising of joint projects in all economical sectors
and a serious cooperation between all the parties and groups in the region for
creating a new reality of peace and prosperity in severals fields like water,
health, environment, tourism and others, even before reaching a final peace
deal between Israel and its Arab neighbors. / To give the Palestinian laborers
the possibility to work inside Israel. / The improvement of the economical
and living conditions will have considerable positive effects on the support
of any future peace negotiations. / To permit the free transportation of goods
to/from Palestine.
SLN32: Shared control over natural resources: Control over natural resources: land,
water, minerals, sea - for the benefit of the whole population’s economic
growth and prosperity. / To ensure legitimate control over natural resources
that comprise of land, water, mineral and marine rights. / Natural resources
are vital for the sustained development and growth of any society, and should
be controlled for the benefit of the whole population, without discrimination.
NA: Total number of articles
Here the encoder will refer to the total number of articles in each newspaper.
Total number of articles in each newspaper (excluding unrelated
sections): .
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Steps of the codification process 
1. Read the article to see if it is relevant. 
2. If relevant, code it on the 1st level; the article level, to gather general info. 
3. Afterwards code the second level; the evidence level. 
4. Start a new codification when you find a new evidence in the same article. 
 
Formal Categories 
 
IS1: Encoder   IS2: Name of newspaper   
 
 
IS3: Issue number   IS4: Date     
 
     D  D M  M  Y   Y   Y   Y 
 
IS5: Section    IS6: Page number     
 
 
IS7: Type of article   IS8: Source   
 
 
 
IS9: Style of the article IS10: Tendency of the article 
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IS11: Photo    IS12: Target of the Photo 
   
 
IS13: Tonality of the Photo IS14: Link to the article content    
 
 
 
IS15: Occasion  IS16: Article size/length 
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Content  
 
QUESTION YES NO 
CL   
RS     
 
CAUSES 
ITEM - +/- + 
QCSS1    
QCSS2       
QCSS3       
QCSS4       
QCSS5       
QCSS6       
QCSS7       
QCSS8       
QCSS9       
QCSS10       
QCSS11       
QCSS12       
QCSS13       
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CONSEQUENCES 
ITEM - +/- + 
QSC1    
QSC2       
QSC3       
QSC4       
QSC5       
QSC6       
QSC7       
QSC8       
QSC9       
QSC10       
QSC11       
QSC12       
QSC13       
QSC14       
QSC15       
QSC16       
QSC17       
QSC18       
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SOLUTIONS 
ITEM - +/- + 
SLN1       
SLN2       
SLN3       
SLN4       
SLN5       
SLN6       
SLN7       
SLN8       
SLN9       
SLN10       
SLN11       
SLN12       
SLN13       
SLN14       
SLN15       
SLN16       
SLN17       
SLN18       
SLN19       
SLN20       
SLN21       
SLN22       
SLN23       
SLN24       
SLN25       
SLN26       
SLN27       
SLN28       
SLN29       
SLN30       
SLN31       
SLN32       
 
Number of articles:  
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Chapter C
CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK - ARABIC
TRANSLATION
 "ج"الملحق 
 اإلطار العاّم لتحليل المحتوى
C.0.1 .هدف الدراسة 
 أبعاد/ مواضيع  -؟  "ماذا قيل" 
 أية صحيفة ؟ -؟  "من قاله" 
 الفلسطينيّون أم اإلسرائيليّون ؟ –" من هو المعني ؟" 
 من هو المسؤؤل ؟  - ؟ "كيف"و  
 
المعالجة المعرفيّة )الجزئي على عامل المستوى ( ماإلعال)عامل المستوى الكّلي الغرض من الدراسة هو فحص تأثير 
وظيفة اإلعالم في فلسطين المستوى العاّم من أجل فحص وهنا ينبغي تقييم محتويات اإلعالم ومدى الرأي على (. للجمهور
 . وإسرائيل
 
لفلسطيني، وتهدف إلى ا –من دراسة جميع المقاالت المنشورة في الصحف حول الصراع اإلسرائيلي  الدراسة منهجيّةتتكون 
 . بوضع إطار ٍ للصراع والعمليّة السلميّةفحص مدى قيام أشهر الصحف في فلسطين وإسرائيل 
 
C.1 .وحدة الفحص 
أخذ عيّنات من العناوين في جميع الصحف و ( 3)عيّنة اإلعالم، ( 2)فترة الفحص، ( 1)تتضّمن عمليّة اختيار وحدة الفحص 
 . العيّنة شفيرت( 4)
 
C.1.1 .فترة الفحص 
على النحو  2114( آذار)مارس  31لغاية  2113( آب)أغسطس  1لقد تّم فحص عينات اإلعالم المطبوعة خالل الفترة من 
 :التالي
 ــرـــــــالشه  السنـــة   
 (آب)أغسطس      
 (أيلول)سبتمبر      
 (تشرين أول)أكتوبر   2113   
 (تشرين ثاني)نوفمبر      
 (كانون أول)سمبر دي     
 
 (كانون ثاني)يناير      
 (شباط)فبراير   2114   
 (آذار)مارس      
 
 الفترة الزمنيّة: C.1الجدول       
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C.1.2 .عيّنة اإلعالم 
 : تشمل عينة اإلعالم أو وحدة البحث ما مجموعه ثمانية صحف، أربع صحف في كّل من الجانبين، وهي على النحو التالي
 . صحيفة القدس، صحيفة األيام، الحياة الجديدة و فلسطين :في فلسطين
 . هاآريتس و معاريف إسرائيل هيوم، يديعوت أحرونوت، :وفي إسرائيل
 
C.1.3 .العّينة شفيرت 
في الخطوة األولى يتّم اختيار جميع المقاالت أثناء فترة (. أدناه C1 أنظر الشكل)العينة في خطوتين  شفيرتقّرر أن يكون ت
: كلمات رئيسيّة مثلحص من الوحدات واألقسام اإلعالمية المخصصة للبحث التي يحتوي فيها العنوان الرئيسي أو الفرعي الف
 وليس من المهّم إن كانت الكلمة الرئيسية مطبوعة بأحرف كبيرة أم صغيرة، أو إذا كانت مسبوقة .فلسطين، إسرائيل أو صراع
أو في سياق " إرهابي أو إرهابيّة"أو ذكرت لوحدها " مثل في اإلرهاب"الحقة تلتها ، أم "مثال ً في مكافحة اإلرهابيين"ببادئة 
 ". هجوم إرهابي"
 
: مثال ً)تعالج القضايا الرئيسية للصراع عّما إذا كانت بدقّة في الخطوة الثانية تُقرأ المقالة الُمختارة بشكل ٍ كامل وثّم تُفحص 
نيين، المستوطنات اليهوديّة، األسرى الفلسطينيين، أمن إسرائيل، وضع مدينة القدس، الآلجئين الفلسطي، الخسائر البشريّة
 . شفّروإن لم تعالج المقالة أّي من هذه القضايا، ال ت(. الموارد الطبيعيّة، الحدود، اإلعتقادات، المشاعر والمبادىء وغّزة
 
 معايير الدخول
وجهات / أفكار/ التعليق في الصحيفة التي تناقش، تذكر أو تعرض آراء  بوابأمقاالت في األخبار و تشفيرجميع وحدات إعادة ال
اتفاقيّات سالم، حلول، شخصيّات سياسيّة وخطابات، أحداث،  ،معاهداتنظر بخصوص القضايا الرئيسّية للصراع، تاريخ، 
الصراع دة أو المواقع التي ال تعالج األعم. ، إيديولوجيّات ورأي عامخسائر بشريّةاليوميّة، هجومات وتقارير حول المواجهات 
 . بشكل ٍ مباشر لن يتّم فحصها
 
 اإلستبعادمعايير 
ها ألنها شفيرالموضة والتسلية ولن يتّم ت الثقافة ، السيارات، اإلسكان، الّسفر، الرياضة، :تُستبعد المقاالت من األقسام التالية
 . نشرات مرفقة بالصحيفةهذا أيضا ً على أية مجالت أو ويطبّق . تحتوي على مقاالت قليلة جدّا ً تتعلّق بالصراع
 
C.1.4  السياقوحدة 
، شفيرسجّل التوا المقاالت المذكورة على النحو الوارد في شفرأن ي مشفّرينوعلى ال. وحدة السياق لهذا التحليل هي كّل المقالة
 . إّما كأسباب، أو نتائج أو حلول
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C.2 العاّمة شفيرإرشادات الت 
 : أية مقالة مطابقا ً تماما ً للخطوات التالية رشفييكون ت
 . تقرأ المقالة مّرة واحدة   .1
 .شفيررقم التسلسل على ورقة التيتّم بعد ذلك إدخال  .2
 (الخ...رقم العدد، التاريخ )األخرى  اإلسميّة أو الشكليّةجميع الفئات  تشفيريتّم بعد ذلك  .3
 . بالكامل لفئات المحتوى يتّم قراءة المقالة أو الموقع مّرة أخرى .4
 . ةشفرأو الم شفّرفقط لما هو موجود في المقالة وليس لما يفّكر به الم شفيريجرى الت .5
 . تخمينات أو حقائقال يهّم إن كانت التفاصيل الواردة في المقالة  .6
 . الرائدالمحتوى، ينبغي استخدام العناوين والنّص  شفيرلت .7
 .المعّرفة مسبّقا ً ورقة اإلكسلفي  شيفراتتُعالج ال .8
 
C.2.1 إرشادات المعالجة العاّمة 
 :الشيفراتالخطوات التالية عند معالجة  شفّرونيجب أن يتذكر الم
 .شفيرتحت البند الصحيح في ورقة الت شيفريينبغي أن يُعالج الرقم ال .1
 .شفيرتّم تحديد خلية لكّل بند في ورقة الت .2
 . الكاملالمعني ب شفيريجب دائما ً تسجيل رقم الت .3
 !يجب أن يعادل عدد الصفوف المعبّأة  شفرةهذا يعني بأن عدد المقاالت الم. صّف بأكملهيتوفّر لكّل مقالة  .4
 
C.3 نظام الفئــات 
 . مستوى األدلّة أو أبعاد الّصراع( 2)و  مستوى المقال أو مصدر المعلومة( 1: )من مستويين من التحليل شفيريتكّون سجل الت
 
C.3.1 مقالمستوى ال 
، إسم الصحيفة، عدد وتاريخ اإلصدار، القسم، رقم مشفّرال: يتألّف مستوى المقال أو مصدر المعلومة من الفئات الشكليّة وهي
الصلة، المناسبة ما وراء ،  مدعوم بصورة، هدف الّصورة، الميل أو اإلتجاهأسلوب المقال،  المصدر، الصفحة، نوع المقال،
 . قالطول الم/كتابة المقال وحجم
 
IS1: المشفّر 
ويجب إدخالها في صحيفة التشفير، وذلك (. الصحيفة: مثالً )المشفّر هو الشخص الذي قام بتحليل مصدر المعلومة  :التعريف
 :على النحو التالي
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 الشيفرة المشفّر
 11 إحسان
 12 سلوى
 13 أحالم
 
IS2:  إسم الصحيفة 
 :ي ُنشر فيها المقاليتّم بعد ذلك تشفير الصحيفة الت 
 الشيفرة الصحيفة
  الصحف الفلسطينيّة   
 11 صحيفة القدس
 12 صحيفة األيّام
 13 صحيفة الحياة الجديدة
 14 صحيفة فلسطين
  الصحف اإلسرائيليّة   
 15 إسرائيل هيوم 
 16 يديعوت أحرونوت
 17 هاآريتس
 18 معاريــف
 
IS3: رقم العدد) رقم اإلصدار) 
 (.أي رقم العدد)يتّم تشفير رقم إصدار الصحيفة  اهن
 .يكون عادة ً مطبوعا ً في الصفحة األماميّة من الّصحف( رقم العدد)رقم اإلصدار  :مالحظة المشفّر
 7854 :مثال 
IS4: التاريخ 
 السنــة -الشهر  - اليوم  :يتّم تشفير التاريخ الذي نشرت فيه الصحيفة بهذا الشكل
 س س س س  -ش ش  - ي ي                    
 2113 – 18 – 21 :مثال 
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IS5: الباب)القســم ا) 
شاملة )اإلفتتاحيّة األخبار، أو في / أو الباب الذي نُشر فيه المقال، أكان مثال ً في قسم الشؤون السياسيّة هنا يسّجل المشفّر القسم 
 :التالي ، وذلك على النحو(اإلقتصاد)مال وأعمال و في قسم ( تعليق/ رأي 
 
 الشيفرة الباب/القسم
 11 فلسطينية/  أخبار/ شؤون سياسيّة 
 12 (تقارير/ تعليق / رأي )افتتاحيّة 
 13 فلسطينية دولية/  مال وأعمال
 14 المحليات
 15 بانوراما الصحافة/ شؤون إسرائيلية 
 16 مقاالت
 17 حوارات
 18 منوعات
 
IS6: رقم الصفحة 
 .فّر تسجيل رقم الصفحة التي نشرت فيها المقالةهنا ينبغي على المش
 4صفحة  :مثال 
IS7: نوع المقال 
قّصة لخلفيّة /  (تحقيق صحفي)ريبورتاج  تعليق،/ يبيّن المشفّر في هذا الباب نوع المقال، مثال ً إن كان قّصة إخباريّة ، عمود 
مقال رأي عام، رسالة للمحّرر، سؤال موجه للصحيفة، وذلك  بّينة موثّقة، عنوان فقط، نشرة، مقابلة ، ،صورة افتتاحيّة، حدث،
 :يلعلى النحو التا
 الشيفرة نوع المقال
 11 أخبار
 12 تقرير/  تعليق/ عمود 
 13 سيناريو/ تحليل /  قّصة لخلفية حدث( / تحقيق صحفي)ريبورتاج 
 14 افتتاحيّــة
 15 صورة
 16 مقابلة
 17 نشرة
 18 عنوان فقط
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 10 ثّقةبيّنة مو
 11 مقال رأي عام
 11 رسالة للمحّرر
 12 سؤال موّجه للصحيفة
 13 .________: غير ذلك، الّرجاء حدّد
 
IS8: المصدر 
، قارىء أو شخصيّة نسخة من المحّرر، صحافي خبار،أوكيل هل هو صحيفة، . إلى مصدر المقال ينبغي أن يشير المشفّر هنا
 سياسيّة ؟
 فرةالشي المصدر/  الكاتب
 11 صحيفــةال
 12 وكيل أخبار
 13 نسخة من المحّرر باإلسم
 14 صحافـي
 15 قارئة/ قارىء 
 16 شخصيّة سياسيّة
 17 ليس باإلمكان التعّرف عليه
 18 .________: غير ذلك، الّرجاء حدّد
 10 مركز استطالع للرأي
 11 قناة
 11 كاريكاتير
 12 مكتب االُمم المتحدة
 13 ليممنظمة بتسي
 14 مركز حقوقي
 
IS9: أسلوب المقال 
 هل هو حقيقة أو رأي ؟. ينبغي على المشفّر هنا أن يشير إلى أسلوب أو نمط المقال
 الشيفرة النمط/ األسلوب  
 11 (الخ..أخبار، تقارير، وثائق)واقعي 
 12 (الخ ..تعليق، رسائل قّراء، مراجعة )رأي 
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IS10: ميل أو اتجاه المقال 
   : هل هو إيجابي، سلبي أو حيادي، وذلك على النحو التالي. على المشفّر هنا أن يحدّد الميل أو اإلتجاه العام للمقال
 الشيفرة ميل أو اتجاه المقال
 11 سلبي
 12 ايجابي
 13 حيادي
 
IS11:  الصورة 
 : لك على النحو التاليينبغي على المشفّر هنا أن يبيّن إذا كان المقال مصحوبا ً بصورة أم ال، وذ
    
 الشيفرة صورة
 11 نعم
 12 ال
 
IS12: هدف الصورة 
 ؟( مرتبط بموضوع معيّن)أم موضوعي ( مرتبط بحدث)عرضي ينبغي هنا تحديد هدف الصورة، فهل هو 
    
 الشيفرة الهدف
 11 عرضي
 12 موضوعي
 
IS13: النّسق اللوني بالصورة 
أم لون حيادي، ( ايجابي)أم سلمي  (سلبي)عدواني هل تحمل لون . نسق أو الصبغيّة اللونيّة للصورةعلى المشفّر هنا أن يصف ال
    :وذلك على النحو التالي
 الشيفرة النسق اللوني
 11 عدواني
 12 سلمي
 13 حيادي
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IS14: العالقة بمحتوى المقال 
  . المقال أم ال على المشفّر هنا أن يحدّد عّما إذا كانت الصورة تدعم نسق
 الشيفرة العالقة
 11 نعم
 12 ال
 13 .ليس باإلمكان التعّرف عليها
IS15:  المناسبة 
المناسبة ما الذي دفع الكاتب لكتابة المقال ؟ ويقوم المشفّرون هنا بتشفير . يتناول هذا القسم المناسبة الكامنة وراء كتابة المقال
 : على النحو التالي
 
 مثـــــــــــــــــــــال الشيفرة المناسبة
 خطابات لشخصيّات سياسيّة/ اتفاقيّة / مؤتمر سياسي  11 ةسياسيّ  مناسبة
  ةدينيّ  مناسبة
12 
وفي ( انوكاهحيوم الغفران، الفصح، )في إسرائيل : مثالً 
عيد الفطر، عيد األضحى، عيد المولد النبوي )فلسطين 
 (الشريف
: مثالً )إحياء ذكرى أحداث / عيد اإلستقالل أو اليوم الوطني  13 مناسبة وطنيّة
 ...( ، ِذكرى وعد بلفورالنكبة، حرب يوم الغفران
/ تعليق على مقال / اتب أو للصحيفة رسالة كتبت لمحّرر أو ك 14 تعليق على مقال
 .تقارير
ا ، هجمات يقوم بهجماعيّةاعتقاالت : مثال ً) أعمال تخريب 15 هجوم
مستوطنون، رجال مقاومة أو قّوة من جيش الدفاع 
 (.، اإلبعاد والنفي، المقدسات واألماكن األثريةاإلسرائيلي
اإلستمرار في توسيع : تحتوي هذه الفئة على أحد البنود التالية 16 عد المشكلــةبُ 
.. األسرى الفلسطينيين، أمن إسرائيل المستوطنات اليهوديّة،
 (.الخ
 ______________________: الّرجاء حدّد 17 لكغير ذ
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IS16:  طول المقال/ حجم 
 : النحو التالي ويقدّر المشفّر الحيّز على. طول المقال حسب الحيّز الذي يشغله في الصفحة/ يُحدّد حجم 
 
 الشيفرة الطول/ الحجم   
 11 الصفحة ¼ لغاية
 12 الصفحة ½ لغاية
 13 الصفحة ¾ لغاية
 14 الصفحة¾ ر من أكث
 
C.3.2:  األدلّةمستوى 
والآلجئين الخسائر، الحرب والمسؤوليّات تجاه هذه  الخسائر البشريّة فييغطي مستوى األدلّة أهّم نواحي الّصراع مثل 
الطبيعيّة، والحدود، ووضع مدينة القدس، والموارد  الفلسطينيين، والمستوطنات اليهوديّة، واألسرى الفلسطينيين، وأمن إسرائيل،
ويطلب من المشفّر في النهاية تحديد العدد اإلجمالي للمقاالت التي لم تتطّرق  .وقطاع غّزة والمعتقدات، والمشاعر والمبادىء
 .للصراع
 
CL:  الخسائر البشريّة 
وينبغي على . ينيين واإلسرائيليينالفلسط يشمل هذا البعد ذكر أية خسائر بشريّة على كّل من الجانبين نتيجة الصراع ما بين
 . المشفّر أن يدّون عما إذا ورد ذكر الخسائر البشريّة أم ال
 الشيفرة البنود 
 RS ) 11ل  إستمرّ )نعم 
 CSS) 12إنتقل ل )ال 
 
 :تعريفات
 . أم غير مقاتلين اتلينأكانوا بصفة مق أو ُخطفوا أو فُقدوا في عمليّةتعني أية أفراد ُجرحوا أو قتلوا  ةالخسائر البشريّ 
مسلّحة أو  فصائل هم أولئك المشتركون بشكل ٍ مباشر أم تطوعي في الحرب كجنود أو حركات مقاومة أو المقاتلون
 . مستوطنون
 . على ذلك مجبرين بشكل ٍ مباشر في عمليّة بل كانوا  ونهم على الناحية األخرى المدنيّون الغير مشترك الغير مقاتلون
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 RS:  المسؤوليــة 
 :يدّون المشفرون هنا الجهة التي كانت مسؤولة عن هذه الخسائر البشريّة على النحو التالي 
 الشيفرة المسؤوليــــة
 11  اإلسرائيليةقّوات ال
 12 المقاتلون الفلسطينيّون
 13 المستوطنون اإلسرائيليّون
 14 المدنيّون الفلسطينيّون
 15 نالمدنيّون اإلسرائيليّو
 16 جهة مجهولة
 17 غير مذكورة 
 18 جهة أو جهات أخرى
 10 ______: غير ذلك، الّرجاء حدّد
 
 .ما زالوا قيد البحث   ولكن( مجهولين)أن الفرد أو األفراد المسؤولين كانوا غير معروفين  هي في حالة جهة مجهولة :مالحظة
  .معروفة ولكن لم تُذكر من قبل كاتب المقال  ل أو العمليّةتعني أّن الجهة المسؤولة عن الفع غير مذكورة ولكن
 
  فلسطيني  2.114في آخر إحصائيّة ذكر مكتب األمم المتحدة لتنسيق الشؤون اإلنسانيّة بأن  ": 1مثال
 .1"إمرأة 253طفال ً و  405مدنيّا ً من بينهم  1.462ُقتلوا في غّزة،شاماًل 
 الشيفرة السؤال
 CL) 11)خسائر بشريّة 
 RS) 11)المسؤوليّة 
 
  سائق الجرافة بعد ذلك  ووّجه.بجرافةُقتل عندما دهسه إرهابي  ،عاما ً 20أفراهام فالتس، ": 2مثال
وفي هجوم ٍ منفصل . ضربة ً عنيفة لحافلة مدينة فقلبها على جنبها وجرح سّتة إسرائيليين آخرين
  .2"بة بالغةً إصا ،عاما 21،  جندي إسرائيلي أصيببإطالق النار 
                                                          
ّن كانوا مدنيين، غير أقتلوا في غزة فلسطينيين  11من  7تقول األمم المتحدة بأن " واشنطن بوست،  (.2114، 20أغسطس )بوث، وليام  (1)
 ."إسرائيل تنكر ذلك
(2) 
2
قُتل إسرائيلي وُجرح آخر بصورة ٍ خطيرة في هجومين :" إسرائيل هيوم(. 2114، 5أغسطس )واي و دانيال سيريوتي . يالون سابان ي، 
 ".إرهابيين بالقدس
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 الشيفرة السؤال
 CL) 11)خسائر بشريّة 
 RS) 17)المسؤوليّة 
 
 . ةالمقترح والحلول والنتائج الصراعكأسباب  مصنّفةومواضيع الصراع / األبعاد / فيما يلي القضايا الرئيسية 
وعلى كّل مشفّر أن . ترد عدّة بنود في كّل فئة واصفة ً الصراع والعمليّة السلميّة من وجهات النظر الفلسطينيّة واإلسرائيليّة
 : لكّل بعد ٍ على حدة مذكور في المقال، وذلك على النحو التالي( إيجابي، سلبي أو حيادي: مثال ً)يسّجل اإلتجاه أو الميول 
 الشيفرة السؤال
 11 يجابيا
 12 سلبي
 13 متردّد/حيادي
 
المتعلقة أبعاد المشاكل أو  النتائجبند تلّخص ( 18)أسباب الصراع، بند منها تشير إلى ( 13)بند، ( 63)هناك ما مجموعه 
عملية  وذلك لتسهيل بأحرف ثخينة واضحةمعنونة معظم البنود . المقترحة لهذه النتائج الحلولبندا ً تناقش ( 32)بالّصراع، و 
  .موضوع البحث مسألةوتحت كّل عنوان عدّة نقاط تشير إلى نفس ال. التشفير
 
 (.CSS13)إلى ( CSS1)يشار إليها فيما بعد بالشيفرة ) :األسباب
 
CSS1:  1067و 1048عام  اإلسرائيليّة –الحروب العربيّة 
CSS2: وعد بلفور عام / الصهيونيّة  صعود/ ا وبلدان أخرى الهجرة اليهوديّة من روسيا، أوروب :تداعياتهاالهجرة اليهوديّة و
 . فلسطين في أعقاب الحرب العالميّة األولى شراء أآلراضي والهجرة الغير شرعيّة لليهود إلى/  1017
CSS3 :والبيولوجي لإلسرائيليين القدماء عبر ألوف  اإلرتباط الحضاري والديني والتاريخي :واإلنتماء اليهودي اإلرتباط
قديم، وهي بذلك بؤرة معظم األحداث التاريخيّة المذكورة في العهد ال  إنها أرض آباء وأجداد اليهود التي وقعت فيها. / سنينال
  .هويّة إسرائيل اليهوديّة. / ويستمّر الوجود في األرض بعد الفترة الزمنيّة المغطاة في العهد القديم. / ممارساتهم الدينيّة وعاداتهم
CSS4 :الّصالة في ساحة يُحّظر على اليهود من الناحية الدينيّة  :موقع هيكلين –( الحرم الشريف بالعربيّة)لهيكل جبل ا
تخصيص جزء من مساحة جبل الهيكل للصالة اليهوديّة "./ قدس األقداس"المسجد األقصى وقبّة الصخرة المشّرفة ألنها موقع 
من الناحية التاريخيّة كان هناك في فترة ٍ من الزمن . / صخرة المشرفةوتكون هذه ليست من ضمن المسجد األقصى أو قبة ال
من قبل جهات أخرى بحيث ال يُسمح اآلن لليهود ألن يكونوا  كنيس في الموقع، هذا في حين تّم توسيع قدسيّة الحرم الشريف
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تدنيسا ً للمنطقة ال ي الوقف الفلسطيني ولهذا السبب يعتبر البعض الوجود اليهودي ف(. حائط البراق)بالقرب من الحائط الغربي 
 .يُقبل به
CSS5 : تعتمد إسرائيل إلى حدّ كبير  :اإلسرائيليّة المدعومة –أو اإلستراتيجيّة األمريكيّة  األمريكي –التحالف اإلسرائيلي
 . اضي الفلسطينيّة المحتلّةعلى الدّعم األمريكي وعلى المساعدة العسكريّة األمريكيّة التي تتحّكم من خاللها إسرائيل باألر
CSS6 :في ملكيّة خاّصة مصادرة أراضي ذات  هدم البيوت، نزع ملكيّة أراضي، :اإلجراءات اإلسرائيليّة ضّد الفلسطينيين
وهجمات عسكريّة، اإلفراط في استخدام القّوة من   وجود عسكري، الجماعيّةاإلعتقاالت . / الضفّة الغربيّة وقلع المزروعات
القوات العسكريّة اإلسرائيليّة أو ./ اإلسرائيلي داخل المدن الفلسطينيّة واإلغتياالتغارات الجيش  لجيش اإلسرائيلي،طرف ا
اإلغتياالت الخارجة عن نطاق ./ المستوطنون يغيرون شبه يومي، يجرحون أو يخطفون وأحياناً  يقتلون مدنيين فلسطينيين
الهدف اإلستراتيجي من ./ في رفع اإلجراءات األمنيّة خوفا ً من اإلرهاب األصوليعدم رغبة إسرائيل ./ المذابح . / القضاء
 .العنصرية. / المواجهات والتهديدات. / اإلبعاد والنفي/ . السياج األمني هو لضمان أمن إسرائيل
:CSS7  هجمات على ، تحارييناإلن استمرار التهديد بالهجمات بدون تمييز من طرف :الفلسطينيّةاإلرهاب / أعمال التخريب
أشخاص وطائرات،  أعمال خطف. / القسام وقذائف الهاون  قصف أهداف إسرائيلية بصواريخ مستوطنات ومدنيين إسرائيليين،
هجمات فلسطينيّة قاتلة ./ العنف السياسي الفلسطيني واإلرهاب األصولي ضدّ إسرائيل./ طعن، إطالق نار والقذف بالحجارة
مواجهات  / .مشروعة كمةاإعتقاالت بدون أي مح. / اإلعتقال اإلداري. / ات مسلّحة ضدّ الفلسطينيينعمليّ ./ داخل إسرائيل
 .باأليدي مع الشرطة اإلسرائيلية
CSS8: فلسطين أمانة إسالميّة./ الجهاد ضدّ إسرائيل والتهويد هو واجب إسالمي: عدم اإلعتراف بحّق إسرائيل في الوجود /.
المقاومة ما زالت القّوة التي توّحد . / إسرائيل  ضرورة تدمير/ ؟ زمٍن طويلمنذ  قطنون فيهاذين ياألرض للفلسطينيين ال
 . الفلسطينيين كشعب
CSS9 :الحقيقي هو القذف باليهود  لم يكن للفلسطينيين أية نيّة في صنع سالم وبأن هدفهم :دولة فلسطين ستصبح دولة إرهابيّة
استمرار . / إلطالق انتفاضة ثالثة ضدّ إسرائيل  تحريض حماس. / لسطينيّة ضدّ إسرائيلتحريض السلطة الف . /في البحر
 . المفاوضات مع السلطة الفلسطينيّة من موقف ضعف يؤدي فقط لمزيد من اإلرهاب
:CSS10  وضوعالفلسطيني م حدود الكيان: حّق تقرير المصير –عدم منح الفلسطينيين حقهم في إقامة دولتهم المستقلّة 
   .عدم اإلعتراف بالفلسطينيين كأصحاب هذه األرض./ ضرورة قتل كّل العرب./ الخالف
CSS11 :مواد البناء يمنع  القيود المفروضة على إدخال./ حروب الجيش اإلسرائيلي على غّزة :إجراءات إسرائيل ضّد غّزة
./  قبالة شواطىء قطاع غّزةالطبيعي  ى موارد الغازاستغالل إسرائيل وسيطرتها عل./ قطاع غّزة من إصالح بنيته التحتيّة
مكافحة جيش الدفاع اإلسرائيلي ضدّ أّي إعادة تسليح أو بناء أنفاق ./ الحصار البحري الذي تفرضه إسرائيل على قطاع غّزة
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غل وت. / ق التحت أرضيّةغياب التكنولوجيا اإلسرائيليّة الكتشاف األنفا./ على طول الحدود الغربيّة ما بين إسرائيل وقطاع غّزة
 . عمليات بريّة داخل قطاع غّزةالجيش اإلسرائيلي في 
CSS12 :ومدارس وسيّارات استمرار هجمات المستوطنين على الفلسطينيين وعلى أراض ٍ  :أعمال المستوطنين التخريبيّة
من عنف المتطرفين من بين المستوطنين اليهود الخوف ./ المستوطنون عدّو خطير يسلب الفلسطينيين أراضيهم. / فلسطينيّة
 قد في القدس القديمة ننشاطات المستوطني . /وفي حياة الفلسطينيين اليوميّةيشّكل عامال ً مهّما ً في قرارات الحكومة اإلسرائيليّة 
 .اليهوديامتدّت لما وراء الحّي 
CSS13 :معيّن أّي شيء إذا ما قّررت إسرائيل فرض حلّ ال يستطيع الفلسطينيّون فعل  :تفّوق إسرائيل العسكري. 
 (.QSC18)إلى ( QSC1)يشار إليها فيما بعد بالشيفرة : )لنتائجا
QSC1: ليس . / إلسرائيلحق العودة الذي يطالب به الفلسطينيّون هو تهديد ديمغرافي  :التهديد الديمغرافي إلسرائيل
ينبغي أن يكون مطابقا ً للتعريف المطبّق على " الجىء"تعريف مصطلح ./ للفلسطينيين أّي حق بالهجرة إلى أرض إسرائيل
 (.وال ينتقل هذا الوضع إلى أجيال. الآلجىء هو شخص عاش في مكان ٍ ما وتركه: أي بالتحديد)مجموعات ٍ أخرى 
QSC2: مما يتسبّب أحياناً  )، منع النساء في وضع الوالدة من وصول المستشفيات :انتهاكات القانون الدولي وحقوق اإلنسان
 . مقابر األرقام/  .المستشفيات والمدارس  قصف./ منع الغذاء والدواء من دخول قطاع غّزة./ (في موت األّم والطفل
QSC3: والتماس بين مناطق   اإلفتقار للتواصل . /نقاط التفتيش والحصار على غّزة :قيود على حريّة حركة الفلسطينيين
قيود على حريّة الحركة في التوجه للقدس، / أمن ؟  جدار فصل أم سياج. / وبين الضفّة الغربيّة وقطاع غّزةالضفة الغربيّة، 
القيود التي تفرضها /  .معامالت اإلذالل التي يفرضها اإلحتالل اإلسرائيلي . /لقطاع غّزة وضمن مناطق الضفّة الغربيّة
سيطرة ./ للمستوطنين فقط" اإللتفافّيةطرق ال"من معقّدة بناء شبكة ./ نيينتصاريح عمل للعّمال الفلسطيإسرائيل على إصدار 
 . إسرائيل المطلقة على المعابر الحدوديّة
QSC4: العربيّة المجاورة  في الدوللآلجئين الفلسطينيين في مخيمات الآلجئين  ّوعةالظروف المر :الآلجئون الفلسطينيّون
: مثالً )اإلنسانيّة األساسيّة من قبل الدّول المضيفة  إنكار حقوق الآلجئين. / مصر وغيرها مثل األردن، العراق، لبنان، سوريا،
 (.وغيرها..حّق المواطنة، حقوق العمل بدون قيود
QSC5: لمستوطنات اإلستراتيجيّة في مواقع  :تأثير المستوطنات اإلسرائيليّة على موارد فلسطين الطبيعيّة وعلى قيام الدولة
./ التواصل الجغرافيالمستوطنات تهدّد . / الطبيعيّة للسيطرة على المياه واألرض والموارد (منطقة ج)ة الغربيّة الضفّ 
، كّل منها محاط معزولة (كنتونات)جيوب وقطاع غّزة وتسجن الفلسطينيين في  المستوطنات تقّطع أوصال الضفّة الغربيّة
 .تستمّر في احتالل بعض أخصب المناطق في الضفة الغربيّة المستوطنات. / وقّوات اإلحتالل  بالمستوطنات
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QSC6 :نقص مياه الّشرب . /تسيطر إسرائيل على جميع موارد البلد المائيّة والطبيعيّة :السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعيّة /.
 .يعّزز اإلقتصاد اإلسرائيلي األمر الذي ، الوقوداعتماد األراضي الفلسطينيّة المحتلّة على إسرائيل بالنسبة إلمدادات 
QSC7 :اإلسرائيلية واإلنشاء   اإلسكان إصدار وزارة./ توسيع المستوطنات اليهوديّة في الضفّة الغربيّة :توسيع المستوطنات
طات توّسع النشا ./وفي البلوكات اإلستيطانّية الرئيسيّةمئات من العطاءات إلنشاء وحدات سكنيّة جديدة في القدس الشرقيّة 
حركة أو انتقال . / اإلستيطانيّة إلى عمليّات تسلّل في األحياء الفلسطينيّة في القدس الشرقيّة، محيطة هذه بتجمعات سكنيّة يهوديّة
 .توسيع المعابر/ . اآلالف من المدنيين اإلسرائيليين لداخل المناطق المحتلّة مئات
QSC8:  ّالعالية إلنشاء  إعاقة اإلقتصاد اإلسرائيلي بسبب التكاليف :ةالعبء اإلقتصادي ومقاطعة المنتجات اإلسرائيلي
مقاطعة المجتمع الدولي . / لضمان أمنهم  المستوطنات والحوافز الممنوحة للمستوطنين، مقرونة ً هذه بالتكاليف العسكريّة
 . اإلسرائيليّة مقاطعة الفلسطينيين المنتجات / .المنتجات اإلسرائيليّة المصنّعة في المستوطنات اليهوديّة
QSC9 :إسرائيل في الزحف  إنتهاكات./ المحاوالت اليوميّة لطمس الهويّة العربيّة واإلسالميّة لمدينة القدس :تهويد القدس
نوايا إسرائيل في تقسيم ٍ عمودّي لسيادة جبل الهيكل   ./على الحرم الشريف والمقدسات اإلسالميّة األخرى والمسيحيّة في القدس
االنتهاكات للمقدسات والمعالم األثرية / . نوايا فتح باب ٍ جديد لدخول اليهود ساحة المسجد األقصى للّصالة./ م الشريفأو الحر
 .في الضفة الغربية
QSC10 :القدسانتهاكات الفلسطينيين للمقدسات اليهودّية في ./ اعتقال اليهود لتأديتهم الّصالة على جبل الهيكل. 
QSC11 :كونها أمالك  ة من اإلنقضاض على بيوت الفلسطينيين بإجراءات غير شرعيّة أو مستندات مزّيفة أوموجة جديد
 .تسليم إخطارات هدم البيوت /. غائبين، محولين إياها لممتلكات يهوديّة
QSC12 :مستويات منخفضة /  .قيود على الرعاية الصحيّة والتعليم./ مستويات غير مسبوقة من الفقر والبطالة :مشقّة الحياة
 .ال مثيل لها من الفلتان األمني الداخلي وعدم اإلستقرار
QSC13 :والمعتقالت اإلسرائيليّةلن يكون هناك أي اتفاق مع إسرائيل ما دام هناك فلسطينيين في السجون  :تهديدات حماس .
قذائف التهديد بإطالق / . اختطاف جنود إسرائيليين / .حماس ستحّرر كّل المقاتلين في السجون اإلسرائيليّة باستخدام القّوة/ 
 .الهاون
QSC14 :تردّي حالة  / .إعتداءات جسدية متكررة وتعذيب السجناء الفلسطينيين :انتهاكات حقوق األسرى الفلسطينيين
 .االعتقال اإلداري. / أسر النساء واألطفال/ . األسرى الفلسطينيين في السجون اإلسرائيليّة
QSC15 :وعصيانهم تجاه أي عناد اإلسرائيليين . / عدم رغبة إسرائيل في التفاوض مباشرة ً مع حماس :العناد اإلسرائيلي
وطرد اإلسرائيليّة لإلستيالء على كّل األرض الحركة الصهيونيّة  جهتت . /اجتماع أو حّل أو قرار ال يتماشى مع مخططاتهم
 .المتشدّدين من الجناح اليميني في إسرائيلالمستمّر من طرف  الّرفض. / السّكان الغير يهود منها
A41
QSC16 :رفض حماس ./ يهوديّةرفض شرعيّة إسرائيل كدولة ./ عدم اإلعتراف بحّق إسرائيل في الوجود :العناد الفلسطيني
ين وعصيانهم تجاه أي اجتماع أو عناد الفلسطيني. / الفلسطينيين  الرفض المستمّر من طرف المتشدّدين. / للتفاوض مع إسرائيل
 . تتجه الحركة الوطنيّة الفلسطينيّة إلقامة دولة فلسطينيّة على كّل األرض/  .حّل أو قرار ال يتماشى مع مخططاتهم
QSC17: ن ومن المحتمل أالمفاوضات ال تتقدّم . / فشل اإلتفاقيات السابقة :انعدام الثقة ما بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين
 . سلميّة من طرفين اإلعتقاد بأنه ال يوجد شريك أهل للثقة ويعتمد عليه إلحراز تقدّم في عملية. / تنهار
QSC18 :إسرائيل بأي لن يقبل الفلسطينيّون بأية اتفاقيّة تحتفظ بموجبها  :اإلنتهاكات اإلسرائيليّة ضّد أراضي الفلسطينيين
 . زءا ً من دولة فلسطينيّةتواجد عسكري على أراض ٍ ستصبح ج
 (.SLN32)إلى ( SLN1)يشار إليها فيما بعد بالشيفرة : )الحلول 
SLN1: حق الآلجئين الفلسطينيين بالعودة إلى ديارهم . 
SLN2: حّق العودة لدولة  ./عودة مشروطة لآلجئين الفلسطينيين بموجب برامج لّم شمل العائالت :عودة مشروطة أو تعويض
 الآلجئين حّق عودة./ الذين ال يريدون العودةدفع تعويض ألولئك الآلجئين ./ من حدود متفق عليها مع تعويضاتفلسطينيّة ض
بالعودة إلى ديارهم داخل حدود عام " إنسانيّة"تعويضات، ويسمح في حاالت   لدولة فلسطينيّة ضمن حدود متفق عليها بدون
1048.  
SLN3 : الغربيّة ويتّم تسليم  إخالء جميع المستوطنين اإلسرائيليين من الضفة :تعويض عنهاأو ال/و هدم المستوطنات/ إخالء
يقبل . / الضفّة الغربيّة/ الفلسطينيّة المحتلّة  هدم جميع المستوطنات المشيّدة في األراضي ./المستوطنات لآلجئين العائدين
 . العيش تحت السيادة الفلسطينّيةيلتزم من يبقى من المستوطنين ب . /المستوطنون تعويضات النسحابهم
SLN4 :المجتمع الدولي،  على . / تدعو الحكومة اإلسرائيليّة إلى وقف برنامج اإلستيطان :اإلمتناع عن إنشاء مستوطنات
ولتخفيف الصعوبات التي قد . / برنامجها اإلستيطاني وبشكل ٍ خاّص الواليات المتحدة، أن تمارس ضغطا ً على إسرائيل لوقف
 وقت إلعطاءالضفة الغربيّة، يمكن نقل األراضي للسيادة الفلسطينيّة على مراحل اجهها إسرائيل في إخالء مستوطنيها من تو
  .شعبها وعيةتقوم فيه بت كاف ٍ إلسرائيل
SLN5 :اإلسرائيلي من الجدار  تصبح جميع المستوطنات الواقعة على الجانب :عدم إجراء أّي تغيير على المستوطنات
 .ينبغي بقاء جميع المستوطنات بدون تغيير . /لفاصل جزءأً من إسرائيلا
SLN6 :إخالء األسرى الفلسطينيين من السجون اإلسرائيليّة . 
SLN7 :من السجون  إطالق سراح السجناء السياسيين الفلسطينيين :إطالق سراح األسرى تحت شروط أو ظروف معيّنة
إطالق سراح . / ء الفلسطينيين الذين قضوا في السجون اإلسرائيليّة فترة طويلة من الّزمنإطالق سراح السجنا. / اإلسرائيليّة
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إطالق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين من السجون اإلسرائيلّية الذين حكم عليهم قبل اتفاقية  ./السجناء الذين يعانون من أمراض
 . أوسلو
SLN8 : وقف  –قتل  نماإلبقاء في السجون على  :أمن وسالمة إسرائيلاإلبقاء على جميع السجناء الفلسطينيين من أجل
اإلعتقاد اإلسرائيلي بأن إطالق سراح اإلرهابيين يصّب فقط الزيت على نار  ./إطالق سراح اإلرهابيين الملّطخة أياديهم بالدماء
 . إطالق سراح اإلرهابيين الغير مسؤول سيعّرض أمن اإلسرائيليين للخطر. / اإلرهابيين
SLN9 : مكافأة اإلرهابيين بصرف رواتب لذويهم أثناء فترة سجنهمعلى السلطة الفلسطينيّة ايقاف . 
SLN10 :فيها الهيئات القانونيّة المؤثّرة، بما عدم اإللتجاء للمؤسسات والهيئات الدوليّة  :الكّف عن اإللتجاء للمؤسسات الدوليّة
 . السجناء الفلسطينيينقة إسرائيل على إطالق سراح التي تتمتّع بصالحيات دوليّة، في حالة مواف
SLN11 :وجود مراكز رقابة إسرائيليّة . / وجود إسرائيلي على المعابر الفلسطينيّة :الوجود العسكري اإلسر ائيلي في فلسطين
 . الضفة الغربيّة/ المحتلّة  أن تبقى في المناطق ينبغي على قوات الدفاع اإلسرائيلي. / دائمة في الدولة الفلسطينيّة
SLN12 :الفلسطينيّة المسلّحةمصادرة جميع األسلحة الغير مرخصة ونزع سالح الفصائل  :دولة فلسطينيّة منزوعة الّسالح /.
دولة : الشرط اإلسرائيلي. / والجهاد اإلسالمي نزع سالح حماس ./سجن ومحاكمة جميع من لهم عالقة بهجمات إرهابيّة
  .سطينيّة منزوعة السالح بدون جيشفل
SLN13 :تدمير جميع /  .المطالبة اإلسرائيليّة بنزع سالح المجموعات الفلسطينيّة في قطاع غّزة :نزع سالح قطاع غّزة
 .غّزةقطاع تدمير جميع األنفاق المتواجدة تحت حدود . / مخزون الصواريخ وقذائف الهاون وغيرها
SLN14 :لوقف الهجمات ينبغي على السلطة الفلسطينيّة اتخاذ خطوات صارمة  :تلين ضد إسرائيلتوقف عملّيات المقا
 . األنظمة اإلسالمية المتطّرفة تتمثّل مخاوف إسرائيل الشديدة بالتهديد األمني الذي تشّكله. / الفلسطينيّة ضدّ إسرائيل
SLN15 :يجب أن تكون  . /وإسرائيللفلسطينيّة المقامة حديثا ً مراقب دولي على الحدود ما بين الدولة ا :وساطة أطراف ثالثة
وتحاسب كال الطرفين وتضع نهاية للتصرفات حياديّة  منقادة ً بالقانون والقرارات الدوليّة، وأن تكون الجدوى أية عمليّة نحو
لعربيّة لكي تتعهد بسالم ٍ يتّم ضغطا ً على السلطة الفلسطينيّة وجامعة الدول ايمارس  على المجتمع الدولي أن . /بدون عقاب
بالعملية السلميّة، وإالّ سيكون هناك  وتقيدهاها اتقبل بدء المفاوضات، على كّل حكومة أن تبيّن التزام. التفاوض حوله في المنطقة
وق اإلنسان يجب على عملية سلمية قابلة للحياة أن تحاسب كال الطرفين عن أية انتهاكات في قانون حق. / اَ منكوثة فقط وعود
 . التواصل مع بعضهما البعض والتوّصل لتسويةوالقانون الدولي، وبناء الثقة الالزمة التي ستمكن كال الطرفين من 
SLN16 :على الهجمات  لن تكون إسرائيل آمنة حتّى قيام دولة فلسطينيّة تكون قويّة بما يكفي للسيطرة :دولة فلسطينيّة قويّة
ينبغي أن تستمّر الشرطة الفلسطينية والقوات الخاّصة في العمل . / كون لفلسطين قّوة قويّة من الشرطةينبغي أن ي ./الفلسطينيّة
 . ضد أولئك الذين يعّرضون األمن الوطني الفلسطيني للخطر
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SLN17 :التنسيق األمني ما بين قوات الدفاع اإلسرائيلية وقوات األمن الفلسطينيّة. 
SLN18 :األحياء الفلسطينيّة  تقسيم المدينة حسب. / لشرقيّة للفلسطينيين والقدس الغربيّة لإلسرائيليينالقدس ا :تقسيم القدس
مسيحي يكون تحت  –اإلسرائيليّة وجزء إسالمي   ينبغي تقسيم المدينة إلى جزئين، جزء يهودي يكون تحت السيطرة. / واليهوديّة
والوضع . المواقع اإلسالمية المقدسة" حارسة"لمبكى والدولة الفلسطينيّة حائط ا" حارسة"تكون إسرائيل . / السيطرة الفلسطينيّة
 . الراهن لألماكن المسيحيّة المقدسة يبقى بدون تغيير
SLN19 :أن تكون القدس  ينبغي. / ينبغي أن تكون القدس مدينة عالميّة تحت سلطة األمم المتحدة: رقابة دوليّة على القدس
جميع األماكن  راسةح( األمم المتحدة مثال ً)هيئة محايدة  تولىت. / هد أو ميثاق بلدي متعدّد األديانعمدينة عالميّة تحت سلطة 
 . المقدسة
SLN20: الدخول لألماكن  حريّة. / ينبغي أن تكون المدينة القديمة تحت سلطة مشتركة :اتفاقيّة حول إدارة األماكن المقّدسة
 . جانب سيادة على األماكن المقدّسةلن يكون ألي . / المقدسة لكّل شخص
SLN21: األماكن المقدسة، تكون جميع  . /تبقى القدس موّحدة وتحت السيادة اإلسرائيليّة  :القدس تحت السيطرة اإلسرائيليّة
 . ضّم القدس الشرقيّة إلسرائيل. / شاملة األماكن المقدسة في القدس الشرقيّة، تحت السيطرة اإلسرائيليّة
SLN22:  فّك . / 1067عام  انسحاب إسرائيل لحدود : 1691في نكسة عام إنهاء اإلحتالل اإلسرائيلي لألراضي التي احتلّت
رسم حدود . / األخضر هو الحدود ما بين الدولتين الخطّ . / اإلرتباط من حدودها مع قطاع غّزة والضفّة الغربيّة والقدس الشرقيّة
 . الكيان الفلسطيني
SLN23: على مبادلة  اإلتفاق مع تعديالت من خالل 1067إنسحاب إسرائيل لحدود عام  :مشروط ومبادلة أراضي انسحاب
الضفّة الغربيّة التي تشمل التجمعات  من مساحة%  4 – 3ستضّم إسرائيل في مثل هذه الحال . / أراضي بشكل ٍ متكافىء
يمكن التخلّي عن أجزاء من أراضي . / على الجانب الفلسطينياإلستيطانية الرئيسيّة مع التفاوض على ما يعادلها من أراض ٍ 
  .إسرائيل مقابل مساحة ما تشغله المستوطنات من أراض ٍ فلسطينيّة
SLN24: الحدود التي أقامها جدار الفصل . 
SLN25: ثقافة الّسالم. / منع جميع أشكال التحريض على الكراهيّة :بناء جّو من الثقة المتبادلة والتفاهم بين الجانبين / .
 . والبرامج الداعمة للّسالم ضرورة أن تلعب وسائل اإلعالم دورا ً إيجابيّا ً في تعزيز الّسالم واإليديولوجيّات
SLN26: تتخذ دورا ً فعاال ً في  يجب على هذه الدول أن :إجراءات الواليات المتحدة واإلتحاد األوروبي الصارمة ضّد الصراع
إذا لم يتجاوب اإلسرائيليّون  . /ألّن لديها القدرة على التأثير بشكل ٍ كبير على كال الجانبين، اإلسرائيلي والفلسطينيالعمليّة السلميّة 
" هجوماً " أكثر من أشكال الدبلوماسيّة استخدام شكال ً –من أجل الّسالم  –والفلسطينيّون مع العمليّة السلميّة، يجب على هذه الدّول 
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لمجتمع الدولي اإلستمرار في ممارسة ضغط ٍ على إسرائيل والفلسطينيين إللزامهم بالعمليّة السلميّة واتخاذ يجب عليها مع ا./ 
 . الخطوات الالزمة لتعزيز سالم ٍ دائم
SLN27: ي أن ينبغ .األرض ينبغي على األمم المتحدة أن تلعب دورا ً أكثر فعاليّة ً وتقدّما ً على :األمم المتحدة كجانب فعّال
 . تتحّرر األمم المتحدة من نفوذ وهيمنة الواليات المتحدة األمريكيّة
SLN28: إيقاف عمليّاتها  ينبغي على قوات الدفاع اإلسرائيليّة :وقف عمليّات قوات الدفاع اإلسرائيليّة ضّد الفلسطينيين
وينبغي عليها التخلّي عن سياسة العقوبات الجماعيّة / . ينبغي عليها وقف سياسة اإلغتياالت. / العسكريّة المسلّحة ضد الفلسطينيين
 . ألسباب أمنيّة مزعومة وهدم البيوت ومصادرة األراضي الفلسطينيّة
SLN29: البيوت المهدّمة، من للتمّكن من إعادة بناء زيارة األقارب خارج قطاع غّزة،  للتمكن من :رفع الحصار عن قطاع غّزة
 . يود المفروضة على مجال الصيد البحري في القطاعأجل حرية التجارة، ورفع الق
SLN30: الميناء،  / .غّزة وقطاع ما بين الضفّة الغربيّة " ممّر آمن"خلق  . /إعادة فتح مطار غّزة. / إنشاء مطار :الحركة حريّة
دّة وفعلّية لرفع الحصار والتخفيف من بأن اتخاذ الحكومة اإلسرائيليّة إجراءات جاالفلسطينيّون  يعتبر/ تمويل األجورو  المعابر
 . وضع نهاية لبناء الجدار الفاصل. / الحزام األمني سيخفّض من العنف
SLN31: األطراف  القيام بمشاريع مشتركة في جميع القطاعات اإلقتصاديّة وتعاون جادّ مع جميع: التعاون اإلقتصادي
المياه، الصّحة، البيئة، السياحة  الم واإلزدهار في مجاالت متعددة مثلوالمجموعات في المنطقة من أجل خلق واقع ٍ جديد للس
منح العّمال الفلسطينيين إمكانيّة العمل داخل . / وغيرها حتّى قبل التوّصل التفاقية سالم نهائي ما بين إسرائيل وجيرانها العرب
. / بيّة هاّمة على دعم أية مفاوضات سالم مستقبليّةتحسين األوضاع اإلقتصادية والمعيشيّة سيكون له تأثيرات إيجا. / إسرائيل
 .الّسماح بحرية نقل البضائع من وإلى فلسطين
SLN32: المعادن، البحر وذلك األراضي، المياه، : السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعيّة :السيطرة المشتركة على الموارد الطبيعيّة
ضمان السيطرة المشروعة على الموارد الطبيعيّة التي تشمل . / ي واإلسرائيليلفائدة النمّو اإلقتصادي وازدهار الشعبين الفلسطين
الموارد الطبيعيّة حيويّة للتنمية المستديمة ونمّو أي مجتمع، ولذا ينبغي مراقبتها  ./األراضي والمياه والمعادن والحقوق البحريّة
 . لفائدة جميع السّكان بدون تمييز
SLN33 :حّل الدولتين. 
SLN34 :ولة واحدة ثنائية القوميةد. 
 . يشير المشفّر هنا إلى العدد اإلجمالي للمقاالت في كّل صحيفة  :العدد اإلجمالي للمقاالت
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C.4 ورقة التشفيــر 
 :خطوات عمليّة التشفير
 .إقرأ المقال لترى إن كان ذا صلة بالموضوع أم ال .1
 . على مستوى المقال من أجل جمع معلومات عاّمةإن كان ذا صلة بالموضوع، شفّره على المستوى األول، ثّم  .2
 . بعد ذلك شفّر المستوى الثاني، مستوى األدلّة .3
 . دليال ً جديدا ً في نفس المقالابدأ عملية تشفير جديدة إن وجدت  .4
 
 اإلسميّــة أو الشكليّةالفئات 
 
IS1 :المشفّــر      IS2: إسم الصحيفة 
 
  IS3: رقم العدد      IS4 :التاريخ 
                   
 IS5 :الباب/  قسمال      IS6 : رقم الصفحة 
 
 IS7 :نوع المقال      IS8 :المصدر 
  
 IS9 :أسلوب المقال     IS10 :ميل أو اتجاه المقال 
   
IS11: الصورة      IS12 :هدف الصورة 
 
IS13 :النسق اللوني للصورة    IS14 :العالقة بمحتوى المقال 
     
         IS15 :المناسبة     IS16 : طول المقال/ حجم 
      
  المحتويــات            
 ال نعم السؤال
   (CL)خسائر بشريّة 
   (RS)المسؤوليّة 
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   األسبــاب 
 +- +/-  دـــــــالبن
QCSS1    
QCSS2    
QCSS3    
QCSS4    
QCSS5    
QCSS6    
QCSS7    
QCSS8    
QCSS9    
QCSS10    
QCSS11    
QCSS12    
QCSS13    
 
 النتائــــج
 +- +/-  دـــــــالبن
QSC1    
QSC2    
QSC3    
QSC4    
QSC5    
QSC6    
QSC7    
QSC8    
QSC9    
QSC10    
QSC11    
QSC12    
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QSC13    
QSC14    
QSC15    
QSC16    
QSC17    
QSC18    
 
 
 الحلــــول
 +- +/-  دـــــــالبن
SLN1    
SLN2    
SLN3    
SLN4    
SLN5    
SLN6    
SLN7    
SLN8    
SLN9    
SLN10    
SLN11    
SLN12    
SLN13    
SLN14    
SLN15    
SLN16    
SLN17    
SLN18    
SLN19    
SLN20    
A48
SLN21    
SLN22    
SLN23    
SLN24    
SLN25    
SLN26    
SLN27    
SLN28    
SLN29    
SLN30    
SLN31    
SLN32    
 
         :عدد المقاالت
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C.1. ADDITIONS TO THE PALESTINIAN CODEBOOK
C.1 Additions to the Palestinian Codebook
Section Additions Code
IS5: Section Reports 02
International Palestinian 03
Localities 04
Israeli affairs/Panorama Press 05
Articles 06
Dialogues 07
Varieties 08
IS7: Type of articles Report 02
Analysis/scenario 03
Israeli Public Opinion Poll 14
Public Opinion Poll 15
IS8: Source Public Opinion Center 09
Channel 10
Caricature 11
UN Office 12
Btselem 13
Human Rights Center 14
CSS6: Israeli measures
against Palestinians
Deportation and exile./Confrontations
and threats./Racism.
CSS7: Palestinians acts
of vandalism/terrorism
Fights with the Israeli police.
QSC2: Violations of In-
ternational law and Hu-
man rights
Cemetery of Numbers.
QSC7: Settlement ex-
pansion
Expansion of the crossings.
QSC9: Judaization of
Jerusalem
Violations of holy places and monuments
in the West Bank.
QSC11 Delivery notifications of house demoli-
tions.
Continued on next page
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C.1. ADDITIONS TO THE PALESTINIAN CODEBOOK
Continued from previous page
Section Additions Code
QS13: Hamas threats Threat of firing mortars.
QSC14: Acts against
Palestinian prisoners
Imprisoned Women and children./
Administrative detentions.
NEW SLN33 Two states solution.
NEW SLN34 A binational state.
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Chapter D
CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK - HEBREW
TRANSLATION
 
 
 Cנספח 
 מסגרת עבודה כללית לניתוח התוכן
 
C.0.1 מטרת המחקר 
 'נושאים / ממדים – '?מה נאמר 
 איזה עיתון – '?'מי אמר את זה 
 פלסטינים או ישראלים – '?'מי מושפע 
 מי אחראי? – '?ו'איך 
המחקר מתעתד לבחון את השפעת הגורם ברמת במקרו )המדיה(, על הגורם ברמת המיקרו )תהליך העיבוד 
כדי לבחון את  מוערכיםלהיות  כיםעל סדר היום הציבורי צרישהדעות תוכן המדיה והן טווח  הןשל הקהל(. 
 ישראל.בפלסטין ובתפקוד המדיה 
ישראלי. הוא -ת שנכתבו על הקונפליקט הפלסטינים של כל הכתבומתודולוגיה של המחקר מורכבת ממדגה
 נוטה לחקור כיצד רוב העיתונים החשובים בפלסטין ובישראל ממסגרים את הקונפליקט ואת תהליך השלום. 
 
C.1 ת ניתוחיחיד 
( דגימת הכותרות 3( דגימת המדיה, )2( תקופת הניתוח, )1התהליך בו נבחרה יחידת הניתוח מערבת את )
 ( קידוד המדגם.4)-העיתונים ולאורך כל 
C.1.1 תקופת הניתוח 
 :, באופן הבא2014 אפרילל 30ועד  2013באוגוסט  1המדיה המודפסת הבאה נבדק בתקופה שבין מדגם 
 חודש שנה
 אוגוסט 2013
 ספטמבר
 אוקטובר
 נובמבר
 דצמבר
 ינואר 2014
 פברואר
 מארס
 אפריל
 
C.1.2 מדגם המדיה 
 מספר כולל של שמונה עיתונים, ארבעה בכל צד:  יםהמדיה או יחידת הניתוח כוללמדגם 
 ג'דידה ופלסטין.-חייאב, אל-אהיים, אל-אל קודס, אל בפלסטין:
 ישראל היום, ידיעות אחרונות, הארץ ומעריב. בישראל:
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C.1.3 קידוד המדגם 
ן כל הכתבות במהלך תקופת למטה(. בשלב הראשו C.1קידוד המדגם נקבע בשני שלבים )ראה תרשים 
מילים כלול תשל מחקר המדיה, היכן שהכותרת הראשית או המשנית  חלקיםהניתוח ייבחרו ביחידות וב
"פלסטין, ישראל או הקונפליקט". לא משנה האם מילת המפתח מודפסת בפונט קטן או גדול, או הקשורות ל
סיומת כמו "טרוריזם", מוזכרת לבד "טרוריסט", טרוריסט", עוקבת אחריה -קודמת לה תחילית  כמו "אנטיהאם 
  או בהקשר "פיגוע/התקפת טרור".
בדיקה האם הוא מתייחס לנושאים המרכזיים של  ובשלב השני, המאמר הנבחר ייקרא כולו ותיעשה לגבי
הקונפליקט )למשל נפגעים, פליטים פלסטינים, התנחלויות יהודיות, אסירים פלסטינים, בטחון ישראל, מעמד 
 .ירושלים, משאבים טבעיים, גבולות, אמונות, רגשות ועקרונות ועזה(. אם לא, אז המאמר לא יקודד
 
 : אסטרטגיה לגבי איזה כתבות נכנסות למדגם:C.1תרשים 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 נכלל בקידודקריטריונים לגבי מה 
 / מאמרים בחדשות ובמאמרי הדעה בעיתון, שדנים, מזכירים או מתארים הצעות מהוותיחידות הרישום 
נקודות מבט לגבי הנושאים המרכזיים של הקונפליקט, היסטוריה, הסכמים, הסכמי שלום,  רעיונות/
יומיים של עימות, התקפות -, שחקנים פוליטיים ונאומים, אירועים, דיווחים יום(resolutions) החלטות/פתרונות
 חקרו.שלא מתייחסים לקונפליקט באופן ישיר, לא יי רשומותונפגעים, אידיאולוגיות ודעת קהל. 
 קריטריונים לגבי מה לא נכלל בקידוד
יכללו: ספורט, נסיעות/תיירות, בית, תרבות, רכב, אופנה או בידור לא יקודדו מאמרים מהמדורים הבאים לא י
וזאת משום שהם כוללים מעט מאוד כתבות המתייחסות לקונפליקט. כך גם לגבי מגזינים/ברושורים המצורפים 
 לעיתון. 
 
הכותרת כוללת 
את אחת ממילות 
המפתח: "פלסטין, 
 ישראל, קונפליקט"
אין לקודד את 
 הכתבה
 
הנושאים 
המרכזיים של 
הקונפליקט 
 מוזכרים
אין לקודד את 
 הכתבה
יש לקודד את 
 הכתבה
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
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C.1.4 יחידת הקשר 
יחידת הקשר לניתוח זה היא הכתבה כולה. המקודדים יקודדו את הכתבות המצוינות בספר הקידוד, בין אם 
 סיבות, השלכות או פתרונות.
 
C.2 הוראות קידוד כלליות 
 לפי השלבים הבאים: בדיוקהקידוד לכל אחת מהכתבות ייעשה 
 .ראשית, יש לקרוא את הכתבה כולה פעם אחת .1
 .את מספר הסדרה לתוך גיליון הקידודיש להזין  .2
 ליון, תאריך וכו'(יכל הקטגוריות הפורמאליות האחרות )מספר ג יקודדולאחר מכן,  .3
 שוב לפי קטגוריות התוכן. יש לקרוא את הרשומה כולה .4
 בינם ובין עצמם. ה, ולא לפי מה שהמקודדים חושביםבעל הקידוד להתבצע רק לפי מה שבכת .5
 .ם המוזכרים בכתבה הם השערות או עובדותאין זה משנה האם הפרטי .6
  ובטקסט המובילעבור קידוד התוכן, ייעשה שימוש בכותרות  .7
 ליון האקסל שהוגדר מראשיעל המקודדים להמשיך לפי ג .8
 
C.2.1 הוראות עיבוד כלליות 
 על המקודד לזכור את השלבים הבאים כאשר מעבדים את הקודים:
 הנכון בגיליון הקידודמספר הקוד צריך להיות תחת האייטם  .1
 בגיליון הקידודיש תא מוגדר לכל אייטם  .2
 חייב להיות תמיד רשום במלואו מתאיםמספר הקוד ה .3
עבור כל כתבה יש שורה שלמה. כלומר, מספר הכתבות המקודדות חייב להיות תואם למספר  .4
 השורות.
 
C.3 שיטת הקטגוריות 
 .ממדים של הקונפליקט (2)-מקור מידע ורמת הכתבה או  (1)משתי רמות של ניתוח:  ספר הקידוד מורכב
 
C.3.1 רמת הכתבה 
מקודד, שם העיתון ומספר הגיליון שם המהקטגוריות הרשמיות, שהן:  יםמורכבת הכתבה או מקור המידע רמ
תמיכה על ידי תמונה, מטרת התמונה, , סוג הכתבה, מקורוג הכתבה, , מספר העמוד, סמדורוהתאריך, 
 אורך / היקף הכתבה.קישור, סיבה מאחורי כתיבת הכתבה, ומגמה, 
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IS1מקודד : 
המקודד הוא מי שמנתח את מקור המידע )למשל, העיתון(. זה צריך להיכנס בדף הקידוד באופן  – הגדרה
 הבא:
 קוד מקודד
 01 אליאס קוקלי
 02 דנה גיא
 
IS2שם העיתון : 
 באופן הבא:אחרי כן, העיתון בו הכתבה פורסמה יקודד 
 קוד עיתון
 עיתונים פלסטינים
 01 אל קודס
 02 אל אהיים
 03 אל חייאת אל ג'דידה
 04 פלסטין
 עיתונים ישראלים
 05 ישראל היום
 06 ידיעות אחרונות
 07 הארץ
 08 מעריב
 
 
IS3מספר גיליון : 
 כאן יופיע מספר הגיליון של העיתון המקודד. 
 הערה למקודד: מספר הגיליון מודפס על העמוד הראשי של העיתון. 
  :7854למשל. 
 
IS4תאריך : 
 . DD-MM-YYYYהתאריך שבו פורסם העיתון יקודד בפורמט 
  21-08-2013למשל. 
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IS5מדור : 
בו מופיעה הכתבה, בין אם מדובר בחלק הפוליטי/חדשות, מאמרי מערכת כאן המקודד יציין את שם המדור 
 לל מאמרי דעה ותגובה( ועסקים )כלכלה(, באופן הבא:)כו
 קוד מדור
 01 פוליטי / חדשות
 02 מאמרי מערכת )דעה / תגובה(
 03 עסקים
 
IS6מספר עמוד : 
 כאן המקודד יקודד את מספר העמוד בו מופיעה הכתבה.
  4למשל: עמוד 
 
IS7סוג הכתבה : 
, רפורטז' / ספור רקע, מאמר חדשותי, טור דעה / פרשנותבחלק זה, המקודד יציין את סוג הכתבה: סיפור 
, סקר דעת קהל, מכתב לעורך, שאלה לעיתון, באופן תבליט, כותרת בלבד, תיעוד מערכת, פורטרט, ריאיון,
 הבא:
 קוד סוג הכתבה
 01 חדשות
 02 טור / פרשנות
 03 רפורטז' / סיפור רקע
 04 מאמר מערכת
 05 טכתבת פורטר
 06 ריאיון
 07 תבליט
 08 כותרת בלבד
 09 תיעוד
 10 סקר דעת קהל
 11 מכתב לעורך
 12 שאלה לעיתון
 13 אחר, פרט
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IS8: מקור 
או  /ת, קורא/ת, עיתונאיעורכ/תכאן, המקודד יתייחס למקור הכתבה, האם זה העיתון, סוכנות חדשות, 
 ?/תפוליטיקאי
 קוד מחבר/מקור
 01 עיתון
 02 סוכנות חדשות
 03 עורך
 04 עיתונאי
 06 פוליטיקאי
 07 לא מזוהה
 08 אחר, פירוט
 
IS9 :סגנון הכתבה 
 כאן המקודד יתייחס לסגנון הכתבה; עובדה או דעה?
 קוד סגנון
 01 עובדתי )חדשות, דיווח, תיעוד וכו'(
 02 דעה )מאמר מערכת, מכתבי קוראים, ביקורת(
 03 ניתן לדעתלא 
 
IS10מגמת הכתבה : 
 יטרלית, באופן הבא:הכתבה, האם חיובית, שלילית או ני כאן, המקודד יקבע את המגמה הכללית של
 קוד מגמת הכתבה
 01 שלילית
 02 חיובית
 03 נייטרלית
 
IS11תמונה : 
 המקודד יציין כאן האם הכתבה מלווה בתמונה או לא, באופן הבא:
 קוד תמונה
 01 כן
 02 לא
 
IS12מטרת התמונה : 
 :)נושאית( או תמטית )מקרית( מטרת התמונה תיקבע כאן, האם אפיזודית
 קוד מטרה
 01 (ת)מקרי אפיזודית
 02 (ת)נושאי תמטית
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IS13טונאליות של התמונה : 
 peaceful –)שלילי(, רגוע aggressive - הטון של התמונה, האם יש בה גוון תוקפניכאן, המקודד יתאר את 
 באופן הבא:)חיובי( או נייטרלי, 
 קוד טונר
 01 תוקפני
 02 רגוע
 03 נייטרלי
 
IS14:קשר לתוכן הכתבה : 
 המקודד יקבע כאן האם התמונה תומכת בטון של הכתבה או לא
 קוד קשר
 01 כן
 01 לא
 02 ניתן לדעתלא 
 
IS15: סיבה 
שמאחורי כתיבת הכתבה; מה הניע את המחבר לכתוב את הכתבה. המקודד  סיבהזה מתמודד עם ה חלק
 באופן הבא: סיבהיקודד כאן את ה
 דוגמה קוד סיבה
 ועידה / כנס / נאומים על ידי דמויות פוליטיות 01 אירוע פוליטי
 –יום כיפור, פסח, חנוכה, בפלסטין  –למשל בישראל  02 אירוע דתי
 מאווליד אל נאביאיד אל פיטר, איד אל אדחה, 
ון של אירועים, למשל רכייום העצמאות או יום לאומי / ז 03 אירוע פטריוטי / לאומי
 הנכבה, מלחמת יום כיפור
 מכתב שנכתב למחבר, עורך או לעיתון / תגובה לכתבה 04 תגובה לכתבה
מעשה ונדליזם )למשל מעצר המוני, תקיפות של  05 תקיפה / התקפה
 כוח צה"ל(מתנחלים, לוחמים, 
הקטגוריה כוללת את אחד מהבאים: התרחבות  06 ממד בעייתי
מתמשכת של התנחלויות יהודיות, אסירים פלסטינים, 
 בטחון ישראל
 יש לפרט 07 אחר
 
IS16 / היקף הכתבה: אורך 
 היקף הכתבה ייקבע בהתאמה לשטח שהוא תופס בעמוד. המקודד יעריך את השטח באופן הבא:
 קוד שטח
 01 עמוד¼ עד 
 02 עמוד½ עד 
 03 עמוד¾ עד 
 04 עמוד 3/4יותר מ
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C.3.2  ראיותרמת 
נפגעים מלחמה ואחריות כלפי נפגעי המכסה את רוב ההיבטים החשובים של הקונפליקט, כמו  הראיותרמת 
פליטים פלסטינים, התנחלויות יהודיות, אסירים פלסטינים, בטחון ישראל, מעמד ירושלים, משאבי טבע,  אלו,
לציין את המספר הכולל של  בסופו של דבר, המקודד מתבקשגבולות, אמונות, רגשות ועקרונות, ועזה. 
 .הכתבות
CL :נפגעים 
מהקונפליקט בין פלסטינים וישראלים. בכל אחד מהצדדים, כתוצאה  נפגעיםממד זה יכלול כל אזכור של 
  : או לא קודד נפגעים אם דווחומקודד יה
 קוד אייטם
 RS) 01-)המשך ל כן
 CSS) 02-)דלג ל לא
 
נפגעים מוגדרים כאינדיבידואלים שנפצעו, נהרגו, נרצחו, נתפסו או נעדרים בפעולה ישירה או עקיפה  הגדרות:
. פעולה עם האויב. פעולה ישירה מתייחס לכאלה שהיו מעורבות ישירות מרצונם במלחמה כלוחמים/ מתנגדים
 עקיפה מתייחס לאזרחים שלא היו מעורבים באופן ישיר אלא שהפעולה נכפתה עליהם.
 
RSאחריות : 
 המקודד יקודד את מי שהיה אחראי לנפגעים באופן הבא:
 קוד אחריות
 01 צבא ההגנה לישראל )צה"ל(
 02 פלסטינים לוחמים
 03 מתנחלים ישראלים
 05 אזרחים ישראלים
 06 לא ידוע
 07 לא הוזכר
 08 אחרים
 09 אחר, נא לפרט
 
, או עדיין תחת חקירה. 'לא /יםלא ידוע /םחראיאינדיבידואל/ים האיקודד כאשר ה 'לא ידוע' יש לשים לב:
 ' יקודד כאשר האחריות על הפעולה ידועה אבל לא צוינה על ידי המחבר או הכתבה. הוזכר
  לסטינים פ 2104-בספירה האחרונה, קצין האו"ם לתיאום עניינים הומניטאריים מדווח ש" :1דוגמה
  1"נשים. 253-ילדים ו 495ביניהם אזרחים,  1462נהרגו בעזה, כולל 
 קוד שאלה
CL 01 
RS 02 
                                                          
1 Booth, William (August 29, 2014). The Washington Post, “The U.N. says 7 in 10 Palestinians killed in Gaza 
were civilians, Israel disagrees.” 
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  נהרג כאשר טרוריסט דרס אותו עם בולדוזר. נהג הבולדוזר המשיך 29אברהם וולס, " :2דוגמה ,
, 20עירוני, הופך אותו על צידו ופוצע שישה ישראלים נוספים. חייל ישראלי,  סלהתנגש אל תוך אוטובו
 2"נפצע קשה בהתקפת ירי נפרדת.
 קוד שאלה
CL 01 
RS 01 
 
, השלכותשל הקונפליקט,  גורמיםכ יםמקוטלג, הממדים/ נושאים של הקונפליקטסוגיות/ ההמשך יכלול 
מוצעים. פריטים אחדים המפורטים בכל קטגוריה מתארים את הקונפליקט ואת תהליך השלום  פתרונותו
המגמה )למשל, חיובי, שלילי או מנקודות המבט של הפלסטינים ושל  הישראלים. כל מקודד יקודד את 
 נייטרלי( לכל אחד מהממדים המוזכרים בכתבה, באופן הבא: 
 קוד שאלה
 01 חיובי
 02 שלילי
 03 נייטרלי / אמביוולנטי
 
מסכמים את  18של הקונפליקט,  סיבותפריטים מתייחסים ל 13: 63הפריטים הוא כולל של המספר ה
מוצעים להשלכות אלה. לרוב  פתרונותפריטים דנים ב 32-של הקונפליקט, ו היבטים בעייתייםאו  ההשלכות
ידוד. מתחת לכל כותרת יש כמה נקודות הפריטים תהיה כותרת עם תיאור מודגש כדי להקל על תהליך הק
 שמתייחסות לאותה הבעיה:
 
 גורמים
CSS11967-ו 1948ישראל -: מלחמות ערבי 
CSS2:הגירה יהודית מרוסיה, אירופה ומדינות נוספות / עליית הציונות /  : הגירה יהודית והתקופה שאחריה
לפלסטין אחרי מלחמת העולם  אדמות והגירה לא חוקית של יהודים / רכישת 1917הצערת בלפור בשנת 
 .הראשונה
CSS3:זוהי  במשך אלפי שנים רבותי, דתי, היסטורי, וביולוגי לעברים הקדמוניםקשר ת : קשר יהודי ושייכות /
התרחשו, ולכן המוקד  ברית הישנהים מוזכרים ביהיכן שרוב האירועים ההיסטור ,אבות היהודיםמולדתם של 
ממשיכה טוב אחרי התקופה שמכוסה בברית החדשה / זהות  בארץ/ הנוכחות  ותהדתי וההלכותמנהגים של ה
 יהודית של ישראל.
CSS4הר הבית : (Haram al sharif אקצה -אף יהודי לא רוצה להתפלל באל( אתר של שני מקדשים: בערבית
וכיפת הסלע היא המקום של קודש הקודשים ולכן מחוץ לתחום של היהודים להתפלל. / ההקצאה של חלק 
מבחינה היסטורית היתה תקופה אקצה או כיפת הסלע / שאינו אל  למתפללים יהודיםשל הר הבית מהאזור 
הורחבה על ידי אחרים כך שהיא חארם אל שאריף כנסת ממוקם שם בעוד שהקדושה של  תשבה לא היה בי
                                                          
2 Saban, I., Yalon, Y., and Daniel Siryoti (August 5, 2014). Israel Hayom: “Israeli killed, another seriously 
hurt in 2 Jerusalem terror attacks.” 
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ששוקלים נוכחות יהודית בוואקף הפלסטיני  לא מורשת ליהודים להיות ליד הכותל המערבי. לעניין זה יש כמה
 ביחד כחילול האזור שאינו מתקבל על הדעת. 
CSS5 יה מאוד ישראל תלו :ישראלית-אסטרטגיית הגיבוי האמריקאיתאמריקאית או -הישראלית: הברית
בתמיכה של ארה"ב, בתמיכה הצבאית של ארה"ב שבאמצעותם ישראל שולטת בשטחים הפלסטינים 
 הכבושים.
CSS6:בבעלות  אדמות החרמתבתים, הפקעת אדמות,  הרס : האמצעים בהם נוקטת ישראל נגד הפלסטינים
של הצבא  פרזשימוש מו, ועקירת מטעים / מעצרים המוניים, נוכחות צבאית והתקפות, בגדה המערביתפרטית 
בכוח, פשיטות של הצבא לערים פלסטיניות וחיסולים ממוקדים / כוחות ישראלים / מתנחלים פולשים הישראלי 
חוסר / טבח /  חיסולים ללא משפטכמעט בכל יום, פוצעים, חוטפים ולפעמים הורגים אזרחים פלסטינים / 
נדמנטליסטי / המטרה האסטרטגית של גדר בטחון מפחד מטרוריזם פו נכונות ישראלית להסיר אמצעי אבטחה
 להבטיח את הערבות של ישראל.היא 
CSS7:ויות פיצוצי התאבדות, תקיפות על התנחלאיום מתמיד של התקפות  : מעשי ונדליזם על ידי הפלסטינים
ידוי יו אירועי ירי, דקירות, ותעל מטרות ישראליות / חטיפ ואזרחים ישראלים, טילי קסאם והפגזות מרגמה
בתוך תקיפות פלסטיניות קטלניות אבנים / האלימות הפוליטית הפלסטינית וטרור פונדמנטליסטי נגד ישראל / 
 .מעצרים ללא משפט לגיטימי/  מעצרים מנהלייםישראל / פעולות מזוינות נגד פלסטינים / 
CSS8:אמית / פלסטין היא ייהודה זוהי חובה אסלגי'האד נגד ישראל ו : אי הכרה בזכות הקיום של ישראל
המאה השביעית / הצורך להרוס את ישראל /  זמא טינים, בה הם גריםסלאמית / האדמה היא לפלסהבטחה א
 התנגדות היא עדיין הכוח שמאחד את פלסטין כאומה אחת.
CSS9 :הפלסטינים מעולם לא התכוונו לעשות שלום והכוונה האמיתית : מדינת פלסטין תהפוך למדינת טרור
ל חמאס להתחיהסתה של נגד ישראל / הסתה של הרשות הפלסטינית יא לזרוק את היהודים לים / שלהם ה
משא ומתן עם הרשות הפלסטינית מעמדה של חולשה רק תגרום אינתיפאדה שלישית נגד ישראל / רדיפה של 
 ליותר טרור.
CSS10 הגבולות הנתונים  זכות להגדרה עצמית: – לייסד את המדינה שלהםלפלסטינים : אי מתן הזכות
/ אי הכרה בפלסטינים כבעלים של  בסימן שאלה של הישות הפלסטינית / הצורך להרוג את כל הערבים
 מולדתם.
CSS11 :צה"ל נלחם בעזה / הגבלה על הבאת חומרי בניה מונע: האמצעים בהם נוקטת ישראל נגד עזה 
הגז בחוף של רצועת עזה / המצור הימי והשליטה הישראלים על מקורות  מעזה לתקן את התשתיות / הניצול
רצועת עזה/ -מנהרה במזרח גבולות ישראלטענות צה"ל על חימוש מחדש או בניית ישראל על עזה /  של
 לתוך רצועת עזה. פולש קרקעיתהיעדר טכנולוגיות ישראליות לגלות מנהרות תת קרקעיות / צה"ל 
CSS12:בתקיפות על פלסטינים ואדמותיהם / בתי ספר / מתנחלים ממשיכים  : מעשי ונדליזם של מתנחלים
את הפלסטינים מאדמותיהם. / פחד מאלימות מקיצונים בין  שמנשלמכוניות/ מתנחלים הם אויב מסוכן 
מתנחלים יהודים הוא גורם בהחלטות הממשל הישראלי ובחיי היום יום של הפלסטינים / פעילויות המתנחלים 
 הודי.בעיר העתיקה התרחבו מעבר לרובע הי
CSS13:פתרון.  כפותפלסטינים יכולים להיות ללא תשובה אם ישראל מחליטה ל : עליונות צבאית של ישראל 
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 השלכות
QSC1 :הפלסטינים דורשים זכות שיבה הוא איום דמוגרפי לישראל / הפלסטינים אינם : איום דמוגרפי לישראל
להיות בהתאמה להגדרה שמיושמת לקבוצות בעלי זכות להגר לאדמת ישראל / ההגדרה של "פליט" צריכה 
 הוא סטטוס שלא מועבר בדורות(. ,פליט הוא מישהו שלמעשה חי במקום כלשהו ועזב אותו כלומר,אחרות )
QSC2:   :נשים יולדות נמנעות מלהגיע לבתי חולים )לעיתים תוך  הפרה של החוק הבינלאומי וזכויות אדם
 גרימת מוות( / משלוחי מזון ותרופות נחסמים מלהיכנס לעזה / הפצצה של בתי חולים ובתי ספר.
QSC3סמיכות מחסומים ומצור על עזה / חוסר  ת של חופש התנועה של הפלסטינים:ומעשי ות: הגבל
רצועת עזה ובתוך הגדה  רושלים,הגבלה על חופש התנועה למזרח י/ גדר ההפרדה או גדר הביטחון /  ואחדות
ת רשת בניי / לפלסטינים היתרי עבודה על ידי הכיבוש הישראלי / ישראל לא מוציאה השפלההמערבית / 
 / שליטה מלאה של ישראל במעברים.  מתוכננת מתנחלים בלבד של 'מעברי דרכים'
QSC4 :פליטים פלסטינים במחנות פליטים בשכנות למדינות ערביות  תנאים מחפירים של: פליטים פלסטינים
ה על ידי אומות ערביות של זכויות אדם בסיסיות חשכמו ירדן, עיראק, לבנון, סוריה, מצרים ועוד. / הכ
 )אזרחות, זכויות לא מוגבלות לעבודה וכו'( לפלסטינים במדינותיהם.
QSC5 הקצאה אסטרטגית  פלסטין ומעמדה כמדינה:: השפעה של ההתנחלויות על המשאבים הטבעיים של
ליים. / א( במטרה להרשות שליטה על מים, אדמה ומשאבים מינרCשל ההתנחלויות בגדה המערבית )אזור 
ההתנחלויות מאיימות על רצף טריטוריאלי. / ההתנחלויות קוטעות את הגדה המערבית ואת רצועת עזה 
דות, שכל אחד ממנו מוקף בהתנחלויות ובכוחות של כיבוש / לחתיכות וכולאות את הפלסטינים במובלעות מבוד
 ההתנחלויות ממשיכות לכבוש כמה מהאזורים הכי פוריים בגדה המערבית.
QSC6 : :ישראל שולטת בכל מקורות המים והמשאבים הטבעיים במדינה / שליטה במשאבים הטבעיים
 .כך מחזקת את הכלכלה הישראליתוב, של ישראל הגז במשאביתלות השטחים הכבושים /  יהימחסור במי שת
QSC7 :ההתרחבות של ההתנחלויות היהודיות בגדה המערבית / משרד הבינוי : התרחבות ההתנחלויות
והשיכון מפרסם מכרזים לבניה של יחידות דיור חדשות במזרח ירושלים ובגושי התנחלויות גדולות. / פעילויות 
עם אוכלוסיה יהודית /  מכתרות אותןבמזרח ירושלים, שכונות פלסטיניות ל לחדירההתחלות מתרחבות 
 התנועה או מעבר של מאות או אלפי אזרחים ישראלים לתוך הטריטוריה הכבושה. 
QSC8:על ידי מחירים גבוהים של בנייה  ת נעצרתהישראלי הכלכלה : נטל כלכלי והחרמת מוצרים ישראלים
צבאיות של אבטחתם / חרם בין לאומי עולמי על מוצרים עם עלויות , בשילוב בהתנחלויות ותמריצים למתנחלים
 ישראלים המיוצרים בהתנחלויות היהודיות. / פלסטינים מחרימים מוצרים ישראלים.
QSC9:את הזהות הערבית והאסלאמית של ירושלים / הפרות של ישראל  דכאניסיונות יומיים ל : ייהוד ירושלים
. /כוונות ם ולנצרות בירושליםאסלומות אחרים הקדושים לאומק Haram al Sharif-והסגת גבול/חדירה ל
/ הכוונות לפתוח דלת  הבית או של מקום קדוששל הר  אנכיתישראליות להיות בעלת ריבונות המחולקת 
 אל אקצה להתפלל. סגדחדשה ליהודים להיכנס למ
QSC10 ים ליהדות בירושלים. מקומות קדוש: יהודים נעצרים על תפילה בהר הבית / הפרות של פלסטינים של 
QSC11 :היעדר או  מזויפיםמסמכים  שקריים, גל חדש של השתלטות על בתים של פלסטינים על ידי אמצעים
 .הפיכתם לרכוש יהודיבעלות, 
QSC12של עוני ושל אבטלה / חסמים לבריאות ולחינוך / רמות  חסרות תקדים רמות – מחייה /מצוקת: קשיי
 חוסר חוק פנימי ושל חוסר יציבות שלנמוכות באופן חסר תקדים 
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QSC13  :לא יהיה הסכם עם ישראל כל עוד ישנם פלסטינים בכלא / חמאס ישחרר את כל : איומי חמאס
 הלוחמים בכלא הישראלי על ידי שימוש בכוח / חטיפת חיילים ישראלים.
QSC14 :החמרת המצב של התעללות פיזית תכופה ועינוי של שבויים / : פעולות נגד אסירים פלסטינים
 אסירים פלסטינים בכלא הישראלי.
QSC15:  :חוסר נכונות של ישראל לשאת ולתת ישירות עם חמאס / עקשנות עקשנות / אי פשרנות ישראלית
וחוסר פשרנות וחוסר ציות לכל פגישה, פתרון / החלטה שלא מסתדרת עם התכניות שלהם / התנועה 
מדינה ולגרש אוכלוסיות לא יהודיות / ההתנגדות המתמשכת של הישראלית ציונית מכוונת להשתלט על כל ה
  בעלי הקו הנוקשה ולא מתפשר של הצד הימני בישראל. 
QSC16:  :אי הכרה בזכותה של ישראל להתקיים / שלילת הלגיטימיות של עקשנות / אי פשרנות פלסטינית
ההתנגדות המתמשכת של  ישראל כמדינה יהודית / חוסר נכונות של חמאס לשאת ולתת עם ישראל /
פלסטינים בעלי עמדות נוקשות ולא מתפשרות / עקשנות פלסטינית וחוסר ציות שלהם לאף פגישה / פתרון / 
החלטה שלא מסתדרת עם התכניות שלהם / התנועה הלאומית הפלסטינית מכוונת לייסד מדינה פלסטינית 
 בכל המדינה.
QSC17 :לון של הסכמי עבר / משא ומתן לא מתקדם וסביר שייכשל / כש: חוסר אמון בין פלסטינים וישראלים
 לעשות התקדמות בתהליך שלום דו צדדי. כדי האמונה שאין פרטנר אמין ומהימן 
QSC18שמרו נוכחות י: פלסטינים לא יקבלו הסכם שתחתיו ישראלים : הפרה ישראלית של אדמות פלסטינים
 לסטין.צבאית כלשהי על אדמות שהפכו להיות חלק מאדמת פ
 
 פתרונות
SLN1: שיבה של פליטים פלסטינים לאדמותיהםה זכות 
SLN2:חזרה מותנית לפליטים פלסטינים תחת תכניות איחוד משפחות / זכות  : חזרה על תנאי או פיצוי
לחזור / זכות פיצוי ישולם לפליטים שלא רוצים  השיבה למדינה פלסטינית תחת גבולות מוסכמים ופיצוי /
ריים', הם מורשים אפלסטינית במסגרת גבולות מוגדרים ללא פיצוי ובכמה מקרים 'הומניט השיבה למדינה
 .1948לחזור לגבולות 
SLN3 / כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפונו מהגדה המערבית, התנחלויות: ו/או פיצוי של ה הרס: פינוי
המערבית / מתנחלים  גדהב ים חוזרים / הרס כל ההתנחלויות בשטחים הכבושיםוההתנחלויות יהיו לפליט
 יקבלו חבילות פיצוי עבור נסיגתם / מתנחלים שיישארו מחויבים לגור תחת ריבונות פלסטינית.
SLN4 : :הממשלה הישראלית תקרא לעצור את תכנית ההתנחלויות / הקהילה הימנעות מבנייה בהתנחלויות
ההתנחלויות / במטרה למתן את  הבין לאומי ובייחוד ארה"ב צריכים לשים לחץ על ישראל לעצור את תכנית
הקשיים שישראל מתמודדת עם פינוי ההתנחלויות מהגדה המערבית, העברת הטריטוריות צריכה להיות 
 מיושמת בשלבים כדי לאפשר לישראל זמן להיות רגישה עם הציבור שלה. 
SLN5 :כל ההתנחלויות בצד הישראלי של גדר הביטחון צריכות להיות התנחלויות: לא ייעשה שינוי מבחינת ה
 חלק מישראל / כל ההתנחלויות צריכות להישאר כמו שהן. 
SLN6: .לפנות אסירים מבתי הכלא הישראלים 
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SLN7שחרור של אסירים פלסטינים פוליטיים בבתי : שחרור תחת תנאים מסוימים או נסיבות מסוימות :
סירים פלסטינים שנשארו בבתי הכלא הישראלים לתקופה ארוכה / שחרור של הכלא הישראלי/ שחרור של א
 תקופה שלפני הסכם אוסלו מבתי הכלא הישראלים.האסירים שסובלים ממחלה / שחרור של פלסטינים מ
SLN8אלה שהרגו צריכים להישאר בכלא טינים למען בטחון ישראל: סאת כל האסירים הפל השאיר: ל– 
טים שיש להם דם על הידיים / אמונה ישראלית ששחרור טרוריסטים רק יוסיף דלק להפסיק לשחרר טרוריס
 לאש הטרוריסטים/ שחרור לא אחראי של טרוריסטים יסכן את בטחון הישראלים.
SLN9.הרשות הפלסטינית תפסיק לתגמל טרוריסטים עם משכורות כאשר הם בכלא : 
SLN10 :למוסדות בין לאומיים ותאגידים משפיעים, כולל  נותפלא ל ים:ילאומ-הימנעות מפנייה למוסדות בין
 , במקרה שיראל מאשרת שחרור של אסירים פלסטינים.תבין לאומי מכשירותתאגידים חוקיים שנהנים 
SLN11:תצפיתנוכחות ישראלית במעברי הגבול הפלסטינים / קיום של  : נוכחות צבאית ישראלית בפלסטין 
 .צה"ל צריך להישאר בשטחים הכבושים / גדה מערביתבמדינת פלסטין / ה קבוע תישראלי
SLN12 :ת / לוחמניולהחרים כל נשק לא חוקי ופירוק נשק של קבוצות פלסטיניות : מדינת פלסטינית מפורזת
מי / התנאי אסלחמאס והג'יאהד הא מאסר ומשפט לכל מי שמיוחסים לו התקפות טרור / פירוק מנשק של
 ורקת מנשק ללא צבא.הישראלי של מדינה פלסטינית מפ
SLN13:כל של דרישה ישראלית לפרק מנשק קבוצות פלסטיניות ברצועת עזה / הרס  : פירוק מנשק של עזה
 כל המנהרות מתחת לגבול עזה.של הרס וכו' / טילים ורקטות 
SLN14:הרשות הפלסטינית צריכה לנקוט בצעדים דרמטיים כדי  : הפסקה של פעולות לוחמניות נגד ישראל
 עמידיםטחוני שמידאגות מיידיות של ישראל היו האיום הבלהפסיק את ההתקפות הפלסטיניות נגד ישראל / 
 ים.קיצונים הייאמלסהמשטרים הא
SLN15 :ראל / כל משקיף בין לאומי בגבולות בין מדינה פלסטינית חדשה שתקום ובין יש: תיווך של צד שלישי
תהליך כלפי ישימות/ בר קיימא צריך להיות מודרך על ידי החוק והחלטות בין לאומיות, להיות חסר פניות, 
לשני הצדדים, להביא לסוף של פטירה מעונש. / הקהילה הבין לאומי חייבת לשים לחץ על  אחראי כלפילהיות 
הרשות הפלסטינית ועל הליגה הערבית להתחייב לתהליך שלום באזור. לפני שהמשא ומתן יכול להתחיל, כל 
 / רק הבטחות שבורות. וממשלה חייבת להראות את המסירות והמחויבות שלהן לתהליך השלום, או שיהי
תהליך בר קיימא חייב להיות מחויב לכל הפרה של חוק זכויות אדם והחוק הבין לאומי, לבנות את האמון 
 ולהסדר להתקיים. יםההכרחי שמאפשר לשני הצדדים להיות מחויב
SLN16 :ישראל לא יכולה להיות בטוחה עד שמדינה פלסטינית מיוסדת באופן : מדינה פלסטינית חזקה יותר
חזק / משטרה פלסטינית  שיטורלשלוט בהתקפות פלסטיניות. / לפלסטין צריך שיהיה כוח  מספיק חזק כדי
 טחון הלאומי הפלסטיני.יוכוחות מיוחדים ימשיכו לפעול נגד כלפי כל מי שמסכן את הב
SLN17יםטחון הפלסטיניי: תיאום בטחוני בין צה"ל ובין כוחות הב. 
SLN18:מערב ירושלים לפלסטינים ומזרח ירושלים לישראלים / חלוקה של העיר לפי  : חלוקה של ירושלים
שכונות ישראליות ופלסטיניות / העיר העתיקה תהיה מחולקת לשני חלקים: חלק יהודי תחת שליטה ישראלית 
)אפוטרופוס( לכותל והמדינה  וחלק מוסלמי ונוצרי תחת שליטה פלסטינית. / ישראל תהיה "שומרת"
של האתרים הנוצרים הקדושים  הסטטוס קוו סלאמי הקדוש.לאתר הא (ס)אפוטרופו ''שומרתהפלסטינית 
 יישאר.
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SLN19:ירושלים תהיה עיר בין לאומית תחת סמכות של האומות  : שליטה בין לאומית על ירושלים
י )למשל לאטראמנה בין דתית עירונית. / גוף ני תחת שליטה של תהמאוחדות. / ירושלים תהיה עיר בין לאומי
 על כל האתרים הקדושים.)אפוטרופוס(  "השומר"האומות המאוחדות( יהיה 
SLN20 :העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת שליטה משותפת / גישה חופשית : הסכם על ניהול האתרים הקדושים
 לכולם לאתרים הקודשים / אף צד לא יהיה בעל ריבונות על האתרים הקדושים.
SLN21 : ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת ותחת ריבונית ישראלית / כל המקומות  ישראלית:ירושלים תחת שליטה
הקדושים, כולל האתרים הקדושים במזרח ירושלים יהיו תחת שליטה ישראלית / סיפוח של מזרח ירושלים 
 לישראל.
SLN22ישראל תיסוג לגבולות 1967סה של כ: להביא לסיום את הכיבוש הישראלי של אדמות שנלקחו בנ :
מהגבולות עם עזה, הגדה המערבית ומזרח ירושלים / הקו הירוק כגבול בין שתי המדינות /  התנתק/ ל. 1967
 לקבוע את הגבולות של הישות הפלסטינית.
SLN23 :עם התאמה דרך הסכם של חילופי  1967ישראל תיסוג לגבול : נסיגה ללא תנאים וחילופי אדמות
מהגדה המערבית שכוללת גושי התנחלויות מרכזיים עם השוואה של  3-4%ישראל תספח  אדמות מקבילים. / 
חילופי אדמות שידונו במשא ומתן. / האדמה שנלקחה על ידי המתנחלים יכולה פשוט להימסר לפלסטינים 
 מהאזורים האחרים של ישראל.
SLN24: טחוןיגבולות מיוסדים על ידי חומת הב. 
SLN25 : לחנך /  הסתה לאלימות: איסור על כל צורות של אמון הדדי והבנה בין שני הצדדיםבניית אווירה של
 שלום / המדיה תשחק תפקיד חיובי בקידום שלום ואידיאולוגיות ותכניות בעד שלום.ל
SLN26: :הם חייבים לקחת תפקיד אקטיבי  ארה"ב והאיחוד האירופי יחמירו הצעדים נגד הקונפליקט
/ אם  הן על הישראלים והן על הפלסטינים. רבות להם את היכולת להשפיעבתהליך השלום משום שיש 
הישראלים והפלסטינים לא משתפים פעולה עם תהלך השלום, הם חייבים, למען השלום, להשתמש באופן 
הם והקהילה הבין לאומית חייבים להמשיך לשים לחץ על ישראל ועל יותר אגרסיבי של דיפלומטיה. / 
 לתהליך השלום ולקחת צעדים דרושים כדי לקדם שלום מתמשך. הפלסטינים להתחייב
SLN27:  :האו"ם צריך לשחק תפקיד יותר אקטיבי ומתקדם בשטח. / האו"ם האומות המאוחדות כצד פעיל
 צריך להתנתק מההשפעה של ארה"ב והדומיננטיות שלה. 
SLN28: מזוינות כנגד הפלסטינים /  : על צה"ל להפסיק פעולותלהפסיק את פעולות צה"ל כנגד הפלסטינים
צה"ל צריך להפסיק את מדיניות החיסולים / צה"ל צריך לנטוש את המדיניות של ענישה קולקטיבית, הריסת 
 של אדמות פלסטינים. החרמהבתים ו
SLN29:  :קרובים מחוץ לעזה, יכולת לבנות מחדש בתים, חופש להיות יכולים לבקר הסרת המצור על עזה
 עזה.של המסחר והסרת המגבלות על טווח הדייג 
SLN30:  :הקמת שדה תעופה / פתיחה מחדש של נמל התעופה בעזה / יצירת "מעבר בטוח" חופש התנועה
/ פלסטינים שוקלים לקחת צעדים רציניים  מימון משכורותבין הגדה המערבית ורצועת עזה / נמל ימי, מעברים ו
הבניה של הפסקת אלימות. /  חגורת הביטחון תמתן אתישראל להסרת המצור ו תוריאליים על ידי ממשל
 חומת ההפרדה. 
SLN31: :של פרויקטים משותפים בכל המגזרים הכלכליים ושיתוף פעולה רציני  העלאה שיתוף פעולה כלכלי
זור ליצירת מציאות חדשה של שלום ושגשוג במספר תחומים כמו מים, בריאות, בין כל הצדדים והקבצות בא
פועלים סביבה, תיירות ואחרים, אפילו לפני הגעה להסכם שלום סופי בין ישראל ושכנותיה הערביות. / לתת ל
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יהיו בעלי השפעות חיוביות הפלסטינים אפשרות לעבוד בתוך ישראל. / שיפור התנאים הכלכליים והמחייה 
 ה של טובין לפלסטין.הובלאת חופש ה התירניכרות על התמיכה של כל משא ומתן על שלום עתידי. / ל
SLN32:  :שליטה על משאבים טבעיים: אדמה, מים, מינרלים, ים שליטה משותפת על משאבים טבעיים– 
צמיחה הכלכלית והשגשוג של כל האוכלוסייה / להבטיח שליטה לגיטימית על משאבים טבעיים לרווחה ול
/ משאבים טבעיים חיוניים להתפתחות בת קיימא וצמיחה של כל  זכויות ימיותושכוללת אדמה, מים, מינרלים 
 , ללא אפליה. כולה האוכלוסייהמבוקרת לרווחת חברה, וצריכה להיות 
NA: ת: כאן המקודד יתייחס למספר הכולל של הכתבות בכל עיתון.סה"כ מספר הכתבו 
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D.1 Additions to the Israeli Codebook
Section Additions
CSS6 - Israeli measures against Pales-
tinians
Palestinian prisoners in Israel/attempts
to stop financial support for terror/
preventing financial support following
addressing to international institutions/
preventing terror attacks/defence from
terror attacks/confiscation of lands.
CSS7: Palestinians acts of vandalism Tunnels.
CSS8: not recognizing Israel’s right to
exist
Not recognizing Israel’s as a Jewish
state.
CSS11: Israel measurements against
Gaza
Also - steps to ease economic situation
of the Palestinians, defence, attacking
launchers, tense security situation.
CSS12: Settlers acts of vandalism Right wing activists (not necessarily
settlers).
QSC2: Violations of International law
and human rights
Force feeding of Palestinian prisoners.
QSC3: Practical limitations on the
Palestinians freedom of movement
Easing steps in the crossing borders,
jobs permits, age limit to prayers.
QSC4: Palestinian refugees Refugees camps in Palestine
QSC5: The influence of settlements on
Palestine’s natural resources and state-
hood
Discriminatory planning policy, Ju-
daization of lands.
QSC8: Economic burden and boy-
cotting Israeli products
Cultural boycotting/academic boy-
cotting.
QSC9: Judaization of Jerusalem Expansion of the settlements in
Jerusalem area.
QSC12: Life hardship Steps to ease economic situation of the
Palestinians.
QSC13: Hamas threats Threats of building tunnels.
SLN5: No change to be made to settle-
ments
Including annexation of the Jordan Val-
ley.
SLN9: PA to stop rewarding “terrorist” Stop the incitement.
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Section Additions
SLN15: Third-party mediation Mention of the US involvement in the
peace negotiations/UN as a discrimi-
nating organization/EU financial aid.
SLN27: The UN as an active side UN as a discriminating organization
QSC10: Jews arrested for praying on
temple mount/Palestinians’ violations
of Jewish sanctities in Jerusalem
Jews supposedly attacks on holy places
in Jerusalem.
SLN18: Division of Jerusalem Mention of the Palestinian citizens in
East Jerusalem.
SLN21: Jerusalem under Israeli control Mention of the Palestinian citizens in
East Jerusalem.
CSS13: Israel’s military superiority Iron dome against Quasams.
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SURVEY
E.1 Master Copy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Good morning / afternoon / evening, my name is _____________ from the Palestinian 
Center for Public Opinion; an independent market research company, and we are in the 
process of conducting a face-to-face survey for a dissertation project at the Technische 
Universität Dresden in Germany. The survey will investigate how Israelis and 
Palestinians think about the issue of conflict and peace in the area. The questions have 
been developed in Germany and from a non-partisan point of view. They are easy to 
answer. In most cases you just have to indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with 
a statement.  
 
There is no right or wrong answer, it is just about your personal opinion. The whole 
interview should take no more than 25 minutes of your time. 
 
Please be confident that the information you provide will remain confidential and that 
your answers will be used for statistical purposes only. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the supervisor of the 
dissertation or the director of the survey institute.  
 
[IN CASE THE RESPONDENT ASKED FOR CONTACT INFORMATION] 
 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Donsbach 
Director of the Department of Communication at Technische Universität Dresden (TUD) 
Email; wolfgang.donsbach@tu-dresden.de.  
 
Dr. Nabil Kukali  
President and director of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion  
Email: dr.kukali@pcpo.org. 
Tel.: 0599-726-878 
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Good morning / afternoon / evening, my name is _____________ from Maagar Mochot 
Ltd.; an independent market research company, and we are in the process of conducting 
an online survey for a dissertation project at the Technische Universität Dresden in 
Germany. The survey will investigate how Israelis and Palestinians think about the issue 
of conflict and peace in the area. The questions have been developed in Germany and 
from a non-partisan point of view. They are easy to answer. In most cases you just have 
to indicate to what degree you agree or disagree with a statement.  
 
There is no right or wrong answer, it is just about your personal opinion. The whole 
interview should take no more than 25 minutes of your time. 
 
Please be confident that the information you provide will remain confidential and that 
your answers will be used for statistical purposes only. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the supervisor of the 
dissertation or the director of the survey institute.  
 
[IN CASE THE RESPONDENT ASKED FOR THE CONTACT INFORMATION] 
 
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Donsbach 
Director of the Department of Communication at Technische Universität Dresden (TUD) 
Email; wolfgang.donsbach@tu-dresden.de.  
 
Prof. Dr. Ytzhak Katz  
Founder and the CEO of Maagar Mochot Ltd. 
Email: ytzhak@netvision.net.il. 
Tel.: 0505-386-171 
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SPLIT A or B 
 
Respondent No: ____________. 
 
The Questionnaire to be completed by adults 18 years and older.  
 
Note to all interviewers: All questions should have clear and precise answers, otherwise a 
questionnaire will be considered void. Please comply with all notes. Thanks in advance. 
 
 
 
 
Date of Birth Selected Respondent 
(First name or family name) Day Month 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
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PART I: SAMPLE INFO [TO BE COMPLETED BY THE INTERVIEWER] 
 
 
S1) Split:   
1. A. 
2. B. 
 
S2) Region:  
1. West Bank.  
2. Gaza Strip. 
 
S2) Region: ___________.  
 
S3) In which governorate do you live?  
1. Jenin.  
2. Nablus. 
3. Ramallah.   
4. Bethlehem. 
5. Jerusalem.   
6. Hebron. 
7. Jericho.   
8. Tulkarem. 
9. Tubas.   
10. Qalqilya. 
11. Salfit.   
12. Gaza City. 
13. North of Gaza.  
14. Deir Al Balah. 
15. Khan Younis.   
16. Rafah. 
 
S3) City: ___________  
 
S4) Type of residence:  
1. City.    
2. Village. 
3. Refugee camp. 
 
S4) Type of residence:  
1. City.    
2. Village. 
3. Settlement.  
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S5) Date of interview:      /      / 2015 
 
S6) Duration of interview (in minutes): ____________. [SHOULD BE COMPLETED AT 
THE END OF THE INTERVIEW] 
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PART II: STUDY QUESTIONS 
 
1) In general, do you believe that things in your country are heading in the right or 
wrong direction? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Right direction. 
2. Wrong direction. 
3. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
 
2) What are your sources of information regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? 
[MULTIPLE ANWERS ARE ALLOWED] [READ THE LIST] 
1. Radio. 
2. TV. 
3. Internet such as blogs and websites. 
4. Social Media such as facebook, Twitter, etc. 
5. Newspapers, printed or online. 
6. Family and friends. 
7. I do not follow the news. [DON’T READ] 
 
[ASK QUESTIONS 3 IF HE OR SHE READS THE NEWSPAPER (ANSWERED 5) IN THE PREVIOUS 
QUESTION, OTHERWISE SKIP TO QUESTION 4] 
 
3) What is the local daily, weekly, or monthly newspaper do you usually read the 
most?  [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Al-Quds newspaper. 
2. Al-Hayat newspaper. 
3. Al-Ayyam newspaper. 
4. Filistin newspaper. 
5. Other, please specify: ___________________. 
 
4) What is the local daily, weekly, or monthly newspaper do you usually read the 
most?  [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Israel Hayom. 
2. Yediot Ahronot. 
3. Haaretz. 
4. Maariv. 
5. Other, please specify: ___________________. 
 
5) How often do you read the news in the internet? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Several times a day. 
2. Once a day. 
3. 4-6 days a week. 
4. 2-3 days a week. 
5. Once a week. 
6. Less often than once a week. 
7. I don’t use the internet to read news. [DON’T READ] 
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6) How interested, if at all, would you say you are in news related to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict? 
1. Extremely interested. 
2. Very interested. 
3. Somewhat interested. 
4. Not very interested. 
5. Not at all interested. 
 
7) Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a 
very high degree, please tell me what the conflict between the Palestinians and 
Israelis is about?  
 
The conflict between the 
Palestinians and Israelis is 
about.. 
 
Very low 
 degree 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
Very high 
 degree 
Don’t 
know 
[DON’T 
READ] 
a. Religion (SPLIT A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Culture (SPLIT B) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Nationalism (SPLIT A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Politics (SPLIT B) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. Economics (SPLIT A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. History (SPLIT B) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. Existence (SPLIT A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. Ethnicity (SPLIT B) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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8) How much you find the following historical events as a cause of nowadays conflict 
between Palestinians and Israelis. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning to a 
very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree. 
 
 
Historical event 
Very low 
 degree 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Very high 
 degree 
Don’t know 
[DON’T 
READ] 
a. Persecution of Jews in 
Europe and Russia. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Jewish immigration to 
historic Palestine. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. The British granting the 
Jews the right to establish a 
national homeland in Palestine 
-Balfour Declaration. (SPLIT 
A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war. 
(SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. Israel’s occupation of the 
Palestinian territories in 1967 - 
Six Days War. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Arab exploitation of the 
conflict to serve their own 
agendas. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. The Palestinian belief that 
they have lived on this land 
over centuries and are entitled 
to own it. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. The Jewish belief that the 
land is the historical homeland 
of the Jewish people. (SPLIT 
B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
9) Which statement do you feel closest to your opinion, if you were to get back to the 
beginning of the conflict in the beginning of last century, you: 
1. Would have kept the history as it is. 
2. Would have sought out more peaceful changes to the history. 
3. Would have persisted with even more extreme actions. 
4. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 
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10) Do you feel that the following actions pertaining the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
are almost always justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified? 
 
 
 
Action 
Almost 
always 
justified 
Sometimes 
justified 
Rarely 
justified 
Never 
justified 
Don’t 
know 
[DON’T 
READ] 
a. Launching rockets from 
Gaza at Israel. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Military actions by Israeli 
army in the Palestinian 
Territories. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Palestinian actions against 
Israelis. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Jewish settlers’ actions 
against Palestinians. (SPLIT 
B) 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. Movement restrictions 
imposed by Israel. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. The PA funding families of 
those who are in Israeli prison. 
(SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Efforts of the PA to isolate 
Israel internationally.  (SPLIT 
A) 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. Building the wall between 
the Palestinians and the 
Israelis. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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11) Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is 
very serious, how do you evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process: 
 
Items 
Not 
serious at 
all 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Very 
serious 
Don’t know 
[DON’T 
READ] 
a. Building settlements. (SPLIT A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Israeli moves to enhance Jewish 
access to the Temple Mount. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Not recognizing the notion of the 
Jewish state. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s possession 
of weapons. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. Israeli settlers’ possession of weapons. 
(SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Having tunnels under the borders of 
the Gaza Strip. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
g. Detained Palestinians prisoners’ by 
Israel. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
h. The Israeli full control over natural 
resources. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
i. Palestinian refugees' right of return. 
(SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
j. The difficulty of having access to 
places of worship. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
k. Lack of clear borders for the state of 
Palestine. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
l. Not recognizing Israel’s right to exist. 
(SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
m. Hardliners constant refusal to any 
peace agreement. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
n. The Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli 
products. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
o. Deterioration of the Palestinian 
economy. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
p. Lack of territorial contiguity in 
Palestine. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
q. The security threat imposed by 
extremists on both sides. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
r. Lack of confidence between 
Palestinians and Israelis. (SPLIT B) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
s. Dependency of Palestinian economy 
on Israeli economy. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
t. Israel’s absolute control over border 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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crossings. (SPLIT B) 
u. The freezing of the funds’ transfer to 
the Palestinian Authority of the 
Palestinian taxes and custom duties 
retained by Israel. (SPLIT A) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
11) With regard to the issue of Palestinian refugees, which of the following you 
consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?[READ THE 
LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]  
After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution? 
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
 
 Suggested solutions  1
st
 answer 2
nd
 answer 
1. The right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes 
within the 1948 borders.  
1 2 
2. Conditional return of Palestinian refugees. 1 2 
3. Absorbing the Palestinian refugees in the newly established 
Palestinian state.  
1 2 
4. The refugees to be assimilated and granted full citizenship 
rights in their host countries.  
1 2 
5. Abandoning the right of return and replacing it by financial 
compensation.  
1 2 
6. None of the above. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
7. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
 
12) Now, I need to read a list of possible solutions to the issue of Israeli settlements, 
which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be 
implemented? [READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]  
After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution? 
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
 
Suggested solutions 1
st
 answer 2
nd
 answer 
1. All Israeli settlers evacuate settlements built on 1967 
borders. 
1 2 
2. Dismantling all settlements built within the 1967 borders.  1 2 
3. Compensation packages including resettlement of settlers 
within Israeli borders. 
1 2 
4. Keeping all settlements intact.  1 2 
5. Freezing settlement activities in the West Bank and 
Jerusalem.  
1 2 
6. Allowing all settlers to stay in the West Bank under the 
Palestinian sovereignty at their discretion.  
1 2 
7. Relinquishing parts of Israeli lands that would 
commensurate in area with that occupied by the Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank.  
1 2 
8. All settlements built on the Israeli side of the wall become 1 2 
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part of Israel.  
9. None of the above. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
10. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
 
13) There have been several different options proposed for Jerusalem, please tell me  
which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be 
implemented?[READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]  
After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution? 
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
 
Suggested solutions 1
st
 answer 2
nd
 answer 
1. East Jerusalem for Palestinians and West Jerusalem for 
Israelis as it was the case before 1967. 
1 2 
2. Dividing Jerusalem into Palestinian and Jewish quarters. 1 2 
3. International control over Jerusalem and its’ holy places.  1 2 
4. Jerusalem to remain united and under Israeli sovereignty 
with allowing access to Jerusalem's holy sites for both 
nations. 
1 2 
5. The old city should be placed under joint Palestinian-Israeli 
sovereignty. 
1 2 
6. None of the above. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
7. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
 
14) Several solutions have been proposed with regard to issue of Palestinian 
prisoners, which of the following you consider to be the most acceptable solution 
that can be implemented?[READ THE LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]  
After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution? 
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
 
Suggested solutions 1
st
 answer 2
nd
 answer 
1. Releasing Palestinian prisoners for humanitarian reasons 
only as in the case of illness, long-term prisoners, or women 
and children.  
1 2 
2. Keeping in prisons only those who killed or were 
accomplices in the killing of Israelis.  
1 2 
3. Keeping all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons.  1 2 
4. Releasing all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons.  1 2 
5. None of the above. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
6. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
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15) Now, with regard to the issue of natural resources, which of the following you 
consider to be the most acceptable solution that can be implemented?[READ THE 
LIST] [ROTATE ANSWERS]  
After response: And after that, what you consider the next most acceptable solution? 
[RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
 
Suggested solutions 1
st
 answer 2
nd
 answer 
1. That natural resources be under Palestinian control in the 
newly established Palestinian state.  
1 2 
2. That natural resources be under joint control for the sake of 
economic prosperity for both Palestinians and Israelis.  
1 2 
3. That natural resources remain under Israeli control, as it is 
the case today, but equal rights (price, consumption, and 
distribution) must be maintained for the Palestinians and 
Israelis.  
1 2 
4. None of the above. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
5. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 1 2 
 
17) I want to propose to you plans of economic cooperation between Palestinians 
and Israelis. Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very unacceptable to you, and 
5 meaning very acceptable, to what extent do you accept the following: 
 
a. Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors i.e., water, health, environment, 
tourism, etc. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
b. Allowing Palestinian workers to work inside Israel. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
c. Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange between the two states. 
(SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
d. Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between Palestinians and Israelis. 
(SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
e. Building a Palestinian airport. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
f. Building a Palestinian seaport. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
g. Extending the marine fishing range in the Gaza Strip. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
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18) The following elements are all discussed as a part of establishing a Palestinian 
state. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you are completely opposed, and 5 
meaning you are in full support, please tell me how much you support or oppose 
each of the following elements: 
 
a. Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders with some changes upon an agreement on 
equivalent areas of land swap. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
b. A demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for some 
licensed weapons to be used by Palestinian security forces. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
c. International presence on the borders between the newly established Palestinian state 
and Israel. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
d. A Palestinian state with full control over its border crossings. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
e. The presence of Israeli permanent control points over Palestinian border crossings that 
work jointly with the Palestinian Authority. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
f. Building a “Safe Passage” between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
g. Demarcating the present location of the wall as permanent borders of the established 
Palestinian state. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
h. Security coordination between Israel and Palestine. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5. 
 
19) In your opinion, what is the most appropriate solution to the Palestinian – 
Israeli conflict: [READ ALL STATEMENTS] [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] [ROTATE 
ANSWERS] 
1. Two states that reciprocally recognize the legitimacy of each other, the first is Israeli 
and the second is Palestinian. 
2. One state in which both Israelis and Palestinians have the same rights and obligations. 
3. A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. 
4. The West Bank becomes part of Jordan and Gaza Strip part of Egypt. 
5. None. [DON’T READ] 
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20) In your opinion, what are the issues that both Palestinians and Israelis should 
embark on addressing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement 
between the two parties? Please put them in order of priority from 1 to 10, where 1 
represents the most important issue and 10 represents the least important issue 
these days: [READ ALL THE FOLLOWING ITEMS] 
__________ Settlements. 
__________ Prisoners. 
__________ Jerusalem. 
__________ The security of both Israel and the Palestinians. 
__________ Borders and crossing points. 
__________ The Refugees. 
__________ Control over natural resources like water. 
__________ Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders. 
__________ Recognizing the Jewish state. 
__________ Having control over holy places. 
 
 
21) Now I will read to you several notions pertaining to the peace process. Using a 
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree, and 5 meaning you strongly 
agree, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
 
a. The contribution of curricula in disseminating peace culture and the acceptance of the 
other. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5 
 
b. Any agreement between the Palestinian and Israelis must be accepted and supported 
by the Arab League. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5 
 
c. The international community should be ready to assist in the peace building process. 
(SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5 
 
d. Palestinians and Israelis should stop all forms of incitements to hatred. (SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5 
 
e. Peaceful negotiations are the only way to achieve peace between Palestinians and 
Israelis. (SPLIT A) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5 
 
f. Both peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, have the right to live in peace and security. 
(SPLIT B) 
1.    2.   3.   4.   5 
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22) Now I’m going to ask you about the performance of some political figures 
pertaining to the peace process. Is it highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat 
negative or highly negative? [READ ALL CHOICES]  
 
 
 
Political figure 
 
Highly 
positive 
 
 
Somewhat 
positive 
 
 
Neutral 
 
 
 
Somewhat 
negative 
 
 
Highly 
negative 
 
Don’t know 
[DON’T 
READ] 
a. Mahmoud 
Abbas, the head 
of the PA. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
b. Khalid 
Misha’al, the 
head of Hamas 
Politburo. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Rami 
Hamdallah, the 
PA’s Prime 
Minister. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
d. Benjamin 
Netanyaho, 
Israel’s Prime 
Minister. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e. Tzipi Livni, 
the head of the 
Hatnuah party in 
Israel. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
f. Isaac Herzog, 
the head of 
Labor party in 
Israel. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
23) Do you think it is most likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or absolute 
unlikely that the current leadership in your country can make peace with the other 
side? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY]  
1. Most likely. 
2. Somewhat likely. 
3. Somewhat unlikely. 
4. Absolute unlikely. 
5. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
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24) If you had the ability to impose a solution on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
would you: [READ ALL CHOICES]  
1. Impose the same solutions proposed by your government. 
2. Impose solutions different from those proposed by your government. 
3. Agree on the solutions proposed by the government of the other side. 
4. Suggest different solutions than both governments. 
5. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
 
25) Do you support or oppose the resumption of peace negotiations between 
Palestinians and Israelis under the current circumstances? [RECORD ONE ANSWER 
ONLY] 
1. Strongly support. 
2. Somewhat support. 
3. Somewhat oppose. 
4. Strongly oppose. 
5. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 
 
26) Do you believe, or not, that negotiations between the PA and Israel will lead to 
peace between the two parties in the coming years? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Strongly believe. 
2. Believe to a certain degree. 
3. I do not believe to a certain degree. 
4. I do not believe at all. 
5. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
 
27) In your view, to which party resuming peace negotiations is more important, to 
the Palestinians or Israelis? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. More important to Palestinians. 
2. More important to Israelis. 
3. It is as equally important to both parties. 
4. Not important to either party. 
5. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
 
28) Going back to the past, do you believe that Israelis and Palestinians have done 
all what has been required from them to do in order to make peace negotiations and 
treaties a success, or you believe they could have gone further to make them a 
success? 
 
a. The Israelis? 
1. They have done all what has been required from them to do. 
2. They could have gone further. 
3. Not sure. 
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b. The Palestinians? 
1. They have done all what has been required from them to do. 
2. They could have gone further. 
3. Not sure. 
 
29) In your view, historically seen, who is responsible for the failure of peace 
negotiations and treaties between Palestinians and Israelis? [READ ALL CHOICES] 
[MULTIPLE ANWERS ARE ALLOWED] 
1. Palestinian people. 
2. Israeli people. 
3. Palestinian extremist movements. 
4. Israeli extremist parties. 
5. Palestinian government and leaders. 
6. Israeli government and leaders. 
7. Arab leaders. 
8. United States. 
9. Other, please specify: ________________. 
 
30) In your opinion, does the United States play a balanced role towards both 
parties in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a biased role to the Israeli stance, or biased 
role to the Palestinian stance? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. A balanced role to both parties. 
2. A biased role to the Israeli stance. 
3. A biased role to the Palestinian stance. 
4. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
 
31) As you see it, which state or international organization could be the best 
mediator between Palestinians and Israelis? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. The Quartet (United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia). 
2. The United States. 
3. The United Nations. 
4. The European Union. 
5. Russia. 
6. France. 
7. Turkey. 
8. Jordan. 
9. Egypt. 
10. Qatar. 
11. Iran. 
12. None of the above. [DON’T READ] 
13. Other (Please specify: _______________). 
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32) To what degree are you sick and tired from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? 
1. To a high degree. 
2. To a moderate degree. 
3. To a low degree. 
4. They don’t care. 
5. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 
 
33) To what degree are you willing to make peace with the other side?  
1. To a high degree. 
2. To a moderate degree. 
3. To a low degree. 
4. They don’t care. 
5. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 
 
34) I am now going to read you two statements, please tell which of the two best 
represents your own view? 
1. We should be willing to take risks and make sacrifices to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian 
peace. 
2. We should not have to give up any of our demands to achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace. 
 
35) How confident are you that the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians will be 
solved in the near future? Would you say very confident, somewhat confident, 
somewhat not confident or not confident at all? 
1. Very confident. 
2. Somewhat confident 
3. Somewhat not confident 
4. Not confident at ll. 
5. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 
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36) To what degree do the following items apply to you, using a scale from 1 to 5, 
with 1 meaning to a very low degree and 5 meaning to a very high degree: 
 
 
Item 
To a 
low 
degree 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
To a 
high 
degree 
Not 
applicable 
[DON’T 
READ] 
Refused 
[DON’T 
READ] 
a. Poverty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Low wages/pensions      6 7 
c. Unemployment/lack of job 
opportunities/ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Shortage of health care and 
education 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Lack of security and 
safety/crime/violence. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Restrictions imposed on 
freedom of 
movement/blockade. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. high cost of 
living/Inflation/high prices 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Energy or fuel shortages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Electricity shortages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Water shortages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. Housing problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
37) If you have the opportunity to emigrate, would you emigrate or remain in your 
country? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Would remain. 
2. Would emigrate. 
3. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 
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38) Now I am going to read you a list of words and phrases that describe how would 
you express your feelings and attitudes towards the other side. For each word or 
phrase, please tell me whether you don’t share this feeling, you share it to a low 
degree, you share it to a moderate degree, or you share it to a very high degree: 
 
 
Feelings and attitudes 
towards the other side 
Don’t 
share 
this 
feeling 
To a 
low 
degree 
 
To a 
moderate 
degree 
To a 
high 
degree 
 
Don’t 
know 
[DON’T 
READ] 
 
a. Tolerance towards the 
other side. 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Understanding the other 
side. 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Angry at the other side. 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Fear from the other side. 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Trust in the other side. 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Grudge against the other 
side. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
39) In this context, to what degree do you believe that the other side holds the same 
feelings towards you: 
 
 
Feelings and attitudes 
of the other side towards you 
Don’t 
share 
this 
feeling 
 
To a 
low 
degree 
 
To a 
moderate 
degree 
 
To a 
high 
degree 
 
Don’t 
know 
[DON’T 
READ] 
a. Tolerance. 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Understands you. 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Feels angry at you. 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Fears you. 1 2 3 4 5 
e. The other side trusts you. 1 2 3 4 5 
f. Bears the grudge against 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
40) Are you inclined to know more about the other side in domains that have 
nothing to do with politics or the current conflict i.e. music, folklore, general 
tendencies, literature, religion, social ideas or other? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Yes, to a very high degree. 
2. Yes, to a certain degree. 
3. Yes, to a low degree. 
4. No, never. 
5. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
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41) Would you feel very comfortable, somewhat comfortable, somewhat 
uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable if many of your neighbors were not from 
your religion?  
1. Very comfortable. 
2. Somewhat comfortable. 
3. Somewhat uncomfortable. 
4. Very uncomfortable. 
5. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
  
42) Has any of your relatives or friends been killed or injured during the past years 
as a result of the conflict? [RECORD ONE ANSWER ONLY] 
1. Yes. 
2. No. 
 
PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
D1) Gender: 
1. Male. 
2. Female. 
 
D2) Age: _____________ years. 
 
D3) Social status:  
1. Married. 
2. Single. 
3. Divorced. 
4. Widow/er. 
 
D4) Years of education: _____________ years. 
 
D5) Number of household members (of all ages who eat at the same table):  
_____________ persons. 
 
D6) The average monthly household income in Palestine is 2375 shekels. Is your 
monthly household income greater than 2375 shekels, less than 2375 shekels, or 
about the same?  
1. Greater than 2375 shekels.                                                         
2. Less than 2375 shekels.                                                              
3. About the same.                                                                         
4. Don’t know.                                                                                
5. No answer. [DON’T READ]                                                                                
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D6) The average monthly household income in Israel is 8900 shekels. Is your 
monthly household income greater than 8900 shekels, less than 8900 shekels, or 
about the same?  
1. Greater than 8900 shekels.                                                         
2. Less than 8900 shekels.                                                              
3. About the same.                                                                         
4. Don’t know.                                                                                
5. No answer. [DON’T READ]                                                                                
 
D7) What is your religion? 
1. Muslim (Sunni). 
2. Muslim (Shiite). 
3. Christian (Greek Orthodox). 
4. Christian (Roman Catholic). 
5. Christian (Greek Catholic). 
6. Christian (Lutheran). 
7. Druze. 
8. Jewish. 
9. Atheist. 
 
D8) How do you introduce yourself from the religious point of view: 
1. Very religious (religious activist). 
2. Somewhat religious. 
3. Religious to a mediocre degree. 
4. Somewhat irreligious. 
5. Irreligious at all. 
6. Don’t know / Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
 
D9) Are you a refugee or not? [ASK TO ISRAELI ARABS ONLY] 
1. Yes. 
2. No. 
 
D10) Here is a list of parties likely to compete in the next election for the Legislative 
Council. If new elections, agreed to by all factions, were held today and this list were 
presented, for which would you vote? If not sure: To which would you lean? [PRE-
CODED OPEN ANSWERS] [GET ONE ANSWER ONLY] [DO NOT READ THE LIST] 
1. Fatah. 
2. Hamas. 
3. Third Road. 
4. Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 
5. Palestine National Initiative. 
6. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). 
7. Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement. 
8. Independent Islamists. 
9. Independent Nationalists. 
10. Other (Please specify: _________________) (on a voluntary basis). 
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11. No comment/Refused to answer. [DON’T READ] 
12. Don’t know. [DON’T READ] 
 
D11) Which political party did you vote for in the last Israeli election of March 
2015? If not sure: To which would you lean? [PRE-CODED OPEN ANSWERS] [GET ONE 
ANSWER ONLY] [DO NOT READ THE LIST] 
1. Likud. 
2. Zionist Union. 
3. Jewish Home. 
4. Yesh Atid. 
5. United Arab List. 
6. Kulanu. 
7. United Tora Judaism.  
8. Israel Beitenu. 
9. Shas. 
10. Meretz. 
 
 
Thanks for your cooperation 
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DECLARATION 
 
I hereby declare that I have personally filled in this questionnaire form during the 
interview I have conducted with the respondent in accordance with the instructions given 
to me by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion-PCPO / Maagar Mochot and that all 
data and information contained herein are true and correct as given to me by the 
respondent himself. I further declare that I have revised this questionnaire form and made 
sure that it is free of any errors or deficiencies. I’m well aware of the fact that should the 
post- revision reveal any error or deficiency in the implementation, this questionnaire 
form will be annulled and its handling cost, the cost of its revision and the compensation 
for any delay or damage resulting from that will be deducted from any amounts due to 
me. The management of the PCPO / Maagar Mochot is hereby given the authority to 
estimate such deductions in accordance with the severity of such an error or deficiency.  
 
Note: No questionnaire form will be accepted or paid unless duly signed by the surveyor. 
 
Surveyor’s name: ___________________.  
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E.2. ARABIC TRANSLATION
E.2 Arabic Translation
E.2.1 Split A  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
نحن بصدد . وقالسّ  اثوأنا من المركز الفلسطيني الستطالع الرأي، وهي مؤسسة مستقلّة ألبح ___________________، إسمي مرحبــا  
ستبحث الدراسة في كيفيّة تفكير اإلسرائيليين . لوجه ألطروحة دكتوراة ستقدم لجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا بألمانيا إجراء دراسة وجها  
. وهي أسئلة سهل اإلجابة عليها. لقد تّم تصميم األسئلة في ألمانيا ومن وجهة نظر الحزبيّة. الفلسطينيين حول الّصراع والّسالم في المنطقةو
 .لمقولة أو لعبارة معيّنةعليك في معظم األحيان أن تبيّن فقط مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك 
دقيقة من ( 52)والمقابلة كلّها لن تأخذ أكثر من . ودّ معرفته هي وجهة نظرك الشخصيّةليس هناك إجابات صحيحة وأخرى خاطئة، فكّل ما ن
 . وقتك
ستزودنا بها ستبقى في منتهى السريّة وأّن إجاباتك لن تُستخدم إالّ لألغراض بأن البيانات والمعلومات التي  تكوني واثقة /  ا  نرجو أن تكون واثق
 . اإلحصائيّة فقط
 .بالمشرف على هذه الدراسة أو بمدير مركز األبحاث دون تردّدية أسئلة أو استفسارات، الّرجاء اإلتصال بفإذا كان لديك أ
 (:إذا سأل المستجوب عن معلومات لإلتصال)
 انغ دونزباخغفولف.  د.أ
 مدير قسم اإلتصاالت بجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا
  dresden.de-wolfgang.donsbach@tu: البريد اإللكتروني
 
 نبيل كوكالي. د
 رئيس ومدير المركز الفلسطيني الستطالع الرأي 
 dr.kukali@pcpo.org: البريد اإللكتروني
 878-726 – 0599:  هاتف
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 (أ)م  قس  
 
 __________________: رقم المستجوب
 .فما فوق ا  عام 81رهم تعبّأ اإلستمارة من قبل األفراد الذين أعما
 
وفي حالة عدم اإللتزام بتعبئة اإلستمارة كاملة وبدق ة، . يجب أن تكون اإلجابات على جميع األسئلة واضحة ودقيقة :مالحظة لكل الباحثين
 .مع الشكر سلفا َ. الرجاء التقي د بكل  المالحظاتف. كأنها لم تكنتُعتبر فإنها ستُلغى و
 
 (إسمه األول أو الكنيــة) وب المختــارالمستج الميـالد تاريخ 
  الشهر اليوم 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
11    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
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 (تعبّأ من قبل الباحث)  معلومات عن العينة: الجزء األول
 :قس مال(  1م
 .ب. 5     .أ. 8
 
 :المنطقة( 2م
 قطاع غّزة. 5   .الضفة الغربيّة. 8
 
 في أية محافظة تعيش؟(  3م
    .بيت لحم. 4  .رام هللا. 3   .نابلس. 5    .جنين. 8
  .طولكرم. 1   .أريحا. 7   .الخليل. 6   . القدس. 2
  .غزة المدينة. 85  .سلفيت. 88   .قلقيلية. 81              .طوباس. 9
 .رفح. 86  .خان يونس. 82  .دير البلح. 84   .شمال غزة. 83
 
 :نوع مكان اإلقامة(  4م
 .مخيّم الجئين. 3   .ريف/ قرية . 5   .حضر/ مدينة . 8
 
 2115:       /      /  تاريخ إجراء المقابلة(  5م
 (اإلنتهاء من تعبئة اإلستمارة /يجب تعبئته عند نهاية المقابلة )_________  (: بالدقائق)مدة المقابلة (  6م
 
 أسئلة الدراسة:  الجزء الثاني
 
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟بشكل ٍ عام،  هل تعتقد بأن األمور في بلدك تسير في اإلتجاه الصحيح أم اإلتجاه الخاطىء (1
 (تقرأ ال)  .رفض اإلجابة/ ال أدري . 3   .تسير في اإلتجاه الخاطىء. 5  .تسير في اإلتجاه الصحيح. 8
 
  (إقرأ القائمة( )يُسمح بأكثر من إجابة)اإلسرائيلي؟  –ما هي المصادر التي تحصل من خاللها على معلومات فيما يتعل ق بالصراع الفلسطيني  (2
 .(الراديو)اإلذاعة . 8
  .التلفاز. 5
 .البلوغات والمواقعشبكة اإلنترنت مثل . 3
 .وغيرها..تر مثل الفيسبوك، توي وسائل التواصل اإلجتماعي. 4
 ."(أون الين)"الصُّحف، مطبوعة أو على اإلنترنت . 2
 .العائلة واألصدقاء. 6
 .(ال تقرأ)ال أتابع األخبار . 7
 
  ]4، وإالّ انتقل للسؤال رقم )أعاله 2في السؤال رقم  5اإلجابة )تقرأ الجرائد / ة  يقرأ /إذا كان المستجوب 3إسأل السؤال رقم [
 
ل عادة ً قراءتهاما هي الصحيفة المح (3  (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟لي ة، اليومي ة أو األسبوعي ة أو الشهري ة، التي تفض 
  .صحيفة األيّام. 3   .صحيفة الحياة. 5    .صحيفة القدس .8
 .___________________: غير ذلك، الّرجاء حدّد. 2    صحيفة فلسطين. 4
 
ة تط لع على األخبار  (4  (ّجل إجابة واحدة فقطس) ؟عبر اإلنترنتكم مر 
 .أيّام في األسبوع 6 – 4. 3   .مّرة في اليوم. 5   .عدة مرات في اليوم. 8
 أقّل من مّرة في األسبوع ا  غالب. 6   .مّرة في األسبوع. 2   .أيّام في األسبوع 3 – 5. 4
 (ال تقرأ) .ال أستخدم اإلنترنت لقراءة األخبار. 7
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 اإلسرائيلي؟ –األخبار المتعل قة بالص راع الفلسطيني ما هو مدى اهتمامك، إن وجد، في  (5
  .ما نوعا  مهتّم . 3   .جدّا  مهتّم . 5    .مهتّم للغاية .8
 .غير مهتّم إطالقا  . 2    .لست مهتّم  كثيرا  . 4
 
6)  ً اً يعني لدرجة صغيرة ( 1)، بحيث أن  رقم 5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما جاء أن تخبرني عن سبب اً جد  يعني لدرجة كبيرة ( 5)و  جد  ، الر 
 .الصراع ما بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين
  
راع بين الفلسطينيين   سبب الص 
 ...واإلسرائيليين هو حول
 درجةل
اً صغيرة    جد 
2 3 4 
 
 درجة ل
اً كبيرة   جد 
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .الدين 
c. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .القومية 
e. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .اإلقتصاد 
g. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .الوجود 
 
ً إلى أي  مدى ترى بأن  األحدا (7 ً للصراع الحالي بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين،  ث التاريخي ة التالية كانت سببا ، 5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما
اً يعني لدرجة صغيرة ( 1)بحيث أن  رقم  اً يعني لدرجة كبيرة ( 5)و  جد   .جد 
 
 درجة ل لتاريخـــــيالحدث ا 
اً صغيرة   جد 
درجة ل 4 3 2
اً كبيرة   جد 
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 6 2 4 3 5 8   . إضطهاد اليهود في أوروبا وروسيا 
c.  منح اإلنجليز اليهود الحّق في إقامة وطن قومي لهم في
 . وعد بلفورفلسطين حسب 
8 5 3 4 2 6 
e. 8967عام  إسرائيل لألراضي الفلسطينيّة في إحتالل – 
 . حرب األيام السّتة
8 5 3 4 2 6 
g.  اعتقاد الفلسطينيين بأنهم عاشوا على هذه األرض عبر
 . قرون من الزمن وأن لهم الحق في امتالكها
8 5 3 4 2 6 
 
 ....هل كنت  ؟ماضيفي بداية القرن الما هي العبارة التي تشعر بأنها األقرب إلى وجهة نظرك لو كان بمقدورك العودة لبداية الصراع  (8
 .للتاريخ  ستبحث عن تغييرات أكثر سلما  . 5   .ستبقي التاريخ كما كان عليه .8
 (ال تقرأ) . أعرفال. 4   .على إجراءات حتّى أكثر تشدّدا  ستصّر . 3
 
رة  –هل تشعر بأن  اإلجراءات التالية المتعل قة بالصراع الفلسطيني  (9 ً اإلسرائيلي مبر  رة دائماً تقريبا ً ، مبر  رة نادراً أحيانا رة أبد، مبر    ؟اً ، أو ليست مبر 
 
ر  اإلجــــراء  ً مبر   دائما
ً تقريب  ا
ر  مبر 
 ً  أحيانا
ر  مبر 
 نادراً 
ر  ليس مبر 
 اً أبد
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 2 4 3 5 8   .إطالق الصواريخ على إسرائيل من قطاع غّزة 
c. 2 4 3 5 8 . األعمال الفلسطينيّة ضد اإلسرائيليين 
e. 2 4 3 5 8 . قيود الحركة المفروضة من قبل إسرائيل 
g. 2 4 3 5 8  .عزل إسرائيل دوليّا  جهود السلطة الفلسطينيّة ل 
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11)  ً اً يعني مهم  ( 5)غير مهم  على اإلطالق و ( 1)حيث يعني   5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما ، كيف تقي م دور البنود التالية في إعاقة عملي ة جد 
  ؟اإلسرائيلي –الم الفلسطيني الس  
غير مهم  على  البنـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــد 
 اإلطالق
اً  4 3 2  ال أعرف مهم  جد 
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 6 2 4 3 5 8 .  بناء المستوطنات 
c. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . عدم القبول بفكرة الدولة اليهوديّة 
e. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . وجود أسلحة بحوزة المستوطنين 
g. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . األسرى الفلسطينيّون المحتجزون لدى إسرائيل 
i. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . حق العودة للالجئين الفلسطينيين 
k. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . عدم وجود حدود واضحة المعالم لدولة فلسطين 
m.  الرفض المستمّر من طرف المتشددين في كال الطرفين للوصول
 . ألية اتفاقيّة سالم
8 5 3 4 2 6 
o. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . تدهور وضع اإلقتصاد الفلسطيني نتيجة  للصراع 
q. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . التهديد األمني الذي تشّكله الحركات المتطّرفة على كال الجانبين 
s. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . اعتماد اإلقتصاد الفلسطيني على اإلقتصاد اإلسرائيلي 
u. من عائدات الضرائب  تجميد تحويل األموال للسلطة الفلسطينيّة
 .والرسوم الجمركية الفلسطيتيّة المحتجزة من قبل إسرائيل  
 
8 
 
5 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
6 
 
سّجل )، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)وفيما يتعل ق بقضية الآلجئين الفلسطينيين، أي  من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل  عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟  (11
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  هذه الحلول تعتبره  نم   نومَ (. إجابة واحدة فقط
 
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .8941حّق الآلجئين الفلسطينيين بالعودة إلى ديارهم داخل حدود عام . 8 .8
 5 5 .يينعودة مشروطة لآلجئين الفلسطين. 5 .5
 3 3 .استيعاب الآلجئين الفلسطينيين في الدولة الفلسطينيّة المقامة حديثا  . 3 .3
 4 4 . استيعاب الآلجئين ومنحهم حقوق المواطنة الكاملة في الدول العربية المضيفة لهم. 4 .4
 2 2 .التخلي عن حّق العودة واستبداله بالتعويض المالي. 2 .2
 6 6 .ال أحد ّمما ذكر أعاله. 6 .6
 7 7 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 7 .7
 
) أي  من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل  عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ . واآلن أريد أن أقرأ عليك قائمة بالحلول الممكنة لقضي ة المستوطنات اإلسرائيلي ة (12
ن نومَ (. سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة تناوب )، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ل حل  ثاني أفضهذه الحلول تعتبره  م 
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (األجوبة
 
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .8967قيام جميع المستوطنين اإلسرائيليين بإخالء المستوطنات المقامة على حدود عام . 8
 5 5 .8967م تفكيك جميع المستوطنات المقامة ضمن حدود عا. 5
 3 3 .دفع تعويضات للمستوطنين، بما في ذلك إعادة توطينهم ضمن الحدود اإلسرائيليّة. 3
 4 4 .إبقاء جميع المستوطنات سليمة. 4
 2 2 .تجميد نشاطات اإلستيطان في الضفة الغربيّة والقدس. 2
 6 6 .الفلسطينيّة إن هم اختاروا ذلكالّسماح لجميع المستوطنين بالبقاء في الضفّة الغربيّة تحت السيادة . 6
 7 7 . التخلّي عن أجزاء من األراضي اإلسرائيليّة مقابل مساحة ما تشغله المستوطنات اإلسرائيليّة في الضفة الغربيّة. 7
 1 1 .أن تصبح جميع المستوطنات الواقعة على الجانب اإلسرائيلي من الجدار الفاصل جزءا  من إسرائيل. 1
 9 9 (ال تقرأ). مّما ذُكر أعاله ال أحد. 9
 81 81 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 81
E.2. ARABIC TRANSLATION
A101
 
جاء أن تخبرني أي  من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل  عملي يمكن تطبيقه؟ . لقد اقترحت في الماضي عد ة خيارات متنوعة للقدس (13 إقرأ ) الر 
ن نومَ (. سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (القائمة ، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  الحلول تعتبره هذه  م 
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)
 
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .8967القدس الشرقيّة للفلسطينيين والقدس الغربيّة لإلسرائيليين كما كان الوضع قبل عام . 8
 5 5 .ى أحياء فلسطينيّة وأخرى يهوديّةتقسيم القدس إل. 5
 3 3 . رقابة دوليّة على القدس وعلى أماكنها المقدّسة. 3
 4 4 .  تبقى القدس موّحدة وتحت السيادة اإلسرائيليّة مع الّسماح بدخول مواطني الدولتين لألماكن المقدسة في القدس. 4
 2 2 . إسرائيليّة مشتركة –ة ينبغي أن توضع البلدة القديمة تحت سيادة فلسطينيّ . 2
 6 6 (ال تقرأ. )ال أحد ّمما ذكر أعاله. 6
 7 7 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 7
 
جاء أن تخبرني أي  من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل  عملي يمكن . لقد اقترحت في الماضي عد ة حلول بخصوص قضي ة األسرى الفلسطينيين (14 الر 
ن نومَ (. سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (ب األجوبةتناو)، (إقرأ القائمة)تطبيقه؟  ، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  هذه الحلول تعتبره  م 
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)
 
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .في حالة المرض، سجناء فترة طويلة، أو نساء وأطفال إطالق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين لدوافع إنسانيّة فقط، مثال  . 8
 5 5 . اإلبقاء في السجون فقط على من قتل أو كان شريكا  في قتل اإلسرائيليين. 5
 3 3 .اإلبقاء على جميع السجناء الفلسطينيين في السجون اإلسرائيليّة. 3
 4 4 .يليّةإطالق سراح جميع األسرى الفلسطينيين من السجون اإلسرائ. 4
 2 2 (ال تقرأ). ال أحد مّما ذكر أعاله. 2
 6 6 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 6
 
(. سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)واآلن فيما يتعل ق بقضي ة الموارد الطبيعي ة، أي  مما يلي تعتبره أفضل ترتيب عملي؟   (15
ن نومَ   (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه حل  ثاني أفضل هذه الحلول تعتبره  م 
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 . أن تكون الموارد الطبيعيّة تحت السيطرة الفلسطينيّة في الدولة الفلسطينيّة المقامة حديثا  . 8
 5 5 .ة مشتركة لصالح اإلزدهار اإلقتصادي للشعبين، الفلسطيني واإلسرائيليأن تكون الموارد الطبيعيّة تحت سيطر. 5
أن تبقى الموارد الطبيعيّة تحت السيطرة اإلسرائيليّة كما هو الحال عليه اليوم، ولكن يجب اإلبقاء على حقوق . 3
 (.لتوزيعاألسعار، اإلستهالك وا: مثال  من حيث)متساوية لكال الشعبين، الفلسطيني واإلسرائيلي 
3 3 
 4 4 (ال تقرأ. )ال أحد مّما ذكر أعاله. 4
 2 2 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 2
 
غير ( 1)، حيث يعني 5إلى  1وباستخدام سل م درجات من رقم . أود  أن أقترح عليك اآلن خططاً للتعاون اإلقتصادي بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين (16
اً بالنسبة لك، و  اً  يعني مقبول( 5)مقبول جد   :فإلى أي مدى تقبل بما يلي. جد 
 
a . أ)القيام بمشاريع مشتركة في جميع القطاعات اإلقتصاديّة مثل المياه، الصحة، البيئة، السياحة وغيرها  .) 
8.    5   .  3.  4.  2. 
c .تعزيز التجارة وتبادل الّسلع والخدمات بين الدولتين . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
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e .إنشاء مطار فلسطيني . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
g .توسيع نطاق الصيد البحري في قطاع غّزة . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2 . 
 
ً أنك معارض ( 1)، حيث يعني 5إلى  1باستخدام سل م درجات من رقم . لقد نوقشت جميع العناصر التالية كجزء من إقامة دولة فلسطيني ة (17 و  تماما
ً يعني أنك مؤيد ( 5)  :دى تأييدك أو معارضتك لكل  من العناصر التالية، أرجو أن تخبرني عن متماما
a . مع بعض التعديالت من خالل اتفاقيّة على مبادلة أراض ٍ بشكل ٍ متكافىء 8967إنسحاب إسرائيلي إلى حدود عام  . 
 8 .  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
c. ودولة إسرائيل دولة الفلسطينيّة المقامة حديثا  تواجد دولي على الحدود ما بين ال. . 
 8 .  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
e .إلى جنب مع السلطة الفلسطينيّة لحدوديّة الفلسطينيّة تعمل جنبا  نقاط رقابة إسرائيليّة دائمة على المعابر ا وجود . 
 8 .  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
g .تدشين الموقع الحالي لجدار الفصل كحدود نهائيّة للدولة الفلسطينيّة الُمقامة . 
 8 .  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ جميع الخيارات) ؟اإلسرائيلي –يك، أفضل حل  مناسب للصراع الفلسطيني رأما هو، حسب  (18
 .األولى إسرائيليّة والثانية فلسطينيّة –دولتان تعترفان بشرعيّة بعضهما البعض  .8
 . اإلسرائيلي والفلسطيني، نفس الحقوق والواجبات دولة واحدة يكون فيها لكال الشعبين، .5
 .أردنيّة –كونفدراليّة فلسطينيّة  .3
 (ال تقرأ. )ال أحد منها. 2   .من مصر زءا  من األردن، وقطاع غّزة ج الضفّة الغربيّة تصبح جزءا   .4
 
طوة أولى نحو اتفاقية سالم ٍ حقيقي ونهائي ما الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين الشروع في مواجهتها كخحسب رأيك، ما هي القضايا التي يجب على  (19
القضي ة األقل  أهمي ة في الوقت ( 11)ويمث ل  القضي ة األكثر أهمي ة( 1)، حيث يمث ل (11)إلى ( 1)رت ب هذه القضايا حسب أولوياتها من  ؟بين الطرفين
 (الرجاء التركيز في تعبئة هذا السؤال) (.أقرأ جميع البنود التالية) ؟الحاضر
 .المستوطنات__________ 
 .األسرى__________ 
 .القدس__________ 
 .أمن إسرائيل والفلسطينيين__________ 
 .الحدود والمعابر__________ 
 .الآلجئون__________ 
 .السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعيّة مثل المياه__________ 
 .8967قيام دولة فلسطينيّة على حدود عام __________ 
 .اإلعتراف بالدولة اليهوديّة__________ 
 .السيطرة على األماكن المقدسة__________ 
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بأنك تعارض بشد ة و ( 1)، حيث يعني 5إلى  1باستخدام سل م درجات من رقم . واآلن سأقوم بطرح مجموعة من األفكار المتعددة حول عملي ة الس الم (21
جاء أن تخبرني ( 5)  :عن مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك للمقوالت التاليةأنك تؤي د بشدة، الر 
 
a . تساهم المناهج التعليميّة في نشر ثقافة الّسالم وتقبّل الطرف اآلخريجب أن . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
c .يكون المجتمع الدولي على استعداد للمساعدة في عمليّة بناء الّسالم أن . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
e .يّة هي الطريق الوحيدة لتحقيق الّسالم بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليينالمفاوضات السلم . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
f   .ب. )لكال الشعبين، اإلسرائيليين والفلسطينيين، الحّق في العيش بسالم وأمن) 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
اً إيجابي تلعب أداء هل . المفي عملي ة الس  واآلن أود  أن أسألك عن أداء بعض الشخصي ات السياسي ة  (21 ً ، إيجابي نوعا َ ما، سلبي جد  ما  أم سلبي  نوعا
اً   (. إقرأ جميع خيارات اإلجابة لكّل سؤال)  ؟جد 
 
ايجابي  الشخصي ة السياسي ة  
اً   جد 
ايجابي 
 ً  ما نوعا
ً سلبي  حيادي  نوعا
 ما
سلبي 
اً   جد 
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
a . 6 2 4 3 5 8 .ينيّة، رئيس السلطة الفلسطمحمود عب اس 
b. 6 2 4 3 5 8 .، رئيس المكتب السياسي لحركة حماسخالد مشعل 
c. ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .رئيس وزراء السلطة الفلسطينيّة رامي الحمد هللا 
d.  ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .رئيس وزراء إسرائيلبنيامين نتنياهو 
e.  ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .في إسرائيل" الحركة"رئيسة حزب تسيبي ليفني 
f.  ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .رئيس حزب العمل في إسرائيلإسحق هرتسوغ 
 
اً هل تعتقد بأنه من المحتمل  (22 ً ، أو المحتمل جد  ً ما، أو من غير المحتمل  نوعا ً ما، أو من غير المحتمل  نوعا  بلدكأن تستطيع القيادة الحالي ة في  إطالقا
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟الطرف اآلخرصنع سالم ٍ مع 
 .ما نوعا  غير محتمل . 3    .ما نوعا  محتمل . 5   .جدّا  مل محت. 8
 (ال تقرأ) .رفض اإلجابة/ ال أدري . 2   .إطالقا  غير محتمل . 4
 
 (الّرجاء قراءة جميع الخيارات): اإلسرائيلي، هل كنت –لو كان عندك القدرة على فرض حل  للصراع الفلسطيني  (23
 ؟بلدك حكومةستفرض نفس الحلول المطروحة من قبل  .8
 ؟حكومة بلدكمختلفة عن تلك المطروحة من قبل  ستفرض حلوال   .5
 ؟الطرف اآلخرستوافق على الحلول المقترحة من قبل حكومة  .3
  ؟تختلف عّما اقترحته كال الحكومتين ستقترح حلوال   .4
 (ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة  / ال أدري  .2
 
  ؟واإلسرائيليين في ظل  الظروف الحالي ةهل تؤي د أم تعارض استئناف مفاوضات الس الم بين الفلسطينيين  (24
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) 
 .أعارض إلى حدّ ما. 3    .أؤيّد إلى حدّ ما. 5   .أؤيّد بشدّة. 8
 (ال تقرأ) .رفض اإلجابة/ ال أدري . 2   أعارض بشدّة. 4
 
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)  ؟طرفين في السنوات القادمة، أم الهل تعتقد بأن المفاوضات بين السلطة الفلسطينية وإسرائيل ستؤدي إلى سالم بين ال (25
 .ال أعتقد إلى حدّ ما. 3    .أعتقد إلى حدّ ما. 5   .أعتقد بشدّة .8
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2   .ال أعتقد أبدا  . 4
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 ؟يليينحسب رأيك، ألي طرف استئناف مفاوضات الس الم أكثر أهمي ة، للفلسطينيين أم لألسرائ (26
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) 
 .إّن أهميته متساوية لكال الطرفين. 3   .إنه أكثر أهميّة لإلسرائيليين. 5  .إنه أكثر أهميّة للفلسطينيين .8
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2     .ألّي من الطرفين إنّه ليس مهّما  . 4
 
جوع للماضي، هل تعتقد بأن اإلسرائيليين وال (27 فلسطينيين عملوا كل  ما هو مطلوب منهم إلنجاح محادثات ومعاهدات الس الم، أم هل تعتقد أنه كان بالر 
  ؟بإمكانهم فعل المزيد لجعلها تنجح
 
a. ؟بالنسبة لإلسرائيليين 
 .ير متأكدغ. 3   .كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد. 5  .عملوا كّل ما هو مطلوب منهم أن يعملوه .8
 
b. ؟بالنسبة للفلسطينيين 
 .غير متأكد. 3   .كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد. 5  .ا كّل ما هو مطلوب منهم أن يعملوهعملو .8
 
( إقرأ جميع الخيارات) ؟الناحية التاريخي ة عن فشل محادثات ومعاهدات الس الم بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليينمن هو المسؤول من حسب رأيك،  (28
 (. يُسمح بأكثر من إجابة)
 .الشعب اإلسرائيلي .5   .الشعب الفلسطيني .8
   .األحزاب اإلسرائيليّة المتطرفة. 4  .الحركات الفلسطينيّة المتطرفة. 3
 .الحكومة اإلسرائيليّة والقادة اإلسرائيليّون. 6 .الحكومة الفلسطينيّة والقادة الفلسطينيّون. 2
 .الواليات المتحدة. 1    .الّزعماء العرب. 7
 .________________: غير ذلك، الّرجاء حدّد. 9
 
ً متوازن اً حسب رأيك، هل تلعب الواليات المتحدة دور (29 للموقف  اً منحاز اً أم أنها تلعب دوراإلسرائيلي،  –تجاه كال الطرفين في الصراع الفلسطيني  ا
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟للموقف الفلسطيني اً منحاز اً اإلسرائيلي، أم دور
 .نحاز للموقف اإلسرائيليدور م. 5   .دور متوازن تجاه الطرفين .8
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 4  .دور منحاز للموقف الفلسطيني. 3
 
  ؟أفضل وسيط ما بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين –حسب رأيك  –ما هي الدولة أو المنظمة الدولي ة التي قد تكون  (31
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) 
 (.دة، األمم المتحدة، اإلتحاد األوروبي وروسياالواليات المتح)الرباعيّة الدوليّة  .8
 .اإلتحاد األوروبي. 4   .األمم المتحدة. 3  .الواليات المتحدة .5
 .تركيا. 7    .فرنسا. 6   . روسيا. 2
 .قطر. 81    .مصر. 9   .األردن. 1
 .(ال تقرأ) ال أحد مما ذكر أعاله . 85    إيران. 88
 ________________: غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد. 83
 
 ؟اإلسرائيلي –إلى أية درجة تشعر بالملل والتعب من الصراع الفلسطيني  (31
 .ضئيلةلدرجة . 3   .لدرجة متوّسطة. 5   .لدرجة كبيرة. 8
 .(ال تقرأ)ال أعرف . 2   .غير مهتمّ . 4
 
 ؟أنت مستعد  لصنع سالم ٍ مع الطرف اآلخرإلى أية درجة  (32
 .لدرجة ضئيلة. 3   .لدرجة متوّسطة. 5   .لدرجة كبيرة  .8
 .(ال تقرأ)ال أعرف . 2   .غير مهتمّ . 4
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 ؟سأقرأ عليك  عبارتين وأرجو منك أن تخبرني أيهما األقرب لوجهة نظرك (33
 .فلسطيني –لتحقيق سالم إسرائيلي  تنازالتوتقديم  ةمخاطرللنكون مستعدّين  أن ينبغي علينا .8
 .فلسطيني –أجل تحقيق سالم إسرائيلي ال ينبغي علينا أن نتنازل عن أّي من مطالبنا من  .5
 
اً هل من الممكن القول بأنك واثق  ؟بأن يُحل  الصراع ما بين اإلسرائيليين والفلسطينيين في المستقبل القريبما مدى ثقتك  (34 ً ، واثق جد  ما، غير  نوعا
ً واثق   ؟اً ما  أم أنك غير واثق أبد نوعا
 .ما نوعا   غير واثق. 3   .ما نوعا  واثق . 5   .جدّا  واثق  .8
 (.ال تقرأ)ال أدري . 2   .ا  غير واثق أبد. 4
 
ً ألية درجة تنطبق البنود التالية عليك،  (35 اً و ( 1)، حيث يعني رقم 5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما اً لدرجة كبيرة ( 5)لدرجة صغيرة جد   ؟جد 
لدرجة صغيرة  البنـــــــــــــــــــــــــد
اً   جد 
 لدرجة 4 3 2
اً كبيرة    جد 
 ال ينطبق
 (ال تقرأ)
 رفض
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .الفقــر 
b. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .المعاشات المنخفضة/ األجور 
c.  7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .نقص فرص العمل/ البطالة 
d. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .نقص الرعاية الصحيّة والتعليم 
e. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .العنف/ الجريمة  / عدم األمن واألمان 
f. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .الحصار/ ضة على حرية الحركة القيود المفرو 
g.  7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .ارتفاع األسعار/  التضّخم/ ارتفاع تكاليف المعيشة 
h. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .نقص الطاقة أو الوقود 
i. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .الكهرباء عدم توفُّر 
j.  7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .المياهعدم توفُّر 
k. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .مشكلة السكن 
 
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟، هل ستهاجر أم ستبقى في بلدكللهجرةالفرصة  لك أتيحتلو  (36
 (.ال تقرأ) ال أدري . 3   .سأهاجر. 5   .سأبقى. 8
 
أرجو أن تخبرني لكل  . واآلن أود  أن أقرأ عليك قائمة من الكلمات واإلصطالحات التي تصف كيف ستعب ر عن مشاعرك ومواقفك تجاه الطرف اآلخر (37
 :أو بدرجة عاليةلمات أو اإلصطالحات إن كانت ال تعب ر عن مشاعرك، أو إن كانت تعب ر عن مشاعرك بدرجة صغيرة، أو بدرجة متوسطة من هذه الك
 
ال تعب ر عن  المشاعر والمواقف تجاه الطرف اآلخر
 مشاعري
تعب ر بدرجة 
 صغيرة
تعب ر بدرجة 
 متوسطة
تعب ر بدرجة 
 عالية
 ال أدري
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 2 4 3 5 8 جاه الطرف اآلخرالتسامح ت 
b. 2 4 3 5 8 تفّهم الطرف اآلخر 
c. 2 4 3 5 8 الغضب من الطرف اآلخر 
d. 2 4 3 5 8 الخوف من الطرف اآلخر 
e. 2 4 3 5 8 الثقة بالطرف اآلخر 
f. 2 4 3 5 8 الحقد تجاه الطرف اآلخر 
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 ؟عرفي هذا السياق، ألية درجة تشعر بأن الطرف اآلخر يكن  لك نفس المشا  (38
 
 
 كمشاعر ومواقف الطرف اآلخر تجاه
هذه  يك ن ليال 
 المشاعر
بدرجة 
 صغيرة
بدرجة 
 متوسطة
بدرجة 
 عالية
 ال أدري
 (ال تقرأ)
a.  2 4 3 5 8 التسامح 
b. 2 4 3 5 8 أنه يتفهمك 
c. 2 4 3 5 8 الغضب منك 
d. 2 4 3 5 8 الخوف منك 
e. 2 4 3 5 8 يثق بك 
f. 2 4 3 5 8 يحقد عليك 
  
، (الفولكلور)فة المزيد عن الطرف اآلخر في مجاالت ال عالقة لها بالسياسة أو بالصراع القائم، مثل الموسيقى، التراث الشعبي هل تميل إلى معر (39
ة، اآلداب، الدين، األفكار اإلجتماعي ة أو غيرها   ؟اإلتجاهات العام 
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)
 .نعم، ولكن لدرجة صغيرة. 3    . نعم، إلى حدّ ما. 5  .جدّا  نعم، بدرجة كبيرة  .8
 (. ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2   .ا  قطعيّ  ا  ال، أبد. 4
 
ً هل ستشعر بارتياح ٍ شديد، بارتياح ٍ  (41 ً ما، بعدم ارتياح ٍ  نوعا  ؟ما، أو بعدم ارتياح شديد لو كان العديد من جيرانك من غير دينك نوعا
 .ما نوعا  بعدم ارتياح . 3    .ما نوعا  بارتياح . 5   .بارتياح شديد. 8
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2   .بعدم ارتياح شديد. 4
 
      ؟نتيجة للصراعخالل السنوات الماضية أو أصدقائك هل قُتل أو ُجرح أحد من أفراد عائلتك  (41
 ال. 5     نعم  .8
 
 األسئلة الديمغرافي ة : الجزء الثالث
 
 :الجنس(  1د 
 .أنثى. 5    .ذكر .8
 
 .سنة______ _______ :العمر(  2د 
 
 : الحالة اإلجتماعي ة(  3د 
  .أرملة/ أرمل . 4  . مطلّقة/ مطلّق . 3   .عزباء/ أعزب . 5  .متزّوجة/ متزّوج  .8
5.  
 .سنة_______  :عدد سنوات الدراسة(  4د 
 
 .شخص_____ (:  من جميع األعمار من يأكلون على طاولة واحدة)عدد أفراد  األسرة (  5د 
 
ً هل دخل أسرتك الشهري أعلى، أقل  أو تقريب. شاقل  2375في فلسطين هو  الواحدة إن  معد ل الدخل الشهري لألسرة(  6د   ؟شاقل 2375يساوي  ا
 .شاقل 5372 ا  يعادل تقريب. 3  .شاقل 5372أقّل من . 5   .شاقل 5372أعلى من  .8
 (ال تقرأ. )رفض اإلجابة. 2   (ال تقرأ. )ال أدري. 4
 
 ؟ما هي ديانتك(  7د 
 .(روم أرثوذكس)مسيحي . 3    . (شيعي)مسلم . 5   .(سنّي)مسلم  .8
 .(لوثري)مسيحي . 6   (روم كاثوليك)مسيحي . 2   .(التيني)مسيحي . 4
 ُملحد. 9    .يهودي. 1    .درزي. 7
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  ؟كيف تصف نفسك من الناحية الديني ة(  8د 
 .متديّن بدرجة متوسطة. 3   .ى حدّ مامتديّن إل. 5   .(ناشط ديني) جدّا  متديّن  .8
 (ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 6  .إطالقا  غير متديّن . 2   .غير متديّن إلى حدّ ما. 4
 
  ؟هل أنت الجىء أم الفي األصل، (  9د 
 .ال. 5     .نعــم .8
 
إجراء جميع األحزاب والفصائل على  فإذا وافقت. ة للمجلس التشريعيفيما يلي قائمة باألحزاب التي من المحتمل أن تتنافس في اإلنتخابات القادم( 11د 
ت اليوم اإلنتخابات الجديدة أجوبة مفتوحة برموز (. )؟لمن منها يميل: إذا كان المستجوب غير متأك د إسأل) ؟وُعرضت عليك القائمة التالية، فلمن تصو 
 (.ال تقرأ القائمة( )سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط( )ا  مشفّرة مسبق
  فتـح  .8
 حماس .5
 الطريق الثالث .3
  (ج ش ت ف )الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين  .4
 المبادرة الوطنيّة الفلسطينيّة .2
 (ج د ت ف )الجبهة الديمقراطيّة لتحرير فلسطين  .6
 حركة الجهاد اإلسالمي الفلسطينيّة .7
 اإلسالميّون المستقلّون .1
 الوطنيّون المستقلّون .9
 (.ا  ينبغي أن يكون طوع( )_________________: الّرجاء حدّد)غير ذلك  .81
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال تعليق  .88
 (. ال تقرأ)ال أدري  .85
 
 على حسن تعاونكم اً شكر
 
ـــد  إقــرار وتعه 
 
ني الستطالع خالل المقابلة التي أجريتها مع المستجوب وفق التعليمات الصادرة لي عن المركز الفلسطي ا  إنّني أؤّكد بأنني قد نفّذت هذه اإلستمارة شخصيّ 
بأنني قد راجعت هذه  ا  وأصّرح أيض. وبأن كّل البيانات والمعلومات الواردة فيها صحيحة ومضبوطة حسبما أفادني به المستجوب نفسه( PCPO)الرأي 
طاء أو نواقص في التنفيذ، تلغى كما وأنني على علم ٍ مسبق بأنه في حالة ما أظهر التدقيق أية أخ. اإلستمارة وتأكدت بأنها خالية من أية أخطاء أو نواقص
ويترك تقدير . أية مبالغ مستحقّة ليهذه اإلستمارة وتخصم تكلفة معالجتها ومراجعتها وكذلك قيمة التعويض عن أي تأخير أو ضرر يترتّب على ذلك من 
 .حسب أهمية مثل هذا الخطأ أو النقص( PCPO)قيمة الخصم إلدارة المركز الفلسطيني الستطالع الرأي 
 . بأنه لن تُقبل أية استمارة أو تدفع قيمتها إالّ إذا كانت موقعة حسب األصول من قبل الباحث ا  علم
 ________________: توقيع الباحث    __________________________: إسم الباحث
 _______________: توقيع المشرف         
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نحن . وأنا من المركز الفلسطيني الستطالع الرأي، وهي مؤسسة مستقلّة ألبحاث الّسوق___________________ ، إسمي مرحبــا  
ستبحث الدراسة في كيفّية تفكير . بصدد إجراء دراسة وجها  لوجه ألطروحة دكتوراة ستقدم لجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا بألمانيا
وهي أسئلة سهل . لقد تّم تصميم األسئلة في ألمانيا ومن وجهة نظر الحزبيّة. الفلسطينيين حول الّصراع والّسالم في المنطقةاإلسرائيليين و
ليس هناك إجابات صحيحة وأخرى .عليك في معظم األحيان أن تبيّن فقط مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك لمقولة أو لعبارة معيّنة. اإلجابة عليها
/ نرجو أن تكون واثقا   .دقيقة من وقتك( 52)والمقابلة كلّها لن تأخذ أكثر من . دّ معرفته هي وجهة نظرك الشخصيّةخاطئة، فكّل ما نو
 . فقطتكوني واثقة  بأن البيانات والمعلومات التي ستزودنا بها ستبقى في منتهى السريّة وأّن إجاباتك لن تُستخدم إالّ لألغراض اإلحصائّي 
 
 .أسئلة أو استفسارات، الّرجاء اإلتصال بدون تردّد بالمشرف على هذه الدراسة أو بمدير مركز األبحاث فإذا كان لديك أية
 
 (:إذا سأل المستجوب عن معلومات لإلتصال)
 انغ دونزباخغفولف.  د.أ
 مدير قسم اإلتصاالت بجامعة دريسدن للتكنولوجيا
  dresden.de-wolfgang.donsbach@tu: البريد اإللكتروني
 
 نبيل كوكالي. د
 رئيس ومدير المركز الفلسطيني الستطالع الرأي 
 dr.kukali@pcpo.org: البريد اإللكتروني
 878-726 – 0599:  هاتف
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 (ب)م قس  
 __________________: رقم المستجوب
 .فما فوق ا  عام 81تعبّأ اإلستمارة من قبل األفراد الذين أعمارهم 
 
وفي حالة عدم اإللتزام بتعبئة اإلستمارة كاملة وبدق ة، فإنها . يجب أن تكون اإلجابات على جميع األسئلة واضحة ودقيقة :مالحظة لكل الباحثين
 .مع الشكر سلفا َ. الرجاء التقي د بكل  المالحظاتف. كأنها لم تكنتُعتبر ستُلغى و
 
 (إسمه األول أو الكنيــة) لمختــارالمستجوب ا الميـالد تاريخ 
  الشهر اليوم 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
11    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
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 (تعبّأ من قبل الباحث)  معلومات عن العينة: الجزء األول
 :قس مال(  1م
 .ب. 5     .أ. 8
 
 :المنطقة( 2م
 قطاع غّزة. 5   .الضفة الغربيّة. 8
 
 في أية محافظة تعيش؟(  3م
    .بيت لحم. 4  .رام هللا. 3   .نابلس. 5    .جنين. 8
  .طولكرم. 1   .أريحا. 7   .الخليل. 6   . القدس. 2
  .غزة المدينة. 85  .سلفيت. 88   .قلقيلية. 81              .طوباس. 9
 .رفح. 86  .خان يونس. 82  .دير البلح. 84   .شمال غزة. 83
 
 :نوع مكان اإلقامة(  4م
 .مخيّم الجئين. 3  .ريف/ قرية . 5   .حضر/ مدينة . 8
 
 2115:       /      /  تاريخ إجراء المقابلة(  5م
 
 (نتهاء من تعبئة اإلستمارةاإل/ يجب تعبئته عند نهاية المقابلة )_________  (: بالدقائق)مدة المقابلة (  6م
 
 أسئلة الدراسة:  الجزء الثاني
 
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟بشكل ٍ عام،  هل تعتقد بأن األمور في بلدك تسير في اإلتجاه الصحيح أم اإلتجاه الخاطىء (1
 (أال تقر)  .رفض اإلجابة/ ال أدري . 3   .تسير في اإلتجاه الخاطىء. 5  .تسير في اإلتجاه الصحيح. 8
 
  (إقرأ القائمة( )يُسمح بأكثر من إجابة)اإلسرائيلي؟  –ما هي المصادر التي تحصل من خاللها على معلومات فيما يتعل ق بالصراع الفلسطيني  (2
 .(الراديو)اإلذاعة . 8
  .التلفاز. 5
 .البلوغات والمواقعشبكة اإلنترنت مثل . 3
 .وغيرها..مثل الفيسبوك، تويتر  وسائل التواصل اإلجتماعي. 4
 ."(أون الين)"الصُّحف، مطبوعة أو على اإلنترنت . 2
 .العائلة واألصدقاء. 6
 .(ال تقرأ)ال أتابع األخبار . 7
 
  ]4، وإالّ انتقل للسؤال رقم )أعاله 2في السؤال رقم  5اإلجابة )تقرأ الجرائد / ة  يقرأ /إذا كان المستجوب 3إسأل السؤال رقم [
 
ل عادة ً قراءتهاما هي الصحيفة المحلي ة (3  (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟، اليومي ة أو األسبوعي ة أو الشهري ة، التي تفض 
  .صحيفة األيّام. 3   .صحيفة الحياة. 5    .صحيفة القدس .8
 .___________________: غير ذلك، الّرجاء حدّد. 2    صحيفة فلسطين. 4
 
ة تط لع على األخبار  (4  (إجابة واحدة فقطسّجل ) ؟عبر اإلنترنتكم مر 
 .أيّام في األسبوع 6 – 4. 3   .مّرة في اليوم. 5   .عدة مرات في اليوم. 8
 أقّل من مّرة في األسبوع ا  غالب. 6  .مّرة في األسبوع. 2   .أيّام في األسبوع 3 – 5. 4
 (ال تقرأ) .ال أستخدم اإلنترنت لقراءة األخبار. 7
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 اإلسرائيلي؟ –ر المتعل قة بالص راع الفلسطيني ما هو مدى اهتمامك، إن وجد، في األخبا (5
  .ما نوعا  مهتّم . 3   .جدّا  مهتّم . 5    .مهتّم للغاية .8
 .غير مهتّم إطالقا  . 2    .لست مهتّم  كثيرا  . 4
 
6)  ً اً يعني لدرجة صغيرة ( 1)، بحيث أن  رقم 5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما اً يعني لدرجة كبيرة ( 5)و  جد  جاء أن تخبرني عن سبب الصراع ما ، الجد  ر 
 .بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين
  
راع بين الفلسطينيين   سبب الص 
 ...واإلسرائيليين هو حول
 درجة ل
اً صغيرة   جد 
2 3 4 
 
 درجة ل
اً كبيرة   جد 
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
b.  6 2 4 3 5 8  .الحضارة/ الثقافة 
d. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .السياسة 
f. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .التاريخ 
h. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .العرق 
 
ً إلى أي  مدى ترى بأن  األحدا (7 ً للصراع الحالي بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين،  ث التاريخي ة التالية كانت سببا ، بحيث 5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما
اً يعني لدرجة صغيرة ( 1)أن  رقم  اً يعني لدرجة كبيرة ( 5)و  جد   .جد 
 
 درجة ل دث التاريخـــــيالح 
اً صغيرة   جد 
درجة ل 4 3 2
اً كبيرة   جد 
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
b. 6 2 4 3 5 8  . هجرة اليهود إلى فلسطين التاريخيّة 
d.  6 2 4 3 5 8 . 8941اإلسرائيليّة عام  –الحرب العربيّة 
f.  مصالحهم)استغالل العرب الصراع لخدمة أجنداتهم )
 . الخاّصة 
8 5 3 4 2 6 
h.  هي الوطن التاريخي للشعب اعتقاد اليهود بأن األرض
 . اليهودي
8 5 3 4 2 6 
 
 ....هل كنت  ؟في بداية القرن الماضيما هي العبارة التي تشعر بأنها األقرب إلى وجهة نظرك لو كان بمقدورك العودة لبداية الصراع  (8
 .للتاريخ  ر سلما  ستبحث عن تغييرات أكث. 5   .ستبقي التاريخ كما كان عليه .8
 (ال تقرأ) . أعرفال. 4   .على إجراءات حتّى أكثر تشدّدا  ستصّر . 3
 
رة  –هل تشعر بأن  اإلجراءات التالية المتعل قة بالصراع الفلسطيني  (9 ً اإلسرائيلي مبر  رة دائماً تقريبا ً ، مبر  رة نادراً أحيانا رة أبد، مبر    ؟اً ، أو ليست مبر 
 
ر  اإلجــــراء  ً دائممبر   ا
ً تقريب  ا
ر  مبر 
 ً  أحيانا
ر  مبر 
 نادراً 
ر  ليس مبر 
 اً أبد
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
b. 2 4 3 5 8  .األعمال العسكريّة للجيش اإلسرائيلي في األراضي الفلسطينيّة 
d. 2 4 3 5 8 . أعمال المستوطنين اليهود ضدّ الفلسطينيين 
f.  ُلسجون في ا مّ دعم السلطة الفلسطينيّة مالي ا  عائالت من ه
 . اإلسرائيليّة
8 5 3 4 2 
h. 2 4 3 5 8 . بناء الجدار الفاصل ما بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين 
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11)  ً اً يعني مهم  ( 5)غير مهم  على اإلطالق و ( 1)حيث يعني   5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما ، كيف تقي م دور البنود التالية في إعاقة عملي ة الس الم جد 
  ؟اإلسرائيلي –يني الفلسط
  
غير مهم  على  البنـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــد 
 اإلطالق
اً مهم   4 3 2  ال أعرف جد 
 (ال تقرأ)
b.  اخل الحرم بداليهودي  الوجودلتعزيز المحاوالت اإلسرائيليّة
  .القدسي الشريف أو بجواره
8 5 3 4 2 6 
d. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . ميوجود أسلحة بحوزة حماس والجهاد اإلسال 
f. 6 2 4 3 5 8 .  وجود أنفاق تحت حدود قطاع غّزة 
h. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . سيطرة إسرائيل الكاملة على الموارد الطبيعيّة 
j.  6 2 4 3 5 8 . صعوبة الوصول إلى أماكن العبادة 
l. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . عدم اإلعتراف بحق إسرائيل في الوجود 
n. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . منتجات اإلسرائيليّةمقاطعة الفلسطينيين لل 
p. 6 2 4 3 5 8 . اإلفتقار للتواصل بين المناطق في فلسطين 
r. 6 2 4 3 5 8  .اإلفتقار للثقة ما بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين 
t.  ُ6 2 4 3 5 8 . طلقة على المعابرسيطرة إسرائيل الم 
 
سّجل إجابة )، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة) ؟يمكن تطبيقه من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل  عملي وفيما يتعل ق بقضية الآلجئين الفلسطينيين، أي   (11
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  هذه الحلول تعتبره  ِمن نومَ  (.واحدة فقط
 
 اني أفضل حل  ث الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .8941حّق الآلجئين الفلسطينيين بالعودة إلى ديارهم داخل حدود عام . 8 .8
 5 5 .عودة مشروطة لآلجئين الفلسطينيين. 5 .5
 3 3 .استيعاب الآلجئين الفلسطينيين في الدولة الفلسطينيّة المقامة حديثا  . 3 .3
 4 4 . دول العربية المضيفة لهماستيعاب الآلجئين ومنحهم حقوق المواطنة الكاملة في ال. 4 .4
 2 2 .التخلي عن حّق العودة واستبداله بالتعويض المالي. 2 .2
 6 6 .ال أحد ّمما ذكر أعاله. 6 .6
 7 7 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 7 .7
 
إقرأ )  ؟يمكن تطبيقه ل حل  عمليأي  من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفض. لقضي ة المستوطنات اإلسرائيلي ةواآلن أريد أن أقرأ عليك قائمة بالحلول الممكنة  (12
سّجل )، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  هذه الحلول تعتبره  ِمن نومَ  (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (القائمة
 (إجابة واحدة فقط
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .8967مستوطنين اإلسرائيليين بإخالء المستوطنات المقامة على حدود عام قيام جميع ال. 8
 5 5 .8967تفكيك جميع المستوطنات المقامة ضمن حدود عام . 5
 3 3 .دفع تعويضات للمستوطنين، بما في ذلك إعادة توطينهم ضمن الحدود اإلسرائيليّة. 3
 4 4 .إبقاء جميع المستوطنات سليمة. 4
 2 2 .نشاطات اإلستيطان في الضفة الغربيّة والقدس تجميد. 2
 6 6 .الّسماح لجميع المستوطنين بالبقاء في الضفّة الغربيّة تحت السيادة الفلسطينيّة إن هم اختاروا ذلك. 6
 7 7 . ةالتخلّي عن أجزاء من األراضي اإلسرائيليّة مقابل مساحة ما تشغله المستوطنات اإلسرائيليّة في الضفة الغربيّ . 7
 1 1 .أن تصبح جميع المستوطنات الواقعة على الجانب اإلسرائيلي من الجدار الفاصل جزءا  من إسرائيل. 1
 9 9 (ال تقرأ). ال أحد مّما ذُكر أعاله. 9
 81 81 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 81
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جاء أن تخبرني أي  من الحل. لقد اقترحت في الماضي عد ة خيارات متنوعة للقدس (13 ، (إقرأ القائمة)  ؟يمكن تطبيقه ول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل  عمليالر 
سّجل إجابة )، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  هذه الحلول تعتبره  ِمن نومَ  (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)
 (واحدة فقط
 حل   ثاني أفضل الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .8967القدس الشرقيّة للفلسطينيين والقدس الغربيّة لإلسرائيليين كما كان الوضع قبل عام . 8
 5 5 .تقسيم القدس إلى أحياء فلسطينيّة وأخرى يهوديّة. 5
 3 3 . رقابة دوليّة على القدس وعلى أماكنها المقدّسة. 3
 4 4 .  ع الّسماح بدخول مواطني الدولتين لألماكن المقدسة في القدستبقى القدس موّحدة وتحت السيادة اإلسرائيليّة م. 4
 2 2 . إسرائيليّة مشتركة –ينبغي أن توضع البلدة القديمة تحت سيادة فلسطينيّة . 2
 6 6 (ال تقرأ. )ال أحد ّمما ذكر أعاله. 6
 7 7 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 7
 
جاء أن تخبرني أي  من الحلول التالية تعتبره أفضل حل  عملي. األسرى الفلسطينيينلقد اقترحت في الماضي عد ة حلول بخصوص قضي ة  (14 يمكن  الر 
تناوب )، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  هذه الحلول تعتبره  ِمن نومَ  (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة) ؟تطبيقه
 (احدة فقطسّجل إجابة و)، (األجوبة
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 .إطالق سراح السجناء الفلسطينيين لدوافع إنسانيّة فقط، مثال  في حالة المرض، سجناء فترة طويلة، أو نساء وأطفال. 8
 5 5 . اإلبقاء في السجون فقط على من قتل أو كان شريكا  في قتل اإلسرائيليين. 5
 3 3 .على جميع السجناء الفلسطينيين في السجون اإلسرائيليّة اإلبقاء. 3
 4 4 .إطالق سراح جميع األسرى الفلسطينيين من السجون اإلسرائيليّة. 4
 2 2 (ال تقرأ). ال أحد مّما ذكر أعاله. 2
 6 6 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 6
 
 ِمن نومَ  (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)  ؟ه أفضل ترتيب عمليواآلن فيما يتعل ق بقضي ة الموارد الطبيعي ة، أي  مما يلي تعتبر (15
 (سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ القائمة)؟ عملي يمكن تطبيقه ثاني أفضل حل  هذه الحلول تعتبره 
 ثاني أفضل حل   الحل  األفضل الحلول المقترحة
 8 8 . لطبيعيّة تحت السيطرة الفلسطينيّة في الدولة الفلسطينيّة المقامة حديثا  أن تكون الموارد ا. 8
 5 5 .أن تكون الموارد الطبيعيّة تحت سيطرة مشتركة لصالح اإلزدهار اإلقتصادي للشعبين، الفلسطيني واإلسرائيلي. 5
اليوم، ولكن يجب اإلبقاء على حقوق  أن تبقى الموارد الطبيعيّة تحت السيطرة اإلسرائيليّة كما هو الحال عليه. 3
 (.األسعار، اإلستهالك والتوزيع: مثال  من حيث)متساوية لكال الشعبين، الفلسطيني واإلسرائيلي 
3 3 
 4 4 (ال تقرأ. )ال أحد مّما ذكر أعاله. 4
 2 2 (ال تقرأ. )ال أعرف. 2
 
غير مقبول ( 1)، حيث يعني 5إلى  1وباستخدام سل م درجات من رقم . نيين واإلسرائيليينبين الفلسطيأود  أن أقترح عليك اآلن خططاً للتعاون اإلقتصادي  (16
اً  اً يعني مقبول ( 5)بالنسبة لك، و  جد   :فإلى أي مدى تقبل بما يلي. جد 
 
b . الفلسطينيين بالعمل داخل إسرائيل للعّمالالسماج . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
d . الجانبين الفلسطيني واإلسرائيليوضع سياسة ضريبيّة متفق عليها بين . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
f .إنشاء ميناء بحري فلسطيني . 
8.    5.  3.  4.  2. 
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ً أنك معارض ( 1)، حيث يعني 5إلى  1باستخدام سل م درجات من رقم . لقد نوقشت جميع العناصر التالية كجزء من إقامة دولة فلسطيني ة (17 يعني ( 5)و  تماما
ً أنك مؤيد   :رجو أن تخبرني عن مدى تأييدك أو معارضتك لكل  من العناصر التالية، أتماما
 
b .ن الفلسطينيّةدولة فلسطينيّة منزوعة الّسالح في الضفّة الغربيّة وقطاع غّزة، باستثناء توفّر بعض األسلحة المرّخصة  الستخدامها من قبل قوات األم .  
 8.  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
d .كاملة على معابر حدودهافلسطينيّة بسيطرة  دولة . 
 8.  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
f .ما بين الضفّة الغربيّة وقطاع غّزة" ممّر آمن" إنشاء . 
 8.  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
h .التنسيق األمني بين دولة إسرائيل وفلسطين .  
 8.  5.  3.  4.  2. 
 
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)، (تناوب األجوبة)، (إقرأ جميع الخيارات) ؟اإلسرائيلي –يك، أفضل حل  مناسب للصراع الفلسطيني رأما هو، حسب  (18
 .األولى إسرائيليّة والثانية فلسطينيّة –دولتان تعترفان بشرعيّة بعضهما البعض  .8
 . دولة واحدة يكون فيها لكال الشعبين، اإلسرائيلي والفلسطيني، نفس الحقوق والواجبات .5
 .أردنيّة –كونفدراليّة فلسطينيّة  .3
 .من مصر زءا  من األردن، وقطاع غّزة ج فّة الغربيّة تصبح جزءا  الض .4
 (ال تقرأ. )ال أحد منها .2
 
الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين الشروع في مواجهتها كخطوة أولى نحو اتفاقية سالم ٍ حقيقي ونهائي ما بين حسب رأيك، ما هي القضايا التي يجب على  (19
أقرأ ) ؟القضي ة األقل  أهمي ة في الوقت الحاضر( 11)ويمث ل  القضي ة األكثر أهمي ة( 1)، حيث يمث ل (11)إلى ( 1)من رت ب هذه القضايا حسب أولوياتها  ؟الطرفين
 (الرجاء التركيز في تعبئة هذا السؤال) (.جميع البنود التالية
 .المستوطنات__________ 
 .األسرى__________ 
 .القدس__________ 
 .والفلسطينيينأمن إسرائيل __________ 
 .الحدود والمعابر__________ 
 .الآلجئون__________ 
 .السيطرة على الموارد الطبيعيّة مثل المياه__________ 
 .8967قيام دولة فلسطينيّة على حدود عام __________ 
 .اإلعتراف بالدولة اليهوديّة__________ 
 .السيطرة على األماكن المقدسة__________ 
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( 5)بأنك تعارض بشد ة و ( 1)، حيث يعني 5إلى  1باستخدام سل م درجات من رقم . واآلن سأقوم بطرح مجموعة من األفكار المتعددة حول عملي ة الس الم (21
جاء أن تخبرني عن مدى موافقتك أو معارضتك للمقوالت التالية  :أنك تؤي د بشدة، الر 
 
b .يليين يجب أن تكون مقبولة ومدعومة من قبل جامعة الدول العربيّةاتفاقيّة بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائ أية . 
 8.  5.  3.  4.  2. 
d .على الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين إيقاف جميع أشكال التحريض على الكراهية يجب . 
 8.  5.  3.  4.  2. 
f   .لكال الشعبين، اإلسرائيليين والفلسطينيين، الحّق في العيش بسالم وأمن . 
 8.  5.  3.  4.  2. 
اً أداء إيجابي  تلعبهل . عملي ة الس الم فيواآلن أود  أن أسألك عن أداء بعض الشخصي ات السياسي ة   (21 ً ، إيجابي نوعا َ ما، سلبي جد  اً ما  أم سلبي  نوعا   ؟جد 
 (. إقرأ جميع خيارات اإلجابة لكّل سؤال)
ايجابي  الشخصي ة السياسي ة 
اً   جد 
ايجابي 
 نوعاً ما
سلبي نوعاً  حيادي
 ما
سلبي 
اً   جد 
 ال أعرف
 (ال تقرأ)
a . 6 2 4 3 5 8 .، رئيس السلطة الفلسطينيّةمحمود عب اس 
b. 6 2 4 3 5 8 .، رئيس المكتب السياسي لحركة حماسخالد مشعل 
c. ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .رئيس وزراء السلطة الفلسطينيّة رامي الحمد هللا 
d.  ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .اء إسرائيلرئيس وزربنيامين نتنياهو 
e.  ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .في إسرائيل" الحركة"رئيسة حزب تسيبي ليفني 
f.  ،6 2 4 3 5 8 .رئيس حزب العمل في إسرائيلإسحق هرتسوغ 
 
اً هل تعتقد بأنه من المحتمل  (22 ً ، أو المحتمل جد  ً ما، أو من غير المحتمل  نوعا ً ما، أو من غير المحتمل  نوعا صنع  بلدكيع القيادة الحالي ة في أن تستط إطالقا
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟الطرف اآلخرسالم ٍ مع 
 .ما نوعا  غير محتمل . 3    .ما نوعا  محتمل . 5   .جدّا  محتمل . 8
 (ال تقرأ) .رفض اإلجابة/ ال أدري . 2   .إطالقا  غير محتمل . 4
 
 (الّرجاء قراءة جميع الخيارات): سرائيلي، هل كنتاإل –لو كان عندك القدرة على فرض حل  للصراع الفلسطيني  (23
 ؟حكومة بلدكستفرض نفس الحلول المطروحة من قبل  .8
 ؟حكومة بلدكمختلفة عن تلك المطروحة من قبل  ستفرض حلوال   .5
 ؟الطرف اآلخرستوافق على الحلول المقترحة من قبل حكومة  .3
  ؟تختلف عّما اقترحته كال الحكومتين ستقترح حلوال   .4
 (ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة  /  ال أدري .2
 
  ؟هل تؤي د أم تعارض استئناف مفاوضات الس الم بين الفلسطينيين واإلسرائيليين في ظل  الظروف الحالي ة (24
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) 
 .أعارض إلى حدّ ما. 3    .أؤيّد إلى حدّ ما. 5   .أؤيّد بشدّة. 8
 (ال تقرأ) .رفض اإلجابة/ ال أدري . 2   أعارض بشدّة. 4
 
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط)  ؟هل تعتقد بأن المفاوضات بين السلطة الفلسطينية وإسرائيل ستؤدي إلى سالم بين الطرفين في السنوات القادمة، أم ال (25
 .ال أعتقد إلى حدّ ما. 3   .أعتقد إلى حدّ ما. 5   .أعتقد بشدّة .8
 (.تقرأال )رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2   .ال أعتقد أبدا  . 4
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 ؟حسب رأيك، ألي طرف استئناف مفاوضات الس الم أكثر أهمي ة، للفلسطينيين أم لألسرائيليين (26
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) 
 .إّن أهميته متساوية لكال الطرفين. 3  .إنه أكثر أهميّة لإلسرائيليين. 5  .إنه أكثر أهميّة للفلسطينيين .8
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2      .ألّي من الطرفين إنّه ليس مهّما  . 4
 
جوع للماضي، هل تعتقد بأن اإلسرائيليين والفلسطينيين عملوا كل  ما هو مطلوب منهم إلنجاح محادثات ومعاهدات الس الم، أم هل تعت (27 قد أنه كان بالر 
  ؟بإمكانهم فعل المزيد لجعلها تنجح
a. ؟بالنسبة لإلسرائيليين 
 .ير متأكدغ. 3   .كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد. 5  .هم أن يعملوهعملوا كّل ما هو مطلوب من .8
 
b. ؟بالنسبة للفلسطينيين 
 .غير متأكد. 3   .كان بإمكانهم عمل المزيد. 5  .عملوا كّل ما هو مطلوب منهم أن يعملوه .8
 
يُسمح ( )إقرأ جميع الخيارات) ؟ين واإلسرائيليينالناحية التاريخي ة عن فشل محادثات ومعاهدات الس الم بين الفلسطينيمن هو المسؤول من حسب رأيك،  (28
 (. بأكثر من إجابة
 .الشعب اإلسرائيلي .5   .الشعب الفلسطيني .8
   .األحزاب اإلسرائيليّة المتطرفة. 4  .الحركات الفلسطينيّة المتطرفة. 3
 .سرائيليّونالحكومة اإلسرائيليّة والقادة اإل. 6 .الحكومة الفلسطينيّة والقادة الفلسطينيّون. 2
 .الواليات المتحدة. 1    .الّزعماء العرب. 7
 .________________: غير ذلك، الّرجاء حدّد. 9
 
ً متوازن اً حسب رأيك، هل تلعب الواليات المتحدة دور (29 للموقف  اً منحاز اً أم أنها تلعب دوراإلسرائيلي،  –تجاه كال الطرفين في الصراع الفلسطيني  ا
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟للموقف الفلسطيني اً منحاز اً اإلسرائيلي، أم دور
 .دور منحاز للموقف اإلسرائيلي. 5   .دور متوازن تجاه الطرفين .8
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 4  .دور منحاز للموقف الفلسطيني. 3
 
  ؟فلسطينيين واإلسرائيليينأفضل وسيط ما بين ال –حسب رأيك  –ما هي الدولة أو المنظمة الدولي ة التي قد تكون  (31
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) 
 (.الواليات المتحدة، األمم المتحدة، اإلتحاد األوروبي وروسيا)الرباعيّة الدوليّة  .8
 .اإلتحاد األوروبي. 4   .األمم المتحدة. 3  .الواليات المتحدة .5
 .تركيا. 7    .فرنسا. 6   . روسيا. 2
 .رقط. 81    .مصر. 9   .األردن. 1
 .(ال تقرأ) ال أحد مما ذكر أعاله . 85    إيران. 88
 ________________: غير ذلك، الرجاء حدّد. 83
 
 ؟اإلسرائيلي –إلى أية درجة تشعر بالملل والتعب من الصراع الفلسطيني  (31
 .ضئيلةلدرجة . 3   .لدرجة متوّسطة. 5   .لدرجة كبيرة. 8
 .(ال تقرأ)ال أعرف . 2   .غير مهتمّ . 4
 
 ؟أنت مستعد  لصنع سالم ٍ مع الطرف اآلخرلى أية درجة إ (32
 .لدرجة ضئيلة. 3   .لدرجة متوّسطة. 5   .لدرجة كبيرة  .8
 .(ال تقرأ)ال أعرف . 2   .غير مهتمّ . 4
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 ؟سأقرأ عليك  عبارتين وأرجو منك أن تخبرني أيهما األقرب لوجهة نظرك (33
 .فلسطيني –لتحقيق سالم إسرائيلي  التتنازوتقديم  ةمخاطرللنكون مستعدّين  أن ينبغي علينا .8
 .فلسطيني –ال ينبغي علينا أن نتنازل عن أّي من مطالبنا من أجل تحقيق سالم إسرائيلي  .5
 
اً هل من الممكن القول بأنك واثق  ؟بأن يُحل  الصراع ما بين اإلسرائيليين والفلسطينيين في المستقبل القريبما مدى ثقتك  (34 ً ، واثق جد  ثق ما، غير وا نوعا
 ً  ؟اً ما  أم أنك غير واثق أبد نوعا
 .ما نوعا  غير واثق . 3   .ما نوعا  واثق . 5   .جدّا  واثق  .8
 (.ال تقرأ)ال أدري . 2   .ا  غير واثق أبد. 4
 
ً ألية درجة تنطبق البنود التالية عليك،  (35 اً و ( 1)، حيث يعني رقم 5إلى  1سل م درجات من رقم  مستخدما اً كبيرة لدرجة ( 5)لدرجة صغيرة جد   ؟جد 
لدرجة صغيرة  البنـــــــــــــــــــــــــد
اً   جد 
 لدرجة 4 3 2
اً كبيرة    جد 
 ال ينطبق
 (ال تقرأ)
 رفض
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .الفقــر 
b. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .المعاشات المنخفضة/ األجور 
c.  7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .نقص فرص العمل/ البطالة 
d. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .نقص الرعاية الصحيّة والتعليم 
e. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .العنف/ الجريمة  / عدم األمن واألمان 
f.  7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .الحصار/ القيود المفروضة على حرية الحركة 
g.  7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .ارتفاع األسعار/  التضّخم/ ارتفاع تكاليف المعيشة 
h. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .نقص الطاقة أو الوقود 
i. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .الكهرباء عدم توفُّر 
j.  7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .المياهعدم توفُّر 
k. 7 6 2 4 3 5 8 .مشكلة السكن 
 
 (.سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط) ؟، هل ستهاجر أم ستبقى في بلدكللهجرةلك الفرصة  أتيحتلو  (36
 (.ال تقرأ) ال أدري . 3   .سأهاجر. 5   .سأبقى. 8
 
أرجو أن تخبرني لكل  من . تصف كيف ستعب ر عن مشاعرك ومواقفك تجاه الطرف اآلخرواآلن أود  أن أقرأ عليك قائمة من الكلمات واإلصطالحات التي  (37
 :أو بدرجة عاليةهذه الكلمات أو اإلصطالحات إن كانت ال تعب ر عن مشاعرك، أو إن كانت تعب ر عن مشاعرك بدرجة صغيرة، أو بدرجة متوسطة 
ال تعب ر عن  المشاعر والمواقف تجاه الطرف اآلخر
 مشاعري
ر بدرجة تعب  
 صغيرة
تعب ر بدرجة 
 متوسطة
تعب ر بدرجة 
 عالية
 ال أدري
 (ال تقرأ)
a. 2 4 3 5 8 التسامح تجاه الطرف اآلخر 
b. 2 4 3 5 8 تفّهم الطرف اآلخر 
c. 2 4 3 5 8 الغضب من الطرف اآلخر 
d. 2 4 3 5 8 الخوف من الطرف اآلخر 
e. 2 4 3 5 8 الثقة بالطرف اآلخر 
f. 2 4 3 5 8 الحقد تجاه الطرف اآلخر 
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 ؟في هذا السياق، ألية درجة تشعر بأن الطرف اآلخر يكن  لك نفس المشاعر  (38
 
 مشاعر ومواقف الطرف اآلخر تجاهك
ال يك ن لي هذه 
 المشاعر
بدرجة 
 صغيرة
بدرجة 
 متوسطة
بدرجة 
 عالية
 ال أدري
 (ال تقرأ)
a.  2 4 3 5 8 التسامح 
b. 2 4 3 5 8 أنه يتفهمك 
c. 2 4 3 5 8 الغضب منك 
d. 2 4 3 5 8 منك الخوف 
e. 2 4 3 5 8 يثق بك 
f. 2 4 3 5 8 يحقد عليك 
 
، (الفولكلور)هل تميل إلى معرفة المزيد عن الطرف اآلخر في مجاالت ال عالقة لها بالسياسة أو بالصراع القائم، مثل الموسيقى، التراث الشعبي  (39
ة، اآلداب، الدين، األفكار اإلجتماعي ة أو غيرها   ؟اإلتجاهات العام 
 (.ل إجابة واحدة فقطسجّ )
 .نعم، ولكن لدرجة صغيرة. 3   . نعم، إلى حدّ ما. 5   .جدّا  نعم، بدرجة كبيرة  .8
 (. ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2    .ا  قطعيّ  ا  ال، أبد. 4
 
ً هل ستشعر بارتياح ٍ شديد، بارتياح ٍ  (41 ً ما، بعدم ارتياح ٍ  نوعا  ؟لعديد من جيرانك من غير دينكما، أو بعدم ارتياح شديد لو كان ا نوعا
 .ما نوعا  بعدم ارتياح . 3   .ما نوعا  بارتياح . 5    .بارتياح شديد. 8
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 2    .بعدم ارتياح شديد. 4
 
      ؟نتيجة للصراعخالل السنوات الماضية أو أصدقائك هل قُتل أو ُجرح أحد من أفراد عائلتك  (41
 ال. 5      نعم . 8
 
 األسئلة الديمغرافي ة : الجزء الثالث
 
 :الجنس(  1د 
 .أنثى. 5    .ذكر .8
 
 .سنة______ _______ :العمر(  2د 
 
 : الحالة اإلجتماعي ة(  3د 
  .أرملة/ أرمل . 4  . مطلّقة/ مطلّق . 3   .عزباء/ أعزب . 5  .متزّوجة/ متزّوج  .8
 
 .سنة_______  :عدد سنوات الدراسة(  4د 
 
 .شخص_____ (:  من جميع األعمار من يأكلون على طاولة واحدة)عدد أفراد  األسرة (  5د 
 
ً هل دخل أسرتك الشهري أعلى، أقل  أو تقريب. شاقل  2375في فلسطين هو  الواحدة إن  معد ل الدخل الشهري لألسرة(  6د   ؟شاقل 2375يساوي  ا
 .شاقل 5372 ا  عادل تقريبي. 3  .شاقل 5372أقّل من . 5   .شاقل 5372أعلى من  .8
 (ال تقرأ. )رفض اإلجابة. 2   (ال تقرأ. )ال أدري. 4
 
 ؟ما هي ديانتك(  7د 
 .(روم أرثوذكس)مسيحي . 3   . (شيعي)مسلم . 5    .(سنّي)مسلم  .8
 .(لوثري)مسيحي . 6  (روم كاثوليك)مسيحي . 2    .(التيني)مسيحي . 4
 ُملحد. 9   .يهودي. 1     .درزي. 7
E.2. ARABIC TRANSLATION
A119
 
  ؟كيف تصف نفسك من الناحية الديني ة(  8د 
 .متديّن بدرجة متوسطة. 3   .متديّن إلى حدّ ما. 5   .(ناشط ديني) جدّا  متديّن  .8
 (ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال أدري . 6  .إطالقا  غير متديّن . 2   .غير متديّن إلى حدّ ما. 4
 
  ؟هل أنت الجىء أم الفي األصل، (  9د 
 .ال. 5     .نعــم .8
 
إجراء جميع األحزاب والفصائل على  فإذا وافقت. فيما يلي قائمة باألحزاب التي من المحتمل أن تتنافس في اإلنتخابات القادمة للمجلس التشريعي( 11د 
ت اليوم اإلنتخابات الجديدة أجوبة مفتوحة برموز مشفّرة (. )؟لمن منها يميل: إذا كان المستجوب غير متأك د إسأل) ؟وُعرضت عليك القائمة التالية، فلمن تصو 
 (.ال تقرأ القائمة( )سّجل إجابة واحدة فقط( )ا  مسبق
  فتـح  .8
 حماس .5
 الطريق الثالث .3
  (ج ش ت ف )الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين  .4
 المبادرة الوطنيّة الفلسطينيّة .2
 (ج د ت ف )الجبهة الديمقراطيّة لتحرير فلسطين  .6
 حركة الجهاد اإلسالمي الفلسطينيّة .7
 اإلسالميّون المستقلّون .1
 الوطنيّون المستقلّون .9
 (.ا  ينبغي أن يكون طوع( )_________________: الّرجاء حدّد)غير ذلك  .81
 (.ال تقرأ)رفض اإلجابة / ال تعليق  .88
 (. ال تقرأ)ال أدري  .85
 
 
 على حسن تعاونكم اً شكر
 
ـــد  إقــرار وتعه 
 
خالل المقابلة التي أجريتها مع المستجوب وفق التعليمات الصادرة لي عن المركز الفلسطيني الستطالع الرأي  ا  إنّني أؤّكد بأنني قد نفّذت هذه اإلستمارة شخصيّ 
(PCPO )بأنني قد راجعت هذه اإلستمارة  ا  وأصّرح أيض. وبأن كّل البيانات والمعلومات الواردة فيها صحيحة ومضبوطة حسبما أفادني به المستجوب نفسه
كما وأنني على علم ٍ مسبق بأنه في حالة ما أظهر التدقيق أية أخطاء أو نواقص في التنفيذ، تلغى هذه اإلستمارة . أية أخطاء أو نواقص وتأكدت بأنها خالية من
إلدارة  ويترك تقدير قيمة الخصم. أية مبالغ مستحقّة ليوتخصم تكلفة معالجتها ومراجعتها وكذلك قيمة التعويض عن أي تأخير أو ضرر يترتّب على ذلك من 
 .حسب أهمية مثل هذا الخطأ أو النقص( PCPO)المركز الفلسطيني الستطالع الرأي 
 
 . بأنه لن تُقبل أية استمارة أو تدفع قيمتها إالّ إذا كانت موقعة حسب األصول من قبل الباحث ا  علم
 
 __________________________: إسم الباحث
 ________________: توقيع الباحث       
     _______________: توقيع المشرف       
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E.3 Hebrew Translation
E.3.1 Split A  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Aשאלון 
 
השלום תהליך פלסטיני ו-הישראליסכסוך אנו עורכים סקר בנושא ה. ממכון המחקר מאגר מוחות____ ת/מדבר, שלום
 .י על מספר שאלות קצרות/אודה לך אם תשיב, הסקר אנונימי ומיועד לצרכים סטטיסטיים בלבד .באזור
 
 1פרק 
1S . שאלוןA 
2S .ישראל: מדינה 
3S .אזור חיוג: 
4S .התנחלות. 3 יישוב כפרי. 2  יישוב עירוני. 1: סוג המגורים 
5S .תאריך הראיון: 
S6 .המענה לסקר/משך הראיון: 
 
 2פרק 
1Q )לא נכוןהאם אתה מאמין שהעניינים במדינת ישראל מתקדמים בכיוון הנכון או בכיוון ה, באופן כללי 
? 
 תשובות אחרות. 3  לא נכוןבכיוון ה. 2  בכיוון הנכון.1
 
2Q )תשובות' ניתן לענות מס)? פלסטיני-מהם מקורות המידע שלך אודות הסכסוך הישראלי) 
1Q2 . 2רדיוQ2 . 23טלוויזיהQ . 24אינטרנטQ .טוויטר וכדומה, מדיה חברתית כמו פייסבוק 
5Q2 . 26עיתונות מודפסת ובאינטרנטQ . 27משפחה וחבריםQ .תשובות אחרות 
 
3Q )(השבועי או החודשי שאתה קורא בדרך , מהו העיתון היומי( 2בשאלה " עיתונות" 5' למי שענה תשובה מס 3' שאלה מס
 ?כלל הכי הרבה
 _______:פרט, אחר. 5מעריב . 4הארץ . 3ידיעות אחרונות . 2ישראל היום . 1
 
4Q )באיזו תדירות אתה קורא את החדשות באינטרנט? 
. 7פחות מפעם בשבוע . 6פעם בשבוע . 5פעמים בשבוע  2-3. 4פעמים בשבוע  4-6. 3ם ביום פע. 2מספר פעמים ביום . 1
 תשובות אחרות
 
5Q )פלסטיני-הישראליסכסוך עד כמה אתה מתעניין אם בכלל בחדשות העוסקות ב ? 
 מתעניין במידה בינונית . 3מתעניין מאוד . 2אופן קיצוני מתעניין ב. 1
 לא מתעניין כלל . 5  לא כל כך מתעניין. 4
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הסכסוך  עוסק איזו מידהתאמר לי בבקשה ב, במידה גבוהה מאוד=5-במידה נמוכה מאוד ו=1כאשר , 1-5בסולם של ( 6
 (תשובות אחרות 6, 5-1בסולם )? בכל אחד מהנושאים הבאים פלסטיני-הישראלי
Q6A .דת 
Q6C .לאומיות 
Q6E .כלכלה 
Q6G .קיום 
 
 ?פלסטיני-האירועים ההיסטוריים הבאים גורם לסכסוך הישראלימהווה כל אחד מעד כמה ( 7
 (תשובות אחרות 6, במידה גבוהה מאוד=5-במידה נמוכה מאוד ו=1כאשר , 5-1בסולם של )
Q7A .הרדיפות אחר היהודים באירופה וברוסיה 
Q7C . הצהרת בלפור –המנדט הבריטי שאישר ליהודים לכונן בית יהודי בפלסטינה 
Q7E . ימיםהמלחמת ששת  – 1667-הישראלי של השטחים הפלסטינאים בהכיבוש 
Q7G .דורות וזכותם להמשיך בכךיהם מזה האמונה הפלסטינית שהם חיים על אדמות 
 
8Q )בתחילת המאה שעברה, אחור לראשיתו של הסכסוךכאשר אתה מביט ל, איזה משפט מהבאים הכי קרוב לעמדתך: 
 לשלום יביאו הייתי מחפש אחר יותר שינויים ש. 2שהיא הייתי משאיר את ההיסטוריה כמו . 1
 תשובות אחרות. 4 הייתי ממשיך באותו כיוון אבל עם צעדים יותר קיצוניים. 3
 
מוצדקים במידה מסוימת , הם כמעט תמיד מוצדקים: פלסטיני-לסכסוך הישראליהקשורים צעדים הבאים מהי עמדתך ביחס ל (6
 (תשובות אחרות 4, 3-1 בסולם)? או אף פעם לא מוצדקים
Q9A .שיגור רקטות מעזה לישראל 
Q9C .פעולות של פלסטינים נגד ישראל 
Q9E .על פלסטינים הגבלות על תנועה מצד ישראל 
Q9G .ניסיונות הרשות הפלסטינית לבודד את ישראל בזירה הבינלאומית 
 
כל אחד מהגורמים הבאים את תהליך השלום בין סכן מבאיזו מידה , מסכן מאוד=5-ו כלל לא מסכן=1כאשר  1-5בסולם של ( 11
 (תשובות אחרות 6, 5-1בסולם )? הישראלים לפלסטינים
Q10A .בניית התנחלויות 
Q10C .מדינת ישראל אי הכרה בקיומה של 
Q10E .על ידי מתנחלים ישראליים נשקת החזק 
Q10G .החזקת אסירים פלסטיניים במעצר על ידי ישראל 
Q10I . של הפליטים הפלסטיניםזכות השיבה 
Q10K .העדר גבולות ברורים למדינה הפלסטינית 
Q10M .קיצוניים משני הצדדים המתנגדים תמיד לכל הסכם שלום 
Q10O .התדרדרות הכלכלה הפלסטינית בגלל הסכסוך 
Q10Q .האיום הביטחוני מצד קיצוניים על שני הצדדים 
Q10S .תהתלות של הכלכלה הפלסטינית בכלכלה הישראלי 
Q10U .הקפאת העברת כספי מיסים לרשות הפלסטינית ומגבלות מכס מצד ישראל 
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Q11A. מבין הפתרונות , הניתן ליישוםהסיכוי הגבוה ביותר בעל מהו לדעתך הפתרון , הפליטים הפלסטיניםת בהתייחס לסוגי
 ? הבאים
 1648זכותם של הפליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות . 1
 תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטיניםחזרה על . 2
 קליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתקום. 3
 שילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם נקלטו עד היום. 4
 העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחלפתו בפיצויים כספייםנטישת . 5
 אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו. 6
 רותתשובות אח. 7
 
Q11B .יות מיושםהסיכוי השני להבעל פתרון מהו לדעתך הו ? 
 1648זכותם של הפליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות . 1
 חזרה על תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטינים. 2
 קליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתקום. 3
 קלטו עד היוםנשילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם . 4
 ת העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחלפתו בפיצויים כספייםנטיש. 5
 אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו. 6
 תשובות אחרות. 7
 
Q12A .ניתן ליישוםהפתרון הסביר ביותר מהו לדעתך ה, מבין הפתרונות הבאים לבעיית ההתנחלויות הישראליות? 
 1667כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות . 1
 1667בתוך גבולות ההתנחלויות שנבנו כל פרוק . 2
 חבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישראל. 3
 לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים. 4
 ת התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושליםהקפאת פעולו. 5
 לאפשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטיני. 6
 היקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית בהתאם ל, ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות. 7
 כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראל. 8
 מהפתרונות הללואף אחד . 6
 תשובות אחרות. 11
 
Q12B .ומהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי השני להיות מיושם ? 
 1667כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות . 1
 1667פרוק כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בתוך גבולות . 2
 לחבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישרא. 3
 לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים. 4
 הקפאת פעולות התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושלים. 5
 לאפשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטיני. 6
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 בהתאם להיקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית, ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות. 7
 שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראלכל ההתנחלויות . 8
 אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו. 6
 תשובות אחרות. 11
 
Q13A .ביחס לירושלים ליישוםנת ביותר הניתה הסביראופציה לדעתך ה ימה? 
 1667מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני . 1
 ולרובעים פלסטיניםחלוקת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים . 2
 פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים. 3
 עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומות הקדושים לשני העמים ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות ישראלית. 4
 פלסטינית-העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
 
Q13B .השנייה הניתנת ליישום ומהי לדעתך האופציה הסבירה? 
 1667מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני . 1
 חלוקת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים ולרובעים פלסטינים. 2
 פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים. 3
 ת הקדושים לשני העמיםירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות ישראלית עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומו. 4
 פלסטינית-העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
 
Q14A .ביחס לסוגיית האסירים הפלסטינים מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום? 
 נשים וילדיםאסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או , שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה. 1
 להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים . 2
 להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראלים. 3
 לשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא הישראלים. 4
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
 
Q14B . ליישוםומהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר השני הניתן? 
 אסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או נשים וילדים, שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה. 1
 להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים . 2
 להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראלים. 3
 ראליםלשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא היש. 4
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
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Q15A .מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום, ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים? 
 המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם. 1
 והפלסטיניםהמשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משותף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים . 2
לישראלים ( צריכה וחלוקה, ביחס למחירים)אבל יהיו זכויות שוות , המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום. 3
 ולפלסטינים
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
Q15B .הניתן ליישוםהשני מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר , ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים? 
 הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם המשאבים. 1
 המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משותף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים והפלסטינים. 2
לישראלים ( צריכה וחלוקה, ביחס למחירים)אבל יהיו זכויות שוות , המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום. 3
 יניםולפלסט
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
בסולם של , עד כמה כל אחד מהמרכיבים מקובל עליך. נציג בפניך תוכנית לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי בין הפלסטינים לישראלים( 16
 ? מאוד מקובל 5-מאוד לא מקובל ו=1כאשר  5-1
Q16A. תיירות וכדומה, סביבה, בריאות, כמו מים, יישום פרויקטים משולבים בכל תחומי הכלכלה  
Q16C .קידום מסחר והחלפת מוצרים ושירותים בין שתי המדינות 
Q16E .בניית שדה תעופה פלסטיני 
Q16G .הרחבת שטח הדייג המותר סביב רצועת עזה 
 
כאשר  5-1בסולם , המרכיבים הבאים שהם חלק מהקמת מדינה פלסטיניתעד כמה אתה תומך או ממתנגד לכל אחד ( 17
 ?תומך לחלוטין=5-מתנגד לחלוטין ו=1
 Q17A.  עם חילופי שטחים מסוימים ומוסכמים  1667ישראל תיסוג לקוי 
Q17C .נוכחות בינלאומית בגבולות שבין המדינה פלסטינית החדשה שתוקם לבין ישראל 
Q17E .נקודות פיקוח ישראליות קבועות במעברי הגבול של הפלסטינים הפועלות בשיתוף פעולה עם הרשות הפלסטינית קיום 
Q17G. לסמן את המיקום הנוכחי של החומה כגבול הקבע של המדינה הפלסטינית שתקום 
 
Q18 .פלסטיני-מהו הפתרון המתאים ביותר לסכסוך הישראלי, לדעתך? 
 ישראל ומדינה פלסטיניתת מדינ, אחת בלגיטימיות של השנייהשתי מדינות המכירות כל . 1
 מדינה אחת שבה גם לישראלים וגם לפלסטינים יש זכויות וחובות שווים. 2
 פלסטינית-קונפדרציה ירדנית. 3
 הגדה המערבית תהיה חלק מירדן ורצועת עזה חלק ממצרים. 4
 תשובה אחרת. 5
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. פועלים להשגת שלום אמיתי ומלא בין שני הצדדיםהם פלסטינים לעסוק כאשר מהם הנושאים בהם צריכים הישראלים וה( 16
 .הנושא הכי פחות חשוב=11-הנושא החשוב ביותר ו=1לפי חשיבות כאשר  11-1דרג את הגורמים בסולם 
Q19-1  התנחלויות 
Q19-2  אסירים 
Q19-3  ירושלים 
Q19-4  הביטחון של הישראלים והפלסטינים 
Q19-5  גבולות ונקודות מעבר 
Q19-6  הפליטים 
Q19-7  פיקוח על משאבים כמו מים 
Q19-8   1667הקמת מדינה פלסטינית בגבולות 
Q19-9  הכרה במדינה היהודית 
Q19-10 פיקוח על המקומות הקדושים 
 
כאשר  5-1בסולם של עד כמה אתה מסכים או לא מסכים עם כל אחד מהם . להלן מספר משפטים לגבי תהליך השלום( 21
  ?מאוד מסכים=5-מאוד לא מסכים ו=1
Q20A .סדר היום צריך לכלול יצירת תרבות ואווירה של שלום וקבלת האחר 
Q20C .הקהילה הבינלאומית צריכה להיות מוכנה לסייע בתהליך בניית השלום 
Q20E .רק במשא ומתן אפשר להשיג שלום בין ישראלים לפלסטינים 
 
חיובי במידה , חיובי ביותר: ממלא לדעתך כל אחד מהאישים הפוליטיים הבאים הקשורים לתהליך השלום איזה תפקיד( 21
 ?שלילי במידה מסוימת או שלילי ביותר, נייטרלי ,מסוימת
Q21A .יושב ראש הרשות הפלסטינית, מוחמד עבאס 
Q21B .יושב ראש חמאס, חאלד משעל 
Q21C. הפלסטינית ראש הממשלה ברשות, חמדאללה-אלמי אר 
Q21D .ראש ממשלת ישראל, בנימין נתניהו 
Q21E .ראש מפלגת התנועה, ציפי לבני 
Q21F. ראש מפלגת המחנה הציוני, יצחק הרצוג 
 
22Q )האם המנהיגות הישראלית הנוכחית יכולה להשיג שלום עם הצד השני? 
 כנראה שכן. 1
 ייתכן שכן. 2
 כנראה שלא. 3
 בהחלט לא. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
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23Q )פלסטיני-מה היית עושה אם הייתה לך היכולת לאכוף פתרון לסכסוך הישראלי? 
 אוכף את הפתרון המוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל . 1
 אוכף פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל. 2
 מסכים לפתרון המוצע על ידי הצד השני. 3
 מציע פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע על ידי שני הצדדים. 4
 
24Q )האם אתה תומך או מתנגד להמשך המשא ומתן לשלום בתנאים הנוכחיים? 
 תומך מאוד. 1
 תומך במידה מסוימת. 2
 מתנגד במידה מסוימת. 3
 מתנגד מאוד. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
25Q ) האם אתה מאמין או לא מאמין שהמשא ומתן בין הרשות הפלסיטינית וישראל יביא לשלום בין שני הצדדים בשנים
 ?הקרובות
 מאמין מאוד. 1
 מאמין במידה מסוימת. 2
 לא מאמין במידה מסוימת. 3
 כלל לא מאמין. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
26Q )לאיזה צד יותר חשוב להמשיך בתהליך השלום? 
 יותר חשוב לפלסטינים. 1
 יותר חשוב לישראלים. 2
 חשוב לשניהם במידה שווה. 3
 לא חשוב לשניהם במידה שווה. 4
 ת אחרותתשובו. 5
 
האם אתה מאמין שהישראלים והפלסטינים עשו ככל הניתן והנדרש מהם לנהל משא ומתן שיביא להשגת , בהתייחס לעבר( 27
 ?או שהם היו יכולים לעשות יותר בכדי להצליח, שלום
 Q27A .הישראלים: 
 עשו כל מה שניתן. 1
 יכלו לעשות יותר. 2
 לא בטוח. 3
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Q27B .הפלסטינים: 
 לא בטוח. 3 יכלו לעשות יותר. 2  כל מה שניתןעשו . 1
 
אפשר )ׁ   ?מנקודת מבט היסטורית מי לדעתך אחראי לכישלון בהשגת הסכם במשא ומתן לשלום בין הישראלים לפלסטינים( 28
 (תשובות' מס
 1- Q28 .העם הפלסטיני 
2- Q28.העם הישראלי 
3- Q28.תנועות פלסטיניות קיצוניות 
4- Q28. ישראליות קיצוניותמפלגות 
5- Q28.הממשלה וההנהגה הפלסטינית 
6- Q28.הממשלה וההנהגה הישראלית 
7- Q28.מנהיגים ערביים 
8- Q28.ב"ארה 
6- Q28.פרט, אחרים:____________ 
 
26Q )היא מוטה לטובת ישראל או או ש, פלסטיני-ב ממלאת לדעתך תפקיד מאוזן בין הצדדים בסכסוך הישראלי"האם ארה
 ?הפלסטיניםלטובת 
 תפקיד מאוזן. 1
 מוטה לטובת ישראל . 2
 מוטה לטובת הפלסטינים. 3
 תשובות אחרות. 4
 
31Q )איזו מדינה או ארגון בינלאומי יכול לדעתך להיות המתווך הטוב ביותר בין הישראלים לפלסטינים? 
 (האיחוד האירופאי ורוסיה, מ"האו, ב"המרכב מארה) הקווארטט . 1
 ירדן. 8  טורקיה. 7  צרפת. 6  רוסיה. 5  האיחוד האירופאי. 4 מ"האו. 3  ב"ארה. 2
 ______________:פרט, אחר. 13  אף אחת מהם. 12  איראן. 11 קטאר. 11  מצרים. 6
 
31Q ) פלסטיני-סכסוך הישראליביחס ל" חולה"או עד כמה אתה חש עייף? 
 תשובות אחרות. 4 במידה נמוכה. 3  במידה בינונית. 2 במידה רבה. 1
 
32Q ) לעשות שלום עם הצד השניבאיזו מידה אתה מוכן? 
 תשובות אחרות. 5  לא משנה לי. 4  במידה נמוכה. 3  במידה בינונית. 2  במידה רבה. 1
 
33Q )איזה משפט מייצג יותר את השקפתך האישית, מבין שני המשפטים הבאים? 
 פלסטיני-ולהקריב בכדי להשיג שלום ישראליעלינו להיות מוכנים לקחת סיכונים . 1
 פלסטיני-אסור לנו לוותר על שום דרישה למען השגת שלום ישראלי. 2
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34Q )פלסטיני ייפתר בעתיד הקרוב-עד כמה אתה בטוח בכך שהסכסוך הישראלי? 
 בטוח מאוד. 1
 בטוח במידה מסוימת. 2
 מסוימתלא בטוח במידה . 3
 כלל לא בטוח. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
סולם )? במידה רבה מאוד=5במידה נמוכה מאוד עד =1כאשר  1-5בסולם , נוגע לךבאיזו מידה כל אחד מהנושאים הבאים ( 35
 (מסרב להשיב=7, לא רלוונטי=6, 5-1
Q35A. עוני 
Q35B. שכר נמוך ופנסיה נמוכה 
Q35C. אבטלה וחוסר תעסוקה 
Q35D. שרותי בריאות ורווחהמחסור ב 
Q35E. פשיעה ואלימות, חוסר ביטחון אישי 
Q35F. הגבלות על חופש תנועה ומחסומים 
Q35G. יוקר המחייה 
Q35H. אנרגיה או מחסור בדלק 
Q35I. מחסור בחשמל 
Q35J. מחסור במים 
Q35K .בעיות בדיור 
 
36Q )אחרת או נשארהייתה מנצל אותה ועובר למדינה , אם הייתה לך ההזדמנות להגר? 
 לא יודע. 3 מהגר. 2 נשאר. 1
 
 4-1בסולם  עד כמה כל אחד מהם מבטא את תחושתך. אקריא לך משפטים המתארים את יחסך ותחושתך כלפי הצד השני( 37
  (תשובה אחרת=5-ו, שותף במידה רבה=4, שותף במידה בינונית=3, שותף במידה נמוכה=2, לא שותף לתחושה=1כאשר 
Q37A .סובלנות כלפי הצד השני 
Q37B .הבנה כלפי הצד השני 
Q37C .כעס על הצד השני 
Q37D .פחד מהצד השני 
Q37E .צד השניון כלפי הטחיב 
Q37F .עוינות כלפי הצד השני 
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שותף במידה =2, לא שותף לתחושה=1כאשר  4-1בסולם ? מהן לדעתך התחושות של הצד השני כלפיך, באותו הקשר( 38
  (תשובה אחרת=5-ו, שותף במידה רבה=4, שותף במידה בינונית=3, נמוכה
Q38A . סובלנות 
Q38B . הבנה כלפיך 
Q38C . כועס עליך 
Q38D .פוחד ממך 
Q38E . בוטח בך 
Q38F .עוין כלפיך 
 
36Q )דת, ספרות, כמו מוזיקה, האם אתה שואף לדעת יותר על הצד השני בתחומים שאינם קשורים כלל לפוליטיקה או לסכסוך ,
 ?בעיות חברתיות וכדומה
 במידה רבה מאוד, כן. 1
 במידה מסוימת, כן. 2
 במידה מעטה, כן. 3
 לעולם לא, לא. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
 41Q )כיצד היית מרגיש אם רבים משכניך לא היו שותפים לדת שלך ? 
 מאוד נוח. 1
 נוח במידה מסוימת. 2
 לא נוח במידה מסוימת. 3
 מאוד לא נוח. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
41Q )האם מישהו מקרוביך או ממשפחתך נהרג או נפצע בעבר כתוצאה מן הסכסוך ? 
 לא. 2  כן. 1
 
 3 פרק
 
D1 .מין 
 אישה. 2  גבר. 1
 
D2 .שנים___________:גיל 
 
D3 .מצב משפחתי: 
 אלמן. 4 גרוש. 3 רווק. 2 נשוי. 1
 
D4 .שנים___________:שנות לימוד 
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D5 .אנשים ___________:הנפשות המתגוררות איתך בביתך' מס 
 
D6 . מהי הכנסתך ביחס לממוצע. ₪ 8,611ההכנסה המשפחתית הממוצעת לחודש למשפחה בישראל היא? 
 יותר מהממוצע. 1
 פחות מהממוצע. 2
 בערך כמו הממוצע. 3
 לא יודע. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
D7 .מהי דתך? 
 קתולי רומי–נוצרי . 4  יווני אורתודוקסי –נוצרי . 3  שיעי –סלמי מו. 2 סוני –מוסלמי . 1
 חסר דת. 6  יהודי. 8  דרוזי. 7  לותרני –נוצרי . 6  יווני קתולי –נוצרי . 5
 
D8 .כיצד אתה מגדיר עצמך מבחינת דתית? 
   לא דתי במידה מסוימת. 4  דתי במידה מתונה. 3  דתי במידה מסוימת. 2  מאוד דתי. 1
 תשובות אחרות. 6  כלל לא דתי. 5
 
D9. האם אתה פליט, במקור?  
 לא. 2  כן. 1
 
D10 . 2115לאיזו מפלגה הצבעת בבחירות האחרונות לכנסת שהתקיימו במרץ ? 
 כולנו. 6  רשימה ערבית מאוחדת. 5  יש עתיד. 4  בית יהודי. 3  מחנה ציוני. 2  ליכוד. 1
 מרצ. 11  ס"ש. 6  ישראל ביתנו. 8  יהדות התורה. 7
 
 
 !תודה רבה על השתתפותך 
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  Bשאלון 
 
פלסטיני ותהליך השלום -הסכסוך הישראלי בנושא אנו עורכים סקר. מחקר מאגר מוחותממכון ה____ ת/מדבר, שלום
 .שאלות קצרותמספר י על /אודה לך אם תשיב, הסקר אנונימי ומיועד לצרכים סטטיסטיים בלבד .באזור
 
 1פרק 
1S . שאלוןB 
2S .ישראל: מדינה 
3S . חיוגאזור: 
4S .התנחלות. 3 יישוב כפרי. 2  יישוב עירוני. 1: סוג המגורים 
5S .תאריך הראיון: 
S6 .המענה לסקר/משך הראיון: 
 
 2פרק 
1Q )האם אתה מאמין שהעניינים במדינת ישראל מתקדמים בכיוון הנכון או בכיוון הלא נכון, באופן כללי? 
 שובות אחרותת. 3  בכיוון הלא נכון. 2  בכיוון הנכון.1
 
2Q )תשובות' ניתן לענות מס)? פלסטיני-מהם מקורות המידע שלך אודות הסכסוך הישראלי) 
1Q2 . 2רדיוQ2 . 23טלוויזיהQ . 24אינטרנטQ .טוויטר וכדומה, מדיה חברתית כמו פייסבוק 
5Q2 . 26עיתונות מודפסת ובאינטרנטQ . 27משפחה וחבריםQ .תשובות אחרות 
 
3Q )(השבועי או החודשי שאתה קורא בדרך , מהו העיתון היומי( 2בשאלה " עיתונות" 5' למי שענה תשובה מס 3' שאלה מס
 ?הכי הרבה כלל
 _______:פרט, אחר. 5מעריב . 4הארץ . 3ידיעות אחרונות . 2ישראל היום . 1
 
4Q )באיזו תדירות אתה קורא את החדשות באינטרנט? 
. 7פחות מפעם בשבוע . 6פעם בשבוע . 5פעמים בשבוע  2-3. 4פעמים בשבוע  4-6. 3פעם ביום . 2מספר פעמים ביום . 1
 תשובות אחרות
 
5Q )פלסטיני-עד כמה אתה מתעניין אם בכלל בחדשות העוסקות בסכסוך הישראלי ? 
 מתעניין במידה בינונית . 3מתעניין מאוד . 2מתעניין באופן קיצוני . 1
 כלל לא מתעניין . 5  לא כל כך מתעניין. 4
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עוסק הסכסוך איזו מידה תאמר לי בבקשה ב, במידה גבוהה מאוד=5-במידה נמוכה מאוד ו=1כאשר , 1-5בסולם של ( 6
 (תשובות אחרות 6, 5-1בסולם )? בכל אחד מהגורמים הבאים פלסטיני-הישראלי
Q6B .תרבות 
Q6D .פוליטיקה 
Q6F .היסטוריה 
Q6H .גזע 
 
 ?פלסטיני-אחד מהאירועים ההיסטוריים הבאים גורם לסכסוך הישראליעד כמה מהווה כל ( 7
 (תשובות אחרות 6, במידה גבוהה מאוד=5-במידה נמוכה מאוד ו=1כאשר , 5-1בסולם של )
Q7B .הגירת יהודית לפלסטין ההיסטורית 
Q7D . 1441מלחמת העצמאות 
Q7F .העצמת הסכסוך על ידי הערבים לטובת סדר היום שלהם 
Q7H . היהודית ששטחי ארץ ישראל הם הבית לעם היהודיהאמונה 
 
1Q )בתחילת המאה שעברה, כאשר אתה מביט לאחור לראשיתו של הסכסוך, איזה משפט מהבאים הכי קרוב לעמדתך: 
 הייתי מחפש אחר יותר שינויים שיביאו לשלום . 2הייתי משאיר את ההיסטוריה כמו שהיא . 1
 תשובות אחרות. 4 כיוון אבל עם צעדים יותר קיצונייםהייתי ממשיך באותו . 3
 
מוצדקים במידה , הם כמעט תמיד מוצדקים: פלסטיני-מהי עמדתך ביחס לצעדים הבאים הקשורים לסכסוך הישראלי( 4
 (תשובות אחרות 4, 3-1בסולם ) ?מסוימת או אף פעם לא מוצדקים
Q9B .פעולות הצבא הישראלי בשטחים הפלסטינים 
Q9D .ולות מתנחלם יהודים נגד פלסטיניםפע 
Q9F .תמיכה כספית של הרשות הפלסטינית במשפחות האסירים הפלסטינים 
Q9H .בניית החומה בין הישראלים לפלסטינים 
 
את תהליך השלום  כל אחד מהגורמים הבאיםבאיזו מידה מסכן , מסכן מאוד=5-ו כלל לא מסכן=1כאשר  1-5בסולם של ( 11
 (תשובות אחרות 6, 5-1בסולם ) ?לסטיניםבין הישראלים לפ
Q10B .ישראל פועלת לאפשר גישה של יהודים להר הבית 
Q10D .יהד האיסלאמי'החזקת נשק על ידי החמאס והג 
Q10F .מנהרות תחת הגבולות של רצועת עזה 
Q10H .שליטה ישראלית מלאה במשאבים טבעיים 
Q10J .קשיים בגישה למקומות הקדושים 
Q10L .בזכותה של ישראל להתקיים אי הכרה 
Q10N .חרם פלסטיני על מוצרים ישראלים 
Q10P .העדר רצף טריטוריאלי בשטחי פלסטין 
Q10R .חוסר אמון בין ישראלים לפלסטינים 
Q10T .שליטה מוחלטת של ישראל במעברי הגבול 
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Q11A .מבין הפתרונות , מהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי הגבוה ביותר הניתן ליישום, בהתייחס לסוגית הפליטים הפלסטינים
 ? הבאים
 1441זכותם של הפליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות . 1
 חזרה על תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטינים. 2
 שה שתקוםקליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החד. 3
 שילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם נקלטו עד היום. 4
 נטישת העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחלפתו בפיצויים כספיים. 5
 אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו. 6
 תשובות אחרות. 7
 
Q11B .ומהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי השני להיות מיושם ? 
 1441ליטים הפלסטינים לחזור לבתיהם בתוך גבולות זכותם של הפ. 1
 חזרה על תנאי של הפליטים הפלסטינים. 2
 קליטת הפליטים הפלסטינים במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתקום. 3
 שילוב הפליטים הפלסטינים כאזרחים מלאים עם זכויות שוות במדינות בהם נקלטו עד היום. 4
 פתו בפיצויים כספייםנטישת העיקרון של זכות השיבה והחל. 5
 אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו. 6
 תשובות אחרות. 7
 
Q12A .מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום, מבין הפתרונות הבאים לבעיית ההתנחלויות הישראליות? 
 1467כל המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות . 1
 1467ך גבולות פרוק כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בתו. 2
 חבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישראל. 3
 לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים. 4
 הקפאת פעולות התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושלים. 5
 לאפשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטיני. 6
 בהתאם להיקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית , ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות. 7
 כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראל. 1
 אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 11
 
Q12B .ומהו לדעתך הפתרון בעל הסיכוי השני להיות מיושם ? 
 1467המתנחלים הישראלים יפנו את ההתנחלויות שמעבר לגבולות כל . 1
 1467פרוק כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בתוך גבולות . 2
 חבילת פיצויים הכוללת יישוב מחדש של המפונים בתוך גבולות ישראל. 3
 לשמור על כל ההתנחלויות במקומם הקיים. 4
 הקפאת פעולות התיישבות בגדה המערבית וירושלים. 5
 פשר לכל המתנחלים להישאר בגדה המערבית תחת שלטון פלסטינילא. 6
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 בהתאם להיקף השטח המיושב על ידי ישראל בגדה המערבית, ויתור על חלק יחסי של אדמות ישראליות. 7
 כל ההתנחלויות שנבנו בצד הישראלי של החומה יהיו חלק מישראל. 1
 אף אחד מהפתרונות הללו. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 11
 
Q13A .ביחס לירושלים י לדעתך האופציה הסבירה ביותר הניתנת ליישוםמה? 
 1467מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני . 1
 חלוקת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים ולרובעים פלסטינים. 2
 פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים. 3
 ישראלית עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומות הקדושים לשני העמיםירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות . 4
 פלסטינית-העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
 
 Q13B .ומהי לדעתך האופציה הסבירה השנייה הניתנת ליישום? 
 1467מזרח ירושלים לפלסטינים ומערב ירושלים לישראלים כפי שהיה לפני . 1
 קת ירושלים לרובעים יהודים ולרובעים פלסטיניםחלו. 2
 פיקוח בינלאומי על ירושלים והמקומות הקדושים. 3
 ירושלים תישאר מאוחדת תחת סמכות ישראלית עם הבטחת מעבר החופשי למקומות הקדושים לשני העמים. 4
 פלסטינית-העיר העתיקה תהיה תחת סמכות משותפת ישראלית. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
 
Q14A .ביחס לסוגיית האסירים הפלסטינים מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישום? 
 אסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או נשים וילדים, שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה. 1
 להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים . 2
 לסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראליםלהשאיר את כל האסירים הפ. 3
 לשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא הישראלים. 4
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
 
Q14B .ומהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר השני הניתן ליישום? 
 וילדים אסירים שישבו תקופה ארוכה או נשים, שחרור האסירים הפלסטינים מסיבות המוניטאריות של מחלה. 1
 להשאיר בכלא רק מי שרצחו או היו שותפים לרצח יהודים . 2
 להשאיר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים בבתי הכלא הישראלים. 3
 לשחרר את כל האסירים הפלסטינים מבתי הכלא הישראלים. 4
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 5
 תשובות אחרות. 6
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Q15A .הסביר ביותר הניתן ליישוםמהו לדעתך הפתרון , ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים? 
 המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם. 1
 המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משותף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים והפלסטינים. 2
( צריכה וחלוקה, למחיריםביחס )אבל יהיו זכויות שוות , המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום. 3
 לישראלים ולפלסטינים
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
Q15B .מהו לדעתך הפתרון הסביר השני הניתן ליישום, ביחס למשאבים הטבעיים? 
 המשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח פלסטיני במדינה הפלסטינית החדשה שתוקם. 1
 תף לטובת צמיחה כלכלית של הישראלים והפלסטיניםהמשאבים הטבעיים יהיו בפיקוח משו. 2
( צריכה וחלוקה, ביחס למחירים)אבל יהיו זכויות שוות , המשאבים הטבעיים יישארו בפיקוח ישראלי כפי שזה כיום. 3
 לישראלים ולפלסטינים
 ל"אף אחת מהתשובות הנ. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
בסולם של , עד כמה כל אחד מהמרכיבים מקובל עליך. פלסטינים לישראליםנציג בפניך תוכנית לשיתוף פעולה כלכלי בין ה( 16
 ? מאוד מקובל 5-מאוד לא מקובל ו=1כאשר  5-1
Q16B. לאפשר לעובדים פלסטינים לעבוד בתוך ישראל  
Q16D .מדיניות מיסוי שתהיה מוסכמת על ישראלים ופלסטינים 
Q16F . פלסטינינמל ימי בניית 
 
כאשר  5-1בסולם , תומך או ממתנגד לכל אחד המרכיבים הבאים שהם חלק מהקמת מדינה פלסטינית עד כמה אתה (17
 ?תומך לחלוטין=5-מתנגד לחלוטין ו=1
 Q17B. לבד ממספר רישיונות לשאת נשק לשימוש כוחות , מדינה פלסטינית מפורזת מנשק בגדה המערבית וברצועת עזה
  הביטחון הפלסטיני
Q17D . מדינה פלסטינית עם פיקוח מלא במעברי הגבול שלה 
Q17F . בין רצועת עזה לגדה המערבית" מעבר בטוח"בניית 
Q17H. תאום בטחוני בין ישראל לפלסטין 
 
Q18 .פלסטיני-מהו הפתרון המתאים ביותר לסכסוך הישראלי, לדעתך? 
 ישראל ומדינה פלסטיניתמדינת , שתי מדינות המכירות כל אחת בלגיטימיות של השנייה. 1
 מדינה אחת שבה גם לישראלים וגם לפלסטינים יש זכויות וחובות שווים. 2
 פלסטינית-קונפדרציה ירדנית. 3
 הגדה המערבית תהיה חלק מירדן ורצועת עזה חלק ממצרים. 4
 תשובה אחרת. 5
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. גת שלום אמיתי ומלא בין שני הצדדיםמהם הנושאים בהם צריכים הישראלים והפלסטינים לעסוק כאשר הם פועלים להש( 14
 .הנושא הכי פחות חשוב=11-הנושא החשוב ביותר ו=1לפי חשיבות כאשר  11-1דרג את הגורמים בסולם 
Q19-1  התנחלויות 
Q19-2  אסירים 
Q19-3  ירושלים 
Q19-4  הביטחון של הישראלים והפלסטינים 
Q19-5  גבולות ונקודות מעבר 
Q19-6  הפליטים 
Q19-7  פיקוח על משאבים כמו מים 
Q19-8   1467הקמת מדינה פלסטינית בגבולות 
Q19-9  הכרה במדינה היהודית 
Q19-10 פיקוח על המקומות הקדושים 
 
כאשר  5-1בסולם של עד כמה אתה מסכים או לא מסכים עם כל אחד מהם . להלן מספר משפטים לגבי תהליך השלום( 21
  ?מאוד מסכים=5-מאוד לא מסכים ו=1
Q20B .כל הסכם בין ישראלים לפלסטינים חייב להיות מקובל ונתמך על ידי הליגה הערבית 
Q20D .הישראלים והפלסטינים צריכים להפסיק כל דבר המגביר את השנאה 
Q20F. ןיש זכות לחיות בשלום ובביטחו, ישראלי ופלסטיני, לשני העמים 
 
חיובי במידה , חיובי ביותר: איזה תפקיד ממלא לדעתך כל אחד מהאישים הפוליטיים הבאים הקשורים לתהליך השלום( 21
 ?שלילי במידה מסוימת או שלילי ביותר, נייטרלי ,מסוימת
Q21A .יושב ראש הרשות הפלסטינית, מוחמד עבאס 
Q21B .יושב ראש חמאס, חאלד משעל 
Q21C. ראש הממשלה ברשות הפלסטינית ,חמדאללה-ראמי אל 
Q21D .ראש ממשלת ישראל, בנימין נתניהו 
Q21E .ראש מפלגת התנועה, ציפי לבני 
Q21F. ראש מפלגת המחנה הציוני, יצחק הרצוג 
 
22Q )האם המנהיגות הישראלית הנוכחית יכולה להשיג שלום עם הצד השני? 
 כנראה שכן. 1
 ייתכן שכן. 2
 כנראה שלא. 3
 לאבהחלט . 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
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23Q )פלסטיני-מה היית עושה אם הייתה לך היכולת לאכוף פתרון לסכסוך הישראלי? 
 אוכף את הפתרון המוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל . 1
 אוכף פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע על ידי ממשלת ישראל. 2
 מסכים לפתרון המוצע על ידי הצד השני. 3
 ל ידי שני הצדדיםמציע פתרון אחר מזה שמוצע ע. 4
 
24Q )האם אתה תומך או מתנגד להמשך המשא ומתן לשלום בתנאים הנוכחיים? 
 תומך מאוד. 1
 תומך במידה מסוימת. 2
 מתנגד במידה מסוימת. 3
 מתנגד מאוד. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
25Q ) שני הצדדים בשנים האם אתה מאמין או לא מאמין שהמשא ומתן בין הרשות הפלסיטינית וישראל יביא לשלום בין
 ?הקרובות
 מאמין מאוד. 1
 מאמין במידה מסוימת. 2
 לא מאמין במידה מסוימת. 3
 כלל לא מאמין. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
26Q )לאיזה צד יותר חשוב להמשיך בתהליך השלום? 
 יותר חשוב לפלסטינים. 1
 יותר חשוב לישראלים. 2
 חשוב לשניהם במידה שווה. 3
 ידה שווהלא חשוב לשניהם במ. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
האם אתה מאמין שהישראלים והפלסטינים עשו ככל הניתן והנדרש מהם לנהל משא ומתן שיביא להשגת , בהתייחס לעבר( 27
 ?או שהם היו יכולים לעשות יותר בכדי להצליח, שלום
 Q27A .הישראלים: 
 עשו כל מה שניתן. 1
 יכלו לעשות יותר. 2
 לא בטוח. 3
 
Q27B .יניםהפלסט: 
 לא בטוח. 3 יכלו לעשות יותר. 2  עשו כל מה שניתן. 1
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אפשר ) ?מנקודת מבט היסטורית מי לדעתך אחראי לכישלון בהשגת הסכם במשא ומתן לשלום בין הישראלים לפלסטינים( 21
 (תשובות' מס
 1- Q28 .העם הפלסטיני 
2- Q28.העם הישראלי 
3- Q28.תנועות פלסטיניות קיצוניות 
4- Q28.מפלגות ישראליות קיצוניות 
5- Q28.הממשלה וההנהגה הפלסטינית 
6- Q28.הממשלה וההנהגה הישראלית 
7- Q28.מנהיגים ערביים 
1- Q28.ב"ארה 
4- Q28.פרט, אחרים:____________ 
 
24Q )ראל או או שהיא מוטה לטובת יש, פלסטיני-ב ממלאת לדעתך תפקיד מאוזן בין הצדדים בסכסוך הישראלי"האם ארה
 ?לטובת הפלסטינים
 תפקיד מאוזן. 1
 מוטה לטובת ישראל . 2
 מוטה לטובת הפלסטינים. 3
 תשובות אחרות. 4
 
31Q )איזו מדינה או ארגון בינלאומי יכול לדעתך להיות המתווך הטוב ביותר בין הישראלים לפלסטינים? 
 (האיחוד האירופאי ורוסיה, מ"האו, ב"המרכב מארה) הקווארטט . 1
 ירדן. 1  טורקיה. 7  צרפת. 6  רוסיה. 5  האיחוד האירופאי. 4 מ"האו. 3  ב"ארה. 2
 ______________:פרט, אחר. 13  אף אחת מהם. 12  איראן. 11 קטאר. 11  מצרים. 4
 
31Q ) פלסטיני-ביחס לסכסוך הישראלי" חולה"עד כמה אתה חש עייף או? 
 תשובות אחרות. 4 במידה נמוכה. 3  במידה בינונית. 2 הבמידה רב. 1
 
32Q )באיזו מידה אתה מוכן לעשות שלום עם הצד השני? 
 תשובות אחרות. 5  לא משנה לי. 4  במידה נמוכה. 3  במידה בינונית. 2  במידה רבה. 1
 
33Q )האישית איזה משפט מייצג יותר את השקפתך, מבין שני המשפטים הבאים? 
 פלסטיני-עלינו להיות מוכנים לקחת סיכונים ולהקריב בכדי להשיג שלום ישראלי. 1
 פלסטיני-אסור לנו לוותר על שום דרישה למען השגת שלום ישראלי. 2
 
 
 
 
 
E.3. HEBREW TRANSLATION
A139
 
 
34Q )פלסטיני ייפתר בעתיד הקרוב-עד כמה אתה בטוח בכך שהסכסוך הישראלי? 
 בטוח מאוד. 1
 בטוח במידה מסוימת. 2
 בטוח במידה מסוימתלא . 3
 כלל לא בטוח. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
? במידה רבה מאוד=5במידה נמוכה מאוד עד =1כאשר  1-5בסולם , באיזו מידה כל אחד מהנושאים הבאים נוגע לך( 35
 (מסרב להשיב=7, לא רלוונטי=6, 5-1סולם )
Q35A .עוני 
Q35B .שכר נמוך ופנסיה נמוכה 
Q35C .אבטלה וחוסר תעסוקה 
Q35D .מחסור בשרותי בריאות ורווחה 
Q35E .פשיעה ואלימות, חוסר ביטחון אישי 
Q35F .הגבלות על חופש תנועה ומחסומים 
Q35G .יוקר המחייה 
Q35H .אנרגיה או מחסור בדלק 
Q35I .מחסור בחשמל 
Q35J .מחסור במים 
Q35K .בעיות בדיור 
 
36Q )ר למדינה אחרת או נשארהייתה מנצל אותה ועוב, אם הייתה לך ההזדמנות להגר? 
 לא יודע. 3 מהגר. 2 נשאר. 1
 
1-בסולם עד כמה כל אחד מהם מבטא את תחושתך . אקריא לך משפטים המתארים את יחסך ותחושתך כלפי הצד השני( 37
  (תשובה אחרת=5-ו, שותף במידה רבה=4, שותף במידה בינונית=3, שותף במידה נמוכה=2, לא שותף לתחושה=1כאשר  4
Q37A .סובלנות כלפי הצד השני 
Q37B .הבנה כלפי הצד השני 
Q37C .כעס על הצד השני 
Q37D .פחד מהצד השני 
Q37E .ביטחון כלפי הצד השני 
Q37F .עוינות כלפי הצד השני 
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שותף במידה =2, לא שותף לתחושה=1כאשר  4-1בסולם ? מהן לדעתך התחושות של הצד השני כלפיך, באותו הקשר( 31
  (תשובה אחרת=5-ו, שותף במידה רבה=4, שותף במידה בינונית=3, נמוכה
Q38A . סובלנות 
Q38B . הבנה כלפיך 
Q38C . כועס עליך 
Q38D .פוחד ממך 
Q38E . בוטח בך 
Q38F .עוין כלפיך 
 
34Q )ספרות, כמו מוזיקה, ים כלל לפוליטיקה או לסכסוךהאם אתה שואף לדעת יותר על הצד השני בתחומים שאינם קשור ,
 ?בעיות חברתיות וכדומה, דת
 במידה רבה מאוד, כן. 1
 במידה מסוימת, כן. 2
 במידה מעטה, כן. 3
 לעולם לא, לא. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
 41Q )כיצד היית מרגיש אם רבים משכניך לא היו שותפים לדת שלך ? 
 מאוד נוח. 1
 מתנוח במידה מסוי. 2
 לא נוח במידה מסוימת. 3
 מאוד לא נוח. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
41Q )האם מישהו מקרוביך או ממשפחתך נהרג או נפצע בעבר כתוצאה מן הסכסוך ? 
 לא. 2  כן. 1
 
 3פרק 
D1 .מין 
 אישה. 2  גבר. 1
 
D2 .שנים___________:גיל 
 
D3 .מצב משפחתי: 
 אלמן. 4 גרוש. 3 רווק. 2 נשוי. 1
 
D4. שנים___________:שנות לימוד 
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D5 .אנשים ___________:הנפשות המתגוררות איתך בביתך' מס 
 
D6 . מהי הכנסתך ביחס לממוצע. ₪ 1,411ההכנסה המשפחתית הממוצעת לחודש למשפחה בישראל היא? 
 יותר מהממוצע. 1
 פחות מהממוצע. 2
 בערך כמו הממוצע. 3
 לא יודע. 4
 תשובות אחרות. 5
 
D7 .דתך מהי? 
 קתולי רומי–נוצרי . 4  יווני אורתודוקסי –נוצרי . 3  שיעי –מוסלמי . 2 סוני –מוסלמי . 1
 חסר דת. 4  יהודי. 1  דרוזי. 7  לותרני –נוצרי . 6  יווני קתולי –נוצרי . 5
 
D8 .כיצד אתה מגדיר עצמך מבחינת דתית? 
   לא דתי במידה מסוימת. 4  במידה מתונהדתי . 3  דתי במידה מסוימת. 2  מאוד דתי. 1
 תשובות אחרות. 6  כלל לא דתי. 5
 
D9. האם אתה פליט, במקור?  
 לא. 2  כן. 1
 
D10 . 2115לאיזו מפלגה הצבעת בבחירות האחרונות לכנסת שהתקיימו במרץ ? 
 כולנו. 6  ערבית מאוחדתרשימה . 5  יש עתיד. 4  בית יהודי. 3  מחנה ציוני. 2  ליכוד. 1
 מרצ. 11  ס"ש. 4  ישראל ביתנו. 1  יהדות התורה. 7
 
 
 !תודה רבה על השתתפותך 
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Chapter F
LIST OF TABLES
F.1 Tables of Content Analyses
TABLE F.1 EPISODIC VS THEMATIC FRAMES OF PHOTOS IN NEWSPAPERS
Country * Target of the Photo Crosstabulation
Country
Target of the Photo
Total
Episodic Thematic
Palestine
Count 309 33 342
Expected Count 269.9 72.1 342.0
% within Country 90.4% 9.6% 100.0%
% within Target of the Photo 63.4% 25.4% 55.4%
% of Total 50.1% 5.3% 55.4%
Israel
Count 178 97 275
Expected Count 217.1 57.9 275.0
% within Country 64.7% 35.3% 100.0%
% within Target of the Photo 36.6% 74.6% 44.6%
% of Total 28.8% 15.7% 44.6%
Total
Count 487 130 617
Expected Count 487.0 130.0 617.0
% of Total 78.9% 21.1% 100.0%
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TABLE F.2 LEVEL OF HARMONY BETWEEN PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI
NEWSPAPERS
Dimensions
% of total dimesions
Palestine Israel Level of accordance
a. Settlement expansion 4.5% 4.6% 98.4%
b. Israeli Intransigence 5.6% 5.8% 96.8%
c. Lack of trust between Palestinians and Israelis 4.3% 5.9% 73.4%
d. Building an atmosphere of mutual trust 2.4% 4.1% 57.6%
e. 1967 Borders 1.6% 2.9% 57.4%
f. U.S. and E.U. strict measures against the conflict 2.3% 4.2% 55.4%
g. Israel procedures against Gaza 2.5% 1.3% 50.7%
h. Third-party mediation 3.3% 6.9% 47.2%
i. Release under certain conditions 1.6% 3.5% 46.9%
j. Restrictions on freedom of movement 3.8% 1.7% 44.8%
k. Palestinian Intransigence 1.9% 4.8% 39.2%
l. Settlers acts of vandalism 4.0% 1.5% 37.1%
m. Palestinians actions against Israelis 2.5% 6.6% 36.9%
n. Israel’s right to exist 1.0% 2.7% 36.1%
o. United Nations as an active side 2.0% 0.6% 32.4%
p. Israeli military actions against Palestinians 14.8% 4.3% 29.1%
q. Israeli-American (alliance) 1.3% 4.6% 27.5%
r. Hamas threats 0.7% 2.8% 26.3%
s. Judaization of Jerusalem 4.1% 1.1% 26.0%
t. Economic burden 0.7% 3.3% 21.0%
u. Violations of international law and human rights 8.1% 1.0% 12.6%
v. Palestine will become a “terrorist” state 0.3% 2.7% 11.2%
w. Acts against Palestinian prisoners 6.8% 0.4% 5.7%
% of news covered 80.1% 77.2%
A144
F.2. TABLES OF SURVEY ANALYSES
F.2 Tables of Survey Analyses
TABLE F.3 INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - ACTIONS PERTAINING TO
CONFLICT X COUNTRY
Independent samples test
F t df
Sig.
(2-tailed)
a. Launching rockets from Gaza at Israel 279 13.4 710 0.00
b. Military actions by Israeli army in the Palestinian Territories. 193 -18.2 733 0.00
c. Palestinian actions against Israelis 180 11.1 717 0.00
d. Jewish settlers actions against Palestinians. 44 -11.4 735 0.00
e. Movement restrictions imposed by Israel 54 -19.5 712 0.00
f. The PA funding families of those who are in Israeli prison. 110 8.0 721 0.00
g. Efforts of the PA to isolate Israel internationally 241 4.9 707 0.00
h. Building the wall between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 41 -17.6 722 0.00
TABLE F.4 EVALUATION OF NETANYAHU - STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENT
VALUES
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Evaluation of
Benjamin Netanyahu
0.23*** Settlement +
0.15*** Jerusalem +
0.15** Settlement +
0.11* Prisoners +
0.09* Jerusalem +
-0.14** 1967 Borders -
-0.14** 1967 Borders -
-0.16** Natural resources -
-0.24*** Natural resources -
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.5 PALESTINIANS’ EVALUATIONS OF FACTS HINDERING
THE PEACE PROCESS
Palestine - Descriptive Statistics
Items N Mean Std.
Deviation
g. Detained Palestinians prisoners’ by Israel. 508 4.21 1.09
t. Israel’s absolute control over border crossings. 503 4.17 1.23
u. The freezing of the funds transfer to the Palestinian Authority
of the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.
496 4.12 1.15
i. Palestinian refugees’ right of return. 503 4.07 1.20
e. Israeli settlers possession of weapons. 508 4.07 1.09
a. Building settlements. 510 4.07 1.36
h. The Israeli full control over natural resources. 499 4.04 1.15
o. Deterioration of the Palestinian economy because of the conflict. 505 4.00 1.16
j. The difficulty of having access to places of worship. 502 4.00 1.15
b. Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount. 497 3.99 1.37
m. Hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to any peace agreement. 503 3.96 1.09
k. Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine. 504 3.93 1.16
q. The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides. 494 3.86 1.17
s. Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy. 498 3.85 1.23
c. Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state. 501 3.83 1.25
r. Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis. 490 3.80 1.23
p. Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine. 497 3.80 1.22
l. Not recognizing Israel’s right to exist. 497 3.53 1.36
d. Hamas and Islamic Jihads possession of weapons. 489 3.40 1.41
f. Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip. 492 3.40 1.38
n. The Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products. 497 3.39 1.38
Sample Mean 10493 3.88 1.23
Note: Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, how do you
evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
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TABLE F.6 ISRAELIS’ EVALUATIONS OF FACTS HINDERING
THE PEACE PROCESS
Israel - Descriptive Statistics
Items N Mean
Std.
Deviation
f. Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip. 254 4.70 0.80
d. Hamas and Islamic Jihads possession of weapons. 253 4.66 0.78
l. Not recognizing Israel’s right to exist. 252 4.48 0.96
c. Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state. 268 4.37 1.10
r. Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis. 253 4.19 1.09
m. Hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to any peace agreement. 265 4.18 1.13
q. The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides. 261 4.16 1.06
i. Palestinian refugees’ right of return. 266 3.91 1.26
k. Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine. 261 3.69 1.26
a. Building settlements. 268 3.50 1.46
o. Deterioration of the Palestinian economy because of the conflict. 267 3.48 1.29
j. The difficulty of having access to places of worship. 243 3.44 1.22
s. Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy. 260 3.28 1.29
b. Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount. 247 3.18 1.40
u. The freezing of the funds transfer to the Palestinian Authority of
the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.
266 3.18 1.30
n. The Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products. 251 3.05 1.45
p. Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine. 248 2.97 1.31
e. Israeli settlers possession of weapons. 268 2.78 1.40
g. Detained Palestinians prisoners’ by Israel. 268 2.62 1.35
t. Israel’s absolute control over border crossings. 252 2.56 1.36
h. The Israeli full control over natural resources. 252 2.42 1.39
Sample Mean 5423 3.56 1.22
Note: Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning it is not serious at all and 5 meaning it is very serious, how do you
evaluate the role of the following items in hindering the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
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TABLE F.7 INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - EVALUATIONS OF FACTS IN
HINDERING THE PEACE PROCESS
Independent samples test
Facts F t df
Sig.
(2-tailed)
a. Building settlements. 6 5.4 776 0.000
b. Israeli moves to enhance Jewish access to the Temple Mount. 1 7.5 742 0.000
c. Not recognizing the notion of the Jewish state. 16 -5.9 767 0.000
d. Hamas and Islamic Jihads possession of weapons. 212 -13.2 740 0.000
e. Israeli settlers possession of weapons. 42 14.1 774 0.000
f. Having tunnels under the borders of the Gaza Strip. 170 -13.7 744 0.000
g. Detained Palestinians prisoners’ by Israel. 33 17.7 774 0.000
h. The Israeli full control over natural resources. 33 16.9 749 0.000
i. Palestinian refugees’ right of return. 3 1.8 767 0.077
j. The difficulty of having access to places of worship. 5 6.1 743 0.000
k. Lack of clear borders for the state of Palestine. 4 2.7 763 0.007
l. Not recognizing Israel’s right to exist. 75 -10.0 747 0.000
m. Hardliners (on both sides) constant refusal to any peace agreement. 2 -2.6 766 0.009
n. The Palestinians’ boycotting Israeli products. 0 3.2 746 0.001
o. Deterioration of the Palestinian economy because of the conflict. 9 5.7 770 0.000
p. Lack of territorial contiguity in Palestine. 0 8.5 743 0.000
q. The security threat imposed by extremists on both sides. 6 -3.5 753 0.001
r. Lack of confidence between Palestinians and Israelis. 11 -4.3 741 0.000
s. Dependency of Palestinian economy on Israeli economy. 1 5.9 756 0.000
t. Israel’s absolute control over border crossings. 14 16.4 753 0.000
u. The freezing of the funds transfer to the Palestinian Authority
of the Palestinian taxes and custom duties retained by Israel.
9 10.2 760 0.000
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TABLE F.8 DESCRIPTIVES FOR REJECTED HYPOTHESES OF ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
Group Statistics
Rejected hypothesis Country N Mean Std. Deviation
a. Implementing joint projects in all economic sectors
i.e., water, health, environment, tourism, etc.
Palestine 512 3.37 1.38
Israel 269 3.33 1.44
c. Promoting trade as well as goods and services exchange
between the two states.
Palestine 511 3.56 1.29
Israel 269 3.48 1.40
d. Placing a taxation policy that will be agreed upon between
Palestinians and Israelis.
Palestine 508 3.35 1.34
Israel 255 3.38 1.32
Note: Using a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning very unacceptable to you, and 5 meaning very acceptable, to what extent do
you accept the following plans of economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis.
TABLE F.10 INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - PRIORITIZATION OF ISSUES
Independent samples test
Issues F t df Sig.
(2-tailed)
a. Israeli settlements 7 7.0 1537 0.000
b. Palestinian prisoners 37 -29.9 1536 0.000
c. Jerusalem 7 -5.9 1537 0.000
d. Security of both Israel and the Palestinians 8 30.2 1536 0.000
e. Borders and crossing points 1 4.7 1537 0.000
f. Palestinian refugees 1 -21.0 1537 0.000
g. Control over natural resources 1 1.7 1536 0.091
h. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders 4 -15.6 1537 0.000
i. Recognizing the Jewish state 3 29.2 1534 0.000
j. Having control over holy places 3 -2.8 1537 0.005
Note: In your opinion, what are the issues that both Palestinians and Israelis should embark on address-
ing as a first step towards a genuine and final peace agreement between the two parties? Please put
them in order of priority from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the most important issue and 10 represents
the least important issue these days.
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TABLE F.11 INDEPENDENT SAMPLES TEST - EVALUATIONS OF POLITICAL
FIGURES
Independent samples test
Political leaders F t df
Sig
(2-tailed)
a. Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the PA 19 -16.7 1536 0.000
b. Khalid Misha’al, the head of Hamas Politburo 137 -23.7 1535 0.000
c. Rami Hamdallah, the PA’s Prime Minister 15 -14.5 1531 0.000
d. Benjamin Netanyaho, Israel’s Prime Minister 149 30.7 1534 0.000
e. Tzipi Livni, the head of the Hatnuah party in Israel 105 27.8 1534 0.000
f. Isaac Herzog, the head of Labor party in Israel 57 31.3 1534 0.000
Note: I am going to ask you about the performance of some political figures pertaining to the peace
process. Is it highly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or highly negative?
TABLE F.12 FAITH IN LEADERSHIP TO MAKE PEACE
Country Items Percent
Palestinians
Most likely 9.2
Somewhat likely 39.4
Somewhat unlikely 19.1
Absolute unlikely 27.2
Dont know 5.2
Total 100.0
Israelis
Most likely 4.8
Somewhat likely 22.3
Somewhat unlikely 44.8
Absolute unlikely 24.0
Dont know 4.0
Total 100.0
Note: Do you think it is most likely, somewhat likely,
somewhat unlikely, or absolute unlikely that the cur-
rent leadership in your country can make peace with the
other side?
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TABLE F.13 CHI-SQUARE TESTS - RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF PAST
AGREEMENTS
Question 28
Pearson
Chi-Square
df
Asmp. Sig.
(2-sided)
a. Palestinian people 271a 1 0.000
b. Israeli people 63a 1 0.000
c. Palestinian extremist movements 512a 1 0.000
d. Israeli extremist parties 0.03a 1 0.855
e. Palestinian government and leaders 480a 1 0.000
f. Israeli government and leaders 17a 1 0.000
g. Arab leaders 47a 1 0.000
h. United States 46a 1 0.000
i. Other 20a 1 0.000
TABLE F.14 UNCLEAR AFFILIATION TO THE PAST - STANDARDIZED
COEFFICIENT VALUES
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Unclear affiliation
to the past
0.19*** Jerusalem +
0.13** Prisoners +
0.12** 1967 Borders +
0.12* Natural resources +
0.10* Natural resources +
-0.14** Settlement -
-0.16*** Recognizing the Jewish state -
-0.16*** Settlement -
-0.17*** Security -
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.15 R2 VALUES FOR ALL THE REGRESSION MODELS
Palestine Israel
Issue / dependent variable Value of R2 Issue / dependent variable Value of R2
Jerusalem 26.6% Recognizing the Jewish state 38.6%
Recognizing the Jewish state 25.0%
A Palestine state on the
1967 Borders
36.2%
Prisoners 20.5%
A Palestine state on the
1967 Borders
36.0%
A Palestine state on the
1967 Borders
19.6% Recognizing the Jewish state 34.7%
Settlement 19.1% Prisoners 23.1%
Settlement 17.7% Security 21.5%
Jerusalem 17.6% Jerusalem 18.6%
A Palestine state on the
1967 Borders
15.6% Refugees 15.4%
Security 15.2% Natural resources 15.1%
Control over holy places 14.0% Settlement 14.1%
Natural resources 13.9% Natural resources 13.1%
Recognizing the Jewish state 13.5% Jerusalem 12.8%
Security 12.4% Natural resources 12.7%
Control over natural resources 12.2% Borders and crossing points 12.1%
Refugees 11.4% Prisoners 12.0%
Prisoners 11.0% Borders 11.9%
Refugees 9.9% Control over holy places 10.8%
Borders 9.6% Security 10.3%
Borders 7.3% Refugees 10.0%
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.16 SECOND MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES PREDICTING
PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Evaluation of
Khalid Misha’al
0.147*** Control over holy places +
0.13** Recognizing the Jewish state +
0.117** Natural resources +
0.106* Natural resources +
-0.11* Security -
-0.111* Prisoners -
Things are heading
in the right direction
0.126** 1967 Borders +
0.111* Jerusalem +
0.111* Security +
-0.085* Recognizing the Jewish state -
-0.102* Settlement -
-0.102* Borders -
Ready to compromise
for peace
0.191*** Settlement +
0.094* Natural resources +
-0.093* Control over holy places -
-0.097* 1967 Borders -
-0.106* Refugees -
-0.118* Borders -
Casualties as a
result of the conflict
0.131** Security +
0.129** Recognizing the Jewish state +
0.096* Security +
-0.11* Refugees -
-0.114* Borders -
-0.126** 1967 Borders -
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
A154
F.2. TABLES OF SURVEY ANALYSES
TABLE F.17 THIRD MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES FOR PALESTINIANS
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Positive feelings and
attitudes towards the other
0.171*** 1967 Borders +
0.154*** Control over holy places +
0.128** Recognizing the Jewish state +
0.093* 1967 Borders +
-0.103* Security -
-0.153*** Prisoners -
-0.258*** Jerusalem -
Willingness to emigrate
0.163*** Jerusalem +
0.115* Refugees +
0.106* Prisoners +
0.102* Settlement +
-0.101* Natural resources -
-0.133** Borders -
-0.15*** Recognizing the Jewish state -
Negative feelings and
attitudes of the other
towards you
0.157*** Prisoners +
0.153*** Prisoners +
0.106* Jerusalem +
-0.118* 1967 Borders -
-0.121* 1967 Borders -
-0.213*** Control over holy places -
Being a refugee
0.167*** 1967 Borders +
0.095* Recognizing the Jewish state +
-0.12** Jerusalem -
-0.133** Jerusalem -
-0.136** Refugees -
-0.147*** Prisoners -
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.18 OTHER VARIABLES PREDICTING PALESTINIAN’S PERCEPTIONS
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Degree of
religiosity
-0.095* Control over holy places -
-0.097* Recognizing the Jewish state -
Quality of life
0.124** Security +
0.105* Prisoners +
Gender
.126** Jerusalem +
.110* Security +
-.095* Recognizing the Jewish state -
-0.099* Natural resources -
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.19 MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES PREDICTING ISRAELI’S
PERCEPTIONS
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Political affliated to
the United Arab List
0.387*** Recognizing the Jewish state +
0.307*** Recognizing the Jewish state +
0.191** Jerusalem +
0.157** Security +
-0.128* Settlement -
-0.14* Refugees -
-0.139* Refugees -
-0.139* Prisoners -
-0.139** 1967 Borders -
-0.242*** Prisoners -
-0.357*** 1967 Borders -
Degree of religiosity
0.201** Settlement +
0.212** Control over holy places +
0.173** Jerusalem +
0.197* Jerusalem +
0.162* Prisoners +
-0.162* Security -
-0.124* 1967 Borders -
-0.193** Security -
-0.245** Borders -
Ready to compromise
0.229*** Recognizing the Jewish state +
0.261*** Recognizing the Jewish state +
0.245** Prisoners +
0.168* Natural resources +
0.148* Jerusalem +
-0.205** Borders -
-0.264** Prisoners +
-0.34*** Settlement -
-0.298*** 1967 Borders -
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.20 SECOND MOST INFLUENTIAL VARIABLES PREDICTING ISRAELI
PERCEPTIONS
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Formal education
0.243*** Borders +
0.188*** Prisoners +
0.143** Control over holy places +
0.125* Natural resources +
-.107* 1967 Borders -
-.181** Refugees -
Evaluation of
Khalid Misha’al
.221*** Borders +
.160* Settlement +
.158* Settlement +
-.147** Natural resources -
-.161** Recognizing the Jewish state -
-.147** Recognizing the Jewish state -
Politically affiliated to
the United Torah Judaism
.206*** Settlement +
.197*** Jerusalem +
.196** Jerusalem +
-.181** Borders -
-.174** Security -
-.209*** Security -
Meretz
.216*** Jerusalem +
.166** Jerusalem +
.108* Recognizing the Jewish state +
-.148* Settlement -
-.227*** 1967 Borders -
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.21 OTHER VARIABLES PREDICTING ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS
Independent Standardized coefficient Dependent variable Direction
Age
.181** Refugees +
.157* Security +
-.119* Natural resources -
-.180** Natural resources -
Gender
.223* Natural resources +
.176** Borders +
.115* Recognizing the Jewish state +
-.191** Settlement -
Casualties as a result
of the conflict
.216*** Jerusalem +
-.122* Refugees -
-.126* Natural resources -
-.116* Recognizing the Jewish state -
Negative feelings and
attitudes towards the other
.213*** Settlement +
.186** Refugees +
-.120* Security -
-.133* Jerusalem -
Affiliated to
the Zionist Union
.180* Jerusalem +
.142* Settlement +
-.165* Control over holy places -
-.159** 1967 Borders -
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
Note: The duplicate in the dependent variables is due to the use of split-ballot technique; A and B.
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TABLE F.22 INFLUENTIAL DETERMINANTS IN THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI
CONFLICT
Significant independent variables Frequency*
Affiliation with a political party 51
Most appropriate solution to the conflict 19
Actions hindering the peace process 15
Readiness to compromise 15
Degree of religiosity 13
Evaluation of Khalid Misha’al 12
Economic cooperation 11
Skeptic about affiliation to the past 11
Casualties because of the conflict 10
Evaluation of Netanyahu 10
Negative feelings and attitudes towards the other 10
Willingness to immigrate 10
Positive feelings and attitudes towards the other 9
Confidence in the peace process 8
Gender 8
Formal education 7
Optimism 7
Positive feelings and attitudes of the other towards you 7
Quality of life 7
Age 6
A cultural difference 6
Being a refugee 6
Faith in negotiations 6
Evaluation of Mahmoud Abbas 5
Faith in leaders 5
Interest in the conflict 5
No affiliation with any political party 5
There is no best solution 5
Affiliation to the past 4
*Frequency in 40 regression models.
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F.3 Tables of Document Analyses
TABLE F.23 INVESTIGATED DIMENSIONS BY PALESTINIAN POLITICAL
PARTIES
Dimension N %
a. Security 52 17.6%
b. Jerusalem 40 13.6%
c. Prisoners 35 11.9%
d. Hamas condemn the PA negotiations with Israel and calling to stop it 20 6.8%
e. Lack of Trust 16 5.4%
f. Third-party mediation 14 4.7%
g. Settlement 13 4.4%
h. Commemoration 11 3.7%
i. Palestinian Intransigence 11 3.7%
j. Resistance 11 3.7%
k. The Refugees 11 3.7%
l. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders 9 3.1%
m. Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding 8 2.7%
n. Recognizing the Jewish state 7 2.4%
o. Violations of human rights 7 2.4%
p. Other 6 2.6%
q. Borders and crossing points 5 1.7%
r. Boycotting Israeli products 4 1.4%
s. Control over natural resources 4 1.4%
t. Israeli Intransigence 3 1.0%
u. Two-state solution 3 1.0%
v. Settlements 2 0.7%
w. Economic burden and boycotting Israeli products 1 0.3%
Total 295 100.0%
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TABLE F.24 INVESTIGATED DIMENSIONS BY ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES
Dimension N %
a. Security 51 21.4%
b. Building an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding 17 7.1%
c. Israeli Intransigence 17 7.1%
d. Third-party mediation 17 7.1%
e. The Israeli-American (alliance) 16 6.7%
f. Recognizing the Jewish state 15 6.3%
g. Two-state solution 15 6.3%
h. Palestinian Intransigence 11 4.6%
i. Lack of Trust 10 4.2%
j. Other 10 4.2%
k. The Refugees 10 4.2%
l. U.S. and E.U. strict measures against the conflict 8 3.4%
m. Jerusalem 7 2.9%
n. Jewish connection and affiliation 7 2.9%
o. Economic burden and boycotting Israeli products 6 2.5%
p. Settlement 6 2.5%
q. The United Nations as an active side 4 1.7%
r. Establishment of a Palestinian state on 1967 borders 3 1.3%
s. Settlements 3 1.3%
t. Borders and crossing points 2 0.8%
u. Commemoration 2 0.8%
v. Prisoners 1 0.4%
Total 238 100.0%
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Chapter G
SPSS SYNTAX
G.1 Content Analyses
Episodic vs Thematic frames 
 
CROSSTABS 
/TABLES=Country BY IS12 
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
/STATISTICS=CHISQ CC PHI LAMBDA 
/CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED ROW COLUMN TOTAL SRESID 
/COUNT ROUND CELL 
/METHOD=EXACT TIMER(5). 
 
Average number of articles 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=Average 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Percentage of news dedicated to each dimension 
 
CORRELATIONS 
/VARIABLES=Palestine Israel 
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG 
/MISSING=PAIRWISE. 
 
Density of coverage to causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=LISTWISE 
/VARIABLES=Totalcauses 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Density of coverage to consequences of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=LISTWISE 
/VARIABLES=Totalconsequences 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Density of coverage to solutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=LISTWISE 
/VARIABLES=Totalsolutions 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
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Density of coverage to all dimensions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict per article 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=LISTWISE 
/VARIABLES=Total 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Contingency level 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=Agreement 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Intercoder reliability - Krippendorff's Alpha Reliability Estimate 
 
For Causes 
KALPHA judges = Causes_1A Causes_1S Causes_1E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 10000. 
KALPHA judges = Causes_2A Causes_2S Causes_2E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 10000. 
 
Result: 
             Alpha    LL95%CI    UL95%CI      Units   Observrs      Pairs 
Nominal      .8587      .8102      .9029   117.0000     3.0000   293.0000 
 
Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin: 
   alphamin          q 
      .9000      .9649 
      .8000      .0071 
      .7000      .0000 
      .6700      .0000 
      .6000      .0000 
      .5000      .0000 
 
Number of bootstrap samples: 
  10000 
 
Judges used in these computations: 
 Causes_1 Causes_2 Causes_3 
 
For Consequences 
KALPHA judges = Consequences_1A Consequences_1S Consequences_1E/level = 1/detail 
= 0/boot = 10000. 
KALPHA judges = Consequences_2A Consequences_2S Consequences_2E/level = 1/detail 
= 0/boot = 10000. 
 
Result: 
 
             Alpha    LL95%CI    UL95%CI      Units   Observrs      Pairs 
Nominal      .9824      .9644      .9960   150.0000     3.0000   360.0000 
 
Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin: 
   alphamin          q 
      .9000      .0000 
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      .8000      .0000 
      .7000      .0000 
      .6700      .0000 
      .6000      .0000 
      .5000      .0000 
 
Number of bootstrap samples: 
  10000 
 
Judges used in these computations: 
 Conseque Conseq_1 Conseq_2 
 
For Solutions 
KALPHA judges = Solutions_1A Solutions_1S Solutions_1E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 
10000. 
KALPHA judges = Solutions_2A Solutions_2S Solutions_2E/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 
10000. 
 
 
Result: 
 
             Alpha    LL95%CI    UL95%CI      Units   Observrs      Pairs 
Nominal      .8969      .8583      .9356    89.0000     3.0000   251.0000 
 
Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin: 
   alphamin          q 
      .9000      .5329 
      .8000      .0000 
      .7000      .0000 
      .6700      .0000 
      .6000      .0000 
      .5000      .0000 
 
Number of bootstrap samples: 
  10000 
 
Judges used in these computations: 
 Solution Soluti_1 Soluti_2 
 
 
Intracoder reliability tests for SPSS files: Ahlam, Ehsan, Salwa, and Dana (T1, T2) 
 
RELIABILITY 
/VARIABLES=Dimensions_T1 Dimensions_T2 
/SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL 
/MODEL=ALPHA 
/STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE 
/ICC=MODEL(ONEWAY) CIN=95 TESTVAL=0. 
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G.2 Survey Analyses
Evaluations of the role of historical events in nowadays conflict 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=LISTWISE 
/VARIABLES=Q7Index 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Perceptions of most acceptable and next acceptable solutions of the core issues of the 
conflict 
 
CROSSTABS 
/TABLES=Country BY q11a q11b q12a 
q12b q13a q13b q14a q14b q15a q15b 
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
/STATISTICS=CHISQ 
/CELLS=COUNT 
/COUNT ROUND CELL. 
 
Acceptance of plans of economic cooperation between both parties 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=Q16a Q16b Q16c Q16d 
Q16e Q16f Q16g 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Support of elements as a part of establishing a Palestinian state 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=q17a q17b q17c q17d q17e 
q17f q17g q17h 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Prioritization of milestone issues 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4 
q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
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Evaluations of political figures performance 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=q21a q21b q21c q21d q21e 
q21f 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Faith in leadership to make peace 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=q22 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Resumption of peace negotiations 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=q24 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Pearson correlation of support and faith in negotiations 
 
CORRELATIONS 
/VARIABLES=q24 q25 
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG 
/MISSING=PAIRWISE. 
 
Chi-Square Tests for responsiblity for the failure of past agreements 
 
CROSSTABS 
/TABLES=Country BY q28_1 q28_2 
q28_3 q28_4 q28_5 q28_6 q28_7 q28_8 
q28_9 
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
/STATISTICS=CHISQ 
/CELLS=COUNT 
/COUNT ROUND CELL. 
 
Chi-Square Test for role of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict  
 
CROSSTABS 
/TABLES=Country BY q29 
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
/STATISTICS=CHISQ 
/CELLS=COUNT 
/COUNT ROUND CELL. 
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Chi-Square Test for best mediator between Palestinians and Israelis 
 
CROSSTABS 
/TABLES=Country BY q30 
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
/STATISTICS=CHISQ 
/CELLS=COUNT 
/COUNT ROUND CELL. 
 
Chi-Square Tests for being fed up from the conflict and willingness to make peace 
 
CROSSTABS 
/TABLES=Country BY q31 q32 
/FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
/STATISTICS=CHISQ 
/CELLS=COUNT 
/COUNT ROUND CELL. 
 
Difference in confidence in peace 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=q34 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Difference in Quality of life 
 
T-TEST GROUPS=Country(1 2) 
/MISSING=ANALYSIS 
/VARIABLES=q35a q35b q35c q35d q35e 
q35f q35g q35h q35i q35j q35k 
/CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Correlations between underlying and expected feelings and attitudes 
 
CORRELATIONS 
/VARIABLES=q37a q37b q37c q37d q37e q37f q38a q38b q38c q38d q38e q38f 
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG 
/MISSING=PAIRWISE. 
 
Indexes 
 
Compute Historical_events_A = SUM.3 (q7a,q7c,q7e,q7g)/4. 
Compute Historical_events_B = SUM.3 (q7b,q7d,q7f,q7h)/4. 
Compute Action_pertaining_A = SUM.3 (q9a,q9c,q9e,q9g)/4. 
Compute Action_pertaining_B = SUM.3 (q9b,q9d,q9f,q9h)/4. 
Compute Actions_hindering_A = 
SUM.7(q10a,q10c,q10e,q10g,q10i,q10k,q10m,q10o,q10q,q10s,q10u)/11. 
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Compute Actions_hindering_B = 
SUM.7(q10b,q10d,q10f,q10h,q10j,q10l,q10n,q10p,q10r,q10t)/10. 
Compute Borders_A = SUM.3 (q17a,q17c,q17e,q17g)/4. 
Compute Borders_B = SUM.3 (q17b,q17d,q17f,q17h)/4. 
Compute Quality_of_life = SUM.7 
(q35a,q35b,q35c,q35d,q35e,q35f,q35g,q35h,q35i,q35j,q35k)/11. 
Compute Positive_towards_other = q37a+q37b+q37e 
Compute Negative_towards_other = q37c+q37d+q37f 
Compute Positive_others_towards_self = q38a+q38b+q38e 
Compute Negative_others_towards_self = q38c+q38d+q38f 
 
For Normality 
Compute q19_1n = LN(q19_1). 
Compute q19_2n = LN(q19_2). 
Compute q19_3n = LN(q19_3). 
Compute q19_4n = LN(q19_4). 
Compute q19_5n = LN(q19_5). 
Compute q19_6n = LN(q19_6). 
Compute q19_7n = LN(q19_7). 
Compute q19_8n = LN(q19_8). 
Compute q19_9n = LN(q19_9). 
Compute q19_10n = LN(q19_10). 
 
Modelling: 
 
SPLIT A – Palestine 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF R 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4 q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10 
  /METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would_kept Would_have_persisted Do_not_know q21a 
q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive_towards_other Negative_towards_other 
Positive_others_towards_you Negative_others_towards_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 d9 
Quality_of_life q6a q6c q6e q6g Historical_events_A Action_pertaining_A 
Actions_hindering_A Borders_A  q16a q16c d4palestine Hamas Third The_popluar 
The_Palestinian The_democratic The_Islamic Independent_Muslim National_Independence 
Other None Refused onestate_2 confed_3 wbjor_gzegy_4 none_5. 
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SPLIT A – Israel 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4 q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10 
  /METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would_kept Would_have_persisted Do_not_know q21a 
q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive_towards_other Negative_towards_other 
Positive_others_towards_you Negative_others_towards_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 
Quality_of_life q6a q6c q6e q6g Historical_events_A Action_pertaining_A 
Actions_hindering_A Borders_A q16a q16c d4Israel Zionist_Union Jewish_home Yesh_Atid 
United_Arab_List Kulanu United_Tora_Judaism Israel_Beitenu Shas Meretz onestate_2 
confed_3 wbjor_gzegy_4 none_5. 
 
SPLIT B – Palestine 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4 q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10 
  /METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would_kept Would_have_persisted Do_not_know q21a 
q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive_towards_other Negative_towards_other 
Positive_others_towards_you Negative_others_towards_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 d9 
Quality_of_life q6b q6d q6f q6h Historical_events_B Action_pertaining_B 
Actions_hindering_B Borders_B  q16d d4palestine Hamas Third The_popluar The_Palestinian 
The_democratic The_Islamic Independent_Muslim National_Independence Other None 
Refused onestate_2 confed_3 wbjor_gzegy_4 none_5. 
 
 
SPLIT B – Israel 
 
REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4 q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10 
  /METHOD= FORWARD q1 q5 Would_kept Would_have_persisted Do_not_know q21a 
q21b q21d q22 q24 q25 q33 q34 q36 Positive_towards_other Negative_towards_other 
Positive_others_towards_you Negative_others_towards_you q39 q41 d1 d2 d3 d8 
Quality_of_life q6b q6d q6f q6h Historical_events_B Action_pertaining_B 
Actions_hindering_B Borders_B  q16d d4Israel Zionist_Union Jewish_home Yesh_Atid 
United_Arab_List Kulanu United_Tora_Judaism Israel_Beitenu Shas Meretz onestate_2 
confed_3 wbjor_gzegy_4 none_5. 
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List of variables 
 
Description Type Question Split 
 
Right or  wrong direction 
Dummy 
In comparison with 
“wrong direction” 
 
q1 
 
Interest in the conflict Ordinal q5  
What the conflict is about Ordinal q6a q6c q6e q6g A 
Ordinal q6b q6d q6f q6h B 
Influence of historical events Ordinal q7a q7c q7e q7g A 
 Ordinal q7b q7d q7f q7h B 
Affiliation to the past Dummy 
In comparison with 
“more peaceful 
solutions” 
Would_kept 
Would_have_persisted 
Do_not_know 
 
Actions pertaining the conflict Ordinal q9a q9c q9e q9g A 
Ordinal q9b q9d q9f q9h B 
 
Actions hindering peace 
Ordinal q10a q10c q10e q10g q10i 
q10k q10m q10o q10q q10s 
q10u 
A 
 Ordinal q10b q10d q10f q10h q10j 
q10l q10n q10p q10r q10t 
B 
Economic cooperation Ordinal q16a q16c A 
 Ordinal q16d B 
Items for establishing Borders Ordinal q17a q17c q17e q17g A 
Ordinal q17b q17d q17f q17h B 
 
Best solution 
Dummy 
In comparison with a 
“two-states solution” 
onestate_2 confed_3 
wbjor_gzegy_4 
none_5 
 
Evaluation of Abbas Ordinal q21a   
Evaluation of Misha’al Ordinal q21b  
Evaluation of Netanyaho Ordinal q21d  
Faith in political leaders to 
make peace with the other 
Ordinal q22  
Resumption of negotiations Ordinal q24  
Faith in negotiations Ordinal q25  
 
 
Ready to compromise for 
peace 
Dummy  
In comparison with  
“we should not have to 
give up any of our 
demands to achieve 
Israeli-Palestinian peace” 
 
 
 
q33 
 
 
Confidence that peace will 
take place in near future 
 
Ordinal 
 
q34 
 
 
Quality of life 
 
Ordinal 
q35a q35b q35c q35d q35e 
q35f q35g q35h q35i q35j 
q35k 
 
Positive feelings and attitudes 
towards the other 
 
 
Ordinal 
 
q37a q37b q37e 
 
Negative feelings and 
attitudes towards the other 
 
 
Ordinal 
 
q37c q37d q37f 
 
Positive feelings and attitudes 
of the other towards you 
 
Ordinal 
 
q38a q38b q38e 
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Description Type Question Split 
Negative feelings and 
attitudes of the other towards 
you 
Ordinal  
q38c q38d q38f 
 
Willingness to emigrate Recoded to ordinal q36  
Inclination to integrate Ordinal q39  
Casualties as a result of the 
conflict 
Dummy  
In comparison with  
“no casualties” 
 
q41 
 
Gender Dummy 
In comparison with 
“Female” 
 
d1 
 
Age Continues d2  
Social status Dummy  
In comparison with 
“Not-married” 
 
d3 
 
Education Continues d4palestine  
Education Continues d4Israel  
Degree of religiosity Ordinal d8  
Refugee or not Dummy  
In comparison with 
“Not a refugee” 
 
d9 
 
Affiliation to Political Party in 
Palestine 
Dummy 
In comparison with 
“Fatah” 
Hamas 
Third 
The_popluar 
The_Palestinian 
The_democratic 
The_Islamic 
Independent_Muslim 
National_Independence 
Other 
None 
Refused 
 
Affiliation to Political Party in 
Israel 
Dummy 
In comparison with 
“Likud” 
Zionist_Union 
Jewish_home 
Yesh_Atid 
United_Arab_List 
Kulanu 
United_Tora_Judaism 
Israel_Beitenu 
Shas 
Meretz 
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Principle component analysis for the dependent variables of question 32 (Prioritization 
of issues) - Palestine and for Israel 
 
FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4 q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS q19_1 q19_2 q19_3 q19_4 q19_5 q19_6 q19_7 q19_8 q19_9 q19_10 
  /PRINT UNIVARIATE INITIAL CORRELATION SIG DET KMO INV REPR AIC 
EXTRACTION ROTATION 
  /FORMAT SORT BLANK(0.40) 
  /PLOT ROTATION 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(30) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /SAVE AR(ALL) 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
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G.3. DOCUMENT ANALYSES
G.3 Document Analyses
Political documents across causes, consequences, and solutions 
 
CROSSTABS 
  /TABLES=Country BY CCS 
  /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
  /STATISTICS=CHISQ 
  /CELLS=ROW 
  /COUNT ROUND CELL. 
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G.4. REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS
G.4 Regression Diagnostics
To avoid redundancy, below are templated for the syntax of each test 
 
Testing for normality of residuals 
 
Regression 
/dependent Settlements Prisoners Jerusalem Security Borders Refugees Resources 
Borders_1967 Jewish_state Holy_places 
/method=backward  
/save resid(residuals). 
Examine (Independent variables for each Split separately) 
variables=residuals 
/plot boxplot stemleaf histogram npplot. 
 
Testing for collinearity 
 
Regression 
  / Missing listwise 
  / Statistics Coeff outs r anova collin tol 
  / Criteria=pin(.05) pout(.10) 
  / Noorigin 
  / dependent Settlements Prisoners Jerusalem Security Borders Refugees Resources 
Borders_1967 Jewish_state Holy_places 
/  Method= backward (Independent variables for each Split separately) 
 
Testing for heteroscedasticity 
 
After using a specific macro for this test, I ran the bpktest test for each Split: 
 
BPKTEST dependent variables followed by the Independent variables for each Split 
separately. 
 
Testing for Model Specification 
regression 
/dependent Settlements Prisoners Jerusalem Security Borders Refugees Resources 
Borders_1967 Jewish_state Holy_places 
/method=enter  (Independent variables for each Split separately) 
/save pred(residuals). 
compute residuals2 = residuals**2. 
regression 
/dependent hlthexp  
/method=enter residuals residuals2. 
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Zweiri, M. (2006, August). The Hamas Victory: Shifting sandsor major earthquake?
, 27(4), 675–687.
